Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits)
  AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c
  AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly
  KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE
  KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code
  KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted
  KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro
  AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read
  SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook
  LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM
  SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket
  SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute
  SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class
  TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open.
  Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"
  selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions
  selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting
  selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer
  selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm
  ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure
  IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking
  ...

33 files changed, 1243 insertions, 578 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index f204869399ea..2dafe50a2e25 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -6,19 +6,47 @@ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
               resource.o sid.o file.o
 
-clean-files: capability_names.h af_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
 
+
+# Build a lower case string table of capability names
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE     1
+# to
+#    [1] = "dac_override",
 quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN     $@
-cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2]  = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
+	-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@
+
 
+# Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define RLIMIT_STACK		3	/* max stack size */
+# to
+#    [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack",
+#
+# and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps
+# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h  Thi is
+# required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal
+# ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define RLIMIT_STACK		3	/* max stack size */
+# to
+# RLIMIT_STACK, 
 quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN     $@
-cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n --e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+RLIMIT_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2]  = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ ; echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ; sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+\\(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/\\1,/p" $< >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+	sed $< >> $@ -r -n \
+	    -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+	echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+	sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
+	echo "};" >> $@
 
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
 $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
 	$(call cmd,make-caps)
-$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
-	$(call cmd,make-af)
 $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b7106f192b75..d21a427a35ae 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -693,11 +693,9 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
 
 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
 
 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
 
 /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
  * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2a5df2b7da83..ab3d807accc3 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/security.h>
 
-static int cap_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int cap_syslog(int type)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -59,6 +54,11 @@ static int cap_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static void cap_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 }
 
 static int cap_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				   char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+				   const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				   void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
@@ -880,7 +881,6 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sysctl);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory);
@@ -892,6 +892,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_remount);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index ac79032bdf23..08408bd71462 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -110,8 +110,7 @@ struct ima_iint_cache {
 };
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
-		     int mask, int function);
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index d3963de6003d..da36d2c085a4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -105,20 +105,13 @@ err_out:
  * 	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
- * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
- *
- * Return 0 to measure. Return 1 if already measured.
- * For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, or other
- * error, return an error code.
+ * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy,
+ * or other error, return an error code.
 */
-int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
-		     int mask, int function)
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
 {
 	int must_measure;
 
-	if (iint && iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
-		return 1;
-
 	must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
 	return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index c442e47b6785..4ae73040ab7b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -137,11 +137,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
-	if (inode->i_readcount)
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %u\n", __func__, inode->i_readcount);
-
-	inode->i_readcount = 0;
-
 	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 203de979d305..39d66dc2b8e9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -36,67 +36,17 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
 
-struct ima_imbalance {
-	struct hlist_node node;
-	unsigned long fsmagic;
-};
-
-/*
- * ima_limit_imbalance - emit one imbalance message per filesystem type
- *
- * Maintain list of filesystem types that do not measure files properly.
- * Return false if unknown, true if known.
- */
-static bool ima_limit_imbalance(struct file *file)
-{
-	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_imbalance_lock);
-	static HLIST_HEAD(ima_imbalance_list);
-
-	struct super_block *sb = file->f_dentry->d_sb;
-	struct ima_imbalance *entry;
-	struct hlist_node *node;
-	bool found = false;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, node, &ima_imbalance_list, node) {
-		if (entry->fsmagic == sb->s_magic) {
-			found = true;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (found)
-		goto out;
-
-	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
-	if (!entry)
-		goto out;
-	entry->fsmagic = sb->s_magic;
-	spin_lock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
-	/*
-	 * we could have raced and something else might have added this fs
-	 * to the list, but we don't really care
-	 */
-	hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->node, &ima_imbalance_list);
-	spin_unlock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
-	printk(KERN_INFO "IMA: unmeasured files on fsmagic: %lX\n",
-	       entry->fsmagic);
-out:
-	return found;
-}
-
 /*
- * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
+ * ima_rdwr_violation_check
  *
- * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only
- * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
  * 	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
  *	  results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
  *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
  * 	  could result in a file measurement error.
  *
  */
-void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
+static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -104,32 +54,25 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
 	int rc;
 	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
 
-	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
 		return;
 
-	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
-
-	if (!ima_initialized)
-		goto out;
+	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);	/* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
 
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
-		if (inode->i_readcount && IS_IMA(inode))
+		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode))
 			send_tomtou = true;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
+	rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
 		send_writers = true;
 out:
-	/* remember the vfs deals with i_writecount */
-	if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
-		inode->i_readcount++;
-
-	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
 	if (send_tomtou)
 		ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
@@ -139,71 +82,25 @@ out:
 				  "open_writers");
 }
 
-/*
- * Decrement ima counts
- */
-static void ima_dec_counts(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
-
-	assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock);
-
-	if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) {
-		if (unlikely(inode->i_readcount == 0)) {
-			if (!ima_limit_imbalance(file)) {
-				printk(KERN_INFO "%s: open/free imbalance (r:%u)\n",
-				       __func__, inode->i_readcount);
-				dump_stack();
-			}
-			return;
-		}
-		inode->i_readcount--;
-	}
-}
-
 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				  struct inode *inode,
 				  struct file *file)
 {
 	mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 
-	BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&iint->mutex));
-	assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock);
-
+	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE &&
 	    atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
 	    iint->version != inode->i_version)
 		iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
-}
-
-static void ima_file_free_iint(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
-			       struct file *file)
-{
-	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
-
-	ima_dec_counts(inode, file);
-	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
-
-	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 }
 
-static void ima_file_free_noiint(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
-
-	ima_dec_counts(inode, file);
-
-	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
-}
-
 /**
  * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
  * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
  *
- * Flag files that changed, based on i_version;
- * and decrement the i_readcount.
+ * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
  */
 void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
@@ -214,12 +111,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 		return;
 
 	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
 
-	if (iint)
-		ima_file_free_iint(iint, inode, file);
-	else
-		ima_file_free_noiint(inode, file);
-
+	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
 }
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
@@ -232,7 +127,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, mask, function);
+	rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 retry:
@@ -246,7 +141,7 @@ retry:
 
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 
-	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, mask, function);
+	rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0;
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -317,6 +212,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	int rc;
 
+	ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
 	rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
 				 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
 				 FILE_CHECK);
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 07a5f35e3970..338b510e9027 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -12,9 +12,52 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 /*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified compatibility multipart payload and
+ * link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+	key_serial_t id,
+	const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov,
+	unsigned ioc,
+	key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+		goto no_payload;
+
+	ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
+					   ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack),
+					   iovstack, &iov);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto no_payload_free;
+
+	ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
+
+	if (iov != iovstack)
+		kfree(iov);
+	return ret;
+
+no_payload_free:
+	if (iov != iovstack)
+		kfree(iov);
+no_payload:
+	return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
  * The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs
  *
  * This should only be called if the 64-bit arch uses weird pointers in 32-bit
@@ -85,6 +128,13 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
 	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
 		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
 
+	case KEYCTL_REJECT:
+		return keyctl_reject_key(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
+		return compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+			arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4, arg5);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted.c
index 9e7e4ce3fae8..69907a58a683 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted.c
@@ -765,8 +765,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
 	size_t asciiblob_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	epayload = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
-				  rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+	epayload = rcu_dereference_key(key);
 
 	/* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */
 	asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index a52aa7c88b41..07a025f81902 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -214,6 +214,14 @@ extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
 extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
 				size_t buflen);
 extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
+extern long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, unsigned, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
+				       const struct iovec __user *,
+				       unsigned, key_serial_t);
+
+extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
+					  const struct iovec __user *,
+					  unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t);
 
 /*
  * Debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 1c2d43dc5107..f7f9d93f08d9 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -249,6 +249,14 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 	if (!desc || !*desc)
 		goto error;
 
+	if (type->vet_description) {
+		ret = type->vet_description(desc);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
 	desclen = strlen(desc) + 1;
 	quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
 
@@ -503,26 +511,29 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link);
 
 /**
- * key_negate_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring.
+ * key_reject_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring.
  * @key: The key to instantiate.
  * @timeout: The timeout on the negative key.
+ * @error: The error to return when the key is hit.
  * @keyring: Keyring to create a link in on success (or NULL).
  * @authkey: The authorisation token permitting instantiation.
  *
  * Negatively instantiate a key that's in the uninstantiated state and, if
- * successful, set its timeout and link it in to the destination keyring if one
- * is supplied.  The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage
- * collected after the timeout expires.
+ * successful, set its timeout and stored error and link it in to the
+ * destination keyring if one is supplied.  The key and any links to the key
+ * will be automatically garbage collected after the timeout expires.
  *
  * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
- * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires.
+ * them to return the stored error code (typically ENOKEY) until the negative
+ * key expires.
  *
  * If successful, 0 is returned, the authorisation token is revoked and anyone
  * waiting for the key is woken up.  If the key was already instantiated,
  * -EBUSY will be returned.
  */
-int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
+int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 			unsigned timeout,
+			unsigned error,
 			struct key *keyring,
 			struct key *authkey)
 {
@@ -548,6 +559,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 		atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
 		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
 		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
+		key->type_data.reject_error = -error;
 		now = current_kernel_time();
 		key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
 		key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
@@ -577,8 +589,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 
 	return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
 }
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_negate_and_link);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_reject_and_link);
 
 /*
  * Garbage collect keys in process context so that we don't have to disable
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 31a0fd8189f1..427fddcaeb19 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -913,6 +913,21 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Copy the iovec data from userspace
+ */
+static long copy_from_user_iovec(void *buffer, const struct iovec *iov,
+				 unsigned ioc)
+{
+	for (; ioc > 0; ioc--) {
+		if (copy_from_user(buffer, iov->iov_base, iov->iov_len) != 0)
+			return -EFAULT;
+		buffer += iov->iov_len;
+		iov++;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
  * destination keyring if one is given.
  *
@@ -921,10 +936,11 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
  *
  * If successful, 0 will be returned.
  */
-long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
-			    const void __user *_payload,
-			    size_t plen,
-			    key_serial_t ringid)
+long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
+				   const struct iovec *payload_iov,
+				   unsigned ioc,
+				   size_t plen,
+				   key_serial_t ringid)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
@@ -953,7 +969,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
 	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
 	payload = NULL;
 
-	if (_payload) {
+	if (payload_iov) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!payload) {
@@ -965,8 +981,8 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
 				goto error;
 		}
 
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
+		ret = copy_from_user_iovec(payload, payload_iov, ioc);
+		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error2;
 	}
 
@@ -997,6 +1013,72 @@ error:
 }
 
 /*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
+ * destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
+			    const void __user *_payload,
+			    size_t plen,
+			    key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	if (_payload && plen) {
+		struct iovec iov[1] = {
+			[0].iov_base = (void __user *)_payload,
+			[0].iov_len  = plen
+		};
+
+		return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, 1, plen, ringid);
+	}
+
+	return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into
+ * the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
+				const struct iovec __user *_payload_iov,
+				unsigned ioc,
+				key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+		goto no_payload;
+
+	ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
+				    ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto no_payload_free;
+
+	ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
+
+	if (iov != iovstack)
+		kfree(iov);
+	return ret;
+
+no_payload_free:
+	if (iov != iovstack)
+		kfree(iov);
+no_payload:
+	return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
  * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link
  * the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
  *
@@ -1013,12 +1095,42 @@ error:
  */
 long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
 {
+	return keyctl_reject_key(id, timeout, ENOKEY, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error
+ * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
+ * after the timeout expires.
+ *
+ * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
+ * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
+		       key_serial_t ringid)
+{
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
 	struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
 	long ret;
 
