| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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[ Upstream commit 8e2f311a68494a6677c1724bdcb10bada21af37c ]
Following command:
iptables -D FORWARD -m physdev ...
causes connectivity loss in some setups.
Reason is that iptables userspace will probe kernel for the module revision
of the physdev patch, and physdev has an artificial dependency on
br_netfilter (xt_physdev use makes no sense unless a br_netfilter module
is loaded).
This causes the "phydev" module to be loaded, which in turn enables the
"call-iptables" infrastructure.
bridged packets might then get dropped by the iptables ruleset.
The better fix would be to change the "call-iptables" defaults to 0 and
enforce explicit setting to 1, but that breaks backwards compatibility.
This does the next best thing: add a request_module call to checkentry.
This was a stray '-D ... -m physdev' won't activate br_netfilter
anymore.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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__nf_conntrack_confirm
[ Upstream commit 13f5251fd17088170c18844534682d9cab5ff5aa ]
For bridge(br_flood) or broadcast/multicast packets, they could clone
skb with unconfirmed conntrack which break the rule that unconfirmed
skb->_nfct is never shared. With nfqueue running on my system, the race
can be easily reproduced with following warning calltrace:
[13257.707525] CPU: 0 PID: 12132 Comm: main Tainted: P W 4.4.60 #7744
[13257.707568] Hardware name: Qualcomm (Flattened Device Tree)
[13257.714700] [<c021f6dc>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c021bce8>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[13257.720253] [<c021bce8>] (show_stack) from [<c0449e10>] (dump_stack+0x94/0xa8)
[13257.728240] [<c0449e10>] (dump_stack) from [<c022a7e0>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x94/0xb0)
[13257.735268] [<c022a7e0>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c022a898>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24)
[13257.743519] [<c022a898>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<c06ee450>] (__nf_conntrack_confirm+0xa8/0x618)
[13257.752284] [<c06ee450>] (__nf_conntrack_confirm) from [<c0772670>] (ipv4_confirm+0xb8/0xfc)
[13257.761049] [<c0772670>] (ipv4_confirm) from [<c06e7a60>] (nf_iterate+0x48/0xa8)
[13257.769725] [<c06e7a60>] (nf_iterate) from [<c06e7af0>] (nf_hook_slow+0x30/0xb0)
[13257.777108] [<c06e7af0>] (nf_hook_slow) from [<c07f20b4>] (br_nf_post_routing+0x274/0x31c)
[13257.784486] [<c07f20b4>] (br_nf_post_routing) from [<c06e7a60>] (nf_iterate+0x48/0xa8)
[13257.792556] [<c06e7a60>] (nf_iterate) from [<c06e7af0>] (nf_hook_slow+0x30/0xb0)
[13257.800458] [<c06e7af0>] (nf_hook_slow) from [<c07e5580>] (br_forward_finish+0x94/0xa4)
[13257.808010] [<c07e5580>] (br_forward_finish) from [<c07f22ac>] (br_nf_forward_finish+0x150/0x1ac)
[13257.815736] [<c07f22ac>] (br_nf_forward_finish) from [<c06e8df0>] (nf_reinject+0x108/0x170)
[13257.824762] [<c06e8df0>] (nf_reinject) from [<c06ea854>] (nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x3d8/0x420)
[13257.832924] [<c06ea854>] (nfqnl_recv_verdict) from [<c06e940c>] (nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x158/0x248)
[13257.841256] [<c06e940c>] (nfnetlink_rcv_msg) from [<c06e5564>] (netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0xb0)
[13257.849762] [<c06e5564>] (netlink_rcv_skb) from [<c06e4ec8>] (netlink_unicast+0x148/0x23c)
[13257.858093] [<c06e4ec8>] (netlink_unicast) from [<c06e5364>] (netlink_sendmsg+0x2ec/0x368)
[13257.866348] [<c06e5364>] (netlink_sendmsg) from [<c069fb8c>] (sock_sendmsg+0x34/0x44)
[13257.874590] [<c069fb8c>] (sock_sendmsg) from [<c06a03dc>] (___sys_sendmsg+0x1ec/0x200)
[13257.882489] [<c06a03dc>] (___sys_sendmsg) from [<c06a11c8>] (__sys_sendmsg+0x3c/0x64)
[13257.890300] [<c06a11c8>] (__sys_sendmsg) from [<c0209b40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x34)
The original code just triggered the warning but do nothing. It will
caused the shared conntrack moves to the dying list and the packet be
droppped (nf_ct_resolve_clash returns NF_DROP for dying conntrack).
- Reproduce steps:
+----------------------------+
| br0(bridge) |
| |
+-+---------+---------+------+
| eth0| | eth1| | eth2|
| | | | | |
+--+--+ +--+--+ +---+-+
| | |
| | |
+--+-+ +-+--+ +--+-+
| PC1| | PC2| | PC3|
+----+ +----+ +----+
iptables -A FORWARD -m mark --mark 0x1000000/0x1000000 -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 100 --queue-bypass
ps: Our nfq userspace program will set mark on packets whose connection
has already been processed.
PC1 sends broadcast packets simulated by hping3:
hping3 --rand-source --udp 192.168.1.255 -i u100
- Broadcast racing flow chart is as follow:
br_handle_frame
BR_HOOK(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, NF_BR_PRE_ROUTING, br_handle_frame_finish)
// skb->_nfct (unconfirmed conntrack) is constructed at PRE_ROUTING stage
br_handle_frame_finish
// check if this packet is broadcast
br_flood_forward
br_flood
list_for_each_entry_rcu(p, &br->port_list, list) // iterate through each port
maybe_deliver
deliver_clone
skb = skb_clone(skb)
__br_forward
BR_HOOK(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, NF_BR_FORWARD,...)
// queue in our nfq and received by our userspace program
// goto __nf_conntrack_confirm with process context on CPU 1
br_pass_frame_up
BR_HOOK(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, NF_BR_LOCAL_IN,...)
// goto __nf_conntrack_confirm with softirq context on CPU 0
Because conntrack confirm can happen at both INPUT and POSTROUTING
stage. So with NFQUEUE running, skb->_nfct with the same unconfirmed
conntrack could race on different core.
This patch fixes a repeating kernel splat, now it is only displayed
once.
Signed-off-by: Chieh-Min Wang <chiehminw@synology.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit be0502a3f2e94211a8809a09ecbc3a017189b8fb ]
TCP resets cause instant transition from established to closed state
provided the reset is in-window. Endpoints that implement RFC 5961
require resets to match the next expected sequence number.
RST segments that are in-window (but that do not match RCV.NXT) are
ignored, and a "challenge ACK" is sent back.
Main problem for conntrack is that its a middlebox, i.e. whereas an end
host might have ACK'd SEQ (and would thus accept an RST with this
sequence number), conntrack might not have seen this ACK (yet).
Therefore we can't simply flag RSTs with non-exact match as invalid.
This updates RST processing as follows:
1. If the connection is in a state other than ESTABLISHED, nothing is
changed, RST is subject to normal in-window check.
2. If the RSTs sequence number either matches exactly RCV.NXT,
connection state moves to CLOSE.
3. The same applies if the RST sequence number aligns with a previous
packet in the same direction.
In all other cases, the connection remains in ESTABLISHED state.
If the normal-in-window check passes, the timeout will be lowered
to that of CLOSE.
If the peer sends a challenge ack, connection timeout will be reset.
If the challenge ACK triggers another RST (RST was valid after all),
this 2nd RST will match expected sequence and conntrack state changes to
CLOSE.
If no challenge ACK is received, the connection will time out after
CLOSE seconds (10 seconds by default), just like without this patch.
Packetdrill test case:
0.000 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
0.000 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0
0.000 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0
0.000 listen(3, 1) = 0
0.100 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1460,sackOK,nop,nop,nop,wscale 7>
0.100 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 win 64240 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7>
0.200 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257
0.200 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4
// Receive a segment.
