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* KVM: nVMX: Fix some comment typos and coding styleMiaohe Lin2020-02-121-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | Fix some typos in the comments. Also fix coding style. [Sean Christopherson rewrites the comment of write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable field in struct kvm_vcpu_arch.] Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: nVMX: Handle pending #DB when injecting INIT VM-exitOliver Upton2020-02-121-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | SDM 27.3.4 states that the 'pending debug exceptions' VMCS field will be populated if a VM-exit caused by an INIT signal takes priority over a debug-trap. Emulate this behavior when synthesizing an INIT signal VM-exit into L1. Fixes: 4b9852f4f389 ("KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states") Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* x86/kvm/hyper-v: don't allow to turn on unsupported VMX controls for nested ↵Vitaly Kuznetsov2020-02-051-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | guests Sane L1 hypervisors are not supposed to turn any of the unsupported VMX controls on for its guests and nested_vmx_check_controls() checks for that. This is, however, not the case for the controls which are supported on the host but are missing in enlightened VMCS and when eVMCS is in use. It would certainly be possible to add these missing checks to nested_check_vm_execution_controls()/_vm_exit_controls()/.. but it seems preferable to keep eVMCS-specific stuff in eVMCS and reduce the impact on non-eVMCS guests by doing less unrelated checks. Create a separate nested_evmcs_check_controls() for this purpose. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: nVMX: Remove stale comment from nested_vmx_load_cr3()Sean Christopherson2020-02-051-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | The blurb pertaining to the return value of nested_vmx_load_cr3() no longer matches reality, remove it entirely as the behavior it is attempting to document is quite obvious when reading the actual code. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: nVMX: delete meaningless nested_vmx_run() declarationMiaohe Lin2020-02-051-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | The function nested_vmx_run() declaration is below its implementation. So this is meaningless and should be removed. Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* Merge tag 'kvm-5.6-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds2020-01-311-104/+85
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini: "This is the first batch of KVM changes. ARM: - cleanups and corner case fixes. PPC: - Bugfixes x86: - Support for mapping DAX areas with large nested page table entries. - Cleanups and bugfixes here too. A particularly important one is a fix for FPU load when the thread has TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD. There is also a race condition which could be used in guest userspace to exploit the guest kernel, for which the embargo expired today. - Fast path for IPI delivery vmexits, shaving about 200 clock cycles from IPI latency. - Protect against "Spectre-v1/L1TF" (bring data in the cache via speculative out of bound accesses, use L1TF on the sibling hyperthread to read it), which unfortunately is an even bigger whack-a-mole game than SpectreV1. Sean continues his mission to rewrite KVM. In addition to a sizable number of x86 patches, this time he contributed a pretty large refactoring of vCPU creation that affects all architectures but should not have any visible effect. s390 will come next week together with some more x86 patches" * tag 'kvm-5.6-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (204 commits) x86/KVM: Clean up host's steal time structure x86/KVM: Make sure KVM_VCPU_FLUSH_TLB flag is not missed x86/kvm: Cache gfn to pfn translation x86/kvm: Introduce kvm_(un)map_gfn() x86/kvm: Be careful not to clear KVM_VCPU_FLUSH_TLB bit KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix -Werror=return-type build failure KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Release lock on page-out failure path KVM: arm64: Treat emulated TVAL TimerValue as a signed 32-bit integer KVM: arm64: pmu: Only handle supported event counters KVM: arm64: pmu: Fix chained SW_INCR counters KVM: arm64: pmu: Don't mark a counter as chained if the odd one is disabled KVM: arm64: pmu: Don't increment SW_INCR if PMCR.E is unset KVM: x86: Use a typedef for fastop functions KVM: X86: Add 'else' to unify fastop and execute call path KVM: x86: inline memslot_valid_for_gpte KVM: x86/mmu: Use huge pages for DAX-backed files KVM: x86/mmu: Remove lpage_is_disallowed() check from set_spte() KVM: x86/mmu: Fold max_mapping_level() into kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust() KVM: x86/mmu: Zap any compound page when collapsing sptes KVM: x86/mmu: Remove obsolete gfn restoration in FNAME(fetch) ...