-	kenter("%d,%u,%d", id, timeout, ringid);
+	kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id, timeout, error, ringid);
+
+	/* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */
+	if (error <= 0 ||
+	    error >= MAX_ERRNO ||
+	    error == ERESTARTSYS ||
+	    error == ERESTARTNOINTR ||
+	    error == ERESTARTNOHAND ||
+	    error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
 	 * assumed before calling this */
@@ -1038,7 +1150,7 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
 		goto error;
 
 	/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
-	ret = key_negate_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout,
+	ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
 				  dest_keyring, instkey);
 
 	key_put(dest_keyring);
@@ -1492,6 +1604,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
 		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
 
+	case KEYCTL_REJECT:
+		return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					 (unsigned) arg3,
+					 (unsigned) arg4,
+					 (key_serial_t) arg5);
+
+	case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
+		return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+			(key_serial_t) arg2,
+			(const struct iovec __user *) arg3,
+			(unsigned) arg4,
+			(key_serial_t) arg5);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 5620f084dede..cdd2f3f88c88 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 			goto error_2;
 		if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
 			goto error_2;
-		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE))
 			goto error_2;
 		goto found;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ descend:
 
 		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
-			err = -ENOKEY;
+			err = key->type_data.reject_error;
 			continue;
 		}
 
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index a3dc0d460def..df3c0417ee40 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
-		return -ENOKEY;
+		return key->type_data.reject_error;
 	return key_validate(key);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 83fc92e297cd..c99b9368368c 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1076,8 +1076,7 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
 	char *bufp;
 	int i;
 
-	p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
-			rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+	p = rcu_dereference_key(key);
 	if (!p)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 02807fb16340..c6ca8662a468 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -184,8 +184,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 	struct user_key_payload *upayload;
 	long ret;
 
-	upayload = rcu_dereference_protected(
-		key->payload.data, rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+	upayload = rcu_dereference_key(key);
 	ret = upayload->datalen;
 
 	/* we can return the data as is */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bb33ecadcf95..bab9b23c3ff4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -181,11 +181,6 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
-	return security_ops->sysctl(table, op);
-}
-
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb);
@@ -271,6 +266,11 @@ int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
 
+int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	return security_ops->sb_remount(sb, data);
+}
+
 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data);
@@ -335,11 +335,13 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 }
 
 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				  char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+				 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				 void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, name, value, len);
+	return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value,
+						 len);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
 
@@ -359,6 +361,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 		return 0;
 	return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
 
 int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
@@ -373,6 +376,7 @@ int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 		return 0;
 	return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
 
 int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 			  const char *old_name)
@@ -399,6 +403,7 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 	return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
 					 new_dentry);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
 
 int security_path_truncate(struct path *path)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c8d699270687..d52a92507412 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -24,9 +24,11 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
@@ -36,14 +38,15 @@
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -70,7 +73,6 @@
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
-#include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/selinux.h>
@@ -1120,39 +1122,35 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
 				u16 tclass,
 				u32 *sid)
 {
-	int buflen, rc;
-	char *buffer, *path, *end;
+	int rc;
+	char *buffer, *path;
 
 	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buffer)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
-	end = buffer+buflen;
-	*--end = '\0';
-	buflen--;
-	path = end-1;
-	*path = '/';
-	while (de && de != de->parent) {
-		buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
-		if (buflen < 0)
-			break;
-		end -= de->namelen;
-		memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
-		*--end = '/';
-		path = end;
-		de = de->parent;
+	path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(path))
+		rc = PTR_ERR(path);
+	else {
+		/* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
+		 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
+		 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
+		while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
+			path[1] = '/';
+			path++;
+		}
+		rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
 	}
-	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
 	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 	return rc;
 }
 #else
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
 				u16 tclass,
 				u32 *sid)
 {
@@ -1300,10 +1298,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 
 		/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
 		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-		rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
-					     sbsec->sid,
-					     isec->sclass,
-					     &sid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
+					     isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_unlock;
 		isec->sid = sid;
@@ -1316,10 +1312,9 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
 		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
-			struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
-			if (proci->pde) {
+			if (opt_dentry) {
 				isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
+				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
 							  isec->sclass,
 							  &sid);
 				if (rc)
@@ -1578,7 +1573,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 		return rc;
 
 	if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
-		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, NULL, &newsid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
@@ -1862,82 +1857,6 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 	return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 }
 
