poky: refresh thud: 506ec088e5..e4c0a8a7cb

Update poky to thud HEAD.

Alexander Kanavin (1):
      ca-certificates: upgrade 20180409 -> 20190110

André Draszik (1):
      systemd: RDEPENDS on util-linux-umount

Changqing Li (1):
      libsndfile1: Security fix CVE-2018-19432

Chen Qi (1):
      target-sdk-provides-dummy: add more perl modules to avoid populate_sdk failure

Douglas Royds (1):
      libpam: libpamc is licensed under its own BSD-style licence

George McCollister (1):
      systemd: fix CVE-2019-6454

Jonathan Rajotte-Julien (3):
      lttng-ust: update to 2.10.3
      lttng-modules: update to 2.10.9
      lttng-tools: update to 2.9.11

Mark Hatle (10):
      bitbake: gitsm.py: Fix when a submodule is defined, but not initialized
      bitbake: gitsm.py: Add support for alternative URL formats from submodule files
      bitbake: tests/fetch.py: Add alternative gitsm test case
      bitbake: gitsm.py: Optimize code and attempt to resolve locking issue
      bitbake: gitsm.py: revise unpack
      bitbake: gitsm.py: Rework the shallow fetcher and test case
      bitbake: gitsm.py: Refactor the functions and simplify the class
      bitbake: gitsm.py: Fix relative URLs
      bitbake: gitsmy.py: Fix unpack of submodules of submodules
      bitbake: gitsm: The fetcher did not process some recursive submodules properly.

Ming Liu (1):
      rm_work: sort the value of do_build dependencies

Oleksandr Kravchuk (1):
      target-sdk-provides-dummy: add perl-module-overload

Richard Purdie (3):
      target-sdk-provides-dummy: Extend to -dev and -src packages
      systemd: Update recent CVE patches
      kernel: Ensure an initramfs is added if configured

Robert Yang (1):
      send-error-report: Add --no-ssl to use http protocol

Ross Burton (1):
      libpng: fix CVE-2019-7317

Change-Id: I3e03c837688d49703b4989a561f3728d616abbec
Signed-off-by: Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com>

24 files changed, 643 insertions, 396 deletions

diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/kernel.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/kernel.bbclass
index 45cb4fabc..bd185e258 100644
--- a/poky/meta/classes/kernel.bbclass
+++ b/poky/meta/classes/kernel.bbclass
@@ -224,9 +224,11 @@ copy_initramfs() {
 				break
 				;;
 			esac
+			break
 		fi
 	done
-	echo "Finished copy of initramfs into ./usr"
+	# Verify that the above loop found a initramfs, fail otherwise
+	[ -f ${B}/usr/${INITRAMFS_IMAGE_NAME}.cpio ] && echo "Finished copy of initramfs into ./usr" || die "Could not find any ${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${INITRAMFS_IMAGE_NAME}.cpio{.gz|.lz4|.lzo|.lzma|.xz) for bundling; INITRAMFS_IMAGE_NAME might be wrong."
 }
 
 do_bundle_initramfs () {
diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/rm_work.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/rm_work.bbclass
index 10e134b95..c478f4a18 100644
--- a/poky/meta/classes/rm_work.bbclass
+++ b/poky/meta/classes/rm_work.bbclass
@@ -164,8 +164,7 @@ python inject_rm_work() {
 
     # Determine what do_build depends upon, without including do_build
     # itself or our own special do_rm_work_all.
-    deps = set(bb.build.preceedtask('do_build', True, d))
-    deps.difference_update(('do_build', 'do_rm_work_all'))
+    deps = sorted((set(bb.build.preceedtask('do_build', True, d))).difference(('do_build', 'do_rm_work_all')) or "")
 
     # deps can be empty if do_build doesn't exist, e.g. *-inital recipes
     if not deps:
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/meta/target-sdk-provides-dummy.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-core/meta/target-sdk-provides-dummy.bb
index edf07c4a2..0160cb8ee 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/meta/target-sdk-provides-dummy.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/meta/target-sdk-provides-dummy.bb
@@ -2,9 +2,17 @@ DUMMYARCH = "sdk-provides-dummy-target"
 
 DUMMYPROVIDES = "\
     busybox \
+    busybox-dev \
+    busybox-src \
     coreutils \
+    coreutils-dev \
+    coreutils-src \
     bash \
+    bash-dev \
+    bash-src \
     perl \
+    perl-dev \
+    perl-src \
     perl-module-re \
     perl-module-strict \
     perl-module-vars \
@@ -23,16 +31,22 @@ DUMMYPROVIDES = "\
     perl-module-file-glob \
     perl-module-file-path \
     perl-module-file-stat \
+    perl-module-file-temp \
     perl-module-getopt-long \
     perl-module-io-file \
+    perl-module-overload \
     perl-module-posix \
+    perl-module-overload \
     perl-module-thread-queue \
     perl-module-threads \
+    perl-module-warnings \
     /bin/sh \
     /bin/bash \
     /usr/bin/env \
     /usr/bin/perl \
     pkgconfig \
+    pkgconfig-dev \
+    pkgconfig-src \
 "
 
 require dummy-sdk-package.inc
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
index c3009545b..c2f78be39 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From fe19f5a9d0d8b9977e9507a9b66c3cc66744cd38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 9cb07e7d82c7c4f28bbaa1478e1387e8ea3d03dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
 Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100
 Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry for process
@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG.
 
 Patch backported from systemd master at
 084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-16864
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com>
 ---
  src/basic/io-util.c           | 10 ++++++++++
  src/basic/io-util.h           |  2 ++
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 50a01efe8..000000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From 4566aaf97f5b4143b930d75628f3abc905249dcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
-Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 22:45:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k)
-
-We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries,
-our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively
-small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries.
-
-CVE-2018-16865
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861
-
-What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE
-description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating
-many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message.
-
-Patch backported from systemd master at
-052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4.
----
- src/basic/journal-importer.h  | 3 +++
- src/journal/journald-native.c | 5 +++++
- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.h b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
-index f49ce734a1..c4ae45d32d 100644
---- a/src/basic/journal-importer.h
-+++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
-@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
- #define DATA_SIZE_MAX (1024*1024*768u)
- #define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u
- 
-+/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */
-+#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024
-+
- struct iovec_wrapper {
-         struct iovec *iovec;
-         size_t size_bytes;
-diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c
-index 5ff22a10af..951d092053 100644
---- a/src/journal/journald-native.c
-+++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c
-@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int server_process_entry(
-                 }
- 
-                 /* A property follows */
-+                if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) {
-+                        log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry.");
-+                        r = 1;
-+                        goto finish;
-+                }
- 
-                 /* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */
-                 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m,
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae9ef5de5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+From 7cad044b72406cbadf048da432c29afea74c3c10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 22:45:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] journald: set a limit on the number of fields
+
+The fix for CVE-2018-16865 is plucked from two commits that have
+been pushed to systemd master.
+
+journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k)
+
+We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries,
+our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively
+small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries.
+
+CVE-2018-16865
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861
+
+What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE
+description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating
+many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message.
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4.
+
+journal-remote: set a limit on the number of fields in a message
+
+Existing use of E2BIG is replaced with ENOBUFS (entry too long), and E2BIG is
+reused for the new error condition (too many fields).
+
+This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second
+part of the fix for CVE-2018-16865
+(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861).
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+ef4d6abe7c7fab6cbff975b32e76b09feee56074.
+with the changes applied by 7fdb237f5473cb8fc2129e57e8a0039526dcb4fd
+removed.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-16865
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com>
+---
+ src/basic/journal-importer.c             | 5 ++++-
+ src/basic/journal-importer.h             | 3 +++
+ src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c | 7 ++++++-
+ src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c      | 5 ++++-
+ src/journal/journald-native.c            | 5 +++++
+ 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.c b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
+index ca203bbbfc..3ac55a66d9 100644
+--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.c
++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ enum {
+ };
+ 
+ static int iovw_put(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void* data, size_t len) {
++        if (iovw->count >= ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX)
++                return -E2BIG;
++
+         if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovw->iovec, iovw->size_bytes, iovw->count + 1))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+@@ -98,7 +101,7 @@ static int get_line(JournalImporter *imp, char **line, size_t *size) {
+                 imp->scanned = imp->filled;
+                 if (imp->scanned >= DATA_SIZE_MAX) {
+                         log_error("Entry is bigger than %u bytes.", DATA_SIZE_MAX);
+-                        return -E2BIG;
++                        return -ENOBUFS;
+                 }
+ 
+                 if (imp->passive_fd)
+diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.h b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
+index f49ce734a1..c4ae45d32d 100644
+--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.h
++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
+@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
+ #define DATA_SIZE_MAX (1024*1024*768u)
+ #define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u
+ 
++/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */
++#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024
++
+ struct iovec_wrapper {
+         struct iovec *iovec;
+         size_t size_bytes;
+diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
+index 8fda9d1499..3a01fef646 100644
+--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
++++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
+@@ -212,7 +212,12 @@ static int process_http_upload(
+                         break;
+                 else if (r < 0) {
+                         log_warning("Failed to process data for connection %p", connection);
+-                        if (r == -E2BIG)
++                        if (r == -ENOBUFS)
++                                return mhd_respondf(connection,
++                                                    r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
++                                                    "Entry is above the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
++                                                    DATA_SIZE_MAX, connection);
++                        else if (r == -E2BIG)
+                                 return mhd_respondf(connection,
+                                                     r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
+                                                     "Entry is too large, maximum is " STRINGIFY(DATA_SIZE_MAX) " bytes.");
+diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
+index beb75a1cb4..67e3a70c06 100644
+--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
++++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
+@@ -408,7 +408,10 @@ int journal_remote_handle_raw_source(
+                 log_debug("%zu active sources remaining", s->active);
+                 return 0;
+         } else if (r == -E2BIG) {
+-                log_notice_errno(E2BIG, "Entry too big, skipped");
++                log_notice("Entry with too many fields, skipped");
++                return 1;
++        } else if (r == -ENOBUFS) {
++                log_notice("Entry too big, skipped");
+                 return 1;
+         } else if (r == -EAGAIN) {
+                 return 0;
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+index 5ff22a10af..951d092053 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-native.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int server_process_entry(
+                 }
+ 
+                 /* A property follows */
++                if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) {
++                        log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry.");
++                        r = 1;
++                        goto finish;
++                }
+ 
+                 /* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */
+                 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m,
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3925a4abb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From ebd06c37d4311db9851f4d3fdd023de3dd590de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 14:53:33 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] journal: fix out-of-bounds read CVE-2018-16866
+
+The original code didn't account for the fact that strchr() would match on the
+'\0' character, making it read past the end of the buffer if no non-whitespace
+character was present.
+
+This bug was introduced in commit ec5ff4445cca6a which was first released in
+systemd v221 and later fixed in commit 8595102d3ddde6 which was released in
+v240, so versions in the range [v221, v240) are affected.
+
+Patch backported from systemd-stable at f005e73d3723d62a39be661931fcb6347119b52b
+also includes a change from systemd master which removes a heap buffer overflow
+a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-16866
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com>
+---
+ src/journal/journald-syslog.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+index 9dea116722..809b318c06 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
+         e = l;
+         l--;
+ 
+-        if (p[l-1] == ']') {
++        if (l > 0 && p[l-1] == ']') {
+                 size_t k = l-1;
+ 
+                 for (;;) {
+@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
+         if (t)
+                 *identifier = t;
+ 
+-        if (strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
++        if (p[e] != '\0' && strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
+                 e++;
+         *buf = p + e;
+         return e;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 104945cc2..000000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-From 4183ec3a135663128834ca8b35d50a60999343a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
-Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 10:48:10 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] journal-remote: set a limit on the number of fields in a
- message
-
-Existing use of E2BIG is replaced with ENOBUFS (entry too long), and E2BIG is
-reused for the new error condition (too many fields).
-
-This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second
-part of the fix for CVE-2018-16865
-(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861).
-
-Patch backported from systemd master at
-ef4d6abe7c7fab6cbff975b32e76b09feee56074.
----
- src/basic/journal-importer.c             |  5 ++++-
- src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c | 10 ++++++----
- src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c      |  5 ++++-
- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.c b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
-index ca203bbbfc..3ac55a66d9 100644
---- a/src/basic/journal-importer.c
-+++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ enum {
- };
- 
- static int iovw_put(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void* data, size_t len) {
-+        if (iovw->count >= ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX)
-+                return -E2BIG;
-+
-         if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovw->iovec, iovw->size_bytes, iovw->count + 1))
-                 return log_oom();
- 
-@@ -98,7 +101,7 @@ static int get_line(JournalImporter *imp, char **line, size_t *size) {
-                 imp->scanned = imp->filled;
-                 if (imp->scanned >= DATA_SIZE_MAX) {
-                         log_error("Entry is bigger than %u bytes.", DATA_SIZE_MAX);
--                        return -E2BIG;
-+                        return -ENOBUFS;
-                 }
- 
-                 if (imp->passive_fd)
-diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
-index 8fda9d1499..f52618fb7b 100644
---- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
-+++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
-@@ -212,10 +212,12 @@ static int process_http_upload(
-                         break;
-                 else if (r < 0) {
-                         log_warning("Failed to process data for connection %p", connection);
--                        if (r == -E2BIG)
--                                return mhd_respondf(connection,
--                                                    r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
--                                                    "Entry is too large, maximum is " STRINGIFY(DATA_SIZE_MAX) " bytes.");
-+                        if (r == -ENOBUFS)
-+                                log_warning_errno(r, "Entry is above the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
-+                                                  DATA_SIZE_MAX, connection);
-+                        else if (r == -E2BIG)
-+                                log_warning_errno(r, "Entry with more fields than the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
-+                                                  ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX, connection);
-                         else
-                                 return mhd_respondf(connection,
-                                                     r, MHD_HTTP_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
-diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
-index beb75a1cb4..67e3a70c06 100644
---- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
-+++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
-@@ -408,7 +408,10 @@ int journal_remote_handle_raw_source(
-                 log_debug("%zu active sources remaining", s->active);
-                 return 0;
-         } else if (r == -E2BIG) {
--                log_notice_errno(E2BIG, "Entry too big, skipped");
-+                log_notice("Entry with too many fields, skipped");
-+                return 1;
-+        } else if (r == -ENOBUFS) {
-+                log_notice("Entry too big, skipped");
-                 return 1;
-         } else if (r == -EAGAIN) {
-                 return 0;
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d4df0e12f..000000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From 8ccebb04e07628f7fe10131d6cd4f19d6a0d8f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2018 15:06:36 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH] journal: fix syslog_parse_identifier()
-
-Fixes #9829.
-
-An out of bounds read was discovered in systemd-journald in the way it
-parses log messages that terminate with a colon ':'. A local attacker
-can use this flaw to disclose process memory data.
-
-Patch backported from systemd master at
-a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5.
-
-This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the first
-part of the fix for CVE-2018-16866.
----
- src/journal/journald-syslog.c     |  6 +++---
