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-rw-r--r--poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch195
1 files changed, 195 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d2cc66882
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+From b6545b83f94c5fb7aec1478b8d458a1393f479c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Maxin B. John" <maxin.john@intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 14:12:25 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: support 'nullok_secure' option
+
+Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix,
+which accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is
+connected from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
+
+Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>,
+ Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Amarnath Valluri <amarnath.valluri@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@intel.com>
+---
+ modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am | 3 ++-
+ modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ modules/pam_unix/support.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ modules/pam_unix/support.h | 8 ++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
+index 56df178..2bba460 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
+@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING
+ pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
+ endif
+ pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
+- @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@
++ @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@ \
++ ../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo
+
+ securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
+
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+index 1b318f1..be0330e 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
+@@ -159,7 +159,24 @@
+ <para>
+ The default action of this module is to not permit the
+ user access to a service if their official password is blank.
+- The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default.
++ The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default
++ and allows any user with a blank password to access the
++ service.
++ </para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++ <varlistentry>
++ <term>
++ <option>nullok_secure</option>
++ </term>
++ <listitem>
++ <para>
++ The default action of this module is to not permit the
++ user access to a service if their official password is blank.
++ The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this
++ default and allows any user with a blank password to access
++ the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of
++ the values found in /etc/securetty.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+index fc8595e..29e3341 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
+@@ -183,13 +183,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds,
+ /* now parse the arguments to this module */
+
+ for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
++ int sl;
+
+ D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
+
+ for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
+- if (unix_args[j].token
+- && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
+- break;
++ if (unix_args[j].token) {
++ sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token);
++ if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') {
++ /* exclude argument from comparison */
++ if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl))
++ break;
++ } else {
++ /* compare full strings */
++ if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token))
++ break;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -560,6 +569,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
+ if (child == 0) {
+ static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+ const char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
++ int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
+
+ /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
+
+@@ -587,7 +597,16 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
+ /* exec binary helper */
+ args[0] = CHKPWD_HELPER;
+ args[1] = user;
+- if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) { /* this means we've succeeded */
++ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
++ const void *uttyname;
++ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL
++ || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++ nullok = 0;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (nullok) {
+ args[2]="nullok";
+ } else {
+ args[2]="nonull";
+@@ -672,6 +691,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name)
+ if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+ return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */
+
++ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
++ int retval2;
++ const void *uttyname;
++ retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
++ if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL)
++ return 0;
++
++ if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS)
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ /* UNIX passwords area */
+
+ retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
+@@ -758,7 +788,7 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+- retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
++ retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name));
+ }
+
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+index b4c279c..8da4a8e 100644
+--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h
++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
+@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ typedef struct {
+ #define UNIX_QUIET 28 /* Don't print informational messages */
+ #define UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY 29 /* Don't check for password expiration if not used for authentication */
+ #define UNIX_DES 30 /* DES, default */
++#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE 31 /* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */
+ /* -------------- */
+-#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 31 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */
++#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 32 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */
+
+ #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl))
+
+@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
+ /* UNIX_AUTHTOK_TYPE */ {"authtok_type=", _ALL_ON_, 0100, 0},
+ /* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0200, 0},
+ /* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0400, 0},
+-/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000, 0},
++/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(02000000000), 01000, 0},
+ /* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_, 04000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000, 0},
+@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
+ /* UNIX_QUIET */ {"quiet", _ALL_ON_, 01000000000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY */ {"no_pass_expiry", _ALL_ON_, 02000000000, 0},
+ /* UNIX_DES */ {"des", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0, 1},
++/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */ {"nullok_secure", _ALL_ON_^(01000), 02000000000, 0},
+ };
+
+ #define UNIX_DEFAULTS (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
+@@ -172,6 +174,8 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh
+ ,const char *data_name
+ ,const void **pass);
+
++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname);
++
+ extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
+ #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
+--
+2.4.0
+
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