-static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
-{
-	int buflen, rc;
-	char *buffer, *path, *end;
-
-	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!buffer)
-		goto out;
-
-	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
-	end = buffer+buflen;
-	*--end = '\0';
-	buflen--;
-	path = end-1;
-	*path = '/';
-	while (table) {
-		const char *name = table->procname;
-		size_t namelen = strlen(name);
-		buflen -= namelen + 1;
-		if (buflen < 0)
-			goto out_free;
-		end -= namelen;
-		memcpy(end, name, namelen);
-		*--end = '/';
-		path = end;
-		table = table->parent;
-	}
-	buflen -= 4;
-	if (buflen < 0)
-		goto out_free;
-	end -= 4;
-	memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
-	path = end;
-	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
-out_free:
-	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
-out:
-	return rc;
-}
-
-static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
-	int error = 0;
-	u32 av;
-	u32 tsid, sid;
-	int rc;
-
-	sid = current_sid();
-
-	rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
-				    SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
-	if (rc) {
-		/* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
-		tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
-	}
-
-	/* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
-	 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
-	if (op == 001) {
-		error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
-				     SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
-	} else {
-		av = 0;
-		if (op & 004)
-			av |= FILE__READ;
-		if (op & 002)
-			av |= FILE__WRITE;
-		if (av)
-			error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
-					     SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
-	}
-
-	return error;
-}
-
 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -2060,7 +1979,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	} else {
 		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
 		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
-					     SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
+					     SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+					     &new_tsec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
@@ -2443,6 +2363,91 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	int rc, i, *flags;
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+	char *secdata, **mount_options;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!data)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+		return 0;
+
+	security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+	secdata = alloc_secdata();
+	if (!secdata)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_secdata;
+
+	rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_secdata;
+
+	mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
+	flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+		u32 sid;
+		size_t len;
+
+		if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+			continue;
+		len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+			goto out_free_opts;
+		}
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		switch (flags[i]) {
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
+			struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+			root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		}
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto out_free_opts;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out_free_opts:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+out_free_secdata:
+	free_secdata(secdata);
+	return rc;
+out_bad_option:
+	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
+	       "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+	       sb->s_type->name);
+	goto out_free_opts;
+}
+
 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -2509,8 +2514,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				       char **name, void **value,
-				       size_t *len)
+				       const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				       void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
@@ -2531,7 +2536,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
 		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
 					     inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
-					     &newsid);
+					     qstr, &newsid);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
 			       "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
@@ -2932,16 +2937,47 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			      unsigned long arg)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	u32 av = 0;
+	int error = 0;
 
-	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
-		av |= FILE__WRITE;
-	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
-		av |= FILE__READ;
-	if (!av)
-		av = FILE__IOCTL;
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case FIONREAD:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIBMAP:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIGETBSZ:
+	/* fall through */
+	case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+	/* fall through */
+	case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+		break;
+
+	case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+	/* fall through */
+	case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+		break;
+
+	/* sys_ioctl() checks */
+	case FIONBIO:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIOASYNC:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+		break;
 
-	return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
+	case KDSKBENT:
+	case KDSKBSENT:
+		error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+					    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+		break;
+
+	/* default case assumes that the command will go
+	 * to the file's ioctl() function.
+	 */
+	default:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+	}
+	return error;
 }
 
 static int default_noexec;
@@ -3644,9 +3680,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 
 /* socket security operations */
 
-static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+				 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
 {
-	return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
+	if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
+		*socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
+				       socksid);
 }
 
 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
@@ -3670,12 +3713,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 	u32 newsid;
 	u16 secclass;
+	int rc;
 
 	if (kern)
 		return 0;
 
-	newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
 	secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+	rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -3687,12 +3734,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 	int err = 0;
 
+	isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+
 	if (kern)
 		isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
-	else
-		isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
+	else {
+		err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
 
-	isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
 	isec->initialized = 1;
 
 	if (sock->sk) {
@@ -4002,7 +4053,6 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	u32 peer_sid;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
@@ -4021,20 +4071,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
-		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
-				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
-		if (err)
-			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
-	} else {
-		err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-		err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
-	}
+	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -4529,9 +4569,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
-		if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
-			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+	if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
+		return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
 	return NF_ACCEPT;
 }
@@ -4574,27 +4613,14 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
 	sk = skb->sk;
 	if (sk == NULL) {
-		switch (family) {
-		case PF_INET:
-			if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
-				secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
-			else
-				secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
-			break;
-		case PF_INET6:
-			if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
-				secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
-			else
-				secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
-			break;
-		default:
-			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
-		}
-		if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
+		if (skb->skb_iif) {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
 			if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
 				return NF_DROP;
-		} else
+		} else {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
 			peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		}
 	} else {
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 		peer_sid = sksec->sid;
@@ -4848,7 +4874,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 		 * message queue this message will be stored in
 		 */
 		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
-					     &msec->sid);
+					     NULL, &msec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
@@ -5402,7 +5428,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
 	.capget =			selinux_capget,
 	.capset =			selinux_capset,
-	.sysctl =			selinux_sysctl,
 	.capable =			selinux_capable,
 	.quotactl =			selinux_quotactl,
 	.quota_on =			selinux_quota_on,
@@ -5420,6 +5445,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.sb_alloc_security =		selinux_sb_alloc_security,
 	.sb_free_security =		selinux_sb_free_security,
 	.sb_copy_data =			selinux_sb_copy_data,
+	.sb_remount =			selinux_sb_remount,
 	.sb_kern_mount =		selinux_sb_kern_mount,
 	.sb_show_options =		selinux_sb_show_options,
 	.sb_statfs =			selinux_sb_statfs,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7ed3663332ec..b8c53723e09b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
 #define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
 	    "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
 
+/*
+ * Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket",
+ *	 and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
+ */
 struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "security",
 	  { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",
@@ -132,8 +136,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "appletalk_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "packet",
-	  { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "flow_in", "flow_out",
-	    "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
+	  { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
 	{ "key",
 	  { "view", "read", "write", "search", "link", "setattr", "create",
 	    NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 671273eb1115..348eb00cb668 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
 #define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
 
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include "flask.h"
@@ -28,13 +29,14 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP		22
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE	23
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY	24
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS	25
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS
 #endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
@@ -106,8 +108,8 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			     u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			    u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
 