0.210 < P. 1:1001(1000) ack 1 win 46
0.210 > . 1:1(0) ack 1001
// Application writes 1000 bytes.
0.250 write(4, ..., 1000) = 1000
0.250 > P. 1:1001(1000) ack 1001
// First reset, old sequence. Conntrack (correctly) considers this
// invalid due to failed window validation (regardless of this patch).
0.260 < R 2:2(0) ack 1001 win 260
// 2nd reset, but too far ahead sequence. Same: correctly handled
// as invalid.
0.270 < R 99990001:99990001(0) ack 1001 win 260
// in-window, but not exact sequence.
// Current Linux kernels might reply with a challenge ack, and do not
// remove connection.
// Without this patch, conntrack state moves to CLOSE.
// With patch, timeout is lowered like CLOSE, but connection stays
// in ESTABLISHED state.
0.280 < R 1010:1010(0) ack 1001 win 260
// Expect challenge ACK
0.281 > . 1001:1001(0) ack 1001 win 501
// With or without this patch, RST will cause connection
// to move to CLOSE (sequence number matches)
// 0.282 < R 1001:1001(0) ack 1001 win 260
// ACK
0.300 < . 1001:1001(0) ack 1001 win 257
// more data could be exchanged here, connection
// is still established
// Client closes the connection.
0.610 < F. 1001:1001(0) ack 1001 win 260
0.650 > . 1001:1001(0) ack 1002
// Close the connection without reading outstanding data
0.700 close(4) = 0
// so one more reset. Will be deemed acceptable with patch as well:
// connection is already closing.
0.701 > R. 1001:1001(0) ack 1002 win 501
// End packetdrill test case.
With patch, this generates following conntrack events:
[NEW] 120 SYN_SENT src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [UNREPLIED]
[UPDATE] 60 SYN_RECV src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80
[UPDATE] 432000 ESTABLISHED src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [ASSURED]
[UPDATE] 120 FIN_WAIT src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [ASSURED]
[UPDATE] 60 CLOSE_WAIT src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [ASSURED]
[UPDATE] 10 CLOSE src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5437 dport=80 [ASSURED]
Without patch, first RST moves connection to close, whereas socket state
does not change until FIN is received.
[NEW] 120 SYN_SENT src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5141 dport=80 [UNREPLIED]
[UPDATE] 60 SYN_RECV src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5141 dport=80
[UPDATE] 432000 ESTABLISHED src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5141 dport=80 [ASSURED]
[UPDATE] 10 CLOSE src=10.0.2.1 dst=10.0.0.1 sport=5141 dport=80 [ASSURED]
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a9f5e78c403d2d62ade4f4c85040efc85f4049b8 ]
Check the result of dereferencing base_chain->stats, instead of result
of this_cpu_ptr with NULL.
base_chain->stats maybe be changed to NULL when a chain is updated and a
new NULL counter can be attached.
And we do not need to check returning of this_cpu_ptr since
base_chain->stats is from percpu allocator if it is non-NULL,
this_cpu_ptr returns a valid value.
And fix two sparse error by replacing rcu_access_pointer and
rcu_dereference with READ_ONCE under rcu_read_lock.
Thanks for Eric's help to finish this patch.
Fixes: 009240940e84c1 ("netfilter: nf_tables: don't assume chain stats are set when jumplabel is set")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yu <zhangyu31@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f54ba391d88f5a5d032175b4c308c176e34b80b7 ]
Passing a non-existing flag in the sxdp_flags member of struct
sockaddr_xdp was, incorrectly, silently ignored. This patch addresses
that behavior, and rejects any non-existing flags.
We have examined existing user space code, and to our best knowledge,
no one is relying on the current incorrect behavior. AF_XDP is still
in its infancy, so from our perspective, the risk of breakage is very
low, and addressing this problem now is important.
Fixes: 965a99098443 ("xsk: add support for bind for Rx")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b5f9bd15b88563b55a99ed588416881367a0ce5f ]
ila_xlat_nl_cmd_flush uses rhashtable walkers allocated from the
stack but it never frees them. This corrupts the walker list of
the hash table.
This patch fixes it.
Reported-by: syzbot+dae72a112334aa65a159@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b6e71bdebb12 ("ila: Flush netlink command to clear xlat...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 33872d79f5d1cbedaaab79669cc38f16097a9450 ]
When cancelling a subscription, we have to clear the cancel bit in the
request before iterating over any established subscriptions with memcmp.
Otherwise no subscription will ever be found, and it will not be
possible to explicitly unsubscribe individual subscriptions.
Fixes: 8985ecc7c1e0 ("tipc: simplify endianness handling in topology subscriber")
Signed-off-by: Erik Hugne <erik.hugne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9926cb5f8b0f0aea535735185600d74db7608550 ]
When running a syz script, a panic occurred:
[ 156.088228] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_disc_timeout+0x9c9/0xb20 [tipc]
[ 156.094315] Call Trace:
[ 156.094844] <IRQ>
[ 156.095306] dump_stack+0x7c/0xc0
[ 156.097346] print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
[ 156.100445] kasan_report.cold.3+0x37/0x7a
[ 156.102402] tipc_disc_timeout+0x9c9/0xb20 [tipc]
[ 156.106517] call_timer_fn+0x19a/0x610
[ 156.112749] run_timer_softirq+0xb51/0x1090
It was caused by the netns freed without deleting the discoverer timer,
while later on the netns would be accessed in the timer handler.
The timer should have been deleted by tipc_net_stop() when cleaning up a
netns. However, tipc has been able to enable a bearer and start d->timer
without the local node_addr set since Commit 52dfae5c85a4 ("tipc: obtain
node identity from interface by default"), which caused the timer not to
be deleted in tipc_net_stop() then.
So fix it in tipc_net_stop() by changing to check local node_id instead
of local node_addr, as Jon suggested.
While at it, remove the calling of tipc_nametbl_withdraw() there, since
tipc_nametbl_stop() will take of the nametbl's freeing after.
Fixes: 52dfae5c85a4 ("tipc: obtain node identity from interface by default")
Reported-by: syzbot+a25307ad099309f1c2b9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ea239314fe42ace880bdd834256834679346c80e ]
We move the check that prevents connecting service ranges to after
the RDM/DGRAM check, and move address sanity control to a separate
function that also validates the service range.
Fixes: 23998835be98 ("tipc: improve address sanity check in tipc_connect()")
Signed-off-by: Erik Hugne <erik.hugne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 89e4130939a20304f4059ab72179da81f5347528 ]
When a dual stack tcp listener accepts an ipv4 flow,
it should not attempt to use an ipv6 header or tcp_v6_iif() helper.
Fixes: 1397ed35f22d ("ipv6: add flowinfo for tcp6 pkt_options for all cases")
Fixes: df3687ffc665 ("ipv6: add the IPV6_FL_F_REFLECT flag to IPV6_FL_A_GET")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ef82bcfa671b9a635bab5fa669005663d8b177c5 ]
In sctp_setsockopt_bindx()/__sctp_setsockopt_connectx(), it allocates
memory with addrs_size which is passed from userspace. We used flag
GFP_USER to put some more restrictions on it in Commit cacc06215271
("sctp: use GFP_USER for user-controlled kmalloc").
However, since Commit c981f254cc82 ("sctp: use vmemdup_user() rather
than badly open-coding memdup_user()"), vmemdup_user() has been used,
which doesn't check GFP_USER flag when goes to vmalloc_*(). So when
addrs_size is a huge value, it could exhaust memory and even trigger
oom killer.
This patch is to use memdup_user() instead, in which GFP_USER would
work to limit the memory allocation with a huge addrs_size.
Note we can't fix it by limiting 'addrs_size', as there's no demand
for it from RFC.
Reported-by: syzbot+ec1b7575afef85a0e5ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c981f254cc82 ("sctp: use vmemdup_user() rather than badly open-coding memdup_user()")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a4dc6a49156b1f8d6e17251ffda17c9e6a5db78a ]
When using fanouts with AF_PACKET, the demux functions such as
fanout_demux_cpu will return an index in the fanout socket array, which
corresponds to the selected socket.
