Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux

Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
 "Apart from the core arm64 and perf changes, the Spectre v4 mitigation
  touches the arm KVM code and the ACPI PPTT support touches drivers/
  (acpi and cacheinfo). I should have the maintainers' acks in place.

  Summary:

   - Spectre v4 mitigation (Speculative Store Bypass Disable) support
     for arm64 using SMC firmware call to set a hardware chicken bit

   - ACPI PPTT (Processor Properties Topology Table) parsing support and
     enable the feature for arm64

   - Report signal frame size to user via auxv (AT_MINSIGSTKSZ). The
     primary motivation is Scalable Vector Extensions which requires
     more space on the signal frame than the currently defined
     MINSIGSTKSZ

   - ARM perf patches: allow building arm-cci as module, demote
     dev_warn() to dev_dbg() in arm-ccn event_init(), miscellaneous
     cleanups

   - cmpwait() WFE optimisation to avoid some spurious wakeups

   - L1_CACHE_BYTES reverted back to 64 (for performance reasons that
     have to do with some network allocations) while keeping
     ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN to 128. cache_line_size() returns the actual
     hardware Cache Writeback Granule

   - Turn LSE atomics on by default in Kconfig

   - Kernel fault reporting tidying

   - Some #include and miscellaneous cleanups"

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (53 commits)
  arm64: Fix syscall restarting around signal suppressed by tracer
  arm64: topology: Avoid checking numa mask for scheduler MC selection
  ACPI / PPTT: fix build when CONFIG_ACPI_PPTT is not enabled
  arm64: cpu_errata: include required headers
  arm64: KVM: Move VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG macros to the top of the file
  arm64: signal: Report signal frame size to userspace via auxv
  arm64/sve: Thin out initialisation sanity-checks for sve_max_vl
  arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 discovery through ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID
  arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests
  arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support for guests
  arm64: KVM: Add HYP per-cpu accessors
  arm64: ssbd: Add prctl interface for per-thread mitigation
  arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control userspace mitigation
  arm64: ssbd: Restore mitigation status on CPU resume
  arm64: ssbd: Skip apply_ssbd if not using dynamic mitigation
  arm64: ssbd: Add global mitigation state accessor
  arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option
  arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing
  arm64: Add per-cpu infrastructure to call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
  arm64: Call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 on transitions between EL0 and EL1
  ...

1 files changed, 28 insertions, 18 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 576f15153080..b8eecc7b9531 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -235,8 +235,9 @@ static bool is_el1_instruction_abort(unsigned int esr)
 	return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR;
 }
 
-static inline bool is_permission_fault(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs,
-				       unsigned long addr)
+static inline bool is_el1_permission_fault(unsigned int esr,
+					   struct pt_regs *regs,
+					   unsigned long addr)
 {
 	unsigned int ec       = ESR_ELx_EC(esr);
 	unsigned int fsc_type = esr & ESR_ELx_FSC_TYPE;
@@ -254,6 +255,22 @@ static inline bool is_permission_fault(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs,
 	return false;
 }
 
+static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr,
+			     unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	bust_spinlocks(1);
+
+	pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel %s at virtual address %016lx\n", msg,
+		 addr);
+
+	mem_abort_decode(esr);
+
+	show_pte(addr);
+	die("Oops", regs, esr);
+	bust_spinlocks(0);
+	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+}
+
 static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 			      struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
@@ -266,9 +283,7 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	if (!is_el1_instruction_abort(esr) && fixup_exception(regs))
 		return;
 
-	bust_spinlocks(1);
-
-	if (is_permission_fault(esr, regs, addr)) {
+	if (is_el1_permission_fault(esr, regs, addr)) {
 		if (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR)
 			msg = "write to read-only memory";
 		else
@@ -279,15 +294,7 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 		msg = "paging request";
 	}
 
-	pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel %s at virtual address %08lx\n", msg,
-		 addr);
-
-	mem_abort_decode(esr);
-
-	show_pte(addr);
-	die("Oops", regs, esr);
-	bust_spinlocks(0);
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	die_kernel_fault(msg, addr, esr, regs);
 }
 
 static void __do_user_fault(struct siginfo *info, unsigned int esr)
@@ -447,16 +454,19 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 		mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	}
 
-	if (addr < TASK_SIZE && is_permission_fault(esr, regs, addr)) {
+	if (addr < TASK_SIZE && is_el1_permission_fault(esr, regs, addr)) {
 		/* regs->orig_addr_limit may be 0 if we entered from EL0 */
 		if (regs->orig_addr_limit == KERNEL_DS)
-			die("Accessing user space memory with fs=KERNEL_DS", regs, esr);
+			die_kernel_fault("access to user memory with fs=KERNEL_DS",
+					 addr, esr, regs);
 
 		if (is_el1_instruction_abort(esr))
-			die("Attempting to execute userspace memory", regs, esr);
+			die_kernel_fault("execution of user memory",
+					 addr, esr, regs);
 
 		if (!search_exception_tables(regs->pc))
-			die("Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines", regs, esr);
+			die_kernel_fault("access to user memory outside uaccess routines",
+					 addr, esr, regs);
 	}
 
 	perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, addr);