 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 				 u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index dff0c75345c1..63ce2f9e441d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
  *
  * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
@@ -27,16 +27,16 @@ struct avtab_key {
 	u16 source_type;	/* source type */
 	u16 target_type;	/* target type */
 	u16 target_class;	/* target object class */
-#define AVTAB_ALLOWED     1
-#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW  2
-#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY   4
-#define AVTAB_AV         (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
-#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 16
-#define AVTAB_MEMBER     32
-#define AVTAB_CHANGE     64
-#define AVTAB_TYPE       (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
-#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD    0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
-#define AVTAB_ENABLED    0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED		0x0001
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW	0x0002
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY		0x0004
+#define AVTAB_AV		(AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION	0x0010
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER		0x0020
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE		0x0040
+#define AVTAB_TYPE		(AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD   0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED		0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
 	u16 specified;	/* what field is specified */
 };
 
@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
 
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 11
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
-#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK (MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
 
 #endif	/* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index 1f4e93c2ae86..922f8afa89dd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct ebitmap {
 };
 
 #define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
-#define ebitmap_startbit(e) ((e)->node ? (e)->node->startbit : 0)
 
 static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start_positive(struct ebitmap *e,
 						  struct ebitmap_node **n)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 1ef8e4e89880..e96174216bc9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -512,7 +512,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
-		    struct context *newcontext)
+		    struct context *newcontext,
+		    bool sock)
 {
 	struct range_trans rtr;
 	struct mls_range *r;
@@ -531,7 +532,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 			return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
-		if (tclass == policydb.process_class)
+		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
 			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
 			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
 		else
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index cd9152632e54..037bf9d82d41 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
-		    struct context *newcontext);
+		    struct context *newcontext,
+		    bool sock);
 
 int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 			 struct context *usercon);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 57363562f0f8..e7b850ad57ee 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
 	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
 };
 
 static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -704,6 +709,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	int i;
 	struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
 	struct role_trans *tr, *ltr = NULL;
+	struct filename_trans *ft, *nft;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
 		cond_resched();
@@ -781,6 +787,15 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 		}
 		flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array);
 	}
+
+	ft = p->filename_trans;
+	while (ft) {
+		nft = ft->next;
+		kfree(ft->name);
+		kfree(ft);
+		ft = nft;
+	}
+
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
 
@@ -1788,6 +1803,76 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft, *last;
+	u32 nel, len;
+	char *name;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc, i;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	printk(KERN_ERR "%s: nel=%d\n", __func__, nel);
+
+	last = p->filename_trans;
+	while (last && last->next)
+		last = last->next;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		ft = kzalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ft)
+			goto out;
+
+		/* add it to the tail of the list */
+		if (!last)
+			p->filename_trans = ft;
+		else
+			last->next = ft;
+		last = ft;
+
+		/* length of the path component string */
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!name)
+			goto out;
+
+		ft->name = name;
+
+		/* path component string */
+		rc = next_entry(name, fp, len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		name[len] = 0;
+
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ft=%p ft->name=%p ft->name=%s\n", __func__, ft, ft->name, ft->name);
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		ft->stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		ft->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
 	int i, j, rc;
@@ -2251,6 +2336,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		lra = ra;
 	}
 
+	rc = filename_trans_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
 	rc = policydb_index(p);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
@@ -3025,6 +3114,43 @@ static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft;
+	u32 len, nel = 0;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc;
+
+	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next)
+		nel++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
+		len = strlen(ft->name);
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		buf[0] = ft->stype;
+		buf[1] = ft->ttype;
+		buf[2] = ft->tclass;
+		buf[3] = ft->otype;
+
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
 /*
  * Write the configuration data in a policy database
  * structure to a policy database binary representation
@@ -3135,6 +3261,10 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	rc = filename_trans_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 4e3ab9d0b315..732ea4a68682 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -77,6 +77,15 @@ struct role_trans {
 	struct role_trans *next;
 };
 
+struct filename_trans {
+	struct filename_trans *next;
+	u32 stype;		/* current process */
+	u32 ttype;		/* parent dir context */
+	u16 tclass;		/* class of new object */
+	const char *name;	/* last path component */
+	u32 otype;		/* expected of new object */
+};
+
 struct role_allow {
 	u32 role;		/* current role */
 	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
@@ -217,6 +226,9 @@ struct policydb {
 	/* role transitions */
 	struct role_trans *role_tr;
 
+	/* file transitions with the last path component */
+	struct filename_trans *filename_trans;
+
 	/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
 	struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
 	/* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
@@ -302,7 +314,7 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int put_entry(void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	size_t len = bytes * num;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a03cfaf0ee07..3e7544d2a07b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -201,6 +201,21 @@ static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
 	return tclass;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
+ */
+static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
+{
+	u16 i;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
+		if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return pol_value;
+}
+
 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 			 int allow_unknown)
 {
@@ -1343,10 +1358,27 @@ out:
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
+				  u32 scon, u32 tcon, u16 tclass,
+				  const struct qstr *qstr)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft;
+	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
+		if (ft->stype == scon &&
+		    ft->ttype == tcon &&
+		    ft->tclass == tclass &&
+		    !strcmp(ft->name, qstr->name)) {
+			newcontext->type = ft->otype;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
 				u32 specified,
+				const struct qstr *qstr,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
 {
@@ -1357,6 +1389,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	struct avtab_node *node;
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
+	bool sock;
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		switch (orig_tclass) {
@@ -1374,10 +1407,13 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
-	if (kern)
+	if (kern) {
 		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
-	else
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
+	} else {
 		tclass = orig_tclass;
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
+	}
 
 	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
@@ -1408,7 +1444,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	/* Set the role and type to default values. */
-	if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
+	if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
 		/* Use the current role and type of process. */
 		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
 		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
@@ -1442,6 +1478,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 		newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
 	}
 
+	/* if we have a qstr this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+	if (qstr)
+		filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+				      tcontext->type, tclass, qstr);
+
 	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
 	if  (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
 		if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
@@ -1460,7 +1501,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	/* Set the MLS attributes.
 	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
-	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+			     &newcontext, sock);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
@@ -1495,22 +1537,17 @@ out:
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
-			    u32 tsid,
-			    u16 tclass,
-			    u32 *out_sid)
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
 {
 	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
-				    out_sid, true);
+				    qstr, out_sid, true);
 }
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid,
-				 u32 tsid,
-				 u16 tclass,
-				 u32 *out_sid)
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid)
 {
 	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
-				    out_sid, false);
+				    NULL, out_sid, false);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1531,8 +1568,8 @@ int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid,
-				    false);
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1553,8 +1590,8 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid,
-				    false);
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index fff78d3b51a2..728c57e3d65d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	if (!uctx)
 		goto not_from_user;
 
-	if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+	if (uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 129c4eb8ffb1..b449cfdad21c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -52,13 +52,16 @@ struct socket_smack {
 struct inode_smack {
 	char		*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
 	char		*smk_task;	/* label of the task */
+	char		*smk_mmap;	/* label of the mmap domain */
 	struct mutex	smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
 	int		smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
 };
 
 struct task_smack {
-	char		*smk_task;	/* label used for access control */
-	char		*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
+	char			*smk_task;	/* label for access control */
+	char			*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
+	struct list_head	smk_rules;	/* per task access rules */
+	struct mutex		smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for the rules */
 };
 
 #define	SMK_INODE_INSTANT	0x01	/* inode is instantiated */
@@ -152,12 +155,6 @@ struct smack_known {
 #define SMACK_MAGIC	0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */
 
 /*
- * A limit on the number of entries in the lists
- * makes some of the list administration easier.
- */
-#define SMACK_LIST_MAX	10000
-
-/*
  * CIPSO defaults.
  */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT		3	/* Historical */
@@ -174,9 +171,7 @@ struct smack_known {
 /*
  * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
  */
-#define MAY_ANY		(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
 #define MAY_ANYREAD	(MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)
-#define MAY_ANYWRITE	(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)
 #define MAY_READWRITE	(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
 #define MAY_NOT		0
 
@@ -202,7 +197,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
 /*
  * These functions are in smack_access.c
  */
-int smk_access_entry(char *, char *);
+int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
 int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
 int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
 int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 7ba8478f599e..86453db4333d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -70,10 +70,11 @@ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
  * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule
  * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
  * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to search
  *
  * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
- * access rule list and returns pointer to the matching rule if found,
- * NULL otherwise.
+ * access rule list and returns the access mode. If no
+ * entry is found returns -ENOENT.
  *
  * NOTE:
  * Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list
@@ -85,13 +86,13 @@ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
  * will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
  * optimization.
  */
-int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
+int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+			struct list_head *rule_list)
 {
-	u32 may = MAY_NOT;
+	int may = -ENOENT;
 	struct smack_rule *srp;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
 		if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
 		    strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
 			if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
@@ -101,7 +102,6 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return may;
 }
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
 int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	       struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
-	u32 may = MAY_NOT;
+	int may = MAY_NOT;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -181,13 +181,14 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 * Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
 	 * If the requested access is contained in the available
 	 * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
-	 * good.
-	 */
-	may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label);
-	/*
-	 * This is a bit map operation.
+	 * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
+	 * indicates there is no entry for this pair.
 	 */
-	if ((request & may) == request)
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &smack_rule_list);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request)
 		goto out_audit;
 
 	rc = -EACCES;
@@ -212,12 +213,27 @@ out_audit:
  */
 int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+	int may;
 	int rc;
-	char *sp = smk_of_current();
 
+	/*
+	 * Check the global rule list
+	 */
 	rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
-	if (rc == 0)
-		goto out_audit;
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * If there is an entry in the task's rule list
+		 * it can further restrict access.
+		 */
+		may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (may < 0)
+			goto out_audit;
+		if ((mode & may) == mode)
+			goto out_audit;
+		rc = -EACCES;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Return if a specific label has been designated as the
@@ -228,7 +244,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 		goto out_audit;
 
 	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		return 0;
+		rc = 0;
 
 out_audit:
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 533bf3255d7f..23c7a6d0c80c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
 #define task_security(task)	(task_cred_xxx((task), security))
@@ -84,6 +85,56 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
 	return isp;
 }
 
+/**
+ * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
+ * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
+ *
+ * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
+ */
+static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+	tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+	if (tsp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	tsp->smk_task = task;
+	tsp->smk_forked = forked;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
+	mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+
+	return tsp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
+ * @nhead - new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead - old rules header pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *nrp;
+	struct smack_rule *orp;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
+		nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
+		if (nrp == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+		*nrp = *orp;
+		list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * LSM hooks.
  * We he, that is fun!
@@ -102,23 +153,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	char *sp, *tsp;
+	char *tsp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	sp = smk_of_current();
 	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
 
-	/* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
-	rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
-	if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		rc = 0;
-
-	smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -134,23 +179,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	char *sp, *tsp;
+	char *tsp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
+	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
 
-	sp = smk_of_current();
-	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
-	/* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
-	rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
-	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		rc = 0;
-
-	smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -463,6 +502,7 @@ static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
  * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
  * @inode: the inode
  * @dir: unused
+ * @qstr: unused
  * @name: where to put the attribute name
  * @value: where to put the attribute value
  * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
@@ -470,11 +510,12 @@ static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
  * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
  */
 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				     char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+				     const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				     void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
 	char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
-	u32 may;
+	int may;
 
 	if (name) {
 		*name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -483,14 +524,17 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	}
 
 	if (value) {
-		may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp);
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp, &smack_rule_list);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		/*
 		 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
 		 * the directory requests transmutation then
 		 * by all means transmute.
 		 */
-		if (((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
+		if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
+		    smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
 			isp = dsp;
 
