Merge back earlier suspend/hibernation changes for v4.11.

1 files changed, 36 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 00411c82dac5..f97fe77ceb88 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
 /*
  * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 {
 	return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(has_capability);
 
 /**
  * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
@@ -457,6 +458,19 @@ bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
 
 /**
+ * privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid - Do capabilities in the namespace work over the inode?
+ * @ns: The user namespace in question
+ * @inode: The inode in question
+ *
+ * Return true if the inode uid and gid are within the namespace.
+ */
+bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
+		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
+}
+
+/**
  * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
  * @inode: The inode in question
  * @cap: The capability in question
@@ -469,7 +483,26 @@ bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
 
-	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
-		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
+	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(ns, inode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);
+
+/**
+ * ptracer_capable - Determine if the ptracer holds CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the namespace
+ * @tsk: The task that may be ptraced
+ * @ns: The user namespace to search for CAP_SYS_PTRACE in
+ *
+ * Return true if the task that is ptracing the current task had CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+ * in the specified user namespace.
+ */
+bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	int ret = 0;  /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred);
+	if (cred)
+		ret = security_capable_noaudit(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return (ret == 0);
+}