The ordering of this array depends on the order the sockets were added
to a given fanout group, so for FANOUT_CPU this means sockets are bound
to cpus in the order they are configured, which is OK.
However, when stopping then restarting the interface these sockets are
bound to, the sockets are reassigned to the fanout group in the reverse
order, due to the fact that they were inserted at the head of the
interface's AF_PACKET socket list.
This means that traffic that was directed to the first socket in the
fanout group is now directed to the last one after an interface restart.
In the case of FANOUT_CPU, traffic from CPU0 will be directed to the
socket that used to receive traffic from the last CPU after an interface
restart.
This commit introduces a helper to add a socket at the tail of a list,
then uses it to register AF_PACKET sockets.
Note that this changes the order in which sockets are listed in /proc and
with sock_diag.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a3e23f719f5c4a38ffb3d30c8d7632a4ed8ccd9e ]
In netdev_queue_add_kobject and rx_queue_add_kobject,
if sysfs_create_group failed, kobject_put will call
netdev_queue_release to decrease dev refcont, however
dev_hold has not be called. So we will see this while
unregistering dev:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for bcsh0 to become free. Usage count = -1
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: d0d668371679 ("net: don't decrement kobj reference count on init failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e5dcc0c3223c45c94100f05f28d8ef814db3d82c ]
rose_write_internal() uses a temp buffer of 100 bytes, but a manual
inspection showed that given arbitrary input, rose_create_facilities()
can fill up to 110 bytes.
Lets use a tailroom of 256 bytes for peace of mind, and remove
the bounce buffer : we can simply allocate a big enough skb
and adjust its length as needed.
syzbot report :
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116
Write of size 7 at addr ffff88808b1ffbef by task syz-executor.0/24854
CPU: 0 PID: 24854 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x123/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191
memcpy+0x38/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:131
memcpy include/linux/string.h:352 [inline]
rose_create_facilities net/rose/rose_subr.c:521 [inline]
rose_write_internal+0x597/0x15d0 net/rose/rose_subr.c:116
rose_connect+0x7cb/0x1510 net/rose/af_rose.c:826
__sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693
do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x458079
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f47b8d9dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000458079
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f47b8d9e6d4
R13: 00000000004be4a4 R14: 00000000004ceca8 R15: 00000000ffffffff
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00022c7fc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x1fffc0000000000()
raw: 01fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff022c0101 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88808b1ffa80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88808b1ffb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 03
>ffff88808b1ffb80: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f3
^
ffff88808b1ffc00: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88808b1ffc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 01
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 398f0132c14754fcd03c1c4f8e7176d001ce8ea1 ]
Since commit fc62814d690c ("net/packet: fix 4gb buffer limit due to overflow check")
one can now allocate packet ring buffers >= UINT_MAX. However, syzkaller
found that that triggers a warning:
[ 21.100000] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2075 at mm/page_alloc.c:4584 __alloc_pages_nod0
[ 21.101490] Modules linked in:
[ 21.101921] CPU: 2 PID: 2075 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0 #146
[ 21.102784] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 21.103887] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2a0/0x630
[ 21.104640] Code: fe ff ff 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 de 01 00 48 05 90 0f 00 00 41 bd 01 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 48 e9 9c fe 3
[ 21.107121] RSP: 0018:ffff88805e1cf920 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 21.107819] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff85a488a0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 21.108753] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 21.109699] RBP: 1ffff1100bc39f28 R08: ffffed100bcefb67 R09: ffffed100bcefb67
[ 21.110646] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100bcefb66 R12: 000000000000000d
[ 21.111623] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88805e77d888 R15: 000000000000000d
[ 21.112552] FS: 00007f7c7de05700(0000) GS:ffff88806d100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 21.113612] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 21.114405] CR2: 000000000065c000 CR3: 000000005e58e006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
[ 21.115367] Call Trace:
[ 21.115705] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x21c0/0x21c0
[ 21.116362] alloc_pages_current+0xac/0x1e0
[ 21.116923] kmalloc_order+0x18/0x70
[ 21.117393] kmalloc_order_trace+0x18/0x110
[ 21.117949] packet_set_ring+0x9d5/0x1770
[ 21.118524] ? packet_rcv_spkt+0x440/0x440
[ 21.119094] ? lock_downgrade+0x620/0x620
[ 21.119646] ? __might_fault+0x177/0x1b0
[ 21.120177] packet_setsockopt+0x981/0x2940
[ 21.120753] ? __fget+0x2fb/0x4b0
[ 21.121209] ? packet_release+0xab0/0xab0
[ 21.121740] ? sock_has_perm+0x1cd/0x260
[ 21.122297] ? selinux_secmark_relabel_packet+0xd0/0xd0
[ 21.123013] ? __fget+0x324/0x4b0
[ 21.123451] ? selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt+0x101/0x320
[ 21.124186] ? selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb+0x3a0/0x3a0
[ 21.124908] ? __lock_acquire+0x529/0x3200
[ 21.125453] ? selinux_socket_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70
[ 21.126075] ? __sys_setsockopt+0x131/0x210
[ 21.126533] ? packet_release+0xab0/0xab0
[ 21.127004] __sys_setsockopt+0x131/0x210
[ 21.127449] ? kernel_accept+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 21.127911] ? ret_from_fork+0x8/0x50
[ 21.128313] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11b/0x280
[ 21.128800] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150
[ 21.129271] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x37f/0x560
[ 21.129769] do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450
[ 21.130182] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
We should allocate with __GFP_NOWARN to handle this.
Cc: Kal Conley <kal.conley@dectris.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Fixes: fc62814d690c ("net/packet: fix 4gb buffer limit due to overflow check")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0b91bce1ebfc797ff3de60c8f4a1e6219a8a3187 ]
Christoph reported a stall while peeking datagram with an offset when
busy polling is enabled. __skb_try_recv_datagram() uses as the loop
termination condition 'queue empty'. When peeking, the socket
queue can be not empty, even when no additional packets are received.
Address the issue explicitly checking for receive queue changes,
as currently done by __skb_wait_for_more_packets().
Fixes: 2b5cd0dfa384 ("net: Change return type of sk_busy_loop from bool to void")
Reported-and-tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1c87e79a002f6a159396138cd3f3ab554a2a8887 ]
Jianlin reported a crash:
[ 381.484332] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000068
[ 381.619802] RIP: 0010:fib6_rule_lookup+0xa3/0x160
[ 382.009615] Call Trace:
[ 382.020762] <IRQ>
[ 382.030174] ip6_route_redirect.isra.52+0xc9/0xf0
[ 382.050984] ip6_redirect+0xb6/0xf0
[ 382.066731] icmpv6_notify+0xca/0x190
[ 382.083185] ndisc_redirect_rcv+0x10f/0x160
[ 382.102569] ndisc_rcv+0xfb/0x100
[ 382.117725] icmpv6_rcv+0x3f2/0x520
[ 382.133637] ip6_input_finish+0xbf/0x460
[ 382.151634] ip6_input+0x3b/0xb0
[ 382.166097] ipv6_rcv+0x378/0x4e0
It was caused by the lookup function __ip6_route_redirect() returns NULL in
fib6_rule_lookup() when ip6_create_rt_rcu() returns NULL.
So we fix it by simply making ip6_create_rt_rcu() return ip6_null_entry
instead of NULL.
v1->v2:
- move down 'fallback:' to make it more readable.
Fixes: e873e4b9cc7e ("ipv6: use fib6_info_hold_safe() when necessary")
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ceabee6c59943bdd5e1da1a6a20dc7ee5f8113a2 ]
In genl_register_family(), when idr_alloc() fails,
we forget to free the memory we possibly allocate for
family->attrbuf.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 2ae0f17df1cd ("genetlink: use idr to track families")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e0aa67709f89d08c8d8e5bdd9e0b649df61d0090 ]
When a dual stack dccp listener accepts an ipv4 flow,
it should not attempt to use an ipv6 header or
inet6_iif() helper.
