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authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>2018-05-25 14:47:57 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-05-25 18:12:11 -0700
commit23d6aef74da86a33fa6bb75f79565e0a16ee97c2 (patch)
tree553228677345d3d48ebd0d795ef69dfa00871ede /lib
parenta21558618c5dfc55b6086743a88ce5a9c1588f0a (diff)
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kernel/sys.c: fix potential Spectre v1 issue
`resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap) kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index current->signal->rlim Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515030038.GA11822@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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