diff options
author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> | 2016-05-05 19:49:13 -0700 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-05-06 16:01:54 -0400 |
commit | f9c8d19d6c7c15a59963f80ec47e68808914abd4 (patch) | |
tree | aa1ef70115c0fb206623a613956412f3aa330cec /Documentation/networking | |
parent | db58ba45920255e967cc1d62a430cebd634b5046 (diff) | |
download | talos-obmc-linux-f9c8d19d6c7c15a59963f80ec47e68808914abd4.tar.gz talos-obmc-linux-f9c8d19d6c7c15a59963f80ec47e68808914abd4.zip |
bpf: add documentation for 'direct packet access'
explain how verifier checks safety of packet access
and update email addresses.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/networking')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/networking/filter.txt | 85 |
1 files changed, 83 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/filter.txt b/Documentation/networking/filter.txt index 96da119a47e7..6aef0b5f3bc7 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/filter.txt +++ b/Documentation/networking/filter.txt @@ -1095,6 +1095,87 @@ all use cases. See details of eBPF verifier in kernel/bpf/verifier.c +Direct packet access +-------------------- +In cls_bpf and act_bpf programs the verifier allows direct access to the packet +data via skb->data and skb->data_end pointers. +Ex: +1: r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) /* load skb->data_end */ +2: r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) /* load skb->data */ +3: r5 = r3 +4: r5 += 14 +5: if r5 > r4 goto pc+16 +R1=ctx R3=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R4=pkt_end R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R10=fp +6: r0 = *(u16 *)(r3 +12) /* access 12 and 13 bytes of the packet */ + +this 2byte load from the packet is safe to do, since the program author +did check 'if (skb->data + 14 > skb->data_end) goto err' at insn #5 which +means that in the fall-through case the register R3 (which points to skb->data) +has at least 14 directly accessible bytes. The verifier marks it +as R3=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14). +id=0 means that no additional variables were added to the register. +off=0 means that no additional constants were added. +r=14 is the range of safe access which means that bytes [R3, R3 + 14) are ok. +Note that R5 is marked as R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14). It also points +to the packet data, but constant 14 was added to the register, so +it now points to 'skb->data + 14' and accessible range is [R5, R5 + 14 - 14) +which is zero bytes. + +More complex packet access may look like: + R0=imm1 R1=ctx R3=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R4=pkt_end R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R10=fp + 6: r0 = *(u8 *)(r3 +7) /* load 7th byte from the packet */ + 7: r4 = *(u8 *)(r3 +12) + 8: r4 *= 14 + 9: r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) /* load skb->data */ +10: r3 += r4 +11: r2 = r1 +12: r2 <<= 48 +13: r2 >>= 48 +14: r3 += r2 +15: r2 = r3 +16: r2 += 8 +17: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) /* load skb->data_end */ +18: if r2 > r1 goto pc+2 + R0=inv56 R1=pkt_end R2=pkt(id=2,off=8,r=8) R3=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=8) R4=inv52 R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R10=fp +19: r1 = *(u8 *)(r3 +4) +The state of the register R3 is R3=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=8) +id=2 means that two 'r3 += rX' instructions were seen, so r3 points to some +offset within a packet and since the program author did +'if (r3 + 8 > r1) goto err' at insn #18, the safe range is [R3, R3 + 8). +The verifier only allows 'add' operation on packet registers. Any other +operation will set the register state to 'unknown_value' and it won't be +available for direct packet access. +Operation 'r3 += rX' may overflow and become less than original skb->data, +therefore the verifier has to prevent that. So it tracks the number of +upper zero bits in all 'uknown_value' registers, so when it sees +'r3 += rX' instruction and rX is more than 16-bit value, it will error as: +"cannot add integer value with N upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet" +Ex. after insn 'r4 = *(u8 *)(r3 +12)' (insn #7 above) the state of r4 is +R4=inv56 which means that upper 56 bits on the register are guaranteed +to be zero. After insn 'r4 *= 14' the state becomes R4=inv52, since +multiplying 8-bit value by constant 14 will keep upper 52 bits as zero. +Similarly 'r2 >>= 48' will make R2=inv48, since the shift is not sign +extending. This logic is implemented in evaluate_reg_alu() function. + +The end result is that bpf program author can access packet directly +using normal C code as: + void *data = (void *)(long)skb->data; + void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end; + struct eth_hdr *eth = data; + struct iphdr *iph = data + sizeof(*eth); + struct udphdr *udp = data + sizeof(*eth) + sizeof(*iph); + + if (data + sizeof(*eth) + sizeof(*iph) + sizeof(*udp) > data_end) + return 0; + if (eth->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_IP)) + return 0; + if (iph->protocol != IPPROTO_UDP || iph->ihl != 5) + return 0; + if (udp->dest == 53 || udp->source == 9) + ...; +which makes such programs easier to write comparing to LD_ABS insn +and significantly faster. + eBPF maps --------- 'maps' is a generic storage of different types for sharing data between kernel @@ -1293,5 +1374,5 @@ to give potential BPF hackers or security auditors a better overview of the underlying architecture. Jay Schulist <jschlst@samba.org> -Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> -Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> +Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> +Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |