reset upstream subtrees to yocto 2.6

Reset the following subtrees on thud HEAD:

  poky: 87e3a9739d
  meta-openembedded: 6094ae18c8
  meta-security: 31dc4e7532
  meta-raspberrypi: a48743dc36
  meta-xilinx: c42016e2e6

Also re-apply backports that didn't make it into thud:
  poky:
    17726d0 systemd-systemctl-native: handle Install wildcards

  meta-openembedded:
    4321a5d libtinyxml2: update to 7.0.1
    042f0a3 libcereal: Add native and nativesdk classes
    e23284f libcereal: Allow empty package
    030e8d4 rsyslog: curl-less build with fmhttp PACKAGECONFIG
    179a1b9 gtest: update to 1.8.1

Squashed OpenBMC subtree compatibility updates:
  meta-aspeed:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          aspeed: add yocto 2.6 compatibility

  meta-ibm:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          ibm: prepare for yocto 2.6

  meta-ingrasys:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          ingrasys: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6

  meta-openpower:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          openpower: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6

  meta-phosphor:
    Brad Bishop (3):
          phosphor: set layer compatibility to thud
          phosphor: libgpg-error: drop patches
          phosphor: react to fitimage artifact rename

    Ed Tanous (4):
          Dropbear: upgrade options for latest upgrade
          yocto2.6: update openssl options
          busybox: remove upstream watchdog patch
          systemd: Rebase CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF patch

Change-Id: I7b1fe71cca880d0372a82d94b5fd785323e3a9e7
Signed-off-by: Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 70 deletions

diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2017-17087.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2017-17087.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 937b9ba31..000000000
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2017-17087.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-From 9c11f80339372b7aa2f43153d574f2b5abb79708 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com>
-Date: Sun, 17 Dec 2017 23:09:35 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] vim: patch 8.0.1263: others can read the swap file if a user
- is careless
-
-Problem:    Others can read the swap file if a user is careless with his
-            primary group.
-Solution:   If the group permission allows for reading but the world
-            permissions doesn't, make sure the group is right.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-CVE: CVE-2017-17087
-Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com>
----
- src/fileio.c  | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
- src/version.c |  2 ++
- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/fileio.c b/src/fileio.c
-index f54fb8465..2c7740af9 100644
---- a/src/fileio.c
-+++ b/src/fileio.c
-@@ -716,7 +716,29 @@ readfile(
- 	/* Set swap file protection bits after creating it. */
- 	if (swap_mode > 0 && curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp != NULL
- 			  && curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp->mf_fname != NULL)
--	    (void)mch_setperm(curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp->mf_fname, (long)swap_mode);
-+	{
-+	    char_u *swap_fname = curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp->mf_fname;
-+
-+	    /*
-+	     * If the group-read bit is set but not the world-read bit, then
-+	     * the group must be equal to the group of the original file.  If
-+	     * we can't make that happen then reset the group-read bit.  This
-+	     * avoids making the swap file readable to more users when the
-+	     * primary group of the user is too permissive.
-+	     */
-+	    if ((swap_mode & 044) == 040)
-+	    {
-+		stat_T	swap_st;
-+
-+		if (mch_stat((char *)swap_fname, &swap_st) >= 0
-+			&& st.st_gid != swap_st.st_gid
-+			&& fchown(curbuf->b_ml.ml_mfp->mf_fd, -1, st.st_gid)
-+									 == -1)
-+		    swap_mode &= 0600;
-+	    }
-+
-+	    (void)mch_setperm(swap_fname, (long)swap_mode);
-+	}
- #endif
-     }
- 
-diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c
-index a5cb078f0..5c0df475f 100644
---- a/src/version.c
-+++ b/src/version.c
-@@ -770,6 +770,8 @@ static char *(features[]) =
- static int included_patches[] =
- {   /* Add new patch number below this line */
- /**/
-+    1263,
-+/**/
-     983,
- /**/
-     982,
--- 
-2.11.0
-