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-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch177
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch253
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch187
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch82
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch67
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch135
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch85
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch984
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb44
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/0001-aclocal-Add-parameter-to-disable-keyutils-detection.patch11
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/CVE-2017-11462.patch419
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/etc/default/krb5-admin-server4
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/fix-CVE-2017-11368.patch116
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-admin-server.service1
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-kdc.service1
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.16.bb (renamed from import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.15.1.bb)20
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi/0001-Detect-clang.patch3
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi_1.20.0.bb (renamed from import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi_1.16.0.bb)4
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libuv/libuv_1.11.0.bb8
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets_2.1.0.bb7
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/0001-config.mk-allow-prefix-mandir-localedir-from-environ.patch35
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/0002-uthash-remove-in-tree-version.patch975
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/build.patch94
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/mosquitto_1.4.14.bb5
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/obex-data-server_0.4.6.bb4
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/openobex_1.7.2.bb2
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obexftp/obexftp_0.24.2.bb2
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/fix-makefile-override.patch24
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/scripts_no_bash.patch51
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/sms_binpath.patch24
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/sms_binpath_and_psops.patch19
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3_3.1.21.bb (renamed from import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3_3.1.15.bb)9
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/files/0001-replace-SIGCLD-with-SIGCHLD-and-include-sys-types.h.patch49
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/files/0002-replace-PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP-with-PTHREAD_MUTEX_NOR.patch143
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/umip_1.0.bb2
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/cppzmq_git.bb4
-rw-r--r--import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.2.5.bb (renamed from import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.1.6.bb)8
37 files changed, 2344 insertions, 1714 deletions
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5535a3c5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+From 044ae35c5694c39a4aca2a33502cc3897e88f79e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
+
+Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
+processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
+issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
+same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
+also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
+frames on RX side.
+
+This issue was introduced by the commit
+0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
+authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
+times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
+needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
+failed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
+---
+ src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
+ 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+index 4e04169..333035f 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ {
+ struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
+ struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
++ int set = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
+@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
+ * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
+ * does not support full AP client state.
++ *
++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
++ * the same key.
+ */
+- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
++ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
+ hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
++ set = 0;
++ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
+ if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
+@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
+ sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
+ sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
+- sta->added_unassoc)) {
++ set)) {
+ hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
+ HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
+ "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
+- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
++ set ? "set" : "add");
+
+ if (sta->added_unassoc) {
+ hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 3587086..707971d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
+ #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ }
+
+
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
++ return 0;
++ return sm->tk_already_set;
++}
++
++
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len);
+ enum wpa_event {
+ WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
+- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
+ };
+ void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
+@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
++ * PN in the driver */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++ return;
++ }
++
+ /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
+ * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
+ * after association has been completed. This function will be called
+@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+
+ /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
+ sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
+ }
+
+
+@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+
+ sm->pairwise = pairwise;
+ sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
+
+ buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+ struct wpa_ptk PTK;
+ Boolean PTK_valid;
+ Boolean pairwise_set;
++ Boolean tk_already_set;
+ int keycount;
+ Boolean Pair;
+ struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4e57bcaa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+From c623cc973de525f7411dffe438e957ba86ef4733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
+
+Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
+(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
+not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
+attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
+sequence counter associated to the group key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
+ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t tk_len;
+ };
+
++struct wpa_gtk {
++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t gtk_len;
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++struct wpa_igtk {
++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t igtk_len;
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ /* WPA IE version 1
+ * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++{
++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
++
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
++ keyidx);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
++ if (keyidx > 4095) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
++ broadcast_ether_addr,
++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
++
++
+ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
+ {
+@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (ie->igtk) {
+ size_t len;
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+- u16 keyidx;
++
+ len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
+ return -1;
++
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
+- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
+- igtk->igtk, len);
+- if (keyidx > 4095) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+- return -1;
+- }
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ return -1;
+- }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ */
+ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ {
+- int clear_ptk = 1;
++ int clear_keys = 1;
+
+ if (sm == NULL)
+ return;
+@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ /* Prepare for the next transition */
+ wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
+
+- clear_ptk = 0;
++ clear_keys = 0;
+ }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+- if (clear_ptk) {
++ if (clear_keys) {
+ /*
+ * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
+ * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
+@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+ os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
+@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
+- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
+- u16 keyidx;
+-
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
+- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
+-
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
+- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
+-
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+- igd.igtk, keylen);
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
+- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
+- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
+- "WNM mode");
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
++
++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ return -1;
+- }
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e39bbf63d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From a6caab8060ab60876e233306f5c586451169eba1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
+ Mode cases
+
+This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
+separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
+corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
+GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
+detect a possible key reconfiguration.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
+
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
+- const u8 *key_rsc)
++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
+- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
+ gtk_len, gtk_len,
+ &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
+- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
++ int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
+ keyidx);
+@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
+ key_rsc = null_rsc;
+
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
+ wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
+ goto failed;
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+ gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
+ "WNM mode");
+@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..510362510
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From abf941647f2dc33b0b59612f525e1b292331cc9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
+
+Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
+and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
+trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
+
+This fixes the earlier fix in commit
+ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
+driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
+possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
+message 3/4.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 -
+ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index d200285..1021ccb 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t kck_len;
+ size_t kek_len;
+ size_t tk_len;
++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
+ };
+
+ struct wpa_gtk {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ }
+ sm->tptk_set = 1;
+- sm->tk_to_set = 1;
+
+ kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
+ kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
+@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ enum wpa_alg alg;
+ const u8 *key_rsc;
+
+- if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
++ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
+ return 0;
+@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
+- sm->tk_to_set = 0;
++ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
+ int ptk_set, tptk_set;
+ unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
+- unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
+ u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
+ u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
+ int renew_snonce;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b0e1df314
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 804b9d72808cddd822e7dcec4d60f40c1aceda82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
+
+The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
+the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
+directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
+determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
+new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
+
+Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
+for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
+ }
+
+
++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
++ return -1;
++ }
++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
++ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
+ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
+ {
+ u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
+@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
+ else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
+- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
+- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
++ else
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
+ break;
+ case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..72c7d51e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+From 7fd26db2d8147ed662db192c41d7bc15752a601d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
+
+Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
+been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
+related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
+for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
+that behavior does not get modified.
+
+For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
+followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
+the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
+ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
+and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
+
+As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
+the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+index e424168..9eb9738 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
+ u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
+ } tpk;
+ int tpk_set;
++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
+ int tpk_success;
+ int tpk_in_progress;
+
+@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ u8 rsc[6];
+ enum wpa_alg alg;
+
++ if (peer->tk_set) {
++ /*
++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
++ * not allow that to happen.
++ */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
+
+ switch (peer->cipher) {
+@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
+ rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
+ "driver");
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ peer->cipher = 0;
+ peer->qos_info = 0;
+ peer->wmm_capable = 0;
+- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
+ os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
+ os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
+ wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
+ peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
+ }
+
+
++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
++{
++ int i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
++ if (nonce[i])
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
+ static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+ const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
+ peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
+ peer->cipher = cipher;
+
+- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
+ /*
+ * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
+ * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
+@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
+ "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
+ goto error;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ }
+
+ #if 0
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d0978c797
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From a42eb67c42f845faf266b0633d52e17f2a82f511 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
+
+The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
+the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
+case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
+pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
+be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
+even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
+Reassociation Response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+ wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+ /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
+ wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
+ u16 capab;
+
+ sm->ft_completed = 0;
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+
+ buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+ 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
+@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
+ return -1;
+@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
++
+ if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ size_t r0kh_id_len;
+ u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
+ int ft_completed;
++ int ft_reassoc_completed;
+ int over_the_ds_in_progress;
+ u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
+ int set_ptk_after_assoc;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 694da8fb6..000000000
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,984 +0,0 @@
-The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
-result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
-
-Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-13077
-CVE: CVE-2017-13078
-CVE: CVE-2017-13079
-CVE: CVE-2017-13080
-CVE: CVE-2017-13081
-CVE: CVE-2017-13082
-CVE: CVE-2017-13086
-CVE: CVE-2017-13087
-CVE: CVE-2017-13088
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
-
-Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
-processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
-issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
-same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
-also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
-frames on RX side.
-
-This issue was introduced by the commit
-0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
-authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
-times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
-needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
-failed.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
- src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
- src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
- src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
- src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-index 4e04169..333035f 100644
---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- {
- struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
- struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
-+ int set = 1;
-
- /*
- * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
-@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
- * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
- * does not support full AP client state.
-+ *
-+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
-+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
-+ * the same key.
- */
-- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
-+ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
-+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
-+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
- hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
-+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
-+ set = 0;
-+ }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
- if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
-@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
- sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
- sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
-- sta->added_unassoc)) {
-+ set)) {
- hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
- HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
- "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
-- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
-+ set ? "set" : "add");
-
- if (sta->added_unassoc) {
- hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-index 3587086..707971d 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
- #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
- break;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
-+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
-+ return 0;
- }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
- }
-
-
-+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-+{
-+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
-+ return 0;
-+ return sm->tk_already_set;
-+}
-+
-+
- int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
- {
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
-@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
- u8 *data, size_t data_len);
- enum wpa_event {
- WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
-- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
-+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
- };
- void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
-@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
-+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
- int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
- struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
-@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
- return;
- }
-
-+ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
-+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
-+ * PN in the driver */
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
- /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
- * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
- * after association has been completed. This function will be called
-@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-
- /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
- sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
-+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
- }
-
-
-@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
-
- sm->pairwise = pairwise;
- sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
-+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
- wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
-
- buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
-@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
- struct wpa_ptk PTK;
- Boolean PTK_valid;
- Boolean pairwise_set;
-+ Boolean tk_already_set;
- int keycount;
- Boolean Pair;
- struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
---
-2.7.4
-
-From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
-
-Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
-(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
-not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
-attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
-sequence counter associated to the group key.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
- 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
-+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
- size_t tk_len;
- };
-
-+struct wpa_gtk {
-+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
-+ size_t gtk_len;
-+};
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+struct wpa_igtk {
-+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
-+ size_t igtk_len;
-+};
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-
- /* WPA IE version 1
- * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
- u8 gtk_buf[32];
-
-+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
-+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
-+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
-@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
- os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
-
-+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
-
-
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
-+{
-+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
-+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-+
-+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
-+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
-+ keyidx);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
-+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
-+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
-+ if (keyidx > 4095) {
-+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-+ broadcast_ether_addr,
-+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
-+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
-+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-+
-+
- static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
- {
-@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- if (ie->igtk) {
- size_t len;
- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-- u16 keyidx;
-+
- len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
- if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
- return -1;
-+
- igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
-- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
-- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
-- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
-- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
-- igtk->igtk, len);
-- if (keyidx > 4095) {
-- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
-- return -1;
-- }
-- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-- broadcast_ether_addr,
-- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
-- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
-- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
-- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
- return -1;
-- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- */
- void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- {
-- int clear_ptk = 1;
-+ int clear_keys = 1;
-
- if (sm == NULL)
- return;
-@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- /* Prepare for the next transition */
- wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
-
-- clear_ptk = 0;
-+ clear_keys = 0;
- }
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-
-- if (clear_ptk) {
-+ if (clear_keys) {
- /*
- * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
- * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
-@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
- sm->tptk_set = 0;
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- }
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
-@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
- os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
- os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
- os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
-@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
-- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
-- u16 keyidx;
--
-- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
-- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
-- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
-- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
--
-- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
-- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
--
-- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
-- igd.igtk, keylen);
-- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
-- broadcast_ether_addr,
-- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
-- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
-- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
-- "WNM mode");
-- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
-+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-+
-+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
- return -1;
-- }
-- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- } else {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
- int rx_replay_counter_set;
- u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
-+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
-+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-
- struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
-
---
-2.7.4
-
-From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
- Mode cases
-
-This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
-separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
-corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
-GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
-detect a possible key reconfiguration.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
-
- static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
-- const u8 *key_rsc)
-+ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
- {
- const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
- u8 gtk_buf[32];
-
- /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
-+ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
-+ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
-+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
- gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
-@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- }
- os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
-
-- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+ if (wnm_sleep) {
-+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
-+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
-+ } else {
-+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
-+ }
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
- gtk_len, gtk_len,
- &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
-- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
-+ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
-@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
-+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
-+ int wnm_sleep)
- {
- size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
- u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
-
- /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
-- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
-+ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
-+ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
-+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
-+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
- keyidx);
-@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- return -1;
- }
-
-- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+ if (wnm_sleep) {
-+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
-+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
-+ } else {
-+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
-+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
-+ }
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- return -1;
-
- igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
- return -1;
- }
-
-@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
- key_rsc = null_rsc;
-
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
- wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
- goto failed;
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
-@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
- sm->tptk_set = 0;
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
- os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- }
-
-@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
- os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
- os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
-+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
- os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
-@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
-
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
- gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
- os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
- "WNM mode");
-@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
-
- igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
-- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
-+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
- return -1;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- } else {
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- int rx_replay_counter_set;
- u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
- struct wpa_gtk gtk;
-+ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
- #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
- struct wpa_igtk igtk;
-+ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
- #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
-
- struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
---
-2.7.4
-
-From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
-Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
-
-Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
-and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
-trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
-
-This fixes the earlier fix in commit
-ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
-driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
-possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
-message 3/4.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
----
- src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++---
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 -
- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-index d200285..1021ccb 100644
---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
-+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
-@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
- size_t kck_len;
- size_t kek_len;
- size_t tk_len;
-+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
- };
-
- struct wpa_gtk {
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- }
- sm->tptk_set = 1;
-- sm->tk_to_set = 1;
-
- kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
- kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
-@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- enum wpa_alg alg;
- const u8 *key_rsc;
-
-- if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
-+ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
- "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
- return 0;
-@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
-
- /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
- os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
-- sm->tk_to_set = 0;
-+ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
-
- if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
- eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
- int ptk_set, tptk_set;
- unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
-- unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
- u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
- u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
- int renew_snonce;
---
-2.7.4
-
-From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
-
-The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
-the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
-directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
-determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
-new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
-
-Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
-for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
-@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
- }
-
-
-+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
-+{
-+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
-+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
-+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
-+ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
- {
- u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
-@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
- else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
-- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
-- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
-- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
-+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
-+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
-+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
-+ else
-+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
-+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
- case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
- break;
- case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
---
-2.7.4
-
-From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
-
-Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
-been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
-related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
-for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
-that behavior does not get modified.
