diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh')
13 files changed, 893 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_2.patch b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_2.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9fac69c3d --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From f98a09cacff7baad8748c9aa217afd155a4d493f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "mmcc@openbsd.org" <mmcc@openbsd.org> +Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 03:36:35 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit + +Replace a function-local allocation with stack memory. + +ok djm@ + +Upstream-ID: c09fbbab637053a2ab9f33ca142b4e20a4c5a17e +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2016-1907 + +[YOCTO #8935] + +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> + +--- + clientloop.c | 9 ++------- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c +index 87ceb3d..1e05cba 100644 +--- a/clientloop.c ++++ b/clientloop.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.275 2015/07/10 06:21:53 markus Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.276 2015/10/20 03:36:35 mmcc Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -311,11 +311,10 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, + static char proto[512], data[512]; + FILE *f; + int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i; +- char *xauthdir, *xauthfile; ++ char xauthdir[PATH_MAX] = "", xauthfile[PATH_MAX] = ""; + struct stat st; + u_int now, x11_timeout_real; + +- xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL; + *_proto = proto; + *_data = data; + proto[0] = data[0] = '\0'; +@@ -343,8 +342,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, + display = xdisplay; + } + if (trusted == 0) { +- xauthdir = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); +- xauthfile = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); + mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX); + /* + * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive +@@ -407,8 +404,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, + unlink(xauthfile); + rmdir(xauthdir); + } +- free(xauthdir); +- free(xauthfile); + + /* + * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3dfc51af7 --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,329 @@ +From ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 23:04:47 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit + +eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted + forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by + Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@ + +Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938 +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2016-1907 + +[YOCTO #8935] + +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> + +--- + clientloop.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- + clientloop.h | 4 +-- + mux.c | 22 ++++++------ + ssh.c | 23 +++++------- + 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) + +Index: openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/clientloop.c ++++ openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.276 2015/10/20 03:36:35 mmcc Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.279 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis + { + size_t i, dlen; + ++ if (display == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ + dlen = strlen(display); + for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) { + if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) && +@@ -301,34 +304,33 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis + + #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" + #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 +-void ++int + client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, + u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) + { +- char cmd[1024]; +- char line[512]; +- char xdisplay[512]; ++ char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512]; ++ char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX]; + static char proto[512], data[512]; + FILE *f; +- int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i; +- char xauthdir[PATH_MAX] = "", xauthfile[PATH_MAX] = ""; ++ int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i, r; + struct stat st; + u_int now, x11_timeout_real; + + *_proto = proto; + *_data = data; +- proto[0] = data[0] = '\0'; ++ proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0'; + +- if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) { +- debug("No xauth program."); +- } else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { +- logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data", ++ if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { ++ logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding", + display); +- } else { +- if (display == NULL) { +- debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set"); +- return; +- } ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) { ++ debug("No xauth program."); ++ xauth_path = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ if (xauth_path != NULL) { + /* + * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does + * not match an authorization entry. For this we +@@ -337,43 +339,60 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display + * is not perfect. + */ + if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) { +- snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", +- display + 10); ++ if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", ++ display + 10)) < 0 || ++ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) { ++ error("%s: display name too long", __func__); ++ return -1; ++ } + display = xdisplay; + } + if (trusted == 0) { +- mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX); + /* ++ * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie. ++ * + * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive + * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to + * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server. + */ ++ mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir)); ++ if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) { ++ error("%s: mkdtemp: %s", ++ __func__, strerror(errno)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ do_unlink = 1; ++ if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile), ++ "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 || ++ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) { ++ error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__); ++ unlink(xauthfile); ++ rmdir(xauthdir); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK) + x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX; + else + x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK; +- if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) { +- do_unlink = 1; +- snprintf(xauthfile, PATH_MAX, "%s/xauthfile", +- xauthdir); +- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), +- "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO +- " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, +- xauth_path, xauthfile, display, +- x11_timeout_real); +- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); +- if (x11_refuse_time == 0) { +- now = monotime() + 1; +- if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) +- x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; +- else +- x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; +- channel_set_x11_refuse_time( +- x11_refuse_time); +- } +- if (system(cmd) == 0) +- generated = 1; ++ if ((r = snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), ++ "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO ++ " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, ++ xauth_path, xauthfile, display, ++ x11_timeout_real)) < 0 || ++ (size_t)r >= sizeof(cmd)) ++ fatal("%s: cmd too long", __func__); ++ debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd); ++ if (x11_refuse_time == 0) { ++ now = monotime() + 1; ++ if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) ++ x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; ++ else ++ x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; ++ channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time); + } ++ if (system(cmd) == 0) ++ generated = 1; + } + + /* +@@ -395,9 +414,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display + got_data = 1; + if (f) + pclose(f); +- } else +- error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " +- "xauth key data not generated"); ++ } + } + + if (do_unlink) { +@@ -405,6 +422,13 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display + rmdir(xauthdir); + } + ++ /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */ ++ if (!trusted && !got_data) { ++ error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " ++ "xauth key data not generated"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + /* + * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some + * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the +@@ -427,6 +451,8 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display + rnd >>= 8; + } + } ++ ++ return 0; + } + + /* +Index: openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.h +=================================================================== +--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/clientloop.h ++++ openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.h +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.31 2013/06/02 23:36:29 dtucker Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.32 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ + + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> +@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ + + /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */ + int client_loop(int, int, int); +-void client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int, ++int client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int, + char **, char **); + void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *); + void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *, +Index: openssh-7.1p2/mux.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/mux.c ++++ openssh-7.1p2/mux.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.54 2015/08/19 23:18:26 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.58 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org> + * +@@ -1354,16 +1354,18 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, + char *proto, *data; + + /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ +- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, ++ if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, + options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, +- &proto, &data); +- /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ +- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " +- "spoofing."); +- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, +- data, 1); +- client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); +- /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ ++ &proto, &data) == 0) { ++ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ ++ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " ++ "spoofing."); ++ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, ++ data, 1); ++ /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ ++ client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", ++ CONFIRM_WARN); ++ } + } + + if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) { +Index: openssh-7.1p2/ssh.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/ssh.c ++++ openssh-7.1p2/ssh.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.420 2015/07/30 00:01:34 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.433 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland +@@ -1604,6 +1604,7 @@ ssh_session(void) + struct winsize ws; + char *cp; + const char *display; ++ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; + + /* Enable compression if requested. */ + if (options.compression) { +@@ -1674,13 +1675,9 @@ ssh_session(void) + display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) + debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); +- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { +- char *proto, *data; +- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ +- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, +- options.forward_x11_trusted, +- options.forward_x11_timeout, +- &proto, &data); ++ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display, ++ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, ++ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { + /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ + debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " + "spoofing."); +@@ -1770,6 +1767,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, + extern char **environ; + const char *display; + int interactive = tty_flag; ++ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; + + if (!success) + return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */ +@@ -1777,12 +1775,9 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, + display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) + debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); +- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { +- char *proto, *data; +- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ +- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, +- options.forward_x11_trusted, +- options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data); ++ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display, ++ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, ++ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { + /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ + debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " + "spoofing."); diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_upstream_commit.patch b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_upstream_commit.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f3d132e43 --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_upstream_commit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From d77148e3a3ef6c29b26ec74331455394581aa257 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org> +Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2015 21:59:11 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit + +fix OOB read in packet code caused by missing return + statement found by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ deraadt@ + +Upstream-ID: a3e3a85434ebfa0690d4879091959591f30efc62 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2016-1907 + +[YOCTO #8935] + +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> + +--- + packet.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +Index: openssh-7.1p2/packet.c +=================================================================== +--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/packet.c ++++ openssh-7.1p2/packet.c +@@ -1855,6 +1855,7 @@ ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh * + if (len >= state->packet_discard) { + if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0) + return r; ++ return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; + } + state->packet_discard -= len; + return 0; diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/add-test-support-for-busybox.patch b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/add-test-support-for-busybox.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..adc25c668 --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/add-test-support-for-busybox.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +Adjust test cases to work with busybox. + +- Replace dd parameter "obs" with "bs". +- Replace "head -<num>" with "head -n <num>". + +Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@enea.com> +Upstream-Status: Pending + +Index: openssh-6.8p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh +=================================================================== +--- openssh-6.8p1.orig/regress/cipher-speed.sh ++++ openssh-6.8p1/regress/cipher-speed.sh +@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for + printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:" + ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost \ +- exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \ ++ exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null bs=32k"\' \ + < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes + + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then +@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ for c in $ciphers; do + printf "%-60s" "$c:" + ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost \ +- exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \ ++ exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null bs=32k"\' \ + < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c" +Index: openssh-6.8p1/regress/transfer.sh +=================================================================== +--- openssh-6.8p1.orig/regress/transfer.sh ++++ openssh-6.8p1/regress/transfer.sh +@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do + for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do + trace "proto $p dd-size ${s}" + rm -f ${COPY} +- dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ ++ dd if=$DATA bs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ + ${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}" + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" +Index: openssh-6.8p1/regress/yes-head.sh +=================================================================== +--- openssh-6.8p1.orig/regress/yes-head.sh ++++ openssh-6.8p1/regress/yes-head.sh +@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ + tid="yes pipe head" + + for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do +- lines=`${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)` ++ lines=`${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -n 2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)` + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "yes|head test failed" + lines = 0; +Index: openssh-6.8p1/regress/key-options.sh +=================================================================== +--- openssh-6.8p1.orig/regress/key-options.sh ++++ openssh-6.8p1/regress/key-options.sh +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do + fi + + sed 's/.*/from="'"$f"'" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys +- from=`head -1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '` ++ from=`head -n 1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '` + verbose "key option proto $p $from" + r=`${SSH} -$p -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'` + if [ "$r" = "true" ]; then diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/init b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/init new file mode 100644 index 000000000..70d4a3465 --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/init @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +#! /bin/sh +set -e + +PIDFILE=/var/run/sshd.pid + +# source function library +. /etc/init.d/functions + +# /etc/init.d/ssh: start and stop the OpenBSD "secure shell" daemon + +test -x /usr/sbin/sshd || exit 0 +( /usr/sbin/sshd -\? 