| * KVM: nVMX: Check GUEST_DR7 on vmentry of nested guestsKrish Sadhukhan2020-01-271-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | According to section "Checks on Guest Control Registers, Debug Registers, and and MSRs" in Intel SDM vol 3C, the following checks are performed on vmentry of nested guests: If the "load debug controls" VM-entry control is 1, bits 63:32 in the DR7 field must be 0. In KVM, GUEST_DR7 is set prior to the vmcs02 VM-entry by kvm_set_dr() and the latter synthesizes a #GP if any bit in the high dword in the former is set. Hence this field needs to be checked in software. Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Karl Heubaum <karl.heubaum@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: x86: Perform non-canonical checks in 32-bit KVMSean Christopherson2020-01-271-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the CONFIG_X86_64 condition from the low level non-canonical helpers to effectively enable non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM. Non-canonical checks are performed by hardware if the CPU *supports* 64-bit mode, whether or not the CPU is actually in 64-bit mode is irrelevant. For the most part, skipping non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM is ok-ish because 32-bit KVM always (hopefully) drops bits 63:32 of whatever value it's checking before propagating it to hardware, and architecturally, the expected behavior for the guest is a bit of a grey area since the vCPU itself doesn't support 64-bit mode. I.e. a 32-bit KVM guest can observe the missed checks in several paths, e.g. INVVPID and VM-Enter, but it's debatable whether or not the missed checks constitute a bug because technically the vCPU doesn't support 64-bit mode. The primary motivation for enabling the non-canonical checks is defense in depth. As mentioned above, a guest can trigger a missed check via INVVPID or VM-Enter. INVVPID is straightforward as it takes a 64-bit virtual address as part of its 128-bit INVVPID descriptor and fails if the address is non-canonical, even if INVVPID is executed in 32-bit PM. Nested VM-Enter is a bit more convoluted as it requires the guest to write natural width VMCS fields via memory accesses and then VMPTRLD the VMCS, but it's still possible. In both cases, KVM is saved from a true bug only because its flows that propagate values to hardware (correctly) take "unsigned long" parameters and so drop bits 63:32 of the bad value. Explicitly performing the non-canonical checks makes it less likely that a bad value will be propagated to hardware, e.g. in the INVVPID case, if __invvpid() didn't implicitly drop bits 63:32 then KVM would BUG() on the resulting unexpected INVVPID failure due to hardware rejecting the non-canonical address. The only downside to enabling the non-canonical checks is that it adds a relatively small amount of overhead, but the affected flows are not hot paths, i.e. the overhead is negligible. Note, KVM technically could gate the non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM with static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LM), but on bare metal that's an even bigger waste of code for everyone except the 0.00000000000001% of the population running on Yonah, and nested 32-bit on 64-bit already fudges things with respect to 64-bit CPU behavior. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> [Also do so in nested_vmx_check_host_state as reported by Krish. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: nVMX: WARN on failure to set IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRLOliver Upton2020-01-271-14/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Writes to MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CONTROL should never fail if the VM-exit and VM-entry controls are exposed to L1. Promote the checks to perform a full WARN if kvm_set_msr() fails and remove the now unused macro SET_MSR_OR_WARN(). Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: nVMX: vmread should not set rflags to specify success in case of #PFMiaohe Lin2020-01-211-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In case writing to vmread destination operand result in a #PF, vmread should not call nested_vmx_succeed() to set rflags to specify success. Similar to as done in VMPTRST (See handle_vmptrst()). Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: vmx: delete meaningless nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap() declarationMiaohe Lin2020-01-211-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The function nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap() declaration is below its implementation. So this is meaningless and should be removed. Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: Fix some comment typos and missing parenthesesMiaohe Lin2020-01-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix some typos and add missing parentheses in the comments. Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * kvm: nVMX: Aesthetic cleanup of handle_vmread and handle_vmwriteJim Mattson2020-01-081-36/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Apply reverse fir tree declaration order, shorten some variable names to avoid line wrap, reformat a block comment, delete an extra blank line, and use BIT(10) instead of (1u << 10). Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jon Cargille <jcargill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * kvm: nVMX: VMWRITE checks unsupported field before read-only fieldJim Mattson2020-01-081-5/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | According to the SDM, VMWRITE checks to see if the secondary source operand corresponds to an unsupported VMCS field before it checks to see if the secondary source operand corresponds to a VM-exit information field and the processor does not support writing to VM-exit information fields. Fixes: 49f705c5324aa ("KVM: nVMX: Implement VMREAD and VMWRITE") Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jon Cargille <jcargill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * kvm: nVMX: VMWRITE checks VMCS-link pointer before VMCS fieldJim Mattson2020-01-081-34/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | According to the SDM, a VMWRITE in VMX non-root operation with an invalid VMCS-link pointer results in VMfailInvalid before the validity of the VMCS field in the secondary source operand is checked. For consistency, modify both handle_vmwrite and handle_vmread, even though there was no problem with the latter. Fixes: 6d894f498f5d1 ("KVM: nVMX: vmread/vmwrite: Use shadow vmcs12 if running L2") Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jon Cargille <jcargill@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: VMX: Fix the spelling of CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTINGXiaoyao Li2020-01-081-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The mis-spelling is found by checkpatch.pl, so fix them. Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: VMX: Rename NMI_PENDING to NMI_WINDOWXiaoyao Li2020-01-081-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rename the NMI-window exiting related definitions to match the latest Intel SDM. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: VMX: Rename INTERRUPT_PENDING to INTERRUPT_WINDOWXiaoyao Li2020-01-081-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rename interrupt-windown exiting related definitions to match the latest Intel SDM. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | x86/msr-index: Clean up bit defines for IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSRSean Christopherson2020-01-131-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As pointed out by Boris, the defines for bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL are quite a mouthful, especially the VMX bits which must differentiate between enabling VMX inside and outside SMX (TXT) operation. Rename the MSR and its bit defines to abbreviate FEATURE_CONTROL as FEAT_CTL to make them a little friendlier on the eyes. Arguably, the MSR itself should keep the full IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL name to match Intel's SDM, but a future patch will add a dedicated Kconfig, file and functions for the MSR. Using the full name for those assets is rather unwieldy, so bite the bullet and use IA32_FEAT_CTL so that its nomenclature is consistent throughout the kernel. Opportunistically, fix a few other annoyances with the defines: - Relocate the bit defines so that they immediately follow the MSR define, e.g. aren't mistaken as belonging to MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL. - Add whitespace around the block of feature control defines to make it clear they're all related. - Use BIT() instead of manually encoding the bit shift. - Use "VMX" instead of "VMXON" to match the SDM. - Append "_ENABLED" to the LMCE (Local Machine Check Exception) bit to be consistent with the kernel's verbiage used for all other feature control bits. Note, the SDM refers to the LMCE bit as LMCE_ON, likely to differentiate it from IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL.LMCE_EN. Ignore the (literal) one-off usage of _ON, the SDM is simply "wrong". Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
* KVM: nVMX: Remove unnecessary TLB flushes on L1<->L2 switches when L1 use ↵Liran Alon2019-11-211-7/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | apic-access-page According to Intel SDM section 28.3.3.3/28.3.3.4 Guidelines for Use of the INVVPID/INVEPT Instruction, the hypervisor needs to execute INVVPID/INVEPT X in case CPU executes VMEntry with VPID/EPTP X and either: "Virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control was changed from 0 to 1, OR the value of apic_access_page was changed. In the nested case, the burden falls on L1, unless L0 enables EPT in vmcs02 but L1 enables neither EPT nor VPID in vmcs12. For this reason prepare_vmcs02() and load_vmcs12_host_state() have special code to request a TLB flush in case L1 does not use EPT but it uses "virtualize APIC accesses". This special case however is not necessary. On a nested vmentry the physical TLB will already be flushed except if all the following apply: * L0 uses VPID * L1 uses VPID * L0 can guarantee TLB entries populated while running L1 are tagged differently than TLB entries populated while running L2. If the first condition is false, the processor will flush the TLB on vmentry to L2. If the second or third condition are false, prepare_vmcs02() will request KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH. However, even if both are true, no extra TLB flush is needed to handle the APIC access page: * if L1 doesn't use VPID, the second condition doesn't hold and the TLB will be flushed anyway. * if L1 uses VPID, it has to flush the TLB itself with INVVPID and section 28.3.3.3 doesn't apply to L0. * even INVEPT is not needed because, if L0 uses EPT, it uses different EPTP when running L2 than L1 (because guest_mode is part of mmu-role). In this case SDM section 28.3.3.4 doesn't apply. Similarly, examining nested_vmx_vmexit()->load_vmcs12_host_state(), one could note that L0 won't flush TLB only in cases where SDM sections 28.3.3.3 and 28.3.3.4 don't apply. In particular, if L0 uses different VPIDs for L1 and L2 (i.e. vmx->vpid != vmx->nested.vpid02), section 28.3.3.3 doesn't apply. Thus, remove this flush from prepare_vmcs02() and nested_vmx_vmexit(). Side-note: This patch can be viewed as removing parts of commit fb6c81984313 ("kvm: vmx: Flush TLB when the APIC-access address changes”) that is not relevant anymore since commit 1313cc2bd8f6 ("kvm: mmu: Add guest_mode to kvm_mmu_page_role”). i.e. The first commit assumes that if L0 use EPT and L1 doesn’t use EPT, then L0 will use same EPTP for both L0 and L1. Which indeed required L0 to execute INVEPT before entering L2 guest. This assumption is not true anymore since when guest_mode was added to mmu-role. Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: nVMX: Do not mark vmcs02->apic_access_page as dirty when unpinningLiran Alon2019-11-211-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | vmcs->apic_access_page is simply a token that the hypervisor puts into the PFN of a 4KB EPTE (or PTE if using shadow-paging) that triggers APIC-access VMExit or APIC virtualization logic whenever a CPU running in VMX non-root mode read/write from/to this PFN. As every write either triggers an APIC-access VMExit or write is performed on vmcs->virtual_apic_page, the PFN pointed to by vmcs->apic_access_page should never actually be touched by CPU. Therefore, there is no need to mark vmcs02->apic_access_page as dirty after unpin it on L2->L1 emulated VMExit or when L1 exit VMX operation. Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* Merge branch 'kvm-tsx-ctrl' into HEADPaolo Bonzini2019-11-211-28/+36
|\ | | | | | | | | Conflicts: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
| * KVM: nVMX: Don't leak L1 MMIO regions to L2Jim Mattson2019-10-221-28/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control is set in the VMCS, the APIC virtualization hardware is triggered when a page walk in VMX non-root mode terminates at a PTE wherein the address of the 4k page frame matches the APIC-access address specified in the VMCS. On hardware, the APIC-access address may be any valid 4k-aligned physical address. KVM's nVMX implementation enforces the additional constraint that the APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 must be backed by a "struct page" in L1. If not, L0 will simply clear the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control in the vmcs02. The problem with this approach is that the L1 guest has arranged the vmcs12 EPT tables--or shadow page tables, if the "enable EPT" VM-execution control is clear in the vmcs12--so that the L2 guest physical address(es)--or L2 guest linear address(es)--that reference the L2 APIC map to the APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12. Without the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control in the vmcs02, the APIC accesses in the L2 guest will directly access the APIC-access page in L1. When there is no mapping whatsoever for the APIC-access address in L1, the L2 VM just loses the intended APIC virtualization. However, when the APIC-access address is mapped to an MMIO region in L1, the L2 guest gets direct access to the L1 MMIO device. For example, if the APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 is 0xfee00000, then L2 gets direct access to L1's APIC. Since this vmcs12 configuration is something that KVM cannot faithfully emulate, the appropriate response is to exit to userspace with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION. Fixes: fe3ef05c7572 ("KVM: nVMX: Prepare vmcs02 from vmcs01 and vmcs12") Reported-by: Dan Cross <dcross@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Assume TLB entries of L1 and L2 are tagged differently if L0 use EPTLiran Alon2019-11-201-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since commit 1313cc2bd8f6 ("kvm: mmu: Add guest_mode to kvm_mmu_page_role"), guest_mode was added to mmu-role and therefore if L0 use EPT, it will always run L1 and L2 with different EPTP. i.e. EPTP01!=EPTP02. Because TLB entries are tagged with EP4TA, KVM can assume TLB entries populated while running L2 are tagged differently than TLB entries populated while running L1. Therefore, update nested_has_guest_tlb_tag() to consider if L0 use EPT instead of if L1 use EPT. Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Use semi-colon instead of comma for exit-handlers initializationLiran Alon2019-11-201-13/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Add support for capturing highest observable L2 TSCAaron Lewis2019-11-151-6/+95