-
-For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
-followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
-the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
-ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
-and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
-
-As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
-the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-index e424168..9eb9738 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
-@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
- u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
- } tpk;
- int tpk_set;
-+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
- int tpk_success;
- int tpk_in_progress;
-
-@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
- u8 rsc[6];
- enum wpa_alg alg;
-
-+ if (peer->tk_set) {
-+ /*
-+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
-+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
-+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
-+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
-+ * not allow that to happen.
-+ */
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
-+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
-+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
- os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
-
- switch (peer->cipher) {
-@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
- return -1;
- }
-
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
-+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
- rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
- "driver");
- return -1;
- }
-+ peer->tk_set = 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
- peer->cipher = 0;
- peer->qos_info = 0;
- peer->wmm_capable = 0;
-- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
-+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
- peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
- os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
- os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
- wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
- return -1;
- }
-+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
- wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
- peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
- os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
-@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
- }
-
-
-+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
-+{
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
-+ if (nonce[i])
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
- const u8 *buf, size_t len)
- {
-@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
- peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
- peer->cipher = cipher;
-
-- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
-+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
-+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
- /*
- * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
- * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
-@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
- "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
- goto error;
- }
-+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
- }
-
- #if 0
---
-2.7.4
-
-Note: [PATCH 7/8] only applies to wpa_supplicant
-
-From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
-
-The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
-the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
-case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
-pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
-be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
-even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
-Reassociation Response frame.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
- src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
-@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
- #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
- wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
- #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
-+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
-+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
-
- /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
- wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
-@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
- u16 capab;
-
- sm->ft_completed = 0;
-+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
-
- buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
- 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
-@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
- return -1;
- }
-
-+ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
- return -1;
-@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
- return -1;
- }
-
-+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
-+
- if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
- return -1;
-
-diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
- size_t r0kh_id_len;
- u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
- int ft_completed;
-+ int ft_reassoc_completed;
- int over_the_ds_in_progress;
- u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
- int set_ptk_after_assoc;
---
-2.7.4
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
index c3a1eadfd..250add875 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
@@ -1,34 +1,48 @@
+SUMMARY = "User space daemon for extended IEEE 802.11 management"
HOMEPAGE = "http://w1.fi/hostapd/"
SECTION = "kernel/userland"
-LICENSE = "GPLv2 | BSD"
-LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${B}/README;md5=8aa4e8c78b59b12016c4cb2d0a8db350"
-DEPENDS = "libnl openssl"
-SUMMARY = "User space daemon for extended IEEE 802.11 management"
+LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://hostapd/README;md5=8aa4e8c78b59b12016c4cb2d0a8db350"
-inherit update-rc.d systemd
-INITSCRIPT_NAME = "hostapd"
-
-SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN} = "hostapd.service"
-SYSTEMD_AUTO_ENABLE_${PN} = "disable"
+DEPENDS = "libnl openssl"
SRC_URI = " \
http://w1.fi/releases/hostapd-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://defconfig \
file://init \
file://hostapd.service \
- file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \
+ file://0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch \
+ file://0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch \
+ file://0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch \
+ file://0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch \
+ file://0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch \
+ file://0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch \
+ file://0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch \
"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "01526b90c1d23bec4b0f052039cc4456c2fd19347b4d830d1d58a0a6aea7117d"
+
S = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}"
B = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}/hostapd"
-do_configure() {
+inherit update-rc.d systemd pkgconfig distro_features_check
+
+CONFLICT_DISTRO_FEATURES = "openssl-no-weak-ciphers"
+
+INITSCRIPT_NAME = "hostapd"
+
+SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN} = "hostapd.service"
+SYSTEMD_AUTO_ENABLE_${PN} = "disable"
+
+do_configure_append() {
install -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/defconfig ${B}/.config
}
do_compile() {
- export CFLAGS="-MMD -O2 -Wall -g -I${STAGING_INCDIR}/libnl3"
- make
+ export CFLAGS="-MMD -O2 -Wall -g"
+ export EXTRA_CFLAGS="${CFLAGS}"
+ make V=1
}
do_install() {
@@ -42,7 +56,3 @@ do_install() {
}
CONFFILES_${PN} += "${sysconfdir}/hostapd.conf"
-
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "01526b90c1d23bec4b0f052039cc4456c2fd19347b4d830d1d58a0a6aea7117d"
-
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/0001-aclocal-Add-parameter-to-disable-keyutils-detection.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/0001-aclocal-Add-parameter-to-disable-keyutils-detection.patch
index f0c310c5e..cbd5d71fd 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/0001-aclocal-Add-parameter-to-disable-keyutils-detection.patch
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/0001-aclocal-Add-parameter-to-disable-keyutils-detection.patch
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
-From ecb62f3467f493cc0d679323f05367eebbf0fb67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From a9e4057bfda190ad365b503af058b460ab8c7616 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 22:22:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] aclocal: Add parameter to disable keyutils detection
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
+
---
aclocal.m4 | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/aclocal.m4 b/aclocal.m4
-index 210c473..83b1f02 100644
+index d6d1279..80ce604 100644
--- a/aclocal.m4
+++ b/aclocal.m4
-@@ -1650,11 +1650,15 @@ fi
+@@ -1679,12 +1679,16 @@ fi
dnl
dnl If libkeyutils exists (on Linux) include it and use keyring ccache
AC_DEFUN(KRB5_AC_KEYRING_CCACHE,[
@@ -28,6 +29,4 @@ index 210c473..83b1f02 100644
+fi
])dnl
dnl
---
-1.8.3.2
-
+ dnl If libkeyutils supports persistent keyrings, use them
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/CVE-2017-11462.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/CVE-2017-11462.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4b82f0297..000000000
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/CVE-2017-11462.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,419 +0,0 @@
-From 56f7b1bc95a2a3eeb420e069e7655fb181ade5cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 13:02:46 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
-
-After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
-context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
-calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
-is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
-with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
-gss_ctx_id_t.
-
-CVE-2017-11462:
-
-RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
-security context on a second or subsequent call to
-gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
-in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
-leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
-safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
-security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
-
-All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
-contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
-1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
-error.
-
-ticket: 8598 (new)
-target_version: 1.15-next
-target_version: 1.14-next
-tags: pullup
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2017-11462
-
-Signed-off-by: Catalin Enache <catalin.enache@windriver.com>
----
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c | 14 ++++++++------
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c | 4 ++++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c | 4 ++++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c | 2 ++
- src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c | 8 ++++++++
- 17 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c
-index ddaf874..f28e2b1 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c
-@@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
- } else {
- union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
- selected_mech = union_ctx_id->mech_type;
-+ if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- }
-
- /* Now create a new context if we didn't get one. */
-@@ -234,9 +236,6 @@ gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
- free(union_ctx_id);
- return (status);
- }
--
-- /* set the new context handle to caller's data */
-- *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -277,8 +276,10 @@ gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
- d_cred ? &tmp_d_cred : NULL);
-
- /* If there's more work to do, keep going... */
-- if (status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
-+ if (status == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+ *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
- return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
-+ }
-
- /* if the call failed, return with failure */
- if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-@@ -364,14 +365,22 @@ gss_cred_id_t * d_cred;
- *mech_type = gssint_get_public_oid(actual_mech);
- if (ret_flags != NULL)
- *ret_flags = temp_ret_flags;
-- return (status);
-+ *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id;
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- } else {
-
- status = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
- }
-
- error_out:
-- if (union_ctx_id) {
-+ /*
-+ * RFC 2744 5.1 requires that we not create a context on a failed first
-+ * call to accept, and recommends that on a failed subsequent call we
-+ * make the caller responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context.
-+ * Even if the mech deleted its context, keep the union context around
-+ * for the caller to delete.
-+ */
-+ if (union_ctx_id && *context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
- if (union_ctx_id->mech_type) {
- if (union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements)
- free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
-@@ -384,7 +393,6 @@ error_out:
- GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- }
- free(union_ctx_id);
-- *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- }
-
- if (src_name)
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c
-index 9181551..4bcb47e 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_complete_auth_token.c
-@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ gss_complete_auth_token (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech != NULL) {
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c
-index 2ff8d09..c947e76 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c
-@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ OM_uint32 * time_rec;
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech) {
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c
-index 4bf0dec..574ff02 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c
-@@ -87,12 +87,14 @@ gss_buffer_t output_token;
- if (GSSINT_CHK_LOOP(ctx))
- return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
-
-- status = gssint_delete_internal_sec_context(minor_status,
-- ctx->mech_type,
-- &ctx->internal_ctx_id,
-- output_token);
-- if (status)
-- return status;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
-+ status = gssint_delete_internal_sec_context(minor_status,
-+ ctx->mech_type,
-+ &ctx->internal_ctx_id,
-+ output_token);
-+ if (status)
-+ return status;
-+ }
-
- /* now free up the space for the union context structure */
- free(ctx->mech_type->elements);
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c
-index b637452..1d7990b 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c
-@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ gss_buffer_t interprocess_token;
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) *context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
- if (!mech)
- return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c
-index 9f154b8..e2df1ce 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c
-@@ -192,8 +192,13 @@ OM_uint32 * time_rec;
-
- /* copy the supplied context handle */
- union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
-- } else
-+ } else {
- union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
-+ if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
-+ status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
-+ goto end;
-+ }
-+ }
-
- /*
- * get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct.
-@@ -224,15 +229,13 @@ OM_uint32 * time_rec;
-
- if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && status != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- /*
-- * The spec says the preferred method is to delete all context info on
-- * the first call to init, and on all subsequent calls make the caller
-- * responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context. However, if the
-- * mechanism decided to delete the internal context, we should also
-- * delete the union context.
-+ * RFC 2744 5.19 requires that we not create a context on a failed
-+ * first call to init, and recommends that on a failed subsequent call
-+ * we make the caller responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context.
-+ * Even if the mech deleted its context, keep the union context around
-+ * for the caller to delete.
- */
- map_error(minor_status, mech);
-- if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-- *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
- free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements);
- free(union_ctx_id->mech_type);
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c
-index 6f1c71e..6c0d98d 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inq_context.c
-@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ gss_inquire_context(
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (!mech || !mech->gss_inquire_context || !mech->gss_display_name ||
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c
-index fcca3e4..9e168ad 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_prf.c
-@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ gss_pseudo_random (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech != NULL) {
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c
-index bc260ae..3968b5d 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c
-@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech) {
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c
-index f17241c..3db1ee0 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c
-@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ gss_wrap( OM_uint32 *minor_status,
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech) {
-@@ -226,6 +228,8 @@ gss_wrap_size_limit(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (!mech)
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c
-index 86d641a..03fbd8c 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c
-@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ gss_buffer_t msg_token;
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech) {
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c
-index 3e8053c..c208635 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c
-@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ gss_qop_t * qop_state;
- * call it.
- */
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech) {
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c
-index e78bff2..0682bd8 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_aead.c
-@@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ gss_qop_t *qop_state;
- * call it.
- */
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (!mech)
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c
-index c0dd314..599be2c 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unwrap_iov.c
-@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ int iov_count;
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech) {
-@@ -128,6 +130,8 @@ gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
-
- /* Select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and call it. */
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism(ctx->mech_type);
- if (mech == NULL)
- return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c
-index 1578ae1..8996fce 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c
-@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ gss_qop_t * qop_state;
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech) {
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c
-index 96cdf3c..7fe3b7b 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_aead.c
-@@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
- * call it.