 		*value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -716,7 +760,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		/*
@@ -773,6 +818,12 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			isp->smk_task = nsp;
 		else
 			isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		nsp = smk_import(value, size);
+		if (nsp != NULL)
+			isp->smk_mmap = nsp;
+		else
+			isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
 		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 
@@ -815,7 +866,8 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 	} else
@@ -829,6 +881,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 		isp->smk_task = NULL;
+		isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
 	}
 
 	return rc;
@@ -1060,6 +1113,126 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_file_mmap :
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
+ * if mapping anonymous memory.
+ * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+			   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+			   unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
+			   unsigned long addr_only)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	char *sp;
+	char *msmack;
+	char *osmack;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct dentry *dp;
+	int may;
+	int mmay;
+	int tmay;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
+	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	if (rc || addr_only)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	dp = file->f_dentry;
+
+	if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
+	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
+
+	tsp = current_security();
+	sp = smk_of_current();
+	rc = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	/*
+	 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
+	 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
+	 * to that rule's object label.
+	 *
+	 * Because neither of the labels comes
+	 * from the networking code it is sufficient
+	 * to compare pointers.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+		if (srp->smk_subject != sp)
+			continue;
+
+		osmack = srp->smk_object;
+		/*
+		 * Matching labels always allows access.
+		 */
+		if (msmack == osmack)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * If there is a matching local rule take
+		 * that into account as well.
+		 */
+		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack,
+					&tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (may == -ENOENT)
+			may = srp->smk_access;
+		else
+			may &= srp->smk_access;
+		/*
+		 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
+		 * possibly have less access.
+		 */
+		if (may == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fetch the global list entry.
+		 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * can't have as much access as current.
+		 */
+		mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &smack_rule_list);
+		if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
+		 * potential access, too.
+		 */
+		tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (tmay != -ENOENT)
+			mmay &= tmay;
+
+		/*
+		 * If there is any access available to current that is
+		 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * deny access.
+		 */
+		if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
  * @file: object in question
  *
@@ -1095,6 +1268,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
 	 */
 	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+
 	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
 	rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
 	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
@@ -1145,9 +1319,14 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  */
 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	cred->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
-	if (cred->security == NULL)
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+	tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
+	if (tsp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cred->security = tsp;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1156,13 +1335,24 @@ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
  * @cred: the credentials in question
  *
- * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
- * points to an immutable list. The blobs never go away.
- * There is no leak here.
  */
 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
-	kfree(cred->security);
+	struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+	struct smack_rule *rp;
+	struct list_head *l;
+	struct list_head *n;
+
+	if (tsp == NULL)
+		return;
+	cred->security = NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
+		rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
+		list_del(&rp->list);
+		kfree(rp);
+	}
+	kfree(tsp);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1178,13 +1368,16 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 {
 	struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
 	struct task_smack *new_tsp;
+	int rc;
 
-	new_tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+	new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
 	if (new_tsp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
-	new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+	rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	new->security = new_tsp;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1203,6 +1396,11 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 
 	new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
 	new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+	mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
+
+
+	/* cbs copy rule list */
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2419,6 +2617,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			}
 		}
 		isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+		isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
 
 		dput(dp);
 		break;
@@ -2478,6 +2677,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
 static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 			     void *value, size_t size)
 {
+	int rc;
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 	struct task_smack *oldtsp;
 	struct cred *new;
@@ -2513,13 +2713,16 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 	new = prepare_creds();
 	if (new == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (tsp == NULL) {
 		kfree(new);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
-	tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
-	tsp->smk_forked = oldtsp->smk_forked;
+	rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	new->security = tsp;
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return size;
@@ -3221,6 +3424,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
 	.file_lock = 			smack_file_lock,
 	.file_fcntl = 			smack_file_fcntl,
+	.file_mmap =			smack_file_mmap,
 	.file_set_fowner = 		smack_file_set_fowner,
 	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
 	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
@@ -3334,23 +3538,20 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 	struct cred *cred;
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 
-	tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+		return 0;
+
+	tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known,
+				smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (tsp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) {
-		kfree(tsp);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Smack:  Initializing.\n");
 
 	/*
 	 * Set the security state for the initial task.
 	 */
 	cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
-	tsp->smk_forked = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
-	tsp->smk_task = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 	cred->security = tsp;
 
 	/* initialize the smack_know_list */
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 362d5eda948b..90d1bbaaa6f3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_NETLBLADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
 	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
 	SMK_LOGGING	= 10,	/* logging */
+	SMK_LOAD_SELF	= 11,	/* task specific rules */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -135,104 +136,30 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
 #define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN	9
 #define SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX	42
 
-/*
- * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
- */
-
-static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
-{
-	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
-		return NULL;
-	if (list_empty(&smack_rule_list))
-		return NULL;
-	return smack_rule_list.next;
-}
-
-static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
-{
-	struct list_head *list = v;
-
-	if (list_is_last(list, &smack_rule_list)) {
-		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	return list->next;
-}
-
-static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
-{
-	struct list_head *list = v;
-	struct smack_rule *srp =
-		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
-
-	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
-		   (char *)srp->smk_object);
-
-	seq_putc(s, ' ');
-
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
-		seq_putc(s, 'r');
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
-		seq_putc(s, 'w');
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
-		seq_putc(s, 'x');
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
-		seq_putc(s, 'a');
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
-		seq_putc(s, 't');
-	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
-		seq_putc(s, '-');
-
-	seq_putc(s, '\n');
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void load_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
-{
-	/* No-op */
-}
-
-static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
-	.start = load_seq_start,
-	.next  = load_seq_next,
-	.show  = load_seq_show,
-	.stop  = load_seq_stop,
-};
-
-/**
- * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load
- * @inode: inode structure representing file
- * @file: "load" file pointer
- *
- * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
- */
-static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops);
-}
-
 /**
  * smk_set_access - add a rule to the rule list
  * @srp: the new rule to add
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules
+ * @rule_lock: the rule list lock
  *
  * Looks through the current subject/object/access list for
  * the subject/object pair and replaces the access that was
  * there. If the pair isn't found add it with the specified
  * access.
  *
+ * Returns 1 if a rule was found to exist already, 0 if it is new
  * Returns 0 if nothing goes wrong or -ENOMEM if it fails
  * during the allocation of the new pair to add.
  */
-static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
+static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list,
+				struct mutex *rule_lock)
 {
 	struct smack_rule *sp;
-	int ret = 0;
-	int found;
-	mutex_lock(&smack_list_lock);
+	int found = 0;
 