Fixes: 3df80d9320bc ("[DCCP]: Introduce DCCPv6")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 40ba1d9b4d19796afc9b7ece872f5f3e8f5e2c13 ]
The abort path can cause a double-free of an anonymous set.
Added-and-to-be-aborted rule looks like this:
udp dport { 137, 138 } drop
The to-be-aborted transaction list looks like this:
newset
newsetelem
newsetelem
rule
This gets walked in reverse order, so first pass disables the rule, the
set elements, then the set.
After synchronize_rcu(), we then destroy those in same order: rule, set
element, set element, newset.
Problem is that the anonymous set has already been bound to the rule, so
the rule (lookup expression destructor) already frees the set, when then
cause use-after-free when trying to delete the elements from this set,
then try to free the set again when handling the newset expression.
Rule releases the bound set in first place from the abort path, this
causes the use-after-free on set element removal when undoing the new
element transactions. To handle this, skip new element transaction if
set is bound from the abort path.
This is still causes the use-after-free on set element removal. To
handle this, remove transaction from the list when the set is already
bound.
Joint work with Florian Westphal.
Fixes: f6ac85858976 ("netfilter: nf_tables: unbind set in rule from commit path")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1325
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69 upstream.
The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len
as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user
and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the
actual packet.
To prevent any potential leak of heap memory, it is enough to check that
the resulting len calculation after calling l2cap_get_conf_opt is not
below zero. A well formed packet will always return >= 0 here and will
end with the length value being zero after the last option has been
parsed. In case of malformed packets messing with the opt->len field the
length value will become negative. If that is the case, then just abort
and ignore the option.
In case an attacker uses a too short opt->len value, then garbage will
be parsed, but that is protected by the unknown option handling and also
the option parameter size checks.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit af3d5d1c87664a4f150fcf3534c6567cb19909b0 upstream.
When doing option parsing for standard type values of 1, 2 or 4 octets,
the value is converted directly into a variable instead of a pointer. To
avoid being tricked into being a pointer, check that for these option
types that sizes actually match. In L2CAP every option is fixed size and
thus it is prudent anyway to ensure that the remote side sends us the
right option size along with option paramters.
If the option size is not matching the option type, then that option is
silently ignored. It is a protocol violation and instead of trying to
give the remote attacker any further hints just pretend that option is
not present and proceed with the default values. Implementation
following the specification and its qualification procedures will always
use the correct size and thus not being impacted here.
To keep the code readable and consistent accross all options, a few
cosmetic changes were also required.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d824548dae220820bdf69b2d1561b7c4b072783f upstream.
They are however frequently triggered by syzkaller, so remove them.
ebtables userspace should never trigger any of these, so there is little
value in making them pr_debug (or ratelimited).
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e20a2e9c42c9e4002d9e338d74e7819e88d77162 upstream.
When releasing socket, it is possible to enter hci_sock_release() and
hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG) at the same time in different thread.
The reference count of hdev should be decremented only once from one of
them but if storing hdev to local variable in hci_sock_release() before
detached from socket and setting to NULL in hci_sock_dev_event(),
hci_dev_put(hdev) is unexpectedly called twice. This is resolved by
referencing hdev from socket after bt_sock_unlink() in
hci_sock_release().
Reported-by: syzbot+fdc00003f4efff43bc5b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bb229bbb3bf63d23128e851a1f3b85c083178fa1 upstream.
Because map updates are distributed lazily, an OSD may not know about
the new blacklist for quite some time after "osd blacklist add" command
is completed. This makes it possible for a blacklisted but still alive
client to overwrite a post-blacklist update, resulting in data
corruption.
Waiting for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add() and thus using
the post-blacklist epoch for all post-blacklist requests ensures that
all such requests "wait" for the blacklist to come into force on their
respective OSDs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6305a3b41515 ("libceph: support for blacklisting clients")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7b3fef8e4157ed424bcde039a60a730aa0dfb0eb upstream.
Fix a regression where soft and softconn requests are not timing out
as expected.
Fixes: 89f90fe1ad8b ("SUNRPC: Allow calls to xprt_transmit() to drain...")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 477687e1116ad16180caf8633dd830b296a5ce73 upstream.
Now that transmissions happen through a queue, we require the RPC tasks
to handle error conditions that may have been set while they were
sleeping. The back channel does not currently do this, but assumes
that any error condition happens during its own call to xprt_transmit().
The solution is to ensure that the back channel splits out the
error handling just like the forward channel does.
Fixes: 89f90fe1ad8b ("SUNRPC: Allow calls to xprt_transmit() to drain...")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ed7dc973bd91da234d93aff6d033a5206a6c9885 upstream.
If the socket is not connected, then we want to initiate a reconnect
rather that trying to transmit requests. If there is a large number
of requests queued and waiting for the lock in call_transmit(),
then it can take a while for one of the to loop back and retake
the lock in call_connect.
Fixes: 89f90fe1ad8b ("SUNRPC: Allow calls to xprt_transmit() to drain...")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b7e5034cbecf5a65b7bfdc2b20a8378039577706 upstream.
James Pearson found that an NFS server stopped responding to UDP
requests if started with more than 1017 threads.
sv_max_mesg is about 2^20, so that is probably where the calculation
performed by
svc_sock_setbufsize(svsk->sk_sock,
(serv->sv_nrthreads+3) * serv->sv_max_mesg,
(serv->sv_nrthreads+3) * serv->sv_max_mesg);
starts to overflow an int.
Reported-by: James Pearson <jcpearson@gmail.com>
Tested-by: James Pearson <jcpearson@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bb06c388fa20ae24cfe80c52488de718a7e3a53f upstream.
If msize is less than 4096, we should close and put trans, destroy
tagpool, not just free client. This patch fixes that.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/m/1552464097-142659-1-git-send-email-zhengbin13@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 574d356b7a02 ("9p/net: put a lower bound on msize")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ecb3dea400d3beaf611ce76ac7a51d4230492cf2 ]
When adding new filter to flower classifier, fl_change() inserts it to
handle_idr before initializing filter extensions and assigning it a mask.
Normally this ordering doesn't matter because all flower classifier ops
callbacks assume rtnl lock protection. However, when filter has an action
that doesn't have its kernel module loaded, rtnl lock is released before
call to request_module(). During this time the filter can be accessed bu
concurrent task before its initialization is completed, which can lead to a
crash.
Example case of NULL pointer dereference in concurrent dump:
Task 1 Task 2
tc_new_tfilter()
fl_change()
idr_alloc_u32(fnew)
fl_set_parms()
tcf_exts_validate()
tcf_action_init()
tcf_action_init_1()
rtnl_unlock()
request_module()
... rtnl_lock()
tc_dump_tfilter()
tcf_chain_dump()
fl_walk()
idr_get_next_ul()
tcf_node_dump()
tcf_fill_node()
fl_dump()
mask = &f->mask->key; <- NULL ptr
rtnl_lock()
Extension initialization and mask assignment don't depend on fnew->handle
that is allocated by idr_alloc_u32(). Move idr allocation code after action
creation and mask assignment in fl_change() to prevent concurrent access
to not fully initialized filter when rtnl lock is released to load action
module.
Fixes: 01683a146999 ("net: sched: refactor flower walk to iterate over idr")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4c404ce23358d5d8fbdeb7a6021a9b33d3c3c167 ]
Previous to commit 22b5c0b63f32 ("vsock/virtio: fix kernel panic
after device hot-unplug"), vsock_core_init() was called from
virtio_vsock_probe(). Now, virtio_transport_reset_no_sock() can be called
before vsock_core_init() has the chance to run.