- */
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
- if (!mech)
- return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
-diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c
-index 40cd98f..14447c4 100644
---- a/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c
-+++ b/src/lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_wrap_iov.c
-@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ int iov_count;
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech) {
-@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ int iov_count;
- */
-
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
-
- if (mech) {
-@@ -190,6 +194,8 @@ gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
-
- /* Select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and call it. */
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism(ctx->mech_type);
- if (mech == NULL)
- return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
-@@ -218,6 +224,8 @@ gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
-
- /* Select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and call it. */
- ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
-+ if (ctx->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
-+ return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
- mech = gssint_get_mechanism(ctx->mech_type);
- if (mech == NULL)
- return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
---
-2.10.2
-
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/etc/default/krb5-admin-server b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/etc/default/krb5-admin-server
index 283592913..e097353c2 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/etc/default/krb5-admin-server
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/etc/default/krb5-admin-server
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
# Automatically generated. If you change anything in this file other than the
-# values of RUN_KADMIND or DAEMON_ARGS, first run dpkg-reconfigure
+# values of DAEMON_ARGS, first run dpkg-reconfigure
# krb5-admin-server and disable managing the kadmin configuration with
# debconf. Otherwise, changes will be overwritten.
-
-RUN_KADMIND=true
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/fix-CVE-2017-11368.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/fix-CVE-2017-11368.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a2eb7bc02..000000000
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/fix-CVE-2017-11368.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/ffb35baac6981f9e8914f8f3bffd37f284b85970]
-
-Backport patch to fix CVE-2017-11368.
-
-Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
----
-From ffb35baac6981f9e8914f8f3bffd37f284b85970 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
-Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 12:14:20 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
-
-Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
-S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
-uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
-server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
-
-If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
-"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
-prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
-will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
-as small memory allocation failures.
-
-CVE-2017-11368:
-
-In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
-assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
-S4U2Proxy request.
-
- CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
-
-ticket: 8599 (new)
-target_version: 1.15-next
-target_version: 1.14-next
-tags: pullup
----
- src/kdc/do_as_req.c | 4 ++--
- src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c | 3 ++-
- src/kdc/kdc_util.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
-index 2d3ad13..9b256c8 100644
---- a/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/do_as_req.c
-@@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
- did_log = 1;
-
- egress:
-- if (errcode != 0)
-- assert (state->status != 0);
-+ if (errcode != 0 && state->status == NULL)
-+ state->status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
-
- au_state->status = state->status;
- au_state->reply = &state->reply;
-diff --git a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-index cdc79ad..d8d6719 100644
---- a/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/do_tgs_req.c
-@@ -823,7 +823,8 @@ process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
- free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
-
- cleanup:
-- assert(status != NULL);
-+ if (status == NULL)
-+ status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
- if (reply_key)
- krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
- if (errcode)
-diff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-index 778a629..b710aef 100644
---- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c
-@@ -1220,8 +1220,10 @@ kdc_process_for_user(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
- req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
-
- code = decode_krb5_pa_for_user(&req_data, &for_user);
-- if (code)
-+ if (code) {
-+ *status = "DECODE_PA_FOR_USER";
- return code;
-+ }
-
- code = verify_for_user_checksum(kdc_context, tgs_session, for_user);
- if (code) {
-@@ -1320,8 +1322,10 @@ kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context,
- req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
-
- code = decode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&req_data, s4u_x509_user);
-- if (code)
-+ if (code) {
-+ *status = "DECODE_PA_S4U_X509_USER";
- return code;
-+ }
-
- code = verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(context,
- tgs_subkey ? tgs_subkey :
-@@ -1624,6 +1628,7 @@ kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
- * that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
- */
- if (request->kdc_options & (NON_TGT_OPTION | KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
-+ *status = "INVALID_S4U2PROXY_OPTIONS";
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
- }
-
-@@ -1631,6 +1636,7 @@ kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
- if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
- server->princ, /* after canon */
- server_princ)) {
-+ *status = "EVIDENCE_TICKET_MISMATCH";
- return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
- }
-
---
-2.10.1
-
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-admin-server.service b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-admin-server.service
index 1b4271643..21939a1f0 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-admin-server.service
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-admin-server.service
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ConditionPathExists=/etc/krb5.conf
Type=forking
ExecStartPre=/bin/sh -c "test ! -f /var/log/kadmind.log || test ! -x /sbin/restorecon || /sbin/restorecon -F /var/log/kadmind.log"
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/kadmind
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/krb5-admin-server
SuccessExitStatus=1 2 SIGKILL
TimeoutStopSec=30
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-kdc.service b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-kdc.service
index d5e5a9579..bf37c45ba 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-kdc.service
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/krb5-kdc.service
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ ConditionPathExists=/etc/krb5.conf
[Service]
Type=forking
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/krb5kdc
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/krb5-kdc
SuccessExitStatus=1 2 SIGKILL
TimeoutStopSec=30
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.15.1.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.16.bb
index e75e86138..f95240f54 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.15.1.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.16.bb
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ DESCRIPTION = "Kerberos is a system for authenticating users and services on a n
HOMEPAGE = "http://web.mit.edu/Kerberos/"
SECTION = "console/network"
LICENSE = "MIT"
-LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${S}/../NOTICE;md5=3e12b8a065cca25dfdcac734fb3ec0b9"
-DEPENDS = "ncurses util-linux e2fsprogs e2fsprogs-native"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${S}/../NOTICE;md5=59b8da652f07186b44782a8454574f30"
+DEPENDS = "ncurses util-linux e2fsprogs e2fsprogs-native openssl"
inherit autotools-brokensep binconfig perlnative systemd update-rc.d
@@ -30,19 +30,17 @@ SRC_URI = "http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/${BPN}/${SHRT_VER}/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://etc/default/krb5-admin-server \
file://krb5-kdc.service \
file://krb5-admin-server.service \
- file://fix-CVE-2017-11368.patch;striplevel=2 \
- file://CVE-2017-11462.patch;striplevel=2 \
"
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "8022f3a1cde8463e44fd35ef42731f85"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "437c8831ddd5fde2a993fef425dedb48468109bb3d3261ef838295045a89eb45"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "23c5e9f07642db4a67f7a5b6168b1319"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "faeb125f83b0fb4cdb2f99f088140631bb47d975982de0956d18c85842969e08"
CVE_PRODUCT = "kerberos"
S = "${WORKDIR}/${BP}/src"
-PACKAGECONFIG ??= "openssl"
+PACKAGECONFIG ??= ""
PACKAGECONFIG[libedit] = "--with-libedit,--without-libedit,libedit"
-PACKAGECONFIG[openssl] = "--with-pkinit-crypto-impl=openssl,,openssl"
+PACKAGECONFIG[openssl] = "--with-crypto-impl=openssl,,openssl"
PACKAGECONFIG[keyutils] = "--enable-keyutils,--disable-keyutils,keyutils"
PACKAGECONFIG[ldap] = "--with-ldap,--without-ldap,openldap"
PACKAGECONFIG[readline] = "--with-readline,--without-readline,readline"
@@ -53,6 +51,7 @@ CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += "krb5_cv_attr_constructor_destructor=yes ac_cv_func_regc
ac_cv_file__etc_TIMEZONE=no"
CFLAGS_append = " -fPIC -DDESTRUCTOR_ATTR_WORKS=1 -I${STAGING_INCDIR}/et"
+CFLAGS_append_riscv64 = " -D_REENTRANT -pthread"
LDFLAGS_append = " -pthread"
do_configure() {
@@ -79,12 +78,17 @@ do_install_append() {
mkdir -p ${D}/${sysconfdir}/default/volatiles
echo "d root root 0755 ${localstatedir}/run/krb5kdc none" \
> ${D}${sysconfdir}/default/volatiles/87_krb5
+
+ echo "RUN_KADMIND=true" >> ${D}/${sysconfdir}/default/krb5-admin-server
fi
if ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'systemd', 'true', 'false', d)}; then
install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}/tmpfiles.d
echo "d /run/krb5kdc - - - -" \
> ${D}${sysconfdir}/tmpfiles.d/krb5.conf
+ mkdir -p ${D}/${sysconfdir}/default
+ install -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/etc/default/* ${D}/${sysconfdir}/default
+
install -d ${D}${systemd_system_unitdir}
install -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/krb5-admin-server.service ${D}${systemd_system_unitdir}
install -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/krb5-kdc.service ${D}${systemd_system_unitdir}
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi/0001-Detect-clang.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi/0001-Detect-clang.patch
index 4047ffbf2..7a3429b9d 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi/0001-Detect-clang.patch
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi/0001-Detect-clang.patch
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ compiler are accepted.
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Upstream-Status: Pending
+
---
m4/compiler-warnings.m4 | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ index de4a8b0..e4ba718 100644
-Wdeclaration-after-statement -Wstrict-prototypes \
@@ -17,22 +37,23 @@ if test "$GCC" = "yes" -a "$set_more_warnings" != "no"; then
-Wmissing-include-dirs -Waggregate-return \
- -Wformat-security; do
+ -Wformat-security -Wtype-limits; do
SAVE_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $option"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $option $WERROR"
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi_1.16.0.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi_1.20.0.bb
index 80c26c05c..9301cbd5e 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi_1.16.0.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libqmi/libqmi_1.20.0.bb
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ inherit autotools pkgconfig bash-completion
SRC_URI = "http://www.freedesktop.org/software/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0001-Detect-clang.patch \
"
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4970c110f160b33637a3515004c637b2"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7ab6bb47fd23bf4d3fa17424e40ea5552d08b19e5ee4f125f21f316c8086ba2a"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "797e365521df76b77b067e6317618b41"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "21428cd3749c56246565123f707fee51238651a22c60bdc85ebce97388626eb4"
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libuv/libuv_1.11.0.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libuv/libuv_1.11.0.bb
index 0a5846bb8..ca4685ab3 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libuv/libuv_1.11.0.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libuv/libuv_1.11.0.bb
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/libuv/libuv/issues"
LICENSE = "MIT"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=bb5ea0d651f4c3519327171906045775"
-SRC_URI = "https://github.com/libuv/${BPN}/archive/v${PV}.tar.gz;downloadfilename=${BP}.tar.gz"
-
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "15550a9f5f45f7f32ae2d9bb0a21a2a7"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6ec7eec6ecc24b1a8ffedebedb2fe9313fffb5410de89aaf784dd01080411c7a"
+S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
+SRCREV = "7452ef4e06a4f99ee26b694c65476401534f2725"
+BRANCH = "v1.x"
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/libuv/libuv.git;protocol=https;branch=${BRANCH};"
inherit autotools
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets_2.1.0.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets_2.1.0.bb
index 935479987..100f3a354 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets_2.1.0.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets_2.1.0.bb
@@ -5,10 +5,9 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=e3393a657830d4a118c5a6ed35ba53d0"
DEPENDS = "zlib"
-SRC_URI = "https://github.com/warmcat/libwebsockets/archive/v${PV}.tar.gz"
-
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4df3be57dee43aeebd54a3ed56568f50"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bcc96aaa609daae4d3f7ab1ee480126709ef4f6a8bf9c85de40aae48e38cce66"
+S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
+SRCREV = "73557509bd15f95a1ad081a6f4fab48ff7743215"
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/warmcat/libwebsockets.git;protocol=https;"
inherit cmake pkgconfig
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/0001-config.mk-allow-prefix-mandir-localedir-from-environ.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/0001-config.mk-allow-prefix-mandir-localedir-from-environ.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a5aa277a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/0001-config.mk-allow-prefix-mandir-localedir-from-environ.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 0be38301249d797ec1f59071cc868ceda6d4720a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Draszik?= <andre.draszik@jci.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2016 12:50:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] config.mk: allow prefix / mandir / localedir from
+ environment
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+We want to control them using OE environment variables.
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [embedded-specific]
+Signed-off-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik@jci.com>
+---
+ config.mk | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/config.mk b/config.mk
+index 71f17e5..81d9702 100644
+--- a/config.mk
++++ b/config.mk
+@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ ifeq ($(WITH_DOCS),yes)
+ endif
+
+ INSTALL?=install
+-prefix=/usr/local
+-mandir=${prefix}/share/man
+-localedir=${prefix}/share/locale
++prefix?=/usr/local
++mandir?=${prefix}/share/man
++localedir?=${prefix}/share/locale
+ STRIP?=strip
+--
+2.15.1
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/0002-uthash-remove-in-tree-version.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/0002-uthash-remove-in-tree-version.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c89dfe6be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/0002-uthash-remove-in-tree-version.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,975 @@
+From d9aeef8d95a325942cc92f4d72415771d75d904c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Draszik?= <andre.draszik@jci.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2016 13:05:10 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] uthash: remove in-tree version
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+We don't need it as we want to use the version provided by
+meta-oe instead.
+
+Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [embedded-specific]
+Signed-off-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik@jci.com>
+---
+ src/uthash.h | 948 -----------------------------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 948 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 src/uthash.h
+
+diff --git a/src/uthash.h b/src/uthash.h
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 915a825..0000000
+--- a/src/uthash.h
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,948 +0,0 @@
+-/*
+-Copyright (c) 2003-2013, Troy D. Hanson http://troydhanson.github.com/uthash/
+-All rights reserved.
+-
+-Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+-modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+-
+- * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+- notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+-
+-THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS
+-IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+-TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+-PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER
+-OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+-EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+-PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
+-PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+-LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
+-NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
+-SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+-*/
+-
+-#ifndef UTHASH_H
+-#define UTHASH_H
+-
+-#include <string.h> /* memcmp,strlen */
+-#include <stddef.h> /* ptrdiff_t */
+-#include <stdlib.h> /* exit() */
+-
+-/* These macros use decltype or the earlier __typeof GNU extension.
