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author | Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> | 2017-08-07 15:26:36 +0100 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-08-08 17:51:34 -0700 |
commit | b03c9f9fdc37dab81ea04d5dacdc5995d4c224c2 (patch) | |
tree | 864f5f7e43fbcba5dcc2953ee84d9c1470373d59 /include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | |
parent | f1174f77b50c94eecaa658fdc56fa69b421de4b8 (diff) | |
download | talos-op-linux-b03c9f9fdc37dab81ea04d5dacdc5995d4c224c2.tar.gz talos-op-linux-b03c9f9fdc37dab81ea04d5dacdc5995d4c224c2.zip |
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values
Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one
bound and an unsigned check of the other.
We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting
ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as
unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more
straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds.
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/bpf_verifier.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 23 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 85936fa92d12..c61c3033522e 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -11,11 +11,15 @@ #include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */ #include <linux/tnum.h> - /* Just some arbitrary values so we can safely do math without overflowing and - * are obviously wrong for any sort of memory access. - */ -#define BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE (1024 * 1024 * 1024) -#define BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE -1 +/* Maximum variable offset umax_value permitted when resolving memory accesses. + * In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit + * ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64. + */ +#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1ULL << 31) +/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures + * that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow. + */ +#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ INT_MAX struct bpf_reg_state { enum bpf_reg_type type; @@ -36,7 +40,7 @@ struct bpf_reg_state { * came from, when one is tested for != NULL. */ u32 id; - /* These three fields must be last. See states_equal() */ + /* These five fields must be last. See states_equal() */ /* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of * the actual value. * For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset @@ -49,9 +53,10 @@ struct bpf_reg_state { * These refer to the same value as var_off, not necessarily the actual * contents of the register. */ - s64 min_value; - u64 max_value; - bool value_from_signed; + s64 smin_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */ + s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */ + u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */ + u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */ }; enum bpf_stack_slot_type { |