- src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-index 9dea116722..97711ac7a3 100644
---- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-+++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
-         e = l;
-         l--;
- 
--        if (p[l-1] == ']') {
-+        if (l > 0 && p[l-1] == ']') {
-                 size_t k = l-1;
- 
-                 for (;;) {
-@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
-         if (t)
-                 *identifier = t;
- 
--        if (strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
--                e++;
-+        e += strspn(p + e, WHITESPACE);
-+
-         *buf = p + e;
-         return e;
- }
-diff --git a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-index 9ba86f6c8a..05f759817e 100644
---- a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-+++ b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
- #include "macro.h"
- #include "string-util.h"
- 
--static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char* str,
--                                         const char *ident, const char*pid, int ret) {
-+static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str,
-+                                         const char *ident, const char *pid, int ret) {
-         const char *buf = str;
-         _cleanup_free_ char *ident2 = NULL, *pid2 = NULL;
-         int ret2;
-@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@ static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char* str,
- int main(void) {
-         test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", 11);
-         test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 6);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:  xxx", "pidu", NULL, 7);
-         test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, 0);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, 1);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":  ", "", NULL, 3);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, 5);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, 6);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, 0);
- 
-         return 0;
- }
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fa2c01034..000000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-From c3a7da1bbb6d2df8ab7ea1c7ce34ded37a21959f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2018 11:07:54 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH] journal: do not remove multiple spaces after identifier in
- syslog message
-
-Single space is used as separator.
-C.f. discussions in #156.
-
-Fixes #9839 introduced by a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5.
-
-Patch backported from systemd master at
-8595102d3ddde6d25c282f965573a6de34ab4421.
-
-This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second
-part of the fix for CVE-2018-16866
----
- src/journal/journald-syslog.c     |  4 +++-
- src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-index 97711ac7a3..e0b55cc566 100644
---- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-+++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
-@@ -219,7 +219,9 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
-         if (t)
-                 *identifier = t;
- 
--        e += strspn(p + e, WHITESPACE);
-+        /* Single space is used as separator */
-+        if (p[e] != '\0' && strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
-+                e++;
- 
-         *buf = p + e;
-         return e;
-diff --git a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-index 05f759817e..7294cde032 100644
---- a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-+++ b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
-@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
- #include "string-util.h"
- 
- static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str,
--                                         const char *ident, const char *pid, int ret) {
-+                                         const char *ident, const char *pid, const char *rest, int ret) {
-         const char *buf = str;
-         _cleanup_free_ char *ident2 = NULL, *pid2 = NULL;
-         int ret2;
-@@ -16,18 +16,22 @@ static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str,
-         assert_se(ret == ret2);
-         assert_se(ident == ident2 || streq_ptr(ident, ident2));
-         assert_se(pid == pid2 || streq_ptr(pid, pid2));
-+        assert_se(streq(buf, rest));
- }
- 
- int main(void) {
--        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", 11);
--        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 6);
--        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:  xxx", "pidu", NULL, 7);
--        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, 0);
--        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, 1);
--        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":  ", "", NULL, 3);
--        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, 5);
--        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, 6);
--        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, 0);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", "xxx", 11);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, "xxx", 6);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:  xxx", "pidu", NULL, " xxx", 6);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, "pidu xxx", 0);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("   pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, "   pidu xxx", 0);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("", NULL, NULL, "", 0);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("  ", NULL, NULL, "  ", 0);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, "", 1);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":  ", "", NULL, " ", 2);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, "", 5);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, "", 6);
-+        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, "pidu : ", 0);
- 
-         return 0;
- }
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2019-6454.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2019-6454.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..80170dac0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2019-6454.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+Description: sd-bus: enforce a size limit for dbus paths, and don't allocate
+ them on the stacka
+Forwarded: no
+
+Patch from: systemd_239-7ubuntu10.8
+
+For information see:
+https://usn.ubuntu.com/3891-1/
+https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/commit/?id=f8e75d5634904c8e672658856508c3a02f349adb
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-6454
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
+
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
+         if (slash)
+                 return false;
+
+-        return true;
++        return (q - p) <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX;
+ }
+
+ char* object_path_startswith(const char *a, const char *b) {
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
+@@ -333,6 +333,10 @@
+
+ #define BUS_MESSAGE_SIZE_MAX (128*1024*1024)
+ #define BUS_AUTH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
++/* Note that the D-Bus specification states that bus paths shall have no size limit. We enforce here one
++ * anyway, since truly unbounded strings are a security problem. The limit we pick is relatively large however,
++ * to not clash unnecessarily with real-life applications. */
++#define BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
+
+ #define BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH 128
+
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
+@@ -1134,7 +1134,8 @@
+                 const char *path,
+                 sd_bus_error *error) {
+
+-        char *prefix;