+- As decltype is only available in newer compilers (VS2010 or gcc 4.3+
+- when compiling c++ source) this code uses whatever method is needed
+- or, for VS2008 where neither is available, uses casting workarounds. */
+-#ifdef _MSC_VER /* MS compiler */
+-#if _MSC_VER >= 1600 && defined(__cplusplus) /* VS2010 or newer in C++ mode */
+-#define DECLTYPE(x) (decltype(x))
+-#else /* VS2008 or older (or VS2010 in C mode) */
+-#define NO_DECLTYPE
+-#define DECLTYPE(x)
+-#endif
+-#else /* GNU, Sun and other compilers */
+-#define DECLTYPE(x) (__typeof(x))
+-#endif
+-
+-#ifdef NO_DECLTYPE
+-#define DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(dst,src) \
+-do { \
+- char **_da_dst = (char**)(&(dst)); \
+- *_da_dst = (char*)(src); \
+-} while(0)
+-#else
+-#define DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(dst,src) \
+-do { \
+- (dst) = DECLTYPE(dst)(src); \
+-} while(0)
+-#endif
+-
+-/* a number of the hash function use uint32_t which isn't defined on win32 */
+-#ifdef _MSC_VER
+-typedef unsigned int uint32_t;
+-typedef unsigned char uint8_t;
+-#else
+-#include <inttypes.h> /* uint32_t */
+-#endif
+-
+-#define UTHASH_VERSION 1.9.8
+-
+-#ifndef uthash_fatal
+-#define uthash_fatal(msg) exit(-1) /* fatal error (out of memory,etc) */
+-#endif
+-#ifndef uthash_malloc
+-#define uthash_malloc(sz) malloc(sz) /* malloc fcn */
+-#endif
+-#ifndef uthash_free
+-#define uthash_free(ptr,sz) free(ptr) /* free fcn */
+-#endif
+-
+-#ifndef uthash_noexpand_fyi
+-#define uthash_noexpand_fyi(tbl) /* can be defined to log noexpand */
+-#endif
+-#ifndef uthash_expand_fyi
+-#define uthash_expand_fyi(tbl) /* can be defined to log expands */
+-#endif
+-
+-/* initial number of buckets */
+-#define HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS 32 /* initial number of buckets */
+-#define HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS_LOG2 5 /* lg2 of initial number of buckets */
+-#define HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH 10 /* expand when bucket count reaches */
+-
+-/* calculate the element whose hash handle address is hhe */
+-#define ELMT_FROM_HH(tbl,hhp) ((void*)(((char*)(hhp)) - ((tbl)->hho)))
+-
+-#define HASH_FIND(hh,head,keyptr,keylen,out) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _hf_bkt,_hf_hashv; \
+- out=NULL; \
+- if (head) { \
+- HASH_FCN(keyptr,keylen, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _hf_hashv, _hf_bkt); \
+- if (HASH_BLOOM_TEST((head)->hh.tbl, _hf_hashv)) { \
+- HASH_FIND_IN_BKT((head)->hh.tbl, hh, (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[ _hf_bkt ], \
+- keyptr,keylen,out); \
+- } \
+- } \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-#ifdef HASH_BLOOM
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_BITLEN (1ULL << HASH_BLOOM)
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN (HASH_BLOOM_BITLEN/8) + ((HASH_BLOOM_BITLEN%8) ? 1:0)
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_MAKE(tbl) \
+-do { \
+- (tbl)->bloom_nbits = HASH_BLOOM; \
+- (tbl)->bloom_bv = (uint8_t*)uthash_malloc(HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN); \
+- if (!((tbl)->bloom_bv)) { uthash_fatal( "out of memory"); } \
+- memset((tbl)->bloom_bv, 0, HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN); \
+- (tbl)->bloom_sig = HASH_BLOOM_SIGNATURE; \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_FREE(tbl) \
+-do { \
+- uthash_free((tbl)->bloom_bv, HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN); \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_BITSET(bv,idx) (bv[(idx)/8] |= (1U << ((idx)%8)))
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_BITTEST(bv,idx) (bv[(idx)/8] & (1U << ((idx)%8)))
+-
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_ADD(tbl,hashv) \
+- HASH_BLOOM_BITSET((tbl)->bloom_bv, (hashv & (uint32_t)((1ULL << (tbl)->bloom_nbits) - 1)))
+-
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_TEST(tbl,hashv) \
+- HASH_BLOOM_BITTEST((tbl)->bloom_bv, (hashv & (uint32_t)((1ULL << (tbl)->bloom_nbits) - 1)))
+-
+-#else
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_MAKE(tbl)
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_FREE(tbl)
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_ADD(tbl,hashv)
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_TEST(tbl,hashv) (1)
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN 0
+-#endif
+-
+-#define HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh,head) \
+-do { \
+- (head)->hh.tbl = (UT_hash_table*)uthash_malloc( \
+- sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \
+- if (!((head)->hh.tbl)) { uthash_fatal( "out of memory"); } \
+- memset((head)->hh.tbl, 0, sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->tail = &((head)->hh); \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets = HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS; \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->log2_num_buckets = HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS_LOG2; \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho = (char*)(&(head)->hh) - (char*)(head); \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->buckets = (UT_hash_bucket*)uthash_malloc( \
+- HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS*sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \
+- if (! (head)->hh.tbl->buckets) { uthash_fatal( "out of memory"); } \
+- memset((head)->hh.tbl->buckets, 0, \
+- HASH_INITIAL_NUM_BUCKETS*sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \
+- HASH_BLOOM_MAKE((head)->hh.tbl); \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->signature = HASH_SIGNATURE; \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-#define HASH_ADD(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add) \
+- HASH_ADD_KEYPTR(hh,head,&((add)->fieldname),keylen_in,add)
+-
+-#define HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add,replaced) \
+-do { \
+- replaced=NULL; \
+- HASH_FIND(hh,head,&((add)->fieldname),keylen_in,replaced); \
+- if (replaced!=NULL) { \
+- HASH_DELETE(hh,head,replaced); \
+- }; \
+- HASH_ADD(hh,head,fieldname,keylen_in,add); \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-#define HASH_ADD_KEYPTR(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,add) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _ha_bkt; \
+- (add)->hh.next = NULL; \
+- (add)->hh.key = (char*)keyptr; \
+- (add)->hh.keylen = (unsigned)keylen_in; \
+- if (!(head)) { \
+- head = (add); \
+- (head)->hh.prev = NULL; \
+- HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh,head); \
+- } else { \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->tail->next = (add); \
+- (add)->hh.prev = ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, (head)->hh.tbl->tail); \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->tail = &((add)->hh); \
+- } \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->num_items++; \
+- (add)->hh.tbl = (head)->hh.tbl; \
+- HASH_FCN(keyptr,keylen_in, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, \
+- (add)->hh.hashv, _ha_bkt); \
+- HASH_ADD_TO_BKT((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_ha_bkt],&(add)->hh); \
+- HASH_BLOOM_ADD((head)->hh.tbl,(add)->hh.hashv); \
+- HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in); \
+- HASH_FSCK(hh,head); \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-#define HASH_TO_BKT( hashv, num_bkts, bkt ) \
+-do { \
+- bkt = ((hashv) & ((num_bkts) - 1)); \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-/* delete "delptr" from the hash table.
+- * "the usual" patch-up process for the app-order doubly-linked-list.
+- * The use of _hd_hh_del below deserves special explanation.
+- * These used to be expressed using (delptr) but that led to a bug
+- * if someone used the same symbol for the head and deletee, like
+- * HASH_DELETE(hh,users,users);
+- * We want that to work, but by changing the head (users) below
+- * we were forfeiting our ability to further refer to the deletee (users)
+- * in the patch-up process. Solution: use scratch space to
+- * copy the deletee pointer, then the latter references are via that
+- * scratch pointer rather than through the repointed (users) symbol.
+- */
+-#define HASH_DELETE(hh,head,delptr) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _hd_bkt; \
+- struct UT_hash_handle *_hd_hh_del; \
+- if ( ((delptr)->hh.prev == NULL) && ((delptr)->hh.next == NULL) ) { \
+- uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl->buckets, \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets*sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket) ); \
+- HASH_BLOOM_FREE((head)->hh.tbl); \
+- uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \
+- head = NULL; \
+- } else { \
+- _hd_hh_del = &((delptr)->hh); \
+- if ((delptr) == ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl,(head)->hh.tbl->tail)) { \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->tail = \
+- (UT_hash_handle*)((ptrdiff_t)((delptr)->hh.prev) + \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho); \
+- } \
+- if ((delptr)->hh.prev) { \
+- ((UT_hash_handle*)((ptrdiff_t)((delptr)->hh.prev) + \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho))->next = (delptr)->hh.next; \
+- } else { \
+- DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head,(delptr)->hh.next); \
+- } \
+- if (_hd_hh_del->next) { \
+- ((UT_hash_handle*)((ptrdiff_t)_hd_hh_del->next + \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho))->prev = \
+- _hd_hh_del->prev; \
+- } \
+- HASH_TO_BKT( _hd_hh_del->hashv, (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets, _hd_bkt); \
+- HASH_DEL_IN_BKT(hh,(head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_hd_bkt], _hd_hh_del); \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->num_items--; \
+- } \
+- HASH_FSCK(hh,head); \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-
+-/* convenience forms of HASH_FIND/HASH_ADD/HASH_DEL */
+-#define HASH_FIND_STR(head,findstr,out) \
+- HASH_FIND(hh,head,findstr,strlen(findstr),out)
+-#define HASH_ADD_STR(head,strfield,add) \
+- HASH_ADD(hh,head,strfield,strlen(add->strfield),add)
+-#define HASH_REPLACE_STR(head,strfield,add,replaced) \
+- HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,strfield,strlen(add->strfield),add,replaced)
+-#define HASH_FIND_INT(head,findint,out) \
+- HASH_FIND(hh,head,findint,sizeof(int),out)
+-#define HASH_ADD_INT(head,intfield,add) \
+- HASH_ADD(hh,head,intfield,sizeof(int),add)
+-#define HASH_REPLACE_INT(head,intfield,add,replaced) \
+- HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,intfield,sizeof(int),add,replaced)
+-#define HASH_FIND_PTR(head,findptr,out) \
+- HASH_FIND(hh,head,findptr,sizeof(void *),out)
+-#define HASH_ADD_PTR(head,ptrfield,add) \
+- HASH_ADD(hh,head,ptrfield,sizeof(void *),add)
+-#define HASH_REPLACE_PTR(head,ptrfield,add) \
+- HASH_REPLACE(hh,head,ptrfield,sizeof(void *),add,replaced)
+-#define HASH_DEL(head,delptr) \
+- HASH_DELETE(hh,head,delptr)
+-
+-/* HASH_FSCK checks hash integrity on every add/delete when HASH_DEBUG is defined.
+- * This is for uthash developer only; it compiles away if HASH_DEBUG isn't defined.
+- */
+-#ifdef HASH_DEBUG
+-#define HASH_OOPS(...) do { fprintf(stderr,__VA_ARGS__); exit(-1); } while (0)
+-#define HASH_FSCK(hh,head) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _bkt_i; \
+- unsigned _count, _bkt_count; \
+- char *_prev; \
+- struct UT_hash_handle *_thh; \
+- if (head) { \
+- _count = 0; \
+- for( _bkt_i = 0; _bkt_i < (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets; _bkt_i++) { \
+- _bkt_count = 0; \
+- _thh = (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_bkt_i].hh_head; \
+- _prev = NULL; \
+- while (_thh) { \
+- if (_prev != (char*)(_thh->hh_prev)) { \
+- HASH_OOPS("invalid hh_prev %p, actual %p\n", \
+- _thh->hh_prev, _prev ); \
+- } \
+- _bkt_count++; \
+- _prev = (char*)(_thh); \
+- _thh = _thh->hh_next; \
+- } \
+- _count += _bkt_count; \
+- if ((head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_bkt_i].count != _bkt_count) { \
+- HASH_OOPS("invalid bucket count %d, actual %d\n", \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->buckets[_bkt_i].count, _bkt_count); \
+- } \
+- } \
+- if (_count != (head)->hh.tbl->num_items) { \
+- HASH_OOPS("invalid hh item count %d, actual %d\n", \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->num_items, _count ); \
+- } \
+- /* traverse hh in app order; check next/prev integrity, count */ \
+- _count = 0; \
+- _prev = NULL; \
+- _thh = &(head)->hh; \
+- while (_thh) { \
+- _count++; \
+- if (_prev !=(char*)(_thh->prev)) { \
+- HASH_OOPS("invalid prev %p, actual %p\n", \
+- _thh->prev, _prev ); \
+- } \
+- _prev = (char*)ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _thh); \
+- _thh = ( _thh->next ? (UT_hash_handle*)((char*)(_thh->next) + \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho) : NULL ); \
+- } \
+- if (_count != (head)->hh.tbl->num_items) { \
+- HASH_OOPS("invalid app item count %d, actual %d\n", \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->num_items, _count ); \
+- } \
+- } \
+-} while (0)
+-#else
+-#define HASH_FSCK(hh,head)
+-#endif
+-
+-/* When compiled with -DHASH_EMIT_KEYS, length-prefixed keys are emitted to
+- * the descriptor to which this macro is defined for tuning the hash function.