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000110
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] PGD 0 P4D 0
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] CPU: 3 PID: 59 Comm: kworker/3:1 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7-390-generic-hvi #390
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] Workqueue: virtio_vsock virtio_transport_rx_work [vmw_vsock_virtio_transport]
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] RIP: 0010:virtio_transport_reset_no_sock+0x8c/0xc0 [vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common]
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] Code: 35 8b 4f 14 48 8b 57 08 31 f6 44 8b 4f 10 44 8b 07 48 8d 7d c8 e8 84 f8 ff ff 48 85 c0 48 89 c3 74 2a e8 f7 31 03 00 48 89 df <48> 8b 80 10 01 00 00 e8 68 fb 69 ed 48 8b 75 f0 65 48 33 34 25 28
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] RSP: 0018:ffffb42701ab7d40 EFLAGS: 00010282
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d79637ee080 RCX: 0000000000000003
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff9d79637ee080
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] RBP: ffffb42701ab7d78 R08: ffff9d796fae70e0 R09: ffff9d796f403500
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] R10: ffffb42701ab7d90 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9d7969d09240
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] R13: ffff9d79624e6840 R14: ffff9d7969d09318 R15: ffff9d796d48ff80
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d796fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] CR2: 0000000000000110 CR3: 0000000427f22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] Call Trace:
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x63/0x820 [vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common]
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] ? kfree+0x17e/0x190
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] ? detach_buf_split+0x145/0x160
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] virtio_transport_rx_work+0xa0/0x106 [vmw_vsock_virtio_transport]
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] NET: Registered protocol family 40
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] process_one_work+0x167/0x410
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] worker_thread+0x4d/0x460
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] kthread+0x105/0x140
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] ? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x50/0x50
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[Wed Feb 27 14:17:09 2019] Modules linked in: vmw_vsock_virtio_transport vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common input_leds vsock serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid qemu_fw_cfg autofs4 cirrus ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops virtio_net psmouse drm net_failover pata_acpi virtio_blk failover floppy
Fixes: 22b5c0b63f32 ("vsock/virtio: fix kernel panic after device hot-unplug")
Reported-by: Alexandru Herghelegiu <aherghelegiu@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Adalbert Lazăr <alazar@bitdefender.com>
Co-developed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9d3e1368bb45893a75a5dfb7cd21fdebfa6b47af ]
Commit 7716682cc58e ("tcp/dccp: fix another race at listener
dismantle") let inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() fail, and adjusted
{tcp,dccp}_check_req() accordingly. However, TFO and syncookies
weren't modified, thus leaking allocated resources on error.
Contrary to tcp_check_req(), in both syncookies and TFO cases,
we need to drop the request socket. Also, since the child socket is
created with inet_csk_clone_lock(), we have to unlock it and drop an
extra reference (->sk_refcount is initially set to 2 and
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() drops only one ref).
For TFO, we also need to revert the work done by tcp_try_fastopen()
(with reqsk_fastopen_remove()).
Fixes: 7716682cc58e ("tcp/dccp: fix another race at listener dismantle")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f2feaefdabb0a6253aa020f65e7388f07a9ed47c ]
Since commit eeea10b83a13 ("tcp: add
tcp_v4_fill_cb()/tcp_v4_restore_cb()"), tcp_vX_fill_cb is only called
after tcp_filter(). That means, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq still points to
the IP-part of the cb.
We thus should not mock with it, as this can trigger bugs (thanks
syzkaller):
[ 12.349396] ==================================================================
[ 12.350188] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x19b3/0x1a20
[ 12.351035] Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006adbc208 by task test_ip6_datagr/1799
Setting end_seq is actually no more necessary in tcp_filter as it gets
initialized later on in tcp_vX_fill_cb.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: eeea10b83a13 ("tcp: add tcp_v4_fill_cb()/tcp_v4_restore_cb()")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6466e715651f9f358e60c5ea4880e4731325827f ]
Returning 0 as inq to userspace indicates there is no more data to
read, and the application needs to wait for EPOLLIN. For a connection
that has received FIN from the remote peer, however, the application
must continue reading until getting EOF (return value of 0
from tcp_recvmsg) or an error, if edge-triggered epoll (EPOLLET) is
being used. Otherwise, the application will never receive a new
EPOLLIN, since there is no epoll edge after the FIN.
Return 1 when there is no data left on the queue but the
connection has received FIN, so that the applications continue
reading.
Fixes: b75eba76d3d72 (tcp: send in-queue bytes in cmsg upon read)
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2e990dfd13974d9eae493006f42ffb48707970ef ]
syzbot reported a NULL-ptr deref caused by that sched->init() in
sctp_stream_init() set stream->rr_next = NULL.
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
RIP: 0010:sctp_sched_rr_dequeue+0xd3/0x170 net/sctp/stream_sched_rr.c:141
Call Trace:
sctp_outq_dequeue_data net/sctp/outqueue.c:90 [inline]
sctp_outq_flush_data net/sctp/outqueue.c:1079 [inline]
sctp_outq_flush+0xba2/0x2790 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1205
All sched info is saved in sout->ext now, in sctp_stream_init()
sctp_stream_alloc_out() will not change it, there's no need to
call sched->init() again, since sctp_outq_init() has already
done it.
Fixes: 5bbbbe32a431 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations")
Reported-by: syzbot+4c9934f20522c0efd657@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 69ffaebb90369ce08657b5aea4896777b9d6e8fc ]
rxrpc_get_client_conn() adds a new call to the front of the waiting_calls
queue if the connection it's going to use already exists. This is bad as
it allows calls to get starved out.
Fix this by adding to the tail instead.
Also change the other enqueue point in the same function to put it on the
front (ie. when we have a new connection). This makes the point that in
the case of a new connection the new call goes at the front (though it
doesn't actually matter since the queue should be unoccupied).
Fixes: 45025bceef17 ("rxrpc: Improve management and caching of client connection objects")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ee60ad219f5c7c4fb2f047f88037770063ef785f ]
The race occurs in __mkroute_output() when 2 threads lookup a dst:
CPU A CPU B
find_exception()
find_exception() [fnhe expires]
ip_del_fnhe() [fnhe is deleted]
rt_bind_exception()
In rt_bind_exception() it will bind a deleted fnhe with the new dst, and
this dst will get no chance to be freed. It causes a dev defcnt leak and
consecutive dmesg warnings:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for ethX to become free. Usage count = 1
Especially thanks Jon to identify the issue.
This patch fixes it by setting fnhe_daddr to 0 in ip_del_fnhe() to stop
binding the deleted fnhe with a new dst when checking fnhe's fnhe_daddr
and daddr in rt_bind_exception().
It works as both ip_del_fnhe() and rt_bind_exception() are protected by
fnhe_lock and the fhne is freed by kfree_rcu().
Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route")
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ee74d0bd4325efb41e38affe5955f920ed973f23 ]
In case x25_connect() fails and frees the socket neighbour,
we also need to undo the change done to x25->state.
Before my last bug fix, we had use-after-free so this
patch fixes a latent bug.
syzbot report :
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 16137 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #117
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:x25_write_internal+0x1e8/0xdf0 net/x25/x25_subr.c:173
Code: 00 40 88 b5 e0 fe ff ff 0f 85 01 0b 00 00 48 8b 8b 80 04 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 79 1c 48 89 fe 48 c1 ee 03 <0f> b6 34 16 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 83 c2 03 40 38 f2 7c 09 40 84 f6 0f
RSP: 0018:ffff888076717a08 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: ffff88805f2f2292 RBX: ffff8880a0ae6000 RCX: 0000000000000000
kobject: 'loop5' (0000000018d0d0ee): kobject_uevent_env
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 000000000000001c
RBP: ffff888076717b40 R08: ffff8880950e0580 R09: ffffed100be5e46d
R10: ffffed100be5e46c R11: ffff88805f2f2363 R12: ffff888065579840
kobject: 'loop5' (0000000018d0d0ee): fill_kobj_path: path = '/devices/virtual/block/loop5'
R13: 1ffff1100ece2f47 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: 0000000000000013
FS: 00007fb88cf43700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f9a42a41028 CR3: 0000000087a67000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
x25_release+0xd0/0x340 net/x25/af_x25.c:658
__sock_release+0xd3/0x2b0 net/socket.c:579
sock_close+0x1b/0x30 net/socket.c:1162
__fput+0x2df/0x8d0 fs/file_table.c:278
____fput+0x16/0x20 fs/file_table.c:309
task_work_run+0x14a/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113
get_signal+0x1961/0x1d50 kernel/signal.c:2388
do_signal+0x87/0x1940 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:816
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x244/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:197 [inline]
syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:268 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x52d/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457f29
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fb88cf42c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457f29
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb88cf436d4
R13: 00000000004be462 R14: 00000000004cec98 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Modules linked in:
Fixes: 95d6ebd53c79 ("net/x25: fix use-after-free in x25_device_event()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: andrew hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 95d6ebd53c79522bf9502dbc7e89e0d63f94dae4 ]
In case of failure x25_connect() does a x25_neigh_put(x25->neighbour)
but forgets to clear x25->neighbour pointer, thus triggering use-after-free.