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+
+         assert(bus);
+@@ -1150,7 +1151,12 @@
+                 return 0;
+
+         /* Second, add fallback vtables registered for any of the prefixes */
+-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                 r = object_manager_serialize_path(bus, reply, prefix, path, true, error);
+                 if (r < 0)
+@@ -1346,6 +1352,7 @@
+ }
+
+ int bus_process_object(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m) {
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+         int r;
+         size_t pl;
+         bool found_object = false;
+@@ -1370,9 +1377,12 @@
+         assert(m->member);
+
+         pl = strlen(m->path);
+-        do {
+-                char prefix[pl+1];
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
+
++        do {
+                 bus->nodes_modified = false;
+
+                 r = object_find_and_run(bus, m, m->path, false, &found_object);
+@@ -1499,9 +1509,15 @@
+
+         n = hashmap_get(bus->nodes, path);
+         if (!n) {
+-                char *prefix;
++                _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++                size_t pl;
++
++                pl = strlen(path);
++                assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++                prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++                if (!prefix)
++                        return -ENOMEM;
+
+-                prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+                 OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                         n = hashmap_get(bus->nodes, prefix);
+                         if (n)
+@@ -2091,8 +2107,9 @@
+                 char **names) {
+
+         BUS_DONT_DESTROY(bus);
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+         bool found_interface = false;
+-        char *prefix;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+
+         assert_return(bus, -EINVAL);
+@@ -2111,6 +2128,12 @@
+         if (names && names[0] == NULL)
+                 return 0;
+
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         do {
+                 bus->nodes_modified = false;
+
+@@ -2120,7 +2143,6 @@
+                 if (bus->nodes_modified)
+                         continue;
+
+-                prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+                 OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                         r = emit_properties_changed_on_interface(bus, prefix, path, interface, true, &found_interface, names);
+                         if (r != 0)
+@@ -2252,7 +2274,8 @@
+
+ static int object_added_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char *path) {
+         _cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
+-        char *prefix;
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+
+         assert(bus);
+@@ -2297,7 +2320,12 @@
+         if (bus->nodes_modified)
+                 return 0;
+
+-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                 r = object_added_append_all_prefix(bus, m, s, prefix, path, true);
+                 if (r < 0)
+@@ -2436,7 +2464,8 @@
+
+ static int object_removed_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char *path) {
+         _cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
+-        char *prefix;
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+
+         assert(bus);
+@@ -2468,7 +2497,12 @@
+         if (bus->nodes_modified)
+                 return 0;
+
+-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                 r = object_removed_append_all_prefix(bus, m, s, prefix, path, true);
+                 if (r < 0)
+@@ -2618,7 +2652,8 @@
+                 const char *path,
+                 const char *interface) {
+
+-        char *prefix;
++        _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
++        size_t pl;
+         int r;
+
+         assert(bus);
+@@ -2632,7 +2667,12 @@
+         if (bus->nodes_modified)
+                 return 0;
+
+-        prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
++        pl = strlen(path);
++        assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
++        prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
++        if (!prefix)
++                return -ENOMEM;
++
+         OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
+                 r = interfaces_added_append_one_prefix(bus, m, prefix, path, interface, true);
+                 if (r != 0)
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/sd-bus-if-we-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/sd-bus-if-we-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..57311faa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/sd-bus-if-we-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+Description: sd-bus: if we receive an invalid dbus message, ignore and
+ proceeed
+ .
+ dbus-daemon might have a slightly different idea of what a valid msg is
+ than us (for example regarding valid msg and field sizes). Let's hence
+ try to proceed if we can and thus drop messages rather than fail the
+ connection if we fail to validate a message.
+ .
+ Hopefully the differences in what is considered valid are not visible
+ for real-life usecases, but are specific to exploit attempts only.
+Author: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Forwarded: other,https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/11708/
+
+Patch from: systemd_239-7ubuntu10.8
+
+For information see:
+https://usn.ubuntu.com/3891-1/
+https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/commit/?id=f8e75d5634904c8e672658856508c3a02f349adb
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-6454
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c
+index 30d6455b6f..441b4a816f 100644
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c
+@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ static int bus_socket_read_message_need(sd_bus *bus, size_t *need) {
+ }
+
+ static int bus_socket_make_message(sd_bus *bus, size_t size) {
+-        sd_bus_message *t;
++        sd_bus_message *t = NULL;
+         void *b;
+         int r;
+
+@@ -1097,7 +1097,9 @@ static int bus_socket_make_message(sd_bus *bus, size_t size) {
+                                     bus->fds, bus->n_fds,
+                                     NULL,
+                                     &t);
+-        if (r < 0) {
++        if (r == -EBADMSG)
++                log_debug_errno(r, "Received invalid message from connection %s, dropping.", strna(bus->description));
++        else if (r < 0) {
+                 free(b);
+                 return r;
+         }
+@@ -1108,7 +1110,8 @@ static int bus_socket_make_message(sd_bus *bus, size_t size) {
+         bus->fds = NULL;
+         bus->n_fds = 0;
+
+-        bus->rqueue[bus->rqueue_size++] = t;
++        if (t)
++                bus->rqueue[bus->rqueue_size++] = t;
+
+         return 1;
+ }
+--
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
index 6fbef4716..7fbd64ced 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0002-core-Fix-use-after-free-case-in-load_from_path.patch \
            file://0001-meson-rename-Ddebug-to-Ddebug-extra.patch \
            file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \
-           file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch \
-           file://0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch \
-           file://0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch \
-           file://0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch \
+           file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields.patch \
+           file://0026-journal-fix-out-of-bounds-read-CVE-2018-16866.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-6454.patch \
+           file://sd-bus-if-we-receive-an-invalid-dbus-message-ignore-.patch \
            "
 
 # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ FILES_${PN} = " ${base_bindir}/* \
 
 FILES_${PN}-dev += "${base_libdir}/security/*.la ${datadir}/dbus-1/interfaces/ ${sysconfdir}/rpm/macros.systemd"
 
-RDEPENDS_${PN} += "kmod dbus util-linux-mount udev (= ${EXTENDPKGV}) util-linux-agetty util-linux-fsck"
+RDEPENDS_${PN} += "kmod dbus util-linux-mount util-linux-umount udev (= ${EXTENDPKGV}) util-linux-agetty util-linux-fsck"
 RDEPENDS_${PN} += "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'serial-getty-generator', '', 'systemd-serialgetty', d)}"
 RDEPENDS_${PN} += "volatile-binds update-rc.d systemd-conf"
 
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.0.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.0.bb
index 3aec2cdb4..cc1241020 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.0.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.0.bb
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ SECTION = "base"
 # /etc/pam.d comes from Debian libpam-runtime in 2009-11 (at that time
 # libpam-runtime-1.0.1 is GPLv2+), by openembedded
 LICENSE = "GPLv2+ | BSD"
-LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=7eb5c1bf854e8881005d673599ee74d3"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=7eb5c1bf854e8881005d673599ee74d3 \
+                    file://libpamc/License;md5=a4da476a14c093fdc73be3c3c9ba8fb3 \
+                    "
 
 SRC_URI = "http://linux-pam.org/library/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://99_pam \
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-modules/0001-Fix-net-expose-sk-wmem-in-sock_exceed_buf_limit-trac.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-modules/0001-Fix-net-expose-sk-wmem-in-sock_exceed_buf_limit-trac.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 92e12df17..000000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-modules/0001-Fix-net-expose-sk-wmem-in-sock_exceed_buf_limit-trac.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-From 9e67b4c94b94493123d38379bd9b3eceae23a6f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Michael Jeanson <mjeanson@efficios.com>
-Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 12:21:12 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix: net: expose sk wmem in sock_exceed_buf_limit tracepoint
- (4.19)
-
-See upstream commit:
-
-  commit d6f19938eb031ee2158272757db33258153ae59c
-  Author: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
-  Date:   Sun Jul 1 23:31:30 2018 +0800
-
-    net: expose sk wmem in sock_exceed_buf_limit tracepoint
-
-    Currently trace_sock_exceed_buf_limit() only show rmem info,
-    but wmem limit may also be hit.
-    So expose wmem info in this tracepoint as well.
-
-    Regarding memcg, I think it is better to introduce a new tracepoint(if
-    that is needed), i.e. trace_memcg_limit_hit other than show memcg info in
-    trace_sock_exceed_buf_limit.
-
-Signed-off-by: Michael Jeanson <mjeanson@efficios.com>
-Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
----
- instrumentation/events/lttng-module/sock.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/instrumentation/events/lttng-module/sock.h b/instrumentation/events/lttng-module/sock.h
-index 5cd02ca..cd0c92b 100644
---- a/instrumentation/events/lttng-module/sock.h
-+++ b/instrumentation/events/lttng-module/sock.h
-@@ -21,7 +21,28 @@ LTTNG_TRACEPOINT_EVENT(sock_rcvqueue_full,
- 	)
- )
- 
--#if (LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,15,0))
-+#if (LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,19,0))
-+
-+LTTNG_TRACEPOINT_EVENT(sock_exceed_buf_limit,
-+
-+	TP_PROTO(struct sock *sk, struct proto *prot, long allocated, int kind),
-+
-+	TP_ARGS(sk, prot, allocated, kind),
-+
-+	TP_FIELDS(
-+		ctf_string(name, prot->name)
-+		ctf_array(long, sysctl_mem, prot->sysctl_mem, 3)
-+		ctf_integer(long, allocated, allocated)
-+		ctf_integer(int, sysctl_rmem, sk_get_rmem0(sk, prot))
-+		ctf_integer(int, rmem_alloc, atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc))
-+		ctf_integer(int, sysctl_wmem, sk_get_wmem0(sk, prot))
-+		ctf_integer(int, wmem_alloc, refcount_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc))
-+		ctf_integer(int, wmem_queued, sk->sk_wmem_queued)
-+		ctf_integer(int, kind, kind)
-+	)
-+)
-+
-+#elif (LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= KERNEL_VERSION(4,15,0))
- 
- LTTNG_TRACEPOINT_EVENT(sock_exceed_buf_limit,
- 
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-modules_2.10.7.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-modules_2.10.9.bb
index f6c865a87..d29737775 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-modules_2.10.7.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-modules_2.10.9.bb
@@ -15,11 +15,10 @@ COMPATIBLE_HOST = '(x86_64|i.86|powerpc|aarch64|mips|nios2|arm).*-linux'
 SRC_URI = "https://lttng.org/files/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://Makefile-Do-not-fail-if-CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS-is-not-en.patch \
            file://BUILD_RUNTIME_BUG_ON-vs-gcc7.patch \
-           file://0001-Fix-net-expose-sk-wmem-in-sock_exceed_buf_limit-trac.patch \
 "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d3cb4520948083bf1573a2e4cb7406aa"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f049428d3d131e103a7a7038d184731bf7bcdce00503fc19a2c9b5693ecbb3b5"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "09df0ac2e8f245740a2f32411d10c0d1"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a1855bbd02d0f71ebd180e9872309862036624f012442ab9cc5852eb60340145"
 
 export INSTALL_MOD_DIR="kernel/lttng-modules"
 