+- * The app can #include <unistd.h> to get the prototype for write(2). */
+-#ifdef HASH_EMIT_KEYS
+-#define HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh,head,keyptr,fieldlen) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _klen = fieldlen; \
+- write(HASH_EMIT_KEYS, &_klen, sizeof(_klen)); \
+- write(HASH_EMIT_KEYS, keyptr, fieldlen); \
+-} while (0)
+-#else
+-#define HASH_EMIT_KEY(hh,head,keyptr,fieldlen)
+-#endif
+-
+-/* default to Jenkin's hash unless overridden e.g. DHASH_FUNCTION=HASH_SAX */
+-#ifdef HASH_FUNCTION
+-#define HASH_FCN HASH_FUNCTION
+-#else
+-#define HASH_FCN HASH_JEN
+-#endif
+-
+-/* The Bernstein hash function, used in Perl prior to v5.6 */
+-#define HASH_BER(key,keylen,num_bkts,hashv,bkt) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _hb_keylen=keylen; \
+- char *_hb_key=(char*)(key); \
+- (hashv) = 0; \
+- while (_hb_keylen--) { (hashv) = ((hashv) * 33) + *_hb_key++; } \
+- bkt = (hashv) & (num_bkts-1); \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-
+-/* SAX/FNV/OAT/JEN hash functions are macro variants of those listed at
+- * http://eternallyconfuzzled.com/tuts/algorithms/jsw_tut_hashing.aspx */
+-#define HASH_SAX(key,keylen,num_bkts,hashv,bkt) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _sx_i; \
+- char *_hs_key=(char*)(key); \
+- hashv = 0; \
+- for(_sx_i=0; _sx_i < keylen; _sx_i++) \
+- hashv ^= (hashv << 5) + (hashv >> 2) + _hs_key[_sx_i]; \
+- bkt = hashv & (num_bkts-1); \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-#define HASH_FNV(key,keylen,num_bkts,hashv,bkt) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _fn_i; \
+- char *_hf_key=(char*)(key); \
+- hashv = 2166136261UL; \
+- for(_fn_i=0; _fn_i < keylen; _fn_i++) \
+- hashv = (hashv * 16777619) ^ _hf_key[_fn_i]; \
+- bkt = hashv & (num_bkts-1); \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-#define HASH_OAT(key,keylen,num_bkts,hashv,bkt) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _ho_i; \
+- char *_ho_key=(char*)(key); \
+- hashv = 0; \
+- for(_ho_i=0; _ho_i < keylen; _ho_i++) { \
+- hashv += _ho_key[_ho_i]; \
+- hashv += (hashv << 10); \
+- hashv ^= (hashv >> 6); \
+- } \
+- hashv += (hashv << 3); \
+- hashv ^= (hashv >> 11); \
+- hashv += (hashv << 15); \
+- bkt = hashv & (num_bkts-1); \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-#define HASH_JEN_MIX(a,b,c) \
+-do { \
+- a -= b; a -= c; a ^= ( c >> 13 ); \
+- b -= c; b -= a; b ^= ( a << 8 ); \
+- c -= a; c -= b; c ^= ( b >> 13 ); \
+- a -= b; a -= c; a ^= ( c >> 12 ); \
+- b -= c; b -= a; b ^= ( a << 16 ); \
+- c -= a; c -= b; c ^= ( b >> 5 ); \
+- a -= b; a -= c; a ^= ( c >> 3 ); \
+- b -= c; b -= a; b ^= ( a << 10 ); \
+- c -= a; c -= b; c ^= ( b >> 15 ); \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-#define HASH_JEN(key,keylen,num_bkts,hashv,bkt) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _hj_i,_hj_j,_hj_k; \
+- unsigned char *_hj_key=(unsigned char*)(key); \
+- hashv = 0xfeedbeef; \
+- _hj_i = _hj_j = 0x9e3779b9; \
+- _hj_k = (unsigned)keylen; \
+- while (_hj_k >= 12) { \
+- _hj_i += (_hj_key[0] + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[1] << 8 ) \
+- + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[2] << 16 ) \
+- + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[3] << 24 ) ); \
+- _hj_j += (_hj_key[4] + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[5] << 8 ) \
+- + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[6] << 16 ) \
+- + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[7] << 24 ) ); \
+- hashv += (_hj_key[8] + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[9] << 8 ) \
+- + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[10] << 16 ) \
+- + ( (unsigned)_hj_key[11] << 24 ) ); \
+- \
+- HASH_JEN_MIX(_hj_i, _hj_j, hashv); \
+- \
+- _hj_key += 12; \
+- _hj_k -= 12; \
+- } \
+- hashv += keylen; \
+- switch ( _hj_k ) { \
+- case 11: hashv += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[10] << 24 ); \
+- case 10: hashv += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[9] << 16 ); \
+- case 9: hashv += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[8] << 8 ); \
+- case 8: _hj_j += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[7] << 24 ); \
+- case 7: _hj_j += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[6] << 16 ); \
+- case 6: _hj_j += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[5] << 8 ); \
+- case 5: _hj_j += _hj_key[4]; \
+- case 4: _hj_i += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[3] << 24 ); \
+- case 3: _hj_i += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[2] << 16 ); \
+- case 2: _hj_i += ( (unsigned)_hj_key[1] << 8 ); \
+- case 1: _hj_i += _hj_key[0]; \
+- } \
+- HASH_JEN_MIX(_hj_i, _hj_j, hashv); \
+- bkt = hashv & (num_bkts-1); \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-/* The Paul Hsieh hash function */
+-#undef get16bits
+-#if (defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) \
+- || defined(_MSC_VER) || defined (__BORLANDC__) || defined (__TURBOC__)
+-#define get16bits(d) (*((const uint16_t *) (d)))
+-#endif
+-
+-#if !defined (get16bits)
+-#define get16bits(d) ((((uint32_t)(((const uint8_t *)(d))[1])) << 8) \
+- +(uint32_t)(((const uint8_t *)(d))[0]) )
+-#endif
+-#define HASH_SFH(key,keylen,num_bkts,hashv,bkt) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned char *_sfh_key=(unsigned char*)(key); \
+- uint32_t _sfh_tmp, _sfh_len = keylen; \
+- \
+- int _sfh_rem = _sfh_len & 3; \
+- _sfh_len >>= 2; \
+- hashv = 0xcafebabe; \
+- \
+- /* Main loop */ \
+- for (;_sfh_len > 0; _sfh_len--) { \
+- hashv += get16bits (_sfh_key); \
+- _sfh_tmp = (uint32_t)(get16bits (_sfh_key+2)) << 11 ^ hashv; \
+- hashv = (hashv << 16) ^ _sfh_tmp; \
+- _sfh_key += 2*sizeof (uint16_t); \
+- hashv += hashv >> 11; \
+- } \
+- \
+- /* Handle end cases */ \
+- switch (_sfh_rem) { \
+- case 3: hashv += get16bits (_sfh_key); \
+- hashv ^= hashv << 16; \
+- hashv ^= (uint32_t)(_sfh_key[sizeof (uint16_t)] << 18); \
+- hashv += hashv >> 11; \
+- break; \
+- case 2: hashv += get16bits (_sfh_key); \
+- hashv ^= hashv << 11; \
+- hashv += hashv >> 17; \
+- break; \
+- case 1: hashv += *_sfh_key; \
+- hashv ^= hashv << 10; \
+- hashv += hashv >> 1; \
+- } \
+- \
+- /* Force "avalanching" of final 127 bits */ \
+- hashv ^= hashv << 3; \
+- hashv += hashv >> 5; \
+- hashv ^= hashv << 4; \
+- hashv += hashv >> 17; \
+- hashv ^= hashv << 25; \
+- hashv += hashv >> 6; \
+- bkt = hashv & (num_bkts-1); \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-#ifdef HASH_USING_NO_STRICT_ALIASING
+-/* The MurmurHash exploits some CPU's (x86,x86_64) tolerance for unaligned reads.
+- * For other types of CPU's (e.g. Sparc) an unaligned read causes a bus error.
+- * MurmurHash uses the faster approach only on CPU's where we know it's safe.
+- *
+- * Note the preprocessor built-in defines can be emitted using:
+- *
+- * gcc -m64 -dM -E - < /dev/null (on gcc)
+- * cc -## a.c (where a.c is a simple test file) (Sun Studio)
+- */
+-#if (defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_IX86))
+-#define MUR_GETBLOCK(p,i) p[i]
+-#else /* non intel */
+-#define MUR_PLUS0_ALIGNED(p) (((unsigned long)p & 0x3) == 0)
+-#define MUR_PLUS1_ALIGNED(p) (((unsigned long)p & 0x3) == 1)
+-#define MUR_PLUS2_ALIGNED(p) (((unsigned long)p & 0x3) == 2)
+-#define MUR_PLUS3_ALIGNED(p) (((unsigned long)p & 0x3) == 3)
+-#define WP(p) ((uint32_t*)((unsigned long)(p) & ~3UL))
+-#if (defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) || defined(SPARC) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(__ppc64__))
+-#define MUR_THREE_ONE(p) ((((*WP(p))&0x00ffffff) << 8) | (((*(WP(p)+1))&0xff000000) >> 24))
+-#define MUR_TWO_TWO(p) ((((*WP(p))&0x0000ffff) <<16) | (((*(WP(p)+1))&0xffff0000) >> 16))
+-#define MUR_ONE_THREE(p) ((((*WP(p))&0x000000ff) <<24) | (((*(WP(p)+1))&0xffffff00) >> 8))
+-#else /* assume little endian non-intel */
+-#define MUR_THREE_ONE(p) ((((*WP(p))&0xffffff00) >> 8) | (((*(WP(p)+1))&0x000000ff) << 24))
+-#define MUR_TWO_TWO(p) ((((*WP(p))&0xffff0000) >>16) | (((*(WP(p)+1))&0x0000ffff) << 16))
+-#define MUR_ONE_THREE(p) ((((*WP(p))&0xff000000) >>24) | (((*(WP(p)+1))&0x00ffffff) << 8))
+-#endif
+-#define MUR_GETBLOCK(p,i) (MUR_PLUS0_ALIGNED(p) ? ((p)[i]) : \
+- (MUR_PLUS1_ALIGNED(p) ? MUR_THREE_ONE(p) : \
+- (MUR_PLUS2_ALIGNED(p) ? MUR_TWO_TWO(p) : \
+- MUR_ONE_THREE(p))))
+-#endif
+-#define MUR_ROTL32(x,r) (((x) << (r)) | ((x) >> (32 - (r))))
+-#define MUR_FMIX(_h) \
+-do { \
+- _h ^= _h >> 16; \
+- _h *= 0x85ebca6b; \
+- _h ^= _h >> 13; \
+- _h *= 0xc2b2ae35l; \
+- _h ^= _h >> 16; \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-#define HASH_MUR(key,keylen,num_bkts,hashv,bkt) \
+-do { \
+- const uint8_t *_mur_data = (const uint8_t*)(key); \
+- const int _mur_nblocks = (keylen) / 4; \
+- uint32_t _mur_h1 = 0xf88D5353; \
+- uint32_t _mur_c1 = 0xcc9e2d51; \
+- uint32_t _mur_c2 = 0x1b873593; \
+- uint32_t _mur_k1 = 0; \
+- const uint8_t *_mur_tail; \
+- const uint32_t *_mur_blocks = (const uint32_t*)(_mur_data+_mur_nblocks*4); \
+- int _mur_i; \
+- for(_mur_i = -_mur_nblocks; _mur_i; _mur_i++) { \
+- _mur_k1 = MUR_GETBLOCK(_mur_blocks,_mur_i); \
+- _mur_k1 *= _mur_c1; \
+- _mur_k1 = MUR_ROTL32(_mur_k1,15); \
+- _mur_k1 *= _mur_c2; \
+- \
+- _mur_h1 ^= _mur_k1; \
+- _mur_h1 = MUR_ROTL32(_mur_h1,13); \
+- _mur_h1 = _mur_h1*5+0xe6546b64; \
+- } \
+- _mur_tail = (const uint8_t*)(_mur_data + _mur_nblocks*4); \
+- _mur_k1=0; \
+- switch((keylen) & 3) { \
+- case 3: _mur_k1 ^= _mur_tail[2] << 16; \
+- case 2: _mur_k1 ^= _mur_tail[1] << 8; \
+- case 1: _mur_k1 ^= _mur_tail[0]; \
+- _mur_k1 *= _mur_c1; \
+- _mur_k1 = MUR_ROTL32(_mur_k1,15); \
+- _mur_k1 *= _mur_c2; \
+- _mur_h1 ^= _mur_k1; \
+- } \
+- _mur_h1 ^= (keylen); \
+- MUR_FMIX(_mur_h1); \
+- hashv = _mur_h1; \
+- bkt = hashv & (num_bkts-1); \
+-} while(0)
+-#endif /* HASH_USING_NO_STRICT_ALIASING */
+-
+-/* key comparison function; return 0 if keys equal */
+-#define HASH_KEYCMP(a,b,len) memcmp(a,b,len)
+-
+-/* iterate over items in a known bucket to find desired item */
+-#define HASH_FIND_IN_BKT(tbl,hh,head,keyptr,keylen_in,out) \
+-do { \
+- if (head.hh_head) DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(out,ELMT_FROM_HH(tbl,head.hh_head)); \
+- else out=NULL; \
+- while (out) { \
+- if ((out)->hh.keylen == keylen_in) { \
+- if ((HASH_KEYCMP((out)->hh.key,keyptr,keylen_in)) == 0) break; \
+- } \
+- if ((out)->hh.hh_next) DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(out,ELMT_FROM_HH(tbl,(out)->hh.hh_next)); \
+- else out = NULL; \
+- } \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-/* add an item to a bucket */
+-#define HASH_ADD_TO_BKT(head,addhh) \
+-do { \
+- head.count++; \
+- (addhh)->hh_next = head.hh_head; \
+- (addhh)->hh_prev = NULL; \
+- if (head.hh_head) { (head).hh_head->hh_prev = (addhh); } \
+- (head).hh_head=addhh; \
+- if (head.count >= ((head.expand_mult+1) * HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH) \
+- && (addhh)->tbl->noexpand != 1) { \
+- HASH_EXPAND_BUCKETS((addhh)->tbl); \
+- } \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-/* remove an item from a given bucket */
+-#define HASH_DEL_IN_BKT(hh,head,hh_del) \
+- (head).count--; \
+- if ((head).hh_head == hh_del) { \
+- (head).hh_head = hh_del->hh_next; \
+- } \
+- if (hh_del->hh_prev) { \
+- hh_del->hh_prev->hh_next = hh_del->hh_next; \
+- } \
+- if (hh_del->hh_next) { \
+- hh_del->hh_next->hh_prev = hh_del->hh_prev; \
+- }
+-
+-/* Bucket expansion has the effect of doubling the number of buckets
+- * and redistributing the items into the new buckets. Ideally the
+- * items will distribute more or less evenly into the new buckets
+- * (the extent to which this is true is a measure of the quality of
+- * the hash function as it applies to the key domain).