Since the socket is visible in x25_list, we need to hold x25_list_lock
to protect the operation.
syzbot report :
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_kill_by_device net/x25/af_x25.c:217 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_device_event+0x296/0x2b0 net/x25/af_x25.c:252
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880a030edd0 by task syz-executor003/7854
CPU: 0 PID: 7854 Comm: syz-executor003 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
x25_kill_by_device net/x25/af_x25.c:217 [inline]
x25_device_event+0x296/0x2b0 net/x25/af_x25.c:252
notifier_call_chain+0xc7/0x240 kernel/notifier.c:93
__raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline]
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2e/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1739
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1751 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1765 [inline]
__dev_notify_flags+0x1e9/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:7607
dev_change_flags+0x10d/0x170 net/core/dev.c:7643
dev_ifsioc+0x2b0/0x940 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:237
dev_ioctl+0x1b8/0xc70 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:488
sock_do_ioctl+0x1bd/0x300 net/socket.c:995
sock_ioctl+0x32b/0x610 net/socket.c:1096
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xd6e/0x1390 fs/ioctl.c:696
ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4467c9
Code: e8 0c e8 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 5b 07 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fdbea222d98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dbc58 RCX: 00000000004467c9
RDX: 0000000020000340 RSI: 0000000000008914 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dbc50 R08: 00007fdbea223700 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007fdbea223700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dbc5c
R13: 6000030030626669 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000030626669
Allocated by task 7843:
save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:495 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:468
kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:509
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x151/0x760 mm/slab.c:3615
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
x25_link_device_up+0x46/0x3f0 net/x25/x25_link.c:249
x25_device_event+0x116/0x2b0 net/x25/af_x25.c:242
notifier_call_chain+0xc7/0x240 kernel/notifier.c:93
__raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline]
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2e/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1739
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1751 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1765 [inline]
__dev_notify_flags+0x121/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:7605
dev_change_flags+0x10d/0x170 net/core/dev.c:7643
dev_ifsioc+0x2b0/0x940 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:237
dev_ioctl+0x1b8/0xc70 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:488
sock_do_ioctl+0x1bd/0x300 net/socket.c:995
sock_ioctl+0x32b/0x610 net/socket.c:1096
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xd6e/0x1390 fs/ioctl.c:696
ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 7865:
save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:457
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:465
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3494 [inline]
kfree+0xcf/0x230 mm/slab.c:3811
x25_neigh_put include/net/x25.h:253 [inline]
x25_connect+0x8d8/0xde0 net/x25/af_x25.c:824
__sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1685
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1696 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1693 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1693
do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880a030edc0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of
256-byte region [ffff8880a030edc0, ffff8880a030eec0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000280c380 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88812c3f07c0 index:0x0
flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea0002806788 ffffea00027f0188 ffff88812c3f07c0
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880a030e000 000000010000000c 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+04babcefcd396fabec37@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: andrew hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a843dc4ebaecd15fca1f4d35a97210f72ea1473b ]
In func check_6rd,tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen may equal to
32,so UBSAN complain about it.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/ipv6/sit.c:781:47
shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int'
CPU: 6 PID: 20036 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.27 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1
04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113
ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x81 lib/ubsan.c:159
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x293/0x2e8 lib/ubsan.c:425
check_6rd.constprop.9+0x433/0x4e0 net/ipv6/sit.c:781
try_6rd net/ipv6/sit.c:806 [inline]
ipip6_tunnel_xmit net/ipv6/sit.c:866 [inline]
sit_tunnel_xmit+0x141c/0x2720 net/ipv6/sit.c:1033
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4300 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4309 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17c/0x780 net/core/dev.c:3259
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1656/0x2500 net/core/dev.c:3829
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:501 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xa36/0x2290 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120
ip6_finish_output+0x3e7/0xa20 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:154
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:278 [inline]
ip6_output+0x1e2/0x720 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:171
dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline]
ip6_local_out+0x99/0x170 net/ipv6/output_core.c:176
ip6_send_skb+0x9d/0x2f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1697
ip6_push_pending_frames+0xc0/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1717
rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:616 [inline]
rawv6_sendmsg+0x2435/0x3530 net/ipv6/raw.c:946
inet_sendmsg+0xf8/0x5c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xc8/0x110 net/socket.c:631
___sys_sendmsg+0x6cf/0x890 net/socket.c:2114
__sys_sendmsg+0xf0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2152
do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Signed-off-by: linmiaohe <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1e027960edfaa6a43f9ca31081729b716598112b ]
syzbot found another add_timer() issue, this time in net/hsr [1]
Let's use mod_timer() which is safe.
[1]
kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:1136!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 15909 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
kobject: 'loop2' (00000000f5629718): kobject_uevent_env
RIP: 0010:add_timer kernel/time/timer.c:1136 [inline]
RIP: 0010:add_timer+0x654/0xbe0 kernel/time/timer.c:1134
Code: 0f 94 c5 31 ff 44 89 ee e8 09 61 0f 00 45 84 ed 0f 84 77 fd ff ff e8 bb 5f 0f 00 e8 07 10 a0 ff e9 68 fd ff ff e8 ac 5f 0f 00 <0f> 0b e8 a5 5f 0f 00 0f 0b e8 9e 5f 0f 00 4c 89 b5 58 ff ff ff e9
RSP: 0018:ffff8880656eeca0 EFLAGS: 00010246
kobject: 'loop2' (00000000f5629718): fill_kobj_path: path = '/devices/virtual/block/loop2'
RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: 1ffff1100caddd9a RCX: ffffc9000c436000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff816056c4 RDI: ffff88806a2f6cc8
RBP: ffff8880656eed58 R08: ffff888067f4a300 R09: ffff888067f4abc8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88806a2f6cc0
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8880656eed30
FS: 00007fc2019bf700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000738000 CR3: 0000000067e8e000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
hsr_check_announce net/hsr/hsr_device.c:99 [inline]
hsr_check_carrier_and_operstate+0x567/0x6f0 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:120
hsr_netdev_notify+0x297/0xa00 net/hsr/hsr_main.c:51
notifier_call_chain+0xc7/0x240 kernel/notifier.c:93
__raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline]
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2e/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1739
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1751 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1765 [inline]
dev_open net/core/dev.c:1436 [inline]
dev_open+0x143/0x160 net/core/dev.c:1424
team_port_add drivers/net/team/team.c:1203 [inline]
team_add_slave+0xa07/0x15d0 drivers/net/team/team.c:1933
do_set_master net/core/rtnetlink.c:2358 [inline]
do_set_master+0x1d4/0x230 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2332
do_setlink+0x966/0x3510 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2493
rtnl_setlink+0x271/0x3b0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2747
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x465/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5192
netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2485
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5210
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1925
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:632
sock_write_iter+0x27c/0x3e0 net/socket.c:923
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1869 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x5e0/0x8e0 fs/read_write.c:680
do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:956 [inline]
do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:937
vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1001
do_writev+0xf6/0x290 fs/read_write.c:1036
__do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1109 [inline]
__se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1106 [inline]
__x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1106
do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457f29
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fc2019bec78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457f29
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc2019bf6d4
R13: 00000000004c4a60 R14: 00000000004dd218 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Fixes: f421436a591d ("net/hsr: Add support for the High-availability Seamless Redundancy protocol (HSRv0)")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Arvid Brodin <arvid.brodin@alten.se>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6caabe7f197d3466d238f70915d65301f1716626 ]
If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff ..I.............