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The L1 hypervisor may include the IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR in the vmcs12 MSR VM-exit MSR-store area as a way of determining the highest TSC value that might have been observed by L2 prior to VM-exit. The current implementation does not capture a very tight bound on this value. To tighten the bound, add the IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR to the vmcs02 VM-exit MSR-store area whenever it appears in the vmcs12 VM-exit MSR-store area. When L0 processes the vmcs12 VM-exit MSR-store area during the emulation of an L2->L1 VM-exit, special-case the IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR, using the value stored in the vmcs02 VM-exit MSR-store area to derive the value to be stored in the vmcs12 VM-exit MSR-store area. Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | kvm: nested: Introduce read_and_check_msr_entry()Aaron Lewis2019-11-151-13/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add the function read_and_check_msr_entry() which just pulls some code out of nested_vmx_store_msr(). This will be useful as reusable code in upcoming patches. Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Expose load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL VM-{Entry,Exit} controlOliver Upton2019-11-151-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The "load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL" bit for VM-entry and VM-exit should only be exposed to the guest if IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is a valid MSR. Create a new helper to allow pmu_refresh() to update the VM-Entry and VM-Exit controls to ensure PMU values are initialized when performing the is_valid_msr() check. Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Load GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR on VM-EntryOliver Upton2019-11-151-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add condition to prepare_vmcs02 which loads IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on VM-entry if the "load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL" bit on the VM-entry control is set. Use SET_MSR_OR_WARN() rather than directly writing to the field to avoid overwrite by atomic_switch_perf_msrs(). Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Use kvm_set_msr to load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on VM-ExitOliver Upton2019-11-151-2/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing implementation for loading the IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR on VM-exit was incorrect, as the next call to atomic_switch_perf_msrs() could cause this value to be overwritten. Instead, call kvm_set_msr() which will allow atomic_switch_perf_msrs() to correctly set the values. Define a macro, SET_MSR_OR_WARN(), to set the MSR with kvm_set_msr() and WARN on failure. Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Check HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on VM-EntryOliver Upton2019-11-151-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a consistency check on nested vm-entry for host's IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL from vmcs12. Per Intel's SDM Vol 3 26.2.2: If the "load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL" VM-exit control is 1, bits reserved in the IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR must be 0 in the field for that register" Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Check GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL on VM-EntryOliver Upton2019-11-151-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add condition to nested_vmx_check_guest_state() to check the validity of GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL. Per Intel's SDM Vol 3 26.3.1.1: If the "load IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL" VM-entry control is 1, bits reserved in the IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR must be 0 in the field for that register. Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Co-developed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Update vmcs01 TPR_THRESHOLD if L2 changed L1 TPRLiran Alon2019-11-151-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When L1 don't use TPR-Shadow to run L2, L0 configures vmcs02 without TPR-Shadow and install intercepts on CR8 access (load and store). If L1 do not intercept L2 CR8 access, L0 intercepts on those accesses will emulate load/store on L1's LAPIC TPR. If in this case L2 lowers TPR such that there is now an injectable interrupt to L1, apic_update_ppr() will request a KVM_REQ_EVENT which will trigger a call to update_cr8_intercept() to update TPR-Threshold to highest pending IRR priority. However, this update to TPR-Threshold is done while active vmcs is vmcs02 instead of vmcs01. Thus, when later at some point L0 will emulate an exit from L2 to L1, L1 will still run with high TPR-Threshold. This will result in every VMEntry to L1 to immediately exit on TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD and continue to do so infinitely until some condition will cause KVM_REQ_EVENT to be set. (Note that TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD exit handler do not set KVM_REQ_EVENT until apic_update_ppr() will notice a new injectable interrupt for PPR) To fix this issue, change update_cr8_intercept() such that if L2 lowers L1's TPR in a way that requires to lower L1's TPR-Threshold, save update to TPR-Threshold and apply it to vmcs01 when L0 emulates an exit from L2 to L1. Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: VMX: Consume pending LAPIC INIT event when exit on INIT_SIGNALLiran Alon2019-11-151-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Intel SDM section 25.2 OTHER CAUSES OF VM EXITS specifies the following on INIT signals: "Such exits do not modify register state or clear pending events as they would outside of VMX operation." When commit 4b9852f4f389 ("KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states") was applied, I interepted above Intel SDM statement such that INIT_SIGNAL exit don’t consume the LAPIC INIT pending event. However, when Nadav Amit run matching kvm-unit-test on a bare-metal machine, it turned out my interpetation was wrong. i.e. INIT_SIGNAL exit does consume the LAPIC INIT pending event. (See: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg196757.html) Therefore, fix KVM code to behave as observed on bare-metal. Fixes: 4b9852f4f389 ("KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states") Reported-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: VMX: Rename {vmx,nested_vmx}_vcpu_setup()Xiaoyao Li2019-10-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rename {vmx,nested_vmx}_vcpu_setup() to match what they really do. Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: Add helpers to test/mark reg availability and dirtinessSean Christopherson2019-10-221-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add helpers to prettify code that tests and/or marks whether or not a register is available and/or dirty. Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: Always write vmcs02.GUEST_CR3 during nested VM-EnterSean Christopherson2019-10-221-0/+10
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Write the desired L2 CR3 into vmcs02.GUEST_CR3 during nested VM-Enter instead of deferring the VMWRITE until vmx_set_cr3(). If the VMWRITE is deferred, then KVM can consume a stale vmcs02.GUEST_CR3 when it refreshes vmcs12->guest_cr3 during nested_vmx_vmexit() if the emulated VM-Exit occurs without actually entering L2, e.g. if the nested run is squashed because nested VM-Enter (from L1) is putting L2 into HLT. Note, the above scenario can occur regardless of whether L1 is intercepting HLT, e.g. L1 can intercept HLT and then re-enter L2 with vmcs.GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE=HALTED. But practically speaking, a VMM will likely put a guest into HALTED if and only if it's not intercepting HLT. In an ideal world where EPT *requires* unrestricted guest (and vice versa), VMX could handle CR3 similar to how it handles RSP and RIP, e.g. mark CR3 dirty and conditionally load it at vmx_vcpu_run(). But the unrestricted guest silliness complicates the dirty tracking logic to the point that explicitly handling vmcs02.GUEST_CR3 during nested VM-Enter is a simpler overall implementation. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-tested-by: Reto Buerki <reet@codelabs.ch> Tested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: nVMX: Fix consistency check on injected exception error codeSean Christopherson2019-10-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Current versions of Intel's SDM incorrectly state that "bits 31:15 of the VM-Entry exception error-code field" must be zero. In reality, bits 31:16 must be zero, i.e. error codes are 16-bit values. The bogus error code check manifests as an unexpected VM-Entry failure due to an invalid code field (error number 7) in L1, e.g. when injecting a #GP with error_code=0x9f00. Nadav previously reported the bug[*], both to KVM and Intel, and fixed the associated kvm-unit-test. [*] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11124749/ Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: nVMX: cleanup and fix host 64-bit mode checksPaolo Bonzini2019-09-251-31/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | KVM was incorrectly checking vmcs12->host_ia32_efer even if the "load IA32_EFER" exit control was reset. Also, some checks were not using the new CC macro for tracing. Cleanup everything so that the vCPU's 64-bit mode is determined directly from EFER_LMA and the VMCS checks are based on that, which matches section 26.2.4 of the SDM. Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Fixes: 5845038c111db27902bc220a4f70070fe945871c Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* kvm: nvmx: limit atomic switch MSRsMarc Orr2019-09-241-11/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allowing an unlimited number of MSRs to be specified via the VMX load/store MSR lists (e.g., vm-entry MSR load list) is bad for two reasons. First, a guest can specify an unreasonable number of MSRs, forcing KVM to process all of them in software. Second, the SDM bounds the number of MSRs allowed to be packed into the atomic switch MSR lists. Quoting the "Miscellaneous Data" section in the "VMX Capability Reporting Facility" appendix: "Bits 27:25 is used to compute the recommended maximum number of MSRs that should appear in the VM-exit MSR-store list, the VM-exit MSR-load list, or the VM-entry MSR-load list. Specifically, if the value bits 27:25 of IA32_VMX_MISC is N, then 512 * (N + 1) is the recommended maximum number of MSRs to be included in each list. If the limit is exceeded, undefined processor behavior may result (including a machine check during the VMX transition)." Because KVM needs to protect itself and can't model "undefined processor behavior", arbitrarily force a VM-entry to fail due to MSR loading when the MSR load list is too large. Similarly, trigger an abort during a VM exit that encounters an MSR load list or MSR store list that is too large. The MSR list size is intentionally not pre-checked so as to maintain compatibility with hardware inasmuch as possible. Test these new checks with the kvm-unit-test "x86: nvmx: test max atomic switch MSRs". Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: vmx: Introduce handle_unexpected_vmexit and handle WAITPKG vmexitTao Xu2019-09-241-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As the latest Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual, UMWAIT and TPAUSE instructions cause a VM exit if the RDTSC exiting and enable user wait and pause VM-execution controls are both 1. Because KVM never enable RDTSC exiting, the vm-exit for UMWAIT and TPAUSE should never happen. Considering EXIT_REASON_XSAVES and EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS is also unexpected VM-exit for KVM. Introduce a common exit helper handle_unexpected_vmexit() to handle these unexpected VM-exit. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tao Xu <tao3.xu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: x86: Add support for user wait instructionsTao Xu2019-09-241-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | UMONITOR, UMWAIT and TPAUSE are a set of user wait instructions. This patch adds support for user wait instructions in KVM. Availability of the user wait instructions is indicated by the presence of the CPUID feature flag WAITPKG CPUID.0x07.0x0:ECX[5]. User wait instructions may be executed at any privilege level, and use 32bit IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR to set the maximum time. The behavior of user wait instructions in VMX non-root operation is determined first by the setting of the "enable user wait and pause" secondary processor-based VM-execution control bit 26. If the VM-execution control is 0, UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE cause an invalid-opcode exception (#UD). If the VM-execution control is 1, treatment is based on the setting of the “RDTSC exiting†VM-execution control. Because KVM never enables RDTSC exiting, if the instruction causes a delay, the amount of time delayed is called here the physical delay. The physical delay is first computed by determining the virtual delay. If IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL[31:2] is zero, the virtual delay is the value in EDX:EAX minus the value that RDTSC would return; if IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL[31:2] is not zero, the virtual delay is the minimum of that difference and AND(IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL,FFFFFFFCH). Because umwait and tpause can put a (psysical) CPU into a power saving state, by default we dont't expose it to kvm and enable it only when guest CPUID has it. Detailed information about user wait instructions can be found in the latest Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual. Co-developed-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tao Xu <tao3.xu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: nVMX: Check Host Address Space Size on vmentry of nested guestsKrish Sadhukhan2019-09-241-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | According to section "Checks Related to Address-Space Size" in Intel SDM vol 3C, the following checks are performed on vmentry of nested guests: If the logical processor is outside IA-32e mode (if IA32_EFER.LMA = 0) at the time of VM entry, the following must hold: - The "IA-32e mode guest" VM-entry control is 0. - The "host address-space size" VM-exit control is 0. If the logical processor is in IA-32e mode (if IA32_EFER.LMA = 1) at the time of VM entry, the "host address-space size" VM-exit control must be 1. If the "host address-space size" VM-exit control is 0, the following must hold: - The "IA-32e mode guest" VM-entry control is 0. - Bit 17 of the CR4 field (corresponding to CR4.PCIDE) is 0. - Bits 63:32 in the RIP field are 0. If the "host address-space size" VM-exit control is 1, the following must hold: - Bit 5 of the CR4 field (corresponding to CR4.PAE) is 1. - The RIP field contains a canonical address. On processors that do not support Intel 64 architecture, checks are performed to ensure that the "IA-32e mode guest" VM-entry control and the "host address-space size" VM-exit control are both 0. Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Karl Heubaum <karl.heubaum@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds2019-09-181-143/+162
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini: "s390: - ioctl hardening - selftests ARM: - ITS translation cache - support for 512 vCPUs - various cleanups and bugfixes PPC: - various minor fixes and preparation x86: - bugfixes all over the place (posted interrupts, SVM, emulation corner cases, blocked INIT) - some IPI optimizations" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (75 commits) KVM: X86: Use IPI shorthands in kvm guest when support KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU states KVM: VMX: Introduce exit reason for receiving INIT signal on guest-mode KVM: VMX: Stop the preemption timer during vCPU reset KVM: LAPIC: Micro optimize IPI latency kvm: Nested KVM MMUs need PAE root too KVM: x86: set ctxt->have_exception in x86_decode_insn() KVM: x86: always stop emulation on page fault KVM: nVMX: trace nested VM-Enter failures detected by H/W KVM: nVMX: add tracepoint for failed nested VM-Enter x86: KVM: svm: Fix a check in nested_svm_vmrun() KVM: x86: Return to userspace with internal error on unexpected exit reason KVM: x86: Add kvm_emulate_{rd,wr}msr() to consolidate VXM/SVM code KVM: x86: Refactor up kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to simplify callers doc: kvm: Fix return description of KVM_SET_MSRS KVM: X86: Tune PLE Window tracepoint KVM: VMX: Change ple_window type to unsigned int KVM: X86: Remove tailing newline for tracepoints KVM: X86: Trace vcpu_id for vmexit KVM: x86: Manually calculate reserved bits when loading PDPTRS ...