+- *
+- * With the items distributed into more buckets, the chain length
+- * (item count) in each bucket is reduced. Thus by expanding buckets
+- * the hash keeps a bound on the chain length. This bounded chain
+- * length is the essence of how a hash provides constant time lookup.
+- *
+- * The calculation of tbl->ideal_chain_maxlen below deserves some
+- * explanation. First, keep in mind that we're calculating the ideal
+- * maximum chain length based on the *new* (doubled) bucket count.
+- * In fractions this is just n/b (n=number of items,b=new num buckets).
+- * Since the ideal chain length is an integer, we want to calculate
+- * ceil(n/b). We don't depend on floating point arithmetic in this
+- * hash, so to calculate ceil(n/b) with integers we could write
+- *
+- * ceil(n/b) = (n/b) + ((n%b)?1:0)
+- *
+- * and in fact a previous version of this hash did just that.
+- * But now we have improved things a bit by recognizing that b is
+- * always a power of two. We keep its base 2 log handy (call it lb),
+- * so now we can write this with a bit shift and logical AND:
+- *
+- * ceil(n/b) = (n>>lb) + ( (n & (b-1)) ? 1:0)
+- *
+- */
+-#define HASH_EXPAND_BUCKETS(tbl) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _he_bkt; \
+- unsigned _he_bkt_i; \
+- struct UT_hash_handle *_he_thh, *_he_hh_nxt; \
+- UT_hash_bucket *_he_new_buckets, *_he_newbkt; \
+- _he_new_buckets = (UT_hash_bucket*)uthash_malloc( \
+- 2 * tbl->num_buckets * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \
+- if (!_he_new_buckets) { uthash_fatal( "out of memory"); } \
+- memset(_he_new_buckets, 0, \
+- 2 * tbl->num_buckets * sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \
+- tbl->ideal_chain_maxlen = \
+- (tbl->num_items >> (tbl->log2_num_buckets+1)) + \
+- ((tbl->num_items & ((tbl->num_buckets*2)-1)) ? 1 : 0); \
+- tbl->nonideal_items = 0; \
+- for(_he_bkt_i = 0; _he_bkt_i < tbl->num_buckets; _he_bkt_i++) \
+- { \
+- _he_thh = tbl->buckets[ _he_bkt_i ].hh_head; \
+- while (_he_thh) { \
+- _he_hh_nxt = _he_thh->hh_next; \
+- HASH_TO_BKT( _he_thh->hashv, tbl->num_buckets*2, _he_bkt); \
+- _he_newbkt = &(_he_new_buckets[ _he_bkt ]); \
+- if (++(_he_newbkt->count) > tbl->ideal_chain_maxlen) { \
+- tbl->nonideal_items++; \
+- _he_newbkt->expand_mult = _he_newbkt->count / \
+- tbl->ideal_chain_maxlen; \
+- } \
+- _he_thh->hh_prev = NULL; \
+- _he_thh->hh_next = _he_newbkt->hh_head; \
+- if (_he_newbkt->hh_head) _he_newbkt->hh_head->hh_prev = \
+- _he_thh; \
+- _he_newbkt->hh_head = _he_thh; \
+- _he_thh = _he_hh_nxt; \
+- } \
+- } \
+- uthash_free( tbl->buckets, tbl->num_buckets*sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket) ); \
+- tbl->num_buckets *= 2; \
+- tbl->log2_num_buckets++; \
+- tbl->buckets = _he_new_buckets; \
+- tbl->ineff_expands = (tbl->nonideal_items > (tbl->num_items >> 1)) ? \
+- (tbl->ineff_expands+1) : 0; \
+- if (tbl->ineff_expands > 1) { \
+- tbl->noexpand=1; \
+- uthash_noexpand_fyi(tbl); \
+- } \
+- uthash_expand_fyi(tbl); \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-
+-/* This is an adaptation of Simon Tatham's O(n log(n)) mergesort */
+-/* Note that HASH_SORT assumes the hash handle name to be hh.
+- * HASH_SRT was added to allow the hash handle name to be passed in. */
+-#define HASH_SORT(head,cmpfcn) HASH_SRT(hh,head,cmpfcn)
+-#define HASH_SRT(hh,head,cmpfcn) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _hs_i; \
+- unsigned _hs_looping,_hs_nmerges,_hs_insize,_hs_psize,_hs_qsize; \
+- struct UT_hash_handle *_hs_p, *_hs_q, *_hs_e, *_hs_list, *_hs_tail; \
+- if (head) { \
+- _hs_insize = 1; \
+- _hs_looping = 1; \
+- _hs_list = &((head)->hh); \
+- while (_hs_looping) { \
+- _hs_p = _hs_list; \
+- _hs_list = NULL; \
+- _hs_tail = NULL; \
+- _hs_nmerges = 0; \
+- while (_hs_p) { \
+- _hs_nmerges++; \
+- _hs_q = _hs_p; \
+- _hs_psize = 0; \
+- for ( _hs_i = 0; _hs_i < _hs_insize; _hs_i++ ) { \
+- _hs_psize++; \
+- _hs_q = (UT_hash_handle*)((_hs_q->next) ? \
+- ((void*)((char*)(_hs_q->next) + \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho)) : NULL); \
+- if (! (_hs_q) ) break; \
+- } \
+- _hs_qsize = _hs_insize; \
+- while ((_hs_psize > 0) || ((_hs_qsize > 0) && _hs_q )) { \
+- if (_hs_psize == 0) { \
+- _hs_e = _hs_q; \
+- _hs_q = (UT_hash_handle*)((_hs_q->next) ? \
+- ((void*)((char*)(_hs_q->next) + \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho)) : NULL); \
+- _hs_qsize--; \
+- } else if ( (_hs_qsize == 0) || !(_hs_q) ) { \
+- _hs_e = _hs_p; \
+- if (_hs_p){ \
+- _hs_p = (UT_hash_handle*)((_hs_p->next) ? \
+- ((void*)((char*)(_hs_p->next) + \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho)) : NULL); \
+- } \
+- _hs_psize--; \
+- } else if (( \
+- cmpfcn(DECLTYPE(head)(ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl,_hs_p)), \
+- DECLTYPE(head)(ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl,_hs_q))) \
+- ) <= 0) { \
+- _hs_e = _hs_p; \
+- if (_hs_p){ \
+- _hs_p = (UT_hash_handle*)((_hs_p->next) ? \
+- ((void*)((char*)(_hs_p->next) + \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho)) : NULL); \
+- } \
+- _hs_psize--; \
+- } else { \
+- _hs_e = _hs_q; \
+- _hs_q = (UT_hash_handle*)((_hs_q->next) ? \
+- ((void*)((char*)(_hs_q->next) + \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->hho)) : NULL); \
+- _hs_qsize--; \
+- } \
+- if ( _hs_tail ) { \
+- _hs_tail->next = ((_hs_e) ? \
+- ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl,_hs_e) : NULL); \
+- } else { \
+- _hs_list = _hs_e; \
+- } \
+- if (_hs_e) { \
+- _hs_e->prev = ((_hs_tail) ? \
+- ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl,_hs_tail) : NULL); \
+- } \
+- _hs_tail = _hs_e; \
+- } \
+- _hs_p = _hs_q; \
+- } \
+- if (_hs_tail){ \
+- _hs_tail->next = NULL; \
+- } \
+- if ( _hs_nmerges <= 1 ) { \
+- _hs_looping=0; \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->tail = _hs_tail; \
+- DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(head,ELMT_FROM_HH((head)->hh.tbl, _hs_list)); \
+- } \
+- _hs_insize *= 2; \
+- } \
+- HASH_FSCK(hh,head); \
+- } \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-/* This function selects items from one hash into another hash.
+- * The end result is that the selected items have dual presence
+- * in both hashes. There is no copy of the items made; rather
+- * they are added into the new hash through a secondary hash
+- * hash handle that must be present in the structure. */
+-#define HASH_SELECT(hh_dst, dst, hh_src, src, cond) \
+-do { \
+- unsigned _src_bkt, _dst_bkt; \
+- void *_last_elt=NULL, *_elt; \
+- UT_hash_handle *_src_hh, *_dst_hh, *_last_elt_hh=NULL; \
+- ptrdiff_t _dst_hho = ((char*)(&(dst)->hh_dst) - (char*)(dst)); \
+- if (src) { \
+- for(_src_bkt=0; _src_bkt < (src)->hh_src.tbl->num_buckets; _src_bkt++) { \
+- for(_src_hh = (src)->hh_src.tbl->buckets[_src_bkt].hh_head; \
+- _src_hh; \
+- _src_hh = _src_hh->hh_next) { \
+- _elt = ELMT_FROM_HH((src)->hh_src.tbl, _src_hh); \
+- if (cond(_elt)) { \
+- _dst_hh = (UT_hash_handle*)(((char*)_elt) + _dst_hho); \
+- _dst_hh->key = _src_hh->key; \
+- _dst_hh->keylen = _src_hh->keylen; \
+- _dst_hh->hashv = _src_hh->hashv; \
+- _dst_hh->prev = _last_elt; \
+- _dst_hh->next = NULL; \
+- if (_last_elt_hh) { _last_elt_hh->next = _elt; } \
+- if (!dst) { \
+- DECLTYPE_ASSIGN(dst,_elt); \
+- HASH_MAKE_TABLE(hh_dst,dst); \
+- } else { \
+- _dst_hh->tbl = (dst)->hh_dst.tbl; \
+- } \
+- HASH_TO_BKT(_dst_hh->hashv, _dst_hh->tbl->num_buckets, _dst_bkt); \
+- HASH_ADD_TO_BKT(_dst_hh->tbl->buckets[_dst_bkt],_dst_hh); \
+- (dst)->hh_dst.tbl->num_items++; \
+- _last_elt = _elt; \
+- _last_elt_hh = _dst_hh; \
+- } \
+- } \
+- } \
+- } \
+- HASH_FSCK(hh_dst,dst); \
+-} while (0)
+-
+-#define HASH_CLEAR(hh,head) \
+-do { \
+- if (head) { \
+- uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl->buckets, \
+- (head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets*sizeof(struct UT_hash_bucket)); \
+- HASH_BLOOM_FREE((head)->hh.tbl); \
+- uthash_free((head)->hh.tbl, sizeof(UT_hash_table)); \
+- (head)=NULL; \
+- } \
+-} while(0)
+-
+-#define HASH_OVERHEAD(hh,head) \
+- (size_t)((((head)->hh.tbl->num_items * sizeof(UT_hash_handle)) + \
+- ((head)->hh.tbl->num_buckets * sizeof(UT_hash_bucket)) + \
+- (sizeof(UT_hash_table)) + \
+- (HASH_BLOOM_BYTELEN)))
+-
+-#ifdef NO_DECLTYPE
+-#define HASH_ITER(hh,head,el,tmp) \
+-for((el)=(head), (*(char**)(&(tmp)))=(char*)((head)?(head)->hh.next:NULL); \
+- el; (el)=(tmp),(*(char**)(&(tmp)))=(char*)((tmp)?(tmp)->hh.next:NULL))
+-#else
+-#define HASH_ITER(hh,head,el,tmp) \
+-for((el)=(head),(tmp)=DECLTYPE(el)((head)?(head)->hh.next:NULL); \
+- el; (el)=(tmp),(tmp)=DECLTYPE(el)((tmp)?(tmp)->hh.next:NULL))
+-#endif
+-
+-/* obtain a count of items in the hash */
+-#define HASH_COUNT(head) HASH_CNT(hh,head)
+-#define HASH_CNT(hh,head) ((head)?((head)->hh.tbl->num_items):0)
+-
+-typedef struct UT_hash_bucket {
+- struct UT_hash_handle *hh_head;
+- unsigned count;
+-
+- /* expand_mult is normally set to 0. In this situation, the max chain length
+- * threshold is enforced at its default value, HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH. (If
+- * the bucket's chain exceeds this length, bucket expansion is triggered).