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-tools/0001-Allow-multiple-attempts-to-connect-to-relayd.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-tools/0001-Allow-multiple-attempts-to-connect-to-relayd.patch
index 62a097859..0998fc386 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-tools/0001-Allow-multiple-attempts-to-connect-to-relayd.patch
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-tools/0001-Allow-multiple-attempts-to-connect-to-relayd.patch
@@ -16,17 +16,17 @@ Signed-off-by: Mikael Beckius <mikael.beckius@windriver.com>
 Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
 Upstream-Status: Pending
 ---
- src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.c |    8 --------
+ src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.c | 8 --------
  1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.c b/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.c
-index 73b4ce3..36f62ee 100644
+index cf30b8e..cc41a48 100644
 --- a/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.c
 +++ b/src/bin/lttng-sessiond/cmd.c
-@@ -689,14 +689,6 @@ close_sock:
- 	free(rsock);
+@@ -945,14 +945,6 @@ static int send_consumer_relayd_socket(enum lttng_domain_type domain,
+ 	 */
  
- error:
+ close_sock:
 -	if (ret != LTTNG_OK) {
 -		/*
 -		 * The consumer output for this session should not be used anymore
@@ -35,9 +35,8 @@ index 73b4ce3..36f62ee 100644
 -		 */
 -		consumer->enabled = 0;
 -	}
- 	return ret;
- }
+ 	(void) relayd_close(rsock);
+ 	free(rsock);
  
 -- 
-1.7.9.5
-
+2.17.1
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-tools_2.9.5.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-tools_2.9.11.bb
index 0314b5363..5e3fc1aab 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-tools_2.9.5.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-tools_2.9.11.bb
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://lttng.org/files/lttng-tools/lttng-tools-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://lttng-sessiond.service \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "051224eb991aee07f8721ff1877d0b96"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "77839eb6fc6c652125f08acfd9369701c2516eb05cc2084160e7efc7a3fb731c"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f9c2b35810790f5bd802483eb14cb301"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2c45144acf8dc6fcd655be7370a022e9c03c8b7419af489c9c2e786a335006db"
 
 inherit autotools ptest pkgconfig useradd python3-dir manpages systemd
 
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-ust_2.10.1.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-ust_2.10.3.bb
index d79a47931..b5c43200d 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-ust_2.10.1.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/lttng/lttng-ust_2.10.3.bb
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ PE = "2"
 SRC_URI = "https://lttng.org/files/lttng-ust/lttng-ust-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://lttng-ust-doc-examples-disable.patch \
           "
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4863cc2f9f0a070b42438bb646bbba06"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "07cc3c0b71e7b77f1913d5b7f340a78a9af414440e4662712aef2d635b88ee9d"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ffcfa8c1ba9a52f002d240e936e9afa2"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9e8420f90d5f963f7aa32bc6d44adc1e491136f687c69ffb7a3075d33b40852b"
 
 CVE_PRODUCT = "ust"
 
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng/CVE-2019-7317.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng/CVE-2019-7317.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6ee1f8da3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng/CVE-2019-7317.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Use-after-free detected with static analysis.
+
+CVE: CVE-2019-7317
+Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://github.com/glennrp/libpng/issues/275]
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+diff --git a/png.c b/png.c
+index 9d9926f638..efd1aecfbd 100644
+--- a/png.c
++++ b/png.c
+@@ -4588,8 +4588,7 @@ png_image_free(png_imagep image)
+    if (image != NULL && image->opaque != NULL &&
+       image->opaque->error_buf == NULL)
+    {
+-      /* Ignore errors here: */
+-      (void)png_safe_execute(image, png_image_free_function, image);
++      png_image_free_function(image);
+       image->opaque = NULL;
+    }
+ }
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.36.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.36.bb
index 3cf4f7249..a58623788 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.36.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.36.bb
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ DEPENDS = "zlib"
 
 LIBV = "16"
 
-SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz"
+SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz \
+           file://CVE-2019-7317.patch"
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "df2be2d29c40937fe1f5349b16bc2826"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "eceb924c1fa6b79172fdfd008d335f0e59172a86a66481e09d4089df872aa319"
 
