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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-07-23 12:27:27 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-07-23 12:27:27 -0700
commita66d2c8f7ec1284206ca7c14569e2a607583f1e3 (patch)
tree08cf68bcef3559b370843cab8191e5cc0f740bde /security
parenta6be1fcbc57f95bb47ef3c8e4ee3d83731b8f21e (diff)
parent8cae6f7158ec1fa44c8a04a43db7d8020ec60437 (diff)
downloadtalos-op-linux-a66d2c8f7ec1284206ca7c14569e2a607583f1e3.tar.gz
talos-op-linux-a66d2c8f7ec1284206ca7c14569e2a607583f1e3.zip
Merge branch 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull the big VFS changes from Al Viro: "This one is *big* and changes quite a few things around VFS. What's in there: - the first of two really major architecture changes - death to open intents. The former is finally there; it was very long in making, but with Miklos getting through really hard and messy final push in fs/namei.c, we finally have it. Unlike his variant, this one doesn't introduce struct opendata; what we have instead is ->atomic_open() taking preallocated struct file * and passing everything via its fields. Instead of returning struct file *, it returns -E... on error, 0 on success and 1 in "deal with it yourself" case (e.g. symlink found on server, etc.). See comments before fs/namei.c:atomic_open(). That made a lot of goodies finally possible and quite a few are in that pile: ->lookup(), ->d_revalidate() and ->create() do not get struct nameidata * anymore; ->lookup() and ->d_revalidate() get lookup flags instead, ->create() gets "do we want it exclusive" flag. With the introduction of new helper (kern_path_locked()) we are rid of all struct nameidata instances outside of fs/namei.c; it's still visible in namei.h, but not for long. Come the next cycle, declaration will move either to fs/internal.h or to fs/namei.c itself. [me, miklos, hch] - The second major change: behaviour of final fput(). Now we have __fput() done without any locks held by caller *and* not from deep in call stack. That obviously lifts a lot of constraints on the locking in there. Moreover, it's legal now to call fput() from atomic contexts (which has immediately simplified life for aio.c). We also don't need anti-recursion logics in __scm_destroy() anymore. There is a price, though - the damn thing has become partially asynchronous. For fput() from normal process we are guaranteed that pending __fput() will be done before the caller returns to userland, exits or gets stopped for ptrace. For kernel threads and atomic contexts it's done via schedule_work(), so theoretically we might need a way to make sure it's finished; so far only one such place had been found, but there might be more. There's flush_delayed_fput() (do all pending __fput()) and there's __fput_sync() (fput() analog doing __fput() immediately). I hope we won't need them often; see warnings in fs/file_table.c for details. [me, based on task_work series from Oleg merged last cycle] - sync series from Jan - large part of "death to sync_supers()" work from Artem; the only bits missing here are exofs and ext4 ones. As far as I understand, those are going via the exofs and ext4 trees resp.; once they are in, we can put ->write_super() to the rest, along with the thread calling it. - preparatory bits from unionmount series (from dhowells). - assorted cleanups and fixes all over the place, as usual. This is not the last pile for this cycle; there's at least jlayton's ESTALE work and fsfreeze series (the latter - in dire need of fixes, so I'm not sure it'll make the cut this cycle). I'll probably throw symlink/hardlink restrictions stuff from Kees into the next pile, too. Plus there's a lot of misc patches I hadn't thrown into that one - it's large enough as it is..." * 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (127 commits) ext4: switch EXT4_IOC_RESIZE_FS to mnt_want_write_file() btrfs: switch btrfs_ioctl_balance() to mnt_want_write_file() switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itself spufs: shift dget/mntget towards dentry_open() zoran: don't bother with struct file * in zoran_map ecryptfs: don't reinvent the wheels, please - use struct completion don't expose I_NEW inodes via dentry->d_inode tidy up namei.c a bit unobfuscate follow_up() a bit ext3: pass custom EOF to generic_file_llseek_size() ext4: use core vfs llseek code for dir seeks vfs: allow custom EOF in generic_file_llseek code vfs: Avoid unnecessary WB_SYNC_NONE writeback during sys_sync and reorder sync passes vfs: Remove unnecessary flushing of block devices vfs: Make sys_sync writeout also block device inodes vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices vfs: Reorder operations during sys_sync quota: Move quota syncing to ->sync_fs method quota: Split dquot_quota_sync() to writeback and cache flushing part vfs: Move noop_backing_dev_info check from sync into writeback ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c26
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c6
6 files changed, 18 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 3dcbf86b0d31..c246ba5d43ab 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
#define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK 0x04
extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
-extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork);
+extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork);
extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 0f5b3f027299..f1b59ae39d7e 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
{
struct task_struct *me, *parent;
const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
- struct task_work *newwork, *oldwork;
+ struct callback_head *newwork, *oldwork;
key_ref_t keyring_r;
struct cred *cred;
int ret;
@@ -1466,19 +1466,17 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
ret = -ENOMEM;
- newwork = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_work), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!newwork)
- goto error_keyring;
/* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
* and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
* our parent */
cred = cred_alloc_blank();
if (!cred)
- goto error_newwork;
+ goto error_keyring;
+ newwork = &cred->rcu;
cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
- init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring, cred);
+ init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring);
me = current;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1488,6 +1486,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
oldwork = NULL;
parent = me->real_parent;
+ task_lock(parent);
/* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
goto unlock;
@@ -1531,20 +1530,15 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
if (!ret)
newwork = NULL;
unlock:
+ task_unlock(parent);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (oldwork) {
- put_cred(oldwork->data);
- kfree(oldwork);
- }
- if (newwork) {
- put_cred(newwork->data);
- kfree(newwork);
- }
+ if (oldwork)
+ put_cred(container_of(oldwork, struct cred, rcu));
+ if (newwork)
+ put_cred(cred);
return ret;
-error_newwork:
- kfree(newwork);
error_keyring:
key_ref_put(keyring_r);
return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 4ad54eea1ea4..54339cfd6734 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -834,12 +834,11 @@ error:
* Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when
* the target process is about to resume userspace execution.
*/
-void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork)
+void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
- struct cred *new = twork->data;
+ struct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);
- kfree(twork);
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
put_cred(new);
return;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ffd8900a38e8..9292a8971e66 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2157,8 +2157,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
get_file(devnull);
} else {
devnull = dentry_open(
- dget(selinux_null),
- mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
+ &selinux_null,
O_RDWR, cred);
if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
devnull = NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index dde2005407aa..6d3885165d14 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
extern int selinux_disable(void);
extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
-extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
+extern struct path selinux_null;
extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 3ad290251288..298e695d6822 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ out:
#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
-struct dentry *selinux_null;
+struct path selinux_null;
static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
d_add(dentry, inode);
- selinux_null = dentry;
+ selinux_null.dentry = dentry;
dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &sel_last_ino);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
@@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
return err;
}
- selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
+ selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
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