2>&1 | grep -q OpenSSH ) 2>/dev/null || exit 0 + +# /etc/default/ssh may set SYSCONFDIR and SSHD_OPTS +if test -f /etc/default/ssh; then + . /etc/default/ssh +fi + +[ -z "$SYSCONFDIR" ] && SYSCONFDIR=/etc/ssh +mkdir -p $SYSCONFDIR + +HOST_KEY_RSA=$SYSCONFDIR/ssh_host_rsa_key +HOST_KEY_DSA=$SYSCONFDIR/ssh_host_dsa_key +HOST_KEY_ECDSA=$SYSCONFDIR/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +HOST_KEY_ED25519=$SYSCONFDIR/ssh_host_ed25519_key + +check_for_no_start() { + # forget it if we're trying to start, and /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run exists + if [ -e $SYSCONFDIR/sshd_not_to_be_run ]; then + echo "OpenBSD Secure Shell server not in use ($SYSCONFDIR/sshd_not_to_be_run)" + exit 0 + fi +} + +check_privsep_dir() { + # Create the PrivSep empty dir if necessary + if [ ! -d /var/run/sshd ]; then + mkdir /var/run/sshd + chmod 0755 /var/run/sshd + fi +} + +check_config() { + /usr/sbin/sshd -t || exit 1 +} + +check_keys() { + # create keys if necessary + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then + echo " generating ssh RSA key..." + ssh-keygen -q -f $HOST_KEY_RSA -N '' -t rsa + fi + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA ]; then + echo " generating ssh ECDSA key..." + ssh-keygen -q -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA -N '' -t ecdsa + fi + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then + echo " generating ssh DSA key..." + ssh-keygen -q -f $HOST_KEY_DSA -N '' -t dsa + fi + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ED25519 ]; then + echo " generating ssh ED25519 key..." + ssh-keygen -q -f $HOST_KEY_ED25519 -N '' -t ed25519 + fi +} + +export PATH="${PATH:+$PATH:}/usr/sbin:/sbin" + +case "$1" in + start) + check_for_no_start + echo "Starting OpenBSD Secure Shell server: sshd" + check_keys + check_privsep_dir + start-stop-daemon -S -p $PIDFILE -x /usr/sbin/sshd -- $SSHD_OPTS + echo "done." + ;; + stop) + echo -n "Stopping OpenBSD Secure Shell server: sshd" + start-stop-daemon -K -p $PIDFILE -x /usr/sbin/sshd + echo "." + ;; + + reload|force-reload) + check_for_no_start + check_keys + check_config + echo -n "Reloading OpenBSD Secure Shell server's configuration" + start-stop-daemon -K -p $PIDFILE -s 1 -x /usr/sbin/sshd + echo "." + ;; + + restart) + check_keys + check_config + echo -n "Restarting OpenBSD Secure Shell server: sshd" + start-stop-daemon -K -p $PIDFILE --oknodo -x /usr/sbin/sshd + check_for_no_start + check_privsep_dir + sleep 2 + start-stop-daemon -S -p $PIDFILE -x /usr/sbin/sshd -- $SSHD_OPTS + echo "." + ;; + + status) + status /usr/sbin/sshd + exit $? + ;; + + *) + echo "Usage: /etc/init.d/ssh {start|stop|status|reload|force-reload|restart}" + exit 1 +esac + +exit 0 diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/run-ptest b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/run-ptest new file mode 100755 index 000000000..36a3d2a7b --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/run-ptest @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +export TEST_SHELL=sh + +cd regress +sed -i "/\t\tagent-ptrace /d" Makefile +make -k .OBJDIR=`pwd` .CURDIR=`pwd` SUDO="sudo" tests \ + | sed -e 's/^skipped/SKIP: /g' -e 's/^ok /PASS: /g' -e 's/^failed/FAIL: /g' + +SSHAGENT=`which ssh-agent` +GDB=`which gdb` + +if [ -z "${SSHAGENT}" -o -z "${GDB}" ]; then + echo "SKIP: agent-ptrace" + exit +fi + +useradd openssh-test + +eval `su -c "${SSHAGENT} -s" openssh-test` > /dev/null +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + echo "FAIL: could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" +else + su -c "gdb -p ${SSH_AGENT_PID}" openssh-test > /tmp/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF + quit +EOF + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + echo "gdb failed: exit code $r" + fi + egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null /tmp/gdb.out + r=$? + rm -f /tmp/gdb.out + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + echo "FAIL: ptrace agent" + else + echo "PASS: ptrace agent" + fi + + ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null +fi +userdel openssh-test + diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/ssh_config b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/ssh_config new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9e919156d --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/ssh_config @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.28 2013/09/16 11:35:43 sthen Exp $ + +# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See +# ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for +# users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files +# or on the command line. + +# Configuration data is parsed as follows: +# 1. command line options +# 2. user-specific file +# 3. system-wide file +# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. +# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the +# configuration file, and defaults at the end. + +# Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive +# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the +# ssh_config(5) man page. + +Host * + ForwardAgent yes + ForwardX11 yes +# RhostsRSAAuthentication no +# RSAAuthentication yes +# PasswordAuthentication yes +# HostbasedAuthentication no +# GSSAPIAuthentication no +# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no +# BatchMode no +# CheckHostIP yes +# AddressFamily any +# ConnectTimeout 0 +# StrictHostKeyChecking ask +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa +# Port 22 +# Protocol 2,1 +# Cipher 3des +# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc +# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160 +# EscapeChar ~ +# Tunnel no +# TunnelDevice any:any +# PermitLocalCommand no +# VisualHostKey no +# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com +# RekeyLimit 1G 1h diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4882e58b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 + +auth include common-auth +account required pam_nologin.so +account include common-account +password include common-password +session optional pam_keyinit.so force revoke +session include common-session +session required pam_loginuid.so + diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd.socket b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd.socket new file mode 100644 index 000000000..12c39b26b --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd.socket @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +[Unit] +Conflicts=sshd.service + +[Socket] +ExecStartPre=@BASE_BINDIR@/mkdir -p /var/run/sshd +ListenStream=22 +Accept=yes + +[Install] +WantedBy=sockets.target diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd@.service