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author | Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> | 2017-06-13 15:52:13 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-06-14 14:56:25 -0400 |
commit | 31fd85816dbe3a714bcc3f67c17c3dd87011f79e (patch) | |
tree | d8c694e4997605254ea96a76c5d633f60ee091cf /kernel/bpf | |
parent | a88e2676a6cd3352c2f590f872233d83d8db289c (diff) | |
download | talos-obmc-linux-31fd85816dbe3a714bcc3f67c17c3dd87011f79e.tar.gz talos-obmc-linux-31fd85816dbe3a714bcc3f67c17c3dd87011f79e.zip |
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields
Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an
narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example,
__u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or
__u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol
__u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period
which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field.
This patch solves the issue by:
. Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the
field size of narrower load from prog type
specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier.
. The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates
(1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses
supporting non-whole-field access
(2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access.
. In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is
less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it
to a full field load followed by proper masking.
. Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period
are supporting narrowing loads.
. Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores
are just normal stores.
Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and
these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound
__sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two
redundant "skb cb oob" tests.
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 71 |
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 519a6144d3d3..44b97d958fb7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -758,15 +758,26 @@ static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, } /* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields */ -static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, int size, +static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) { + int ctx_field_size = 0; + /* for analyzer ctx accesses are already validated and converted */ if (env->analyzer_ops) return 0; if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access && - env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, reg_type)) { + env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, reg_type, &ctx_field_size)) { + /* a non zero ctx_field_size indicates: + * . For this field, the prog type specific ctx conversion algorithm + * only supports whole field access. + * . This ctx access is a candiate for later verifier transformation + * to load the whole field and then apply a mask to get correct result. + */ + if (ctx_field_size) + env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = ctx_field_size; + /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; @@ -868,7 +879,7 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory */ -static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, +static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t, int value_regno) { @@ -911,7 +922,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno); return -EACCES; } - err = check_ctx_access(env, off, size, t, ®_type); + err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, ®_type); if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs, value_regno); @@ -972,7 +983,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, return err; } -static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) +static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn) { struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs; int err; @@ -994,13 +1005,13 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return err; /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */ - err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, + err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1); if (err) return err; /* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */ - return check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, + return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1); } @@ -1416,7 +1427,7 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx) * is inferred from register state. */ for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { - err = check_mem_access(env, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1); + err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1); if (err) return err; } @@ -2993,18 +3004,12 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) /* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable, * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func */ - err = check_mem_access(env, insn->src_reg, insn->off, + err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg); if (err) return err; - if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && - BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) { - insn_idx++; - continue; - } - prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type; if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) { @@ -3032,7 +3037,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type; if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) { - err = check_xadd(env, insn); + err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn); if (err) return err; insn_idx++; @@ -3051,7 +3056,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ - err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, + err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg); if (err) @@ -3080,7 +3085,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return err; /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ - err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, + err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1); if (err) @@ -3383,7 +3388,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn; struct bpf_prog *new_prog; enum bpf_access_type type; - int i, cnt, delta = 0; + int i, cnt, off, size, ctx_field_size, is_narrower_load, delta = 0; if (ops->gen_prologue) { cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, @@ -3423,11 +3428,39 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX) continue; + off = insn->off; + size = bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_SIZE(insn->code)); + ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; + is_narrower_load = (type == BPF_READ && size < ctx_field_size); + + /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field, + * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific + * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful, + * we will apply proper mask to the result. + */ + if (is_narrower_load) { + int size_code = BPF_H; + + if (ctx_field_size == 4) + size_code = BPF_W; + else if (ctx_field_size == 8) + size_code = BPF_DW; + insn->off = off & ~(ctx_field_size - 1); + insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code; + } cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog); if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) { verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); return -EINVAL; } + if (is_narrower_load) { + if (ctx_field_size <= 4) + insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, + (1 << size * 8) - 1); + else + insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg, + (1 << size * 8) - 1); + } new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); if (!new_prog) |