backtrace:
[<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
[<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
[<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
[<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
[<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
[<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
[<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
[<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
[<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
[<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 163d1c3d6f17556ed3c340d3789ea93be95d6c28 ]
Back in 2013 Hannes took care of most of such leaks in commit
bceaa90240b6 ("inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls")
But the bug in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() has not been fixed.
syzbot report :
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
CPU: 1 PID: 10996 Comm: syz-executor362 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #11
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:600
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x9f4/0xb10 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:694
kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:601
_copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:174 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x311/0x570 net/socket.c:227
___sys_recvmsg+0xb65/0x1310 net/socket.c:2283
do_recvmmsg+0x646/0x10c0 net/socket.c:2390
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2469 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2492 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg+0x1d1/0x350 net/socket.c:2485
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:2485
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x445819
Code: e8 6c b6 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b 12 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f64453eddb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dac28 RCX: 0000000000445819
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000020002f80 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dac20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dac2c
R13: 00007ffeba8f87af R14: 00007f64453ee9c0 R15: 20c49ba5e353f7cf
Local variable description: ----addr@___sys_recvmsg
Variable was created at:
___sys_recvmsg+0xf6/0x1310 net/socket.c:2244
do_recvmmsg+0x646/0x10c0 net/socket.c:2390
Bytes 0-31 of 32 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 32 starts at ffff8880ae62fbb0
Data copied to user address 0000000020000000
Fixes: a32e0eec7042 ("l2tp: introduce L2TPv3 IP encapsulation support for IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 22c74764aa2943ecdf9f07c900d8a9c8ba6c9265 ]
If a non local multicast packet reaches ip_route_input_rcu() while
the ingress device IPv4 private data (in_dev) is NULL, we end up
doing a NULL pointer dereference in IN_DEV_MFORWARD().
Since the later call to ip_route_input_mc() is going to fail if
!in_dev, we can fail early in such scenario and avoid the dangerous
code path.
v1 -> v2:
- clarified the commit message, no code changes
Reported-by: Tianhao Zhao <tizhao@redhat.com>
Fixes: e58e41596811 ("net: Enable support for VRF with ipv4 multicast")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2a5ff07a0eb945f291e361aa6f6becca8340ba46 ]
We keep receiving syzbot reports [1] that show that tunnels do not play
the rcu/IFF_UP rules properly.
At device dismantle phase, gro_cells_destroy() will be called
only after a full rcu grace period is observed after IFF_UP
has been cleared.
This means that IFF_UP needs to be tested before queueing packets
into netif_rx() or gro_cells.
This patch implements the test in gro_cells_receive() because
too many callers do not seem to bother enough.
[1]
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffff4ca0b9ffffe
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 21 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #97
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:__skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1929 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:1945 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:2656 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gro_cells_destroy net/core/gro_cells.c:89 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gro_cells_destroy+0x19d/0x360 net/core/gro_cells.c:78
Code: 03 42 80 3c 20 00 0f 85 53 01 00 00 48 8d 7a 08 49 8b 47 08 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 89 f9 49 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c1 e9 03 <42> 80 3c 21 00 0f 85 10 01 00 00 48 89 c1 48 89 42 08 48 c1 e9 03
RSP: 0018:ffff8880aa3f79a8 EFLAGS: 00010a02
RAX: 00ffffffffffffe8 RBX: ffffe8ffffc64b70 RCX: 1ffff8ca0b9ffffe
RDX: ffffc6505cffffe8 RSI: ffffffff858410ca RDI: ffffc6505cfffff0
RBP: ffff8880aa3f7a08 R08: ffff8880aa3e8580 R09: fffffbfff1263645
R10: fffffbfff1263644 R11: ffffffff8931b223 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffe8ffffc64b80 R15: ffffe8ffffc64b75
kobject: 'loop2' (000000004bd7d84a): kobject_uevent_env
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffff4ca0b9ffffe CR3: 0000000094941000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
Call Trace:
kobject: 'loop2' (000000004bd7d84a): fill_kobj_path: path = '/devices/virtual/block/loop2'
ip_tunnel_dev_free+0x19/0x60 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:1010
netdev_run_todo+0x51c/0x7d0 net/core/dev.c:8970
rtnl_unlock+0xe/0x10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:116
ip_tunnel_delete_nets+0x423/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:1124
vti_exit_batch_net+0x23/0x30 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c:495
ops_exit_list.isra.0+0x105/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:156
cleanup_net+0x3fb/0x960 net/core/net_namespace.c:551
process_one_work+0x98e/0x1790 kernel/workqueue.c:2173
worker_thread+0x98/0xe40 kernel/workqueue.c:2319
kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Modules linked in:
CR2: fffff4ca0b9ffffe
[ end trace 513fc9c1338d1cb3 ]
RIP: 0010:__skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1929 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:1945 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:2656 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gro_cells_destroy net/core/gro_cells.c:89 [inline]
RIP: 0010:gro_cells_destroy+0x19d/0x360 net/core/gro_cells.c:78
Code: 03 42 80 3c 20 00 0f 85 53 01 00 00 48 8d 7a 08 49 8b 47 08 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 89 f9 49 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c1 e9 03 <42> 80 3c 21 00 0f 85 10 01 00 00 48 89 c1 48 89 42 08 48 c1 e9 03
RSP: 0018:ffff8880aa3f79a8 EFLAGS: 00010a02
RAX: 00ffffffffffffe8 RBX: ffffe8ffffc64b70 RCX: 1ffff8ca0b9ffffe
RDX: ffffc6505cffffe8 RSI: ffffffff858410ca RDI: ffffc6505cfffff0
RBP: ffff8880aa3f7a08 R08: ffff8880aa3e8580 R09: fffffbfff1263645
R10: fffffbfff1263644 R11: ffffffff8931b223 R12: dffffc0000000000
kobject: 'loop3' (00000000e4ee57a6): kobject_uevent_env
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffe8ffffc64b80 R15: ffffe8ffffc64b75
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffff4ca0b9ffffe CR3: 0000000094941000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
Fixes: c9e6bc644e55 ("net: add gro_cells infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5355ed6388e23b69a00d48398a68d022135e6486 ]
My prior commit missed the fact that these functions
were using udp_hdr() (aka skb_transport_header())
to get access to GUE header.