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1/CVE-2018-19432.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1/CVE-2018-19432.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ded2c0f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1/CVE-2018-19432.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+From 6f3266277bed16525f0ac2f0f03ff4626f1923e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 18:00:21 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix max channel count bug
+
+The code was allowing files to be written with a channel count of exactly
+`SF_MAX_CHANNELS` but was failing to read some file formats with the same
+channel count.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/
+commit/6f3266277bed16525f0ac2f0f03ff4626f1923e5]
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-19432
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
+
+---
+ src/aiff.c |    6 +++---
+ src/rf64.c |    4 ++--
+ src/w64.c  |    4 ++--
+ src/wav.c  |    4 ++--
+ 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/aiff.c b/src/aiff.c
+index fbd43cb..6386bce 100644
+--- a/src/aiff.c
++++ b/src/aiff.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+-** Copyright (C) 1999-2016 Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
++** Copyright (C) 1999-2018 Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
+ ** Copyright (C) 2005 David Viens <davidv@plogue.com>
+ **
+ ** This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ aiff_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf, COMM_
+ 	if (psf->sf.channels < 1)
+ 		return SFE_CHANNEL_COUNT_ZERO ;
+ 
+-	if (psf->sf.channels >= SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
++	if (psf->sf.channels > SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
+ 		return SFE_CHANNEL_COUNT ;
+ 
+ 	if (! (found_chunk & HAVE_FORM))
+@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ aiff_read_comm_chunk (SF_PRIVATE *psf, C
+ 	psf_log_printf (psf, "  Sample Rate : %d\n", samplerate) ;
+ 	psf_log_printf (psf, "  Frames      : %u%s\n", comm_fmt->numSampleFrames, (comm_fmt->numSampleFrames == 0 && psf->filelength > 104) ? " (Should not be 0)" : "") ;
+ 
+-	if (comm_fmt->numChannels < 1 || comm_fmt->numChannels >= SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
++	if (comm_fmt->numChannels < 1 || comm_fmt->numChannels > SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
+ 	{	psf_log_printf (psf, "  Channels    : %d (should be >= 1 and < %d)\n", comm_fmt->numChannels, SF_MAX_CHANNELS) ;
+ 		return SFE_CHANNEL_COUNT_BAD ;
+ 		} ;
+diff --git a/src/rf64.c b/src/rf64.c
+index d57f0f3..876cd45 100644
+--- a/src/rf64.c
++++ b/src/rf64.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+-** Copyright (C) 2008-2017 Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
++** Copyright (C) 2008-2018 Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
+ ** Copyright (C) 2009      Uli Franke <cls@nebadje.org>
+ **
+ ** This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ rf64_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int *
+ 	if (psf->sf.channels < 1)
+ 		return SFE_CHANNEL_COUNT_ZERO ;
+ 
+-	if (psf->sf.channels >= SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
++	if (psf->sf.channels > SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
+ 		return SFE_CHANNEL_COUNT ;
+ 
+ 	/* WAVs can be little or big endian */
+diff --git a/src/w64.c b/src/w64.c
+index 939b716..a37d2c5 100644
+--- a/src/w64.c
++++ b/src/w64.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+-** Copyright (C) 1999-2016 Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
++** Copyright (C) 1999-2018 Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
+ **
+ ** This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ ** it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ w64_read_header	(SF_PRIVATE *psf, int *b
+ 	if (psf->sf.channels < 1)
+ 		return SFE_CHANNEL_COUNT_ZERO ;
+ 
+-	if (psf->sf.channels >= SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
++	if (psf->sf.channels > SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
+ 		return SFE_CHANNEL_COUNT ;
+ 
+ 	psf->endian = SF_ENDIAN_LITTLE ;		/* All W64 files are little endian. */
+diff --git a/src/wav.c b/src/wav.c
+index 7bd97bc..dc97545 100644
+--- a/src/wav.c
++++ b/src/wav.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*
+-** Copyright (C) 1999-2016 Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
++** Copyright (C) 1999-2018 Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
+ ** Copyright (C) 2004-2005 David Viens <davidv@plogue.com>
+ **
+ ** This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ wav_read_header	(SF_PRIVATE *psf, int *b
+ 	if (psf->sf.channels < 1)
+ 		return SFE_CHANNEL_COUNT_ZERO ;
+ 
+-	if (psf->sf.channels >= SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
++	if (psf->sf.channels > SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
+ 		return SFE_CHANNEL_COUNT ;
+ 
+ 	if (format != WAVE_FORMAT_PCM && (parsestage & HAVE_fact) == 0)
+-- 
+1.7.9.5
+
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.0.28.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.0.28.bb
index 13248f5cb..9700f4a6e 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.0.28.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libsndfile/libsndfile1_1.0.28.bb
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.mega-nerd.com/libsndfile/files/libsndfile-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2017-14634.patch \
            file://CVE-2018-13139.patch \
            file://0001-a-ulaw-fix-multiple-buffer-overflows-432.patch \
+           file://CVE-2018-19432.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "646b5f98ce89ac60cdb060fcd398247c"
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20180409.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20190110.bb
index 0d57083c5..b9f57900c 100644
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20180409.bb
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20190110.bb
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ DEPENDS_class-nativesdk = "openssl-native"
 # Need c_rehash from openssl and run-parts from debianutils
 PACKAGE_WRITE_DEPS += "openssl-native debianutils-native"
 
-SRCREV = "dbbd11e56af93bb79f21d0ee6059a901f83f70a5"
+SRCREV = "c28799b138b044c963d24c4a69659b6e5486e3be"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://salsa.debian.org/debian/ca-certificates.git;protocol=https \
            file://0002-update-ca-certificates-use-SYSROOT.patch \