+- * However, setting expand_mult to a non-zero value delays bucket expansion
+- * (that would be triggered by additions to this particular bucket)
+- * until its chain length reaches a *multiple* of HASH_BKT_CAPACITY_THRESH.
+- * (The multiplier is simply expand_mult+1). The whole idea of this
+- * multiplier is to reduce bucket expansions, since they are expensive, in
+- * situations where we know that a particular bucket tends to be overused.
+- * It is better to let its chain length grow to a longer yet-still-bounded
+- * value, than to do an O(n) bucket expansion too often.
+- */
+- unsigned expand_mult;
+-
+-} UT_hash_bucket;
+-
+-/* random signature used only to find hash tables in external analysis */
+-#define HASH_SIGNATURE 0xa0111fe1
+-#define HASH_BLOOM_SIGNATURE 0xb12220f2
+-
+-typedef struct UT_hash_table {
+- UT_hash_bucket *buckets;
+- unsigned num_buckets, log2_num_buckets;
+- unsigned num_items;
+- struct UT_hash_handle *tail; /* tail hh in app order, for fast append */
+- ptrdiff_t hho; /* hash handle offset (byte pos of hash handle in element */
+-
+- /* in an ideal situation (all buckets used equally), no bucket would have
+- * more than ceil(#items/#buckets) items. that's the ideal chain length. */
+- unsigned ideal_chain_maxlen;
+-
+- /* nonideal_items is the number of items in the hash whose chain position
+- * exceeds the ideal chain maxlen. these items pay the penalty for an uneven
+- * hash distribution; reaching them in a chain traversal takes >ideal steps */
+- unsigned nonideal_items;
+-
+- /* ineffective expands occur when a bucket doubling was performed, but
+- * afterward, more than half the items in the hash had nonideal chain
+- * positions. If this happens on two consecutive expansions we inhibit any
+- * further expansion, as it's not helping; this happens when the hash
+- * function isn't a good fit for the key domain. When expansion is inhibited
+- * the hash will still work, albeit no longer in constant time. */
+- unsigned ineff_expands, noexpand;
+-
+- uint32_t signature; /* used only to find hash tables in external analysis */
+-#ifdef HASH_BLOOM
+- uint32_t bloom_sig; /* used only to test bloom exists in external analysis */
+- uint8_t *bloom_bv;
+- char bloom_nbits;
+-#endif
+-
+-} UT_hash_table;
+-
+-typedef struct UT_hash_handle {
+- struct UT_hash_table *tbl;
+- void *prev; /* prev element in app order */
+- void *next; /* next element in app order */
+- struct UT_hash_handle *hh_prev; /* previous hh in bucket order */
+- struct UT_hash_handle *hh_next; /* next hh in bucket order */
+- void *key; /* ptr to enclosing struct's key */
+- unsigned keylen; /* enclosing struct's key len */
+- unsigned hashv; /* result of hash-fcn(key) */
+-} UT_hash_handle;
+-
+-#endif /* UTHASH_H */
+--
+2.15.1
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/build.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/build.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0d0912b7a..000000000
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/files/build.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-From ebd7c8e548e9b8e096ee4c390173db9a701f2604 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Bruno Bottazzini <bruno.bottazzini@intel.com>
-Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2016 11:18:26 -0300
-Subject: [PATCH] build
-
-Disable stripping and allow easily overriding prefix
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-
-Signed-off-by: Bruno Bottazzini <bruno.bottazzini@intel.com>
----
- client/Makefile | 4 ++--
- config.mk | 2 +-
- lib/Makefile | 2 +-
- lib/cpp/Makefile | 2 +-
- src/Makefile | 4 ++--
- 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/client/Makefile b/client/Makefile
-index bd65355..4e5a640 100644
---- a/client/Makefile
-+++ b/client/Makefile
-@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ client_shared.o : client_shared.c client
-
- install : all
- $(INSTALL) -d ${DESTDIR}$(prefix)/bin
-- $(INSTALL) -s --strip-program=${CROSS_COMPILE}${STRIP} mosquitto_pub ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/bin/mosquitto_pub
-- $(INSTALL) -s --strip-program=${CROSS_COMPILE}${STRIP} mosquitto_sub ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/bin/mosquitto_sub
-+ $(INSTALL) mosquitto_pub ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/bin/mosquitto_pub
-+ $(INSTALL) mosquitto_sub ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/bin/mosquitto_sub
-
- uninstall :
- -rm -f ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/bin/mosquitto_pub
-diff --git a/config.mk b/config.mk
-index c0f175f..3427b83 100644
---- a/config.mk
-+++ b/config.mk
-@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ ifeq ($(WITH_DOCS),yes)
- endif
-
- INSTALL?=install
--prefix=/usr/local
-+prefix?=/usr
- mandir=${prefix}/share/man
- localedir=${prefix}/share/locale
- STRIP?=strip
-diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
-index 825fcea..9b7c05c 100644
---- a/lib/Makefile
-+++ b/lib/Makefile
-@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ all : libmosquitto.so.${SOVERSION} libmo
-
- install : all
- $(INSTALL) -d ${DESTDIR}$(prefix)/lib${LIB_SUFFIX}/
-- $(INSTALL) -s --strip-program=${CROSS_COMPILE}${STRIP} libmosquitto.so.${SOVERSION} ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/lib${LIB_SUFFIX}/libmosquitto.so.${SOVERSION}
-+ $(INSTALL) libmosquitto.so.${SOVERSION} ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/lib${LIB_SUFFIX}/libmosquitto.so.${SOVERSION}
- ln -sf libmosquitto.so.${SOVERSION} ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/lib${LIB_SUFFIX}/libmosquitto.so
- $(INSTALL) -d ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/include/
- $(INSTALL) mosquitto.h ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/include/mosquitto.h
-diff --git a/lib/cpp/Makefile b/lib/cpp/Makefile
-index 8b627d3..cdb2923 100644
---- a/lib/cpp/Makefile
-+++ b/lib/cpp/Makefile
-@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ all : libmosquittopp.so.${SOVERSION}
-
- install : all
- $(INSTALL) -d ${DESTDIR}$(prefix)/lib${LIB_SUFFIX}/
-- $(INSTALL) -s --strip-program=${CROSS_COMPILE}${STRIP} libmosquittopp.so.${SOVERSION} ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/lib${LIB_SUFFIX}/libmosquittopp.so.${SOVERSION}
-+ $(INSTALL) libmosquittopp.so.${SOVERSION} ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/lib${LIB_SUFFIX}/libmosquittopp.so.${SOVERSION}
- ln -sf libmosquittopp.so.${SOVERSION} ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/lib${LIB_SUFFIX}/libmosquittopp.so
- $(INSTALL) -d ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/include/
- $(INSTALL) mosquittopp.h ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/include/mosquittopp.h
-diff --git a/src/Makefile b/src/Makefile
-index 2cfb7d4..9a97644 100644
---- a/src/Makefile
-+++ b/src/Makefile
-@@ -103,12 +103,12 @@ mosquitto_passwd.o : mosquitto_passwd.c
-
- install : all
- $(INSTALL) -d ${DESTDIR}$(prefix)/sbin
-- $(INSTALL) -s --strip-program=${CROSS_COMPILE}${STRIP} mosquitto ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/sbin/mosquitto
-+ $(INSTALL) mosquitto ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/sbin/mosquitto
- $(INSTALL) -d ${DESTDIR}$(prefix)/include
- $(INSTALL) mosquitto_plugin.h ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/include/mosquitto_plugin.h
- ifeq ($(WITH_TLS),yes)
- $(INSTALL) -d ${DESTDIR}$(prefix)/bin
-- $(INSTALL) -s --strip-program=${CROSS_COMPILE}${STRIP} mosquitto_passwd ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/bin/mosquitto_passwd
-+ $(INSTALL) mosquitto_passwd ${DESTDIR}${prefix}/bin/mosquitto_passwd
- endif
-
- uninstall :
---
-2.7.1
-
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/mosquitto_1.4.14.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/mosquitto_1.4.14.bb
index 7554248e4..13ce3811d 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/mosquitto_1.4.14.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/mosquitto/mosquitto_1.4.14.bb
@@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.txt;md5=62ddc846179e908dc0c8efec4a42ef20 \
file://epl-v10;md5=8d383c379e91d20ba18a52c3e7d3a979 \
file://notice.html;md5=a00d6f9ab542be7babc2d8b80d5d2a4c \
"
+DEPENDS = "uthash"
SRC_URI = "http://mosquitto.org/files/source/mosquitto-${PV}.tar.gz \
- file://build.patch \
+ file://0001-config.mk-allow-prefix-mandir-localedir-from-environ.patch \
+ file://0002-uthash-remove-in-tree-version.patch \
file://mosquitto.service \
file://mosquitto.init \
"
@@ -26,6 +28,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[dns-srv] = ",,c-ares"
PACKAGECONFIG[ssl] = ",,openssl"
PACKAGECONFIG[uuid] = ",,util-linux"
EXTRA_OEMAKE = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'dns-srv', 'WITH_SRV=yes', 'WITH_SRV=no', d)} \
+ STRIP=/bin/true \
WITH_DOCS=no \
${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'ssl', 'WITH_TLS=yes WITH_TLS_PSK=yes', 'WITH_TLS=no WITH_TLS_PSK=no', d)} \
${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'uuid', 'WITH_UUID=yes', 'WITH_UUID=no', d)}"
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/obex-data-server_0.4.6.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/obex-data-server_0.4.6.bb
index e10b89c36..715b02352 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/obex-data-server_0.4.6.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/obex-data-server_0.4.6.bb
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://tadas.dailyda.com/software/obex-data-server-${PV}.tar.gz \
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "961ca5db6fe9c97024e133cc6203cc4d"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b399465ddbd6d0217abedd9411d9d74a820effa0a6a142adc448268d3920094f"
-inherit autotools-brokensep pkgconfig
+inherit distro_features_check autotools-brokensep pkgconfig
+
+REQUIRED_DISTRO_FEATURES = "x11"
FILES_${PN} += "${datadir}/dbus-1/"
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/openobex_1.7.2.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/openobex_1.7.2.bb
index 2db48f341..1b56685c5 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/openobex_1.7.2.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obex/openobex_1.7.2.bb
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ EXTRA_OECMAKE += "-DBUILD_DOCUMENTATION=OFF"
#--enable-apps --enable-syslog
+ASNEEDED = ""
+
do_install_append () {
rmdir ${D}${bindir}
}
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obexftp/obexftp_0.24.2.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obexftp/obexftp_0.24.2.bb
index 489861cb7..b4a914d92 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obexftp/obexftp_0.24.2.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/obexftp/obexftp_0.24.2.bb
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d40fb48e0a0eea997b3e582774b29f793919a625d54b87182e31a3f3d1
inherit cmake pkgconfig
+OECMAKE_GENERATOR = "Unix Makefiles"
+
PACKAGECONFIG ?= ""
# fuse support will need meta-filesystems layer
PACKAGECONFIG[fuse] = "-DENABLE_FUSE=ON,-DENABLE_FUSE=OFF,fuse"
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/fix-makefile-override.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/fix-makefile-override.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f0a1d33c9..000000000
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/fix-makefile-override.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport [debian]
-
---- a/src/Makefile
-+++ b/src/Makefile
-@@ -37,16 +37,15 @@
- # Use the following only on GNU/Linux and only if you need ps listing like "smsd: MAINPROCESS" and "smsd: GSM1"
- # CFLAGS += -D USE_LINUX_PS_TRICK
-
--all: smsd
--
--smsd: smsd.c extras.o locking.o cfgfile.o logging.o alarm.o smsd_cfg.o charset.o stats.o blacklist.o whitelist.o modeminit.o pdu.o
--
- ifneq (,$(findstring SOLARIS,$(CFLAGS)))
- ifeq (,$(findstring DISABLE_INET_SOCKET,$(CFLAGS)))
- override LFLAGS += -lsocket -lnsl
- endif
- endif
-
-+all: smsd
-+
-+smsd: smsd.c extras.o locking.o cfgfile.o logging.o alarm.o smsd_cfg.o charset.o stats.o blacklist.o whitelist.o modeminit.o pdu.o
- ifneq (,$(findstring NOSTATS,$(CFLAGS)))
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $^ $(LFLAGS)
- else
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/scripts_no_bash.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/scripts_no_bash.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..49b4d1dda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/scripts_no_bash.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 85602c3e531d39e89dc8cee0c4a592f85006a064 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bill Randle <bill.randle@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 31 Dec 2017 09:08:23 -0800
+
+---
+ scripts/sendsms | 2 +-
+ scripts/sms2html | 2 +-
+ scripts/sms2unicode | 2 +-
+ scripts/unicode2sms | 2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scripts/sendsms b/scripts/sendsms
+index 512026d..bb56856 100755
+--- a/scripts/sendsms
++++ b/scripts/sendsms
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-#!/bin/bash
++#!/bin/sh
+ # This script send a text sms at the command line by creating
+ # a sms file in the outgoing queue.