b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd@.service new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9d83dfb2b --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd@.service @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH Per-Connection Daemon +Wants=sshdgenkeys.service +After=sshdgenkeys.service + +[Service] +Environment="SSHD_OPTS=" +EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/ssh +ExecStart=-@SBINDIR@/sshd -i $SSHD_OPTS +ExecReload=@BASE_BINDIR@/kill -HUP $MAINPID +StandardInput=socket +StandardError=syslog +KillMode=process diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd_config b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd_config new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d48bd2b98 --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshd_config @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.80 2008/07/02 02:24:18 djm Exp $ + +# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See +# sshd_config(5) for more information. + +# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin + +# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with +# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where +# possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options change a +# default value. + +#Port 22 +#AddressFamily any +#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 +#ListenAddress :: + +# The default requires explicit activation of protocol 1 +Protocol 2 + +# HostKey for protocol version 1 +#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key +# HostKeys for protocol version 2 +#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key + +# Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key +#KeyRegenerationInterval 1h +#ServerKeyBits 1024 + +# Ciphers and keying +#RekeyLimit default none + +# Logging +# obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging +#SyslogFacility AUTH +#LogLevel INFO + +# Authentication: + +#LoginGraceTime 2m +#PermitRootLogin yes +#StrictModes yes +#MaxAuthTries 6 +#MaxSessions 10 + +#RSAAuthentication yes +#PubkeyAuthentication yes + +# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2 +# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys +AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + +#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none + +#AuthorizedKeysCommand none +#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody + +# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts +#RhostsRSAAuthentication no +# similar for protocol version 2 +#HostbasedAuthentication no +# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for +# RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication +#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no +# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files +#IgnoreRhosts yes + +# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! +#PasswordAuthentication yes +#PermitEmptyPasswords no + +# Change to no to disable s/key passwords +ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + +# Kerberos options +#KerberosAuthentication no +#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes +#KerberosTicketCleanup yes +#KerberosGetAFSToken no + +# GSSAPI options +#GSSAPIAuthentication no +#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + +# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, +# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and +# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, +# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass +# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password". +# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without +# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication +# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. +#UsePAM no + +#AllowAgentForwarding yes +#AllowTcpForwarding yes +#GatewayPorts no +#X11Forwarding no +#X11DisplayOffset 10 +#X11UseLocalhost yes +#PermitTTY yes +#PrintMotd yes +#PrintLastLog yes +#TCPKeepAlive yes +#UseLogin no +UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Default for new installations. +#PermitUserEnvironment no +Compression no +ClientAliveInterval 15 +ClientAliveCountMax 4 +#UseDNS yes +#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid +#MaxStartups 10:30:100 +#PermitTunnel no +#ChrootDirectory none +#VersionAddendum none + +# no default banner path +#Banner none + +# override default of no subsystems +Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server + +# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis +#Match User anoncvs +# X11Forwarding no +# AllowTcpForwarding no +# PermitTTY no +# ForceCommand cvs server diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshdgenkeys.service b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshdgenkeys.service new file mode 100644 index 000000000..148e6ad63 --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/sshdgenkeys.service @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +[Unit] +Description=OpenSSH Key Generation +RequiresMountsFor=/var /run +ConditionPathExists=!/var/run/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +ConditionPathExists=!/var/run/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +ConditionPathExists=!/var/run/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +ConditionPathExists=!/var/run/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key +ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key + +[Service] +Environment="SYSCONFDIR=/etc/ssh" +EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/ssh +ExecStart=@BASE_BINDIR@/mkdir -p $SYSCONFDIR +ExecStart=@BINDIR@/ssh-keygen -q -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key -N '' -t rsa +ExecStart=@BINDIR@/ssh-keygen -q -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_dsa_key -N '' -t dsa +ExecStart=@BINDIR@/ssh-keygen -q -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N '' -t ecdsa +ExecStart=@BINDIR@/ssh-keygen -q -f ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N '' -t ed25519 +Type=oneshot +RemainAfterExit=yes diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/volatiles.99_sshd b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/volatiles.99_sshd new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a0d2af3c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/volatiles.99_sshd @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +d root root 0755 /var/run/sshd none +f root root 0644 /var/log/lastlog none |