Since pskb_transport_may_pull() does not exist yet, we have to add
transport_offset to our pskb_may_pull() calls.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in gue_err+0x514/0xfa0 net/ipv4/fou.c:1032
CPU: 1 PID: 10648 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #11
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:600
__msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313
gue_err+0x514/0xfa0 net/ipv4/fou.c:1032
__udp4_lib_err_encap_no_sk net/ipv4/udp.c:571 [inline]
__udp4_lib_err_encap net/ipv4/udp.c:626 [inline]
__udp4_lib_err+0x12e6/0x1d40 net/ipv4/udp.c:665
udp_err+0x74/0x90 net/ipv4/udp.c:737
icmp_socket_deliver net/ipv4/icmp.c:767 [inline]
icmp_unreach+0xb65/0x1070 net/ipv4/icmp.c:884
icmp_rcv+0x11a1/0x1950 net/ipv4/icmp.c:1066
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x584/0xbb0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:208
ip_local_deliver_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x624/0x7b0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:255
dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:414 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
ip_rcv+0x6bd/0x740 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:524
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:4973 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:5083 [inline]
process_backlog+0x756/0x10e0 net/core/dev.c:5923
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6346 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x78b/0x1a60 net/core/dev.c:6412
__do_softirq+0x53f/0x93a kernel/softirq.c:293
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:375 [inline]
irq_exit+0x214/0x250 kernel/softirq.c:416
exiting_irq+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x48/0x70 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1064
apic_timer_interrupt+0x2e/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:814
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:finish_lock_switch+0x2b/0x40 kernel/sched/core.c:2597
Code: 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb e8 63 e7 95 00 8b b8 88 0c 00 00 48 8b 00 48 85 c0 75 12 48 89 df e8 dd db 95 00 c6 00 00 c6 03 00 fb 5b <5d> c3 e8 4e e6 95 00 eb e7 66 90 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55
RSP: 0018:ffff888081a0fc80 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: ffff88821fd6bd80 RBX: ffff888027898000 RCX: ccccccccccccd000
RDX: ffff88821fca8d80 RSI: ffff888000000000 RDI: 00000000000004a0
RBP: ffff888081a0fc80 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffff888081a0fb08
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff88811130e388 R14: ffff88811130da00 R15: ffff88812fdb7d80
finish_task_switch+0xfc/0x2d0 kernel/sched/core.c:2698
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2851 [inline]
__schedule+0x6cc/0x800 kernel/sched/core.c:3491
schedule+0x15b/0x240 kernel/sched/core.c:3535
freezable_schedule include/linux/freezer.h:172 [inline]
do_nanosleep+0x2ba/0x980 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1679
hrtimer_nanosleep kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1733 [inline]
__do_sys_nanosleep kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1767 [inline]
__se_sys_nanosleep+0x746/0x960 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1754
__x64_sys_nanosleep+0x3e/0x60 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1754
do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x4855a0
Code: 00 00 48 c7 c0 d4 ff ff ff 64 c7 00 16 00 00 00 31 c0 eb be 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d b1 11 5d 00 00 75 14 b8 23 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 04 e2 f8 ff c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 3a 55 fd ff
RSP: 002b:0000000000a4fd58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000023
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000085780 RCX: 00000000004855a0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000a4fd60
RBP: 00000000000007ec R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000ceb940
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000008
R13: 0000000000a4fdb0 R14: 0000000000085711 R15: 0000000000a4fdc0
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:205 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:159
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2773 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe9e/0xff0 mm/slub.c:4398
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:140 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:208
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1012 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x186/0xa60 net/core/skbuff.c:5287
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xafd/0x10a0 net/core/sock.c:2091
sock_alloc_send_skb+0xca/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:2108
__ip_append_data+0x34cd/0x5000 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:998
ip_append_data+0x324/0x480 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1220
icmp_push_reply+0x23d/0x7e0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:375
__icmp_send+0x2ea3/0x30f0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:737
icmp_send include/net/icmp.h:47 [inline]
ipv4_link_failure+0x6d/0x230 net/ipv4/route.c:1190
dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:427 [inline]
arp_error_report+0x106/0x1a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:297
neigh_invalidate+0x359/0x8e0 net/core/neighbour.c:992
neigh_timer_handler+0xdf2/0x1280 net/core/neighbour.c:1078
call_timer_fn+0x285/0x600 kernel/time/timer.c:1325
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline]
__run_timers+0xdb4/0x11d0 kernel/time/timer.c:1681
run_timer_softirq+0x2e/0x50 kernel/time/timer.c:1694
__do_softirq+0x53f/0x93a kernel/softirq.c:293
Fixes: 26fc181e6cac ("fou, fou6: do not assume linear skbs")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e8e3437762ad938880dd48a3c52d702e7cf3c124 upstream.
We might have never enabled (started) the psock's parser, in which case it
will not get stopped when destroying the psock. This leads to a warning
when trying to cancel parser's work from psock's deferred destructor:
[ 405.325769] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3216 at net/strparser/strparser.c:526 strp_done+0x3c/0x40
[ 405.326712] Modules linked in: [last unloaded: test_bpf]
[ 405.327359] CPU: 1 PID: 3216 Comm: kworker/1:164 Tainted: G W 5.0.0 #42
[ 405.328294] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20180531_142017-buildhw-08.phx2.fedoraproject.org-1.fc28 04/01/2014
[ 405.329712] Workqueue: events sk_psock_destroy_deferred
[ 405.330254] RIP: 0010:strp_done+0x3c/0x40
[ 405.330706] Code: 28 e8 b8 d5 6b ff 48 8d bb 80 00 00 00 e8 9c d5 6b ff 48 8b 7b 18 48 85 ff 74 0d e8 1e a5 e8 ff 48 c7 43 18 00 00 00 00 5b c3 <0f> 0b eb cf 66 66 66 66 90 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 28 e8 0b
[ 405.332862] RSP: 0018:ffffc900026bbe50 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 405.333482] RAX: ffffffff819323e0 RBX: ffff88812cb83640 RCX: ffff88812cb829e8
[ 405.334228] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff88812cb837e8 RDI: ffff88812cb83640
[ 405.335366] RBP: ffff88813fd22680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000073746e657665
[ 405.336472] R10: 8080808080808080 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88812cb83600
[ 405.337760] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88811f401780 R15: ffff88812cb837e8
[ 405.338777] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 405.339903] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 405.340821] CR2: 00007fb11489a6b8 CR3: 000000012d4d6000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[ 405.341981] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 405.343131] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 405.344415] Call Trace:
[ 405.344821] sk_psock_destroy_deferred+0x23/0x1b0
[ 405.345585] process_one_work+0x1ae/0x3e0
[ 405.346110] worker_thread+0x3c/0x3b0
[ 405.346576] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0xd0/0xd0
[ 405.347187] kthread+0x11d/0x140
[ 405.347601] ? __kthread_parkme+0x80/0x80
[ 405.348108] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 405.348566] ---[ end trace a4a3af4026a327d4 ]---
Stop psock's parser just before canceling its work.
Fixes: 1d79895aef18 ("sk_msg: Always cancel strp work before freeing the psock")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c4f5627f7eeecde1bb6b646d8c0907b96dc2b2a6 upstream.
With commit e16337622016 ("Bluetooth: Handle bt_accept_enqueue() socket
atomically") lock_sock[_nested]() is used to acquire the socket lock
before manipulating the socket. lock_sock[_nested]() may block, which
is problematic since bt_accept_enqueue() can be called in bottom half
context (e.g. from rfcomm_connect_ind()):
[<ffffff80080d81ec>] __might_sleep+0x4c/0x80
[<ffffff800876c7b0>] lock_sock_nested+0x24/0x58
[<ffffff8000d7c27c>] bt_accept_enqueue+0x48/0xd4 [bluetooth]
[<ffffff8000e67d8c>] rfcomm_connect_ind+0x190/0x218 [rfcomm]
Add a parameter to bt_accept_enqueue() to indicate whether the
function is called from BH context, and acquire the socket lock
with bh_lock_sock_nested() if that's the case.
Also adapt all callers of bt_accept_enqueue() to pass the new
parameter:
- l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb()
- uses lock_sock() to lock the parent socket => process context
- rfcomm_connect_ind()
- acquires the parent socket lock with bh_lock_sock() => BH
context
- __sco_chan_add()
- called from sco_chan_add(), which is called from sco_connect().
parent is NULL, hence bt_accept_enqueue() isn't called in this
code path and we can ignore it
- also called from sco_conn_ready(). uses bh_lock_sock() to acquire
the parent lock => BH context
Fixes: e16337622016 ("Bluetooth: Handle bt_accept_enqueue() socket atomically")
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0e63208915a8d7590d0a6218dadb2a6a00ac705a ]
Fix regression bug introduced in
commit 365ad353c256 ("tipc: reduce risk of user starvation during link
congestion")
Only signal -EDESTADDRREQ for RDM/DGRAM if we don't have a cached
sockaddr.
Fixes: 365ad353c256 ("tipc: reduce risk of user starvation during link congestion")
Signed-off-by: Erik Hugne <erik.hugne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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