-	found = 0;
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+	mutex_lock(rule_lock);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list) {
 		if (sp->smk_subject == srp->smk_subject &&
 		    sp->smk_object == srp->smk_object) {
 			found = 1;
@@ -241,19 +168,21 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
 		}
 	}
 	if (found == 0)
-		list_add_rcu(&srp->list, &smack_rule_list);
+		list_add_rcu(&srp->list, rule_list);
 
-	mutex_unlock(&smack_list_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
 
-	return ret;
+	return found;
 }
 
 /**
- * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * smk_write_load_list - write() for any /smack/load
  * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to write to
+ * @rule_lock: lock for the rule list
  *
  * Get one smack access rule from above.
  * The format is exactly:
@@ -263,21 +192,19 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
  *
  * writes must be SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_ACCESSLEN bytes.
  */
-static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
-			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
+				struct list_head *rule_list,
+				struct mutex *rule_lock)
 {
 	struct smack_rule *rule;
 	char *data;
 	int rc = -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
-	 * Must have privilege.
 	 * No partial writes.
 	 * Enough data must be present.
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/*
@@ -372,11 +299,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out_free_rule;
 	}
 
-	rc = smk_set_access(rule);
-
-	if (!rc)
-		rc = count;
-	goto out;
+	rc = count;
+	/*
+	 * smk_set_access returns true if there was already a rule
+	 * for the subject/object pair, and false if it was new.
+	 */
+	if (!smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock))
+		goto out;
 
 out_free_rule:
 	kfree(rule);
@@ -385,6 +314,108 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
+ */
+
+static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
+		return NULL;
+	if (list_empty(&smack_rule_list))
+		return NULL;
+	return smack_rule_list.next;
+}
+
+static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+
+	if (list_is_last(list, &smack_rule_list)) {
+		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return list->next;
+}
+
+static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp =
+		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
+		   (char *)srp->smk_object);
+
+	seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
+		seq_putc(s, 'r');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
+		seq_putc(s, 'w');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
+		seq_putc(s, 'x');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
+		seq_putc(s, 'a');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+		seq_putc(s, 't');
+	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+		seq_putc(s, '-');
+
+	seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void load_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	/* No-op */
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load_seq_start,
+	.next  = load_seq_next,
+	.show  = load_seq_show,
+	.stop  = load_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 */
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &smack_rule_list,
+					&smack_list_lock);
+}
+
 static const struct file_operations smk_load_ops = {
 	.open           = smk_open_load,
 	.read		= seq_read,
@@ -1288,6 +1319,112 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
 	.write		= smk_write_logging,
 	.llseek		= default_llseek,
 };
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self
+ */
+
+static void *load_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
+		return NULL;
+	if (list_empty(&tsp->smk_rules))
+		return NULL;
+	return tsp->smk_rules.next;
+}
+
+static void *load_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+
+	if (list_is_last(list, &tsp->smk_rules)) {
+		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return list->next;
+}
+
+static int load_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp =
+		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
+		   (char *)srp->smk_object);
+
+	seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
+		seq_putc(s, 'r');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
+		seq_putc(s, 'w');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
+		seq_putc(s, 'x');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
+		seq_putc(s, 'a');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+		seq_putc(s, 't');
+	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+		seq_putc(s, '-');
+
+	seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void load_self_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	/* No-op */
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_self_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load_self_seq_start,
+	.next  = load_self_seq_next,
+	.show  = load_self_seq_show,
+	.stop  = load_self_seq_stop,
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load_self - open() for /smack/load-self
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load_self_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load_self - write() for /smack/load-self
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+	return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
+					&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_self_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_load_self,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_load_self,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
 /**
  * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
@@ -1304,23 +1441,26 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	struct inode *root_inode;
 
 	static struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
-		[SMK_LOAD]	=
-			{"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_CIPSO]	=
-			{"cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_DOI]	=
-			{"doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_DIRECT]	=
-			{"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_AMBIENT]	=
-			{"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_NETLBLADDR] =
-			{"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_ONLYCAP]	=
-			{"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_LOGGING]	=
-			{"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		/* last one */ {""}
+		[SMK_LOAD] = {
+			"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_CIPSO] = {
+			"cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DOI] = {
+			"doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DIRECT] = {
+			"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_AMBIENT] = {
+			"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_NETLBLADDR] = {
+			"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
+			"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LOGGING] = {
+			"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LOAD_SELF] = {
+			"load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		/* last one */
+			{""}
 	};
 
 	rc = simple_fill_super(sb, SMACK_MAGIC, smack_files);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index 9d32f182301e..cb09f1fce910 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 				 struct path *path, const int flag)
 {
 	const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag);
-	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	int error = 0;
 	struct tomoyo_path_info buf;
 	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
 	int idx;
@@ -938,9 +938,6 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 	buf.name = NULL;
 	r.mode = TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED;
 	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
-	if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path))
-		goto out;
-	error = 0;
 	/*
 	 * If the filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword,
 	 * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission when the filename is not