| * KVM: x86: Fix INIT signal handling in various CPU statesLiran Alon2019-09-111-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit cd7764fe9f73 ("KVM: x86: latch INITs while in system management mode") changed code to latch INIT while vCPU is in SMM and process latched INIT when leaving SMM. It left a subtle remark in commit message that similar treatment should also be done while vCPU is in VMX non-root-mode. However, INIT signals should actually be latched in various vCPU states: (*) For both Intel and AMD, INIT signals should be latched while vCPU is in SMM. (*) For Intel, INIT should also be latched while vCPU is in VMX operation and later processed when vCPU leaves VMX operation by executing VMXOFF. (*) For AMD, INIT should also be latched while vCPU runs with GIF=0 or in guest-mode with intercept defined on INIT signal. To fix this: 1) Add kvm_x86_ops->apic_init_signal_blocked() such that each CPU vendor can define the various CPU states in which INIT signals should be blocked and modify kvm_apic_accept_events() to use it. 2) Modify vmx_check_nested_events() to check for pending INIT signal while vCPU in guest-mode. If so, emualte vmexit on EXIT_REASON_INIT_SIGNAL. Note that nSVM should have similar behaviour but is currently left as a TODO comment to implement in the future because nSVM don't yet implement svm_check_nested_events(). Note: Currently KVM nVMX implementation don't support VMX wait-for-SIPI activity state as specified in MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC bits 6:8 exposed to guest (See nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs()). If and when support for this activity state will be implemented, kvm_check_nested_events() would need to avoid emulating vmexit on INIT signal in case activity-state is wait-for-SIPI. In addition, kvm_apic_accept_events() would need to be modified to avoid discarding SIPI in case VMX activity-state is wait-for-SIPI but instead delay SIPI processing to vmx_check_nested_events() that would clear pending APIC events and emulate vmexit on SIPI. Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Co-developed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: nVMX: trace nested VM-Enter failures detected by H/WSean Christopherson2019-09-111-5/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use the recently added tracepoint for logging nested VM-Enter failures instead of spamming the kernel log when hardware detects a consistency check failure. Take the opportunity to print the name of the error code instead of dumping the raw hex number, but limit the symbol table to error codes that can reasonably be encountered by KVM. Add an equivalent tracepoint in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(), e.g. so that tracing of "invalid control field" errors isn't suppressed when nested early checks are enabled. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: nVMX: add tracepoint for failed nested VM-EnterSean Christopherson2019-09-111-123/+133
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Debugging a failed VM-Enter is often like searching for a needle in a haystack, e.g. there are over 80 consistency checks that funnel into the "invalid control field" error code. One way to expedite debug is to run the buggy code as an L1 guest under KVM (and pray that the failing check is detected by KVM). However, extracting useful debug information out of L0 KVM requires attaching a debugger to KVM and/or modifying the source, e.g. to log which check is failing. Make life a little less painful for VMM developers and add a tracepoint for failed VM-Enter consistency checks. Ideally the tracepoint would capture both what check failed and precisely why it failed, but logging why a checked failed is difficult to do in a generic tracepoint without resorting to invasive techniques, e.g. generating a custom string on failure. That being said, for the vast majority of VM-Enter failures the most difficult step is figuring out exactly what to look at, e.g. figuring out which bit was incorrectly set in a control field is usually not too painful once the guilty field as been identified. To reach a happy medium between precision and ease of use, simply log the code that detected a failed check, using a macro to execute the check and log the trace event on failure. This approach enables tracing arbitrary code, e.g. it's not limited to function calls or specific formats of checks, and the changes to the existing code are minimally invasive. A macro with a two-character name is desirable as usage of the macro doesn't result in overly long lines or confusing alignment, while still retaining some amount of readability. I.e. a one-character name is a little too terse, and a three-character name results in the contents being passed to the macro aligning with an indented line when the macro is used an in if-statement, e.g.: if (VCC(nested_vmx_check_long_line_one(...) && nested_vmx_check_long_line_two(...))) return -EINVAL; And that is the story of how the CC(), a.k.a. Consistency Check, macro got its name. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: x86: Refactor up kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to simplify callersSean Christopherson2019-09-101-16/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Refactor the top-level MSR accessors to take/return the index and value directly instead of requiring the caller to dump them into a msr_data struct. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: nVMX: handle page fault in vmreadPaolo Bonzini2019-09-141-1/+3
|/ | | | | | | | The implementation of vmread to memory is still incomplete, as it lacks the ability to do vmread to I/O memory just like vmptrst. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* KVM: nVMX: Set cached_vmcs12 and cached_shadow_vmcs12 NULL after freeJan Kiszka2019-07-221-0/+2
| | | | | | | | Shall help finding use-after-free bugs earlier. Suggested-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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