+
+diff --git a/scripts/sms2html b/scripts/sms2html
+index ff253e3..946185e 100755
+--- a/scripts/sms2html
++++ b/scripts/sms2html
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-#!/bin/bash
++#!/bin/sh
+
+ # This script converts a received sms file into a html file.
+
+diff --git a/scripts/sms2unicode b/scripts/sms2unicode
+index 46e2756..2826dc1 100755
+--- a/scripts/sms2unicode
++++ b/scripts/sms2unicode
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-#!/bin/bash
++#!/bin/sh
+
+ # This script converts a received sms file into a pure unicode text file.
+
+diff --git a/scripts/unicode2sms b/scripts/unicode2sms
+index 2ae86dc..3fccf0d 100755
+--- a/scripts/unicode2sms
++++ b/scripts/unicode2sms
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-#!/bin/bash
++#!/bin/sh
+
+ # This script converts a pure unicode text file into an sms file for sending.
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/sms_binpath.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/sms_binpath.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e1d79d332
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/sms_binpath.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+From 9a4a872dca78ca9cb6bdc228be61f5a4c2d68b1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kai Ulrich <kaiu@gmx.de>
+Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2015 11:20:53 +0100
+
+---
+ scripts/sms3 | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/scripts/sms3 b/scripts/sms3
+index 6b990bf..09c063b 100755
+--- a/scripts/sms3
++++ b/scripts/sms3
+@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ INFOFILE="/var/run/smsd.working"
+ # Logfile can also be defined in here:
+ LOGFILE="/var/log/smsd.log"
+
+-DAEMON=/usr/local/bin/smsd
++DAEMON=/usr/bin/smsd
+ # A program which turns power off for couple of seconds:
+-RESETMODEMS=/usr/local/bin/smsd_resetmodems
++RESETMODEMS=/usr/bin/smsd_resetmodems
+ NAME=smsd
+ PSOPT="-e"
+ ECHO=echo
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/sms_binpath_and_psops.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/sms_binpath_and_psops.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ffcaa0971..000000000
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3/sms_binpath_and_psops.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-Index: smstools3/scripts/sms3
-===================================================================
---- smstools3.orig/scripts/sms3 2010-05-04 11:21:44.000000000 +0200
-+++ smstools3/scripts/sms3 2015-02-22 20:05:51.615074469 +0100
-@@ -24,11 +24,11 @@
- # Logfile can also be defined in here:
- LOGFILE="/var/log/smsd.log"
-
--DAEMON=/usr/local/bin/smsd
-+DAEMON=/usr/bin/smsd
- # A program which turns power off for couple of seconds:
--RESETMODEMS=/usr/local/bin/smsd_resetmodems
-+RESETMODEMS=/usr/bin/smsd_resetmodems
- NAME=smsd
--PSOPT="-e"
-+PSOPT=""
- ECHO=echo
- case `uname` in
- *BSD|Darwin)
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3_3.1.15.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3_3.1.21.bb
index 310a13c22..6e6413b4b 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3_3.1.15.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/smstools3/smstools3_3.1.21.bb
@@ -6,18 +6,17 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=4d21efa1bb2a186360dde4035f860682"
HOMEPAGE = "http://smstools3.kekekasvi.com"
SRC_URI = "http://smstools3.kekekasvi.com/packages/${BP}.tar.gz \
- file://sms_binpath_and_psops.patch \
- file://fix-makefile-override.patch"
+ file://sms_binpath.patch \
+ file://scripts_no_bash.patch"
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "0241ef60e646fac1a06254a848e61ed7"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ed00ffaeaa312a5b4f969f4e97a64603a866bbe16e393ea02f5bf05234814d59"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "6a9f038fb38a49cc3a4f8f14a88fb8af"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a26ba4c02b16f6cf13177bffca6c9230dc5fefaeba8e3030cd4e4905f6a92084"
S = "${WORKDIR}/${BPN}"
EXTRA_OEMAKE += "LFLAGS='${LDFLAGS}'"
-RDEPENDS_${PN} = "bash"
INITSCRIPT_NAME = "sms3"
INITSCRIPT_PARAMS = "defaults"
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/files/0001-replace-SIGCLD-with-SIGCHLD-and-include-sys-types.h.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/files/0001-replace-SIGCLD-with-SIGCHLD-and-include-sys-types.h.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8192056d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/files/0001-replace-SIGCLD-with-SIGCHLD-and-include-sys-types.h.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From f567740cf64978ac9db014c786b6d0267b244f33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 4 Mar 2018 22:30:30 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] replace SIGCLD with SIGCHLD and include sys/types.h
+
+Fixes
+main.c:129:10: error: 'SIGCLD' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'SIGCHLD'?
+ signal(SIGCLD, sig_child);
+ ^~~~~~
+ SIGCHLD
+
+main.c:125:2: warning: implicit declaration of function 'umask' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
+ umask(0);
+ ^~~~~
+
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+---
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+ src/main.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/main.c b/src/main.c
+index 3cf4072..cd34196 100644
+--- a/src/main.c
++++ b/src/main.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <sys/ioctl.h>
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
+ #include <sys/param.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <pthread.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+@@ -126,9 +127,9 @@ static void daemon_start(int ignsigcld)
+
+ if (ignsigcld) {
+ #ifdef SIGTSTP
+- signal(SIGCLD, sig_child);
++ signal(SIGCHLD, sig_child);
+ #else
+- signal(SIGCLD, SIG_IGN);
++ signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
+ #endif
+ }
+ }
+--
+2.16.2
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/files/0002-replace-PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP-with-PTHREAD_MUTEX_NOR.patch b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/files/0002-replace-PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP-with-PTHREAD_MUTEX_NOR.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..90d12da14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/files/0002-replace-PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP-with-PTHREAD_MUTEX_NOR.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+From 19b6cf8099e1974b5fc39086fc54103b0cbc2658 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 4 Mar 2018 23:01:25 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] replace PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP with PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL
+
+PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP is not available on non-posix systems
+e.g. musl
+
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+---
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+ src/ha.c | 2 +-
+ src/icmp6.c | 2 +-
+ src/mh.c | 2 +-
+ src/mn.c | 2 +-
+ src/movement.c | 2 +-
+ src/mpdisc_ha.c | 2 +-
+ src/mpdisc_mn.c | 2 +-
+ src/tqueue.c | 2 +-
+ src/tunnelctl.c | 2 +-
+ 9 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ha.c b/src/ha.c
+index fbdcff0..b2f811e 100644
+--- a/src/ha.c
++++ b/src/ha.c
+@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ int ha_init(void)
+ {
+ pthread_mutexattr_t mattrs;
+ pthread_mutexattr_init(&mattrs);
+- pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP);
++ pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&bu_worker_mutex, &mattrs) ||
+ pthread_cond_init(&cond, NULL))
+ return -1;
+diff --git a/src/icmp6.c b/src/icmp6.c
+index 3695135..6460634 100644
+--- a/src/icmp6.c
++++ b/src/icmp6.c
+@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ int icmp6_init(void)
+ return -1;
+ /* create ICMP listener thread */
+ pthread_mutexattr_init(&mattrs);
+- pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP);
++ pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&icmp6_sock.send_mutex, &mattrs) ||
+ pthread_rwlock_init(&handler_lock, NULL) ||
+ pthread_create(&icmp6_listener, NULL, icmp6_listen, NULL))
+diff --git a/src/mh.c b/src/mh.c
+index 60e345e..7928f4c 100644
+--- a/src/mh.c
++++ b/src/mh.c
+@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ int mh_init(void)
+ return -1;
+
+ pthread_mutexattr_init(&mattrs);
+- pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP);
++ pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&mh_sock.send_mutex, &mattrs) ||
+ pthread_rwlock_init(&handler_lock, NULL) ||
+ pthread_create(&mh_listener, NULL, mh_listen, NULL))
+diff --git a/src/mn.c b/src/mn.c
+index 092cfcb..8f7f448 100644
+--- a/src/mn.c
++++ b/src/mn.c
+@@ -1478,7 +1478,7 @@ static struct home_addr_info *hai_copy(struct home_addr_info *conf_hai)
+ if (hai != NULL) {
+ pthread_mutexattr_t mattrs;
+ pthread_mutexattr_init(&mattrs);
+- pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP);
++ pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
+
+ memcpy(hai, conf_hai, sizeof(struct home_addr_info));
+
+diff --git a/src/movement.c b/src/movement.c
+index d985937..6400448 100644
+--- a/src/movement.c
++++ b/src/movement.c
+@@ -2013,7 +2013,7 @@ int md_init(void)
+ int val;
+
+ pthread_mutexattr_init(&mattrs);
+- pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP);
++ pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&iface_lock, &mattrs))
+ return -1;
+
+diff --git a/src/mpdisc_ha.c b/src/mpdisc_ha.c
+index 40ba05f..fd7a90d 100644
+--- a/src/mpdisc_ha.c
++++ b/src/mpdisc_ha.c
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ int mpd_ha_init(void)
+ {
+ pthread_mutexattr_t mattrs;
+ pthread_mutexattr_init(&mattrs);
+- pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP);
++ pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&mpa_lock, &mattrs) ||
+ pthread_rwlock_init(&prefix_lock, NULL) ||
+ hash_init(&mpa_hash, DOUBLE_ADDR, MPA_BUCKETS) < 0)
+diff --git a/src/mpdisc_mn.c b/src/mpdisc_mn.c
+index 4873bd6..ada02bd 100644
+--- a/src/mpdisc_mn.c
++++ b/src/mpdisc_mn.c
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ int mpd_mn_init(void)
+ {
+ pthread_mutexattr_t mattrs;
+ pthread_mutexattr_init(&mattrs);
+- pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP);
++ pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&mps_lock, &mattrs))
+ return -1;
+ if (hash_init(&mps_hash, DOUBLE_ADDR, MPS_BUCKETS) < 0)
+diff --git a/src/tqueue.c b/src/tqueue.c
+index 2f7aa0b..9c185b8 100644
+--- a/src/tqueue.c
++++ b/src/tqueue.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ int taskqueue_init(void)
+ {
+ pthread_mutexattr_t mattrs;
+ pthread_mutexattr_init(&mattrs);
+- pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP);
++ pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&mutex, &mattrs) ||
+ pthread_cond_init(&cond, NULL) ||
+ pthread_create(&tq_runner, NULL, runner, NULL))
+diff --git a/src/tunnelctl.c b/src/tunnelctl.c
+index 23fc20b..813b8ec 100644
+--- a/src/tunnelctl.c
++++ b/src/tunnelctl.c
+@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int tunnelctl_init(void)
+ return -1;
+
+ pthread_mutexattr_init(&mattrs);
+- pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP);
++ pthread_mutexattr_settype(&mattrs, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&tnl_lock, &mattrs))
+ return -1;
+
+--
+2.16.2
+
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/umip_1.0.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/umip_1.0.bb
index 2129e379c..0c120bfd8 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/umip_1.0.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/umip/umip_1.0.bb
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/jlanza/umip \
file://mip6d \
file://mip6d.service \
file://0001-Add-format-string-to-fprintf-call.patch \
+ file://0001-replace-SIGCLD-with-SIGCHLD-and-include-sys-types.h.patch \
+ file://0002-replace-PTHREAD_MUTEX_FAST_NP-with-PTHREAD_MUTEX_NOR.patch \
"
SRCREV = "7d67209cd1bba2dd0e183a0fa07eeef07964dd14"
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/cppzmq_git.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/cppzmq_git.bb
index a64745c94..4920bce8c 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/cppzmq_git.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/cppzmq_git.bb
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ LICENSE = "MIT"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=db174eaf7b55a34a7c89551197f66e94"
DEPENDS = "zeromq"
-SRCREV = "68a7b09cfce01c4c279fba2cf91686fcfc566848"
-PV = "4.1.5+git${SRCPV}"
+SRCREV = "6aa3ab686e916cb0e62df7fa7d12e0b13ae9fae6"
+PV = "4.2.3+git${SRCPV}"
SRC_URI = "git://github.com/zeromq/cppzmq.git"
diff --git a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.1.6.bb b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.2.5.bb
index e126f3239..356348b43 100644
--- a/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.1.6.bb
+++ b/import-layers/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.2.5.bb
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING.LESSER;md5=d5311495d952062e0e4fbba39cbf3de1"
PACKAGECONFIG ??= "libsodium"
PACKAGECONFIG[libsodium] = "--with-libsodium, --without-libsodium, libsodium"
-SRC_URI = "http://github.com/zeromq/zeromq4-1/releases/download/v${PV}/zeromq-${PV}.tar.gz \
+SRC_URI = "http://github.com/zeromq/libzmq/releases/download/v${PV}/zeromq-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://run-ptest \
"
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c89db4dbc0b90c34c9f4983cbff6d321"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "02ebf60a43011e770799336365bcbce2eb85569e9b5f52aa0d8cc04672438a0a"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a1c95b34384257e986842f4d006957b8"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "cc9090ba35713d59bb2f7d7965f877036c49c5558ea0c290b0dcc6f2a17e489f"
S = "${WORKDIR}/zeromq-${PV}"
@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ do_compile_ptest () {
do_install_ptest () {
install -d ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/tests
- install -m 0755 ${B}/.libs/test_* ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/tests
+ install -m 0755 ${B}/tests/.libs/test_* ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/tests
}
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