| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The only functional change should be an additional '/n' to
a few log messagees that seemed to be missing it.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Currently if signed-boot is enabled in configure the presence of the
LOCKDOWN_FILE is used as a runtime determination to perform the actual
verification. In some environments this may be acceptable or even the
intended operation but in other environments could be a security hole
since the removal of the file will then cause boot task verification.
Add a 'hard_lockdown' enable flag to generate a HARD_LOCKDOWN
preprocessor definition to force the system to always do a signed boot
verification for each boot task, which in the case of a missing file the
boot will fail.
Signed-off-by: Brett Grandbois <brett.grandbois@opengear.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Refactor to export a generic API rather than specific gpg_ prefixes by
changing gpg.h to security.h and renaming some of the exports.
Break out the common and specific functionality into common.c and
none.c/gpg.c/openssl.c for no/gpgme/openssl modes respectively.
gpgme should work as before
OpenSSL support works like this:
The pb-lockdown file is a PKCS12 file or X509 certificate or PEM-encoded
raw public key. To follow the current conventions the presence of a
PKCS12 file as a lockdown signals decrypt mode because of the presence
of the private key, anything else signals signature verification mode.
The keyring path is currently ignored but in the future could be used to
point to an X509 certificate chain for validity checking. Because of
this self-signed certificates are currently supported and really just
used as a public key container.
Signature verification mode supports:
* Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as detached S/MIME, this is really
more for consistency for the encryption mode (see below). This mode
requires the lockdown file to be an X509 certificate.
A sample creation command would be:
openssl cms -sign -in (infile) -out (outfile) -binary -nocerts \
-inkey (private key) -signer (recipient certificate)
* Raw signature digest as output from openssl dgst -sign command. This
mode can have the lockdown file be an X509 certificate or a PEM raw
public key but the digest algorithm must be pre-defined by the
VERIFY_DIGEST configure argument. The default is SHA256.
A sample creation command would be:
openssl dgst -sign (private key) -out (outfile) -(digest mode) \
(infile)
Decryption mode supports:
* CMS signed-envelope as attached S/MIME. This is for consistency with
the current expectation of no external file for decryption. Some
future enhancement could be to come up with some proprietary external
file format containing the cipher used, the encrypted cipher key, and
the IV (if necessary).
A sample creation command would be:
openssl cms -sign -in (infile) -signer (recipient certificate) \
-binary -nocerts -nodetach -inkey (private key) | \
openssl cms -encrypt -(cipher mode) -out (outfile) \
(recipient certificate)
The PKCS12 file is expecting the private key to have password of NULL or
"" as there is currently no mechanism to supply a custom one.
Signed-off-by: Brett Grandbois <brett.grandbois@opengear.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The patch ccb478ac "Add encrypted file support" removes two
result = KEXEC_LOAD_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
statements from after the `if (verify_file_signature)` lines for the
kernel and cmdline signatures. This appears to have been a mistake that
snuck through testing, and would allow incorrect signatures to pass
validation.
Also fix up some confusing indenting in the decryption section.
Reported-by: Brett Grandbois <brett.grandbois@opengear.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
In certain cases, such as network booting over an untrusted connection,
it may be useful to fully encrypt and sign the kernel files.
Enable fully encrypted boot using builtin keyring via the addition of
the string "ENCRYPTED" to the first line of the /etc/pb-lockdown file.
This disables detached (plaintext) signature verification.
Signed-off-by: Timothy Pearson <tpearson@raptorengineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
|
|
|
kernels and related blobs
This can be used to implement a form of organization-controlled secure boot,
whereby kernels may be loaded from a variety of sources but they will only
boot if a valid signature file is found for each component, and only if the
signature is listed in the /etc/pb-lockdown file.
Signed-off-by: Timothy Pearson <tpearson@raptorengineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
(Minor build fixes and gpgme.m4, comment on secure boot in gpg.c)
|
