thunderbolt: Add documentation how Thunderbolt bus can be used

Since there are no such tool yet that handles all the low-level details
of connecting devices and upgrading their firmware, add a small document
that shows how the Thunderbolt bus can be used directly from command
line.

Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 199 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/thunderbolt.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a4cd1f159ca
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+=============
+ Thunderbolt
+=============
+The interface presented here is not meant for end users. Instead there
+should be a userspace tool that handles all the low-level details, keeps
+database of the authorized devices and prompts user for new connections.
+
+More details about the sysfs interface for Thunderbolt devices can be
+found in ``Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-thunderbolt``.
+
+Those users who just want to connect any device without any sort of
+manual work, can add following line to
+``/etc/udev/rules.d/99-local.rules``::
+
+  ACTION=="add", SUBSYSTEM=="thunderbolt", ATTR{authorized}=="0", ATTR{authorized}="1"
+
+This will authorize all devices automatically when they appear. However,
+keep in mind that this bypasses the security levels and makes the system
+vulnerable to DMA attacks.
+
+Security levels and how to use them
+-----------------------------------
+Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge Thunderbolt controller there are 4
+security levels available. The reason for these is the fact that the
+connected devices can be DMA masters and thus read contents of the host
+memory without CPU and OS knowing about it. There are ways to prevent
+this by setting up an IOMMU but it is not always available for various
+reasons.
+
+The security levels are as follows:
+
+  none
+    All devices are automatically connected by the firmware. No user
+    approval is needed. In BIOS settings this is typically called
+    *Legacy mode*.
+
+  user
+    User is asked whether the device is allowed to be connected.
+    Based on the device identification information available through
+    ``/sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices``. user then can do the decision.
+    In BIOS settings this is typically called *Unique ID*.
+
+  secure
+    User is asked whether the device is allowed to be connected. In
+    addition to UUID the device (if it supports secure connect) is sent
+    a challenge that should match the expected one based on a random key
+    written to ``key`` sysfs attribute. In BIOS settings this is
+    typically called *One time saved key*.
+
+  dponly
+    The firmware automatically creates tunnels for Display Port and
+    USB. No PCIe tunneling is done. In BIOS settings this is
+    typically called *Display Port Only*.
+
+The current security level can be read from
+``/sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/domainX/security`` where ``domainX`` is
+the Thunderbolt domain the host controller manages. There is typically
+one domain per Thunderbolt host controller.
+
+If the security level reads as ``user`` or ``secure`` the connected
+device must be authorized by the user before PCIe tunnels are created
+(e.g the PCIe device appears).
+
+Each Thunderbolt device plugged in will appear in sysfs under
+``/sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices``. The device directory carries
+information that can be used to identify the particular device,
+including its name and UUID.
+
+Authorizing devices when security level is ``user`` or ``secure``
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+When a device is plugged in it will appear in sysfs as follows::
+
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-1/authorized	- 0
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-1/device	- 0x8004
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-1/device_name	- Thunderbolt to FireWire Adapter
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-1/vendor	- 0x1
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-1/vendor_name	- Apple, Inc.
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-1/unique_id	- e0376f00-0300-0100-ffff-ffffffffffff
+
+The ``authorized`` attribute reads 0 which means no PCIe tunnels are
+created yet. The user can authorize the device by simply::
+
+  # echo 1 > /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-1/authorized
+
+This will create the PCIe tunnels and the device is now connected.
+
+If the device supports secure connect, and the domain security level is
+set to ``secure``, it has an additional attribute ``key`` which can hold
+a random 32 byte value used for authorization and challenging the device in
+future connects::
+
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/authorized	- 0
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/device	- 0x305
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/device_name	- AKiTiO Thunder3 PCIe Box
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/key		-
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/vendor	- 0x41
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/vendor_name	- inXtron
+  /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/unique_id	- dc010000-0000-8508-a22d-32ca6421cb16
+
+Notice the key is empty by default.
+
+If the user does not want to use secure connect it can just ``echo 1``
+to the ``authorized`` attribute and the PCIe tunnels will be created in
+the same way than in ``user`` security level.
+
+If the user wants to use secure connect, the first time the device is
+plugged a key needs to be created and send to the device::
+
+  # key=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
+  # echo $key > /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/key
+  # echo 1 > /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/authorized
+
+Now the device is connected (PCIe tunnels are created) and in addition
+the key is stored on the device NVM.
+
+Next time the device is plugged in the user can verify (challenge) the
+device using the same key::
+
+  # echo $key > /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/key
+  # echo 2 > /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-3/authorized
+
+If the challenge the device returns back matches the one we expect based
+on the key, the device is connected and the PCIe tunnels are created.
+However, if the challenge failed no tunnels are created and error is
+returned to the user.
+
+If the user still wants to connect the device it can either approve
+the device without a key or write new key and write 1 to the
+``authorized`` file to get the new key stored on the device NVM.
+
+Upgrading NVM on Thunderbolt device or host
+-------------------------------------------
+Since most of the functionality is handled in a firmware running on a
+host controller or a device, it is important that the firmware can be
+upgraded to the latest where possible bugs in it have been fixed.
+Typically OEMs provide this firmware from their support site.
+
+There is also a central site which has links where to download firmwares
+for some machines:
+
+  `Thunderbolt Updates <https://thunderbolttechnology.net/updates>`_
+
+Before you upgrade firmware on a device or host, please make sure it is
+the suitable. Failing to do that may render the device (or host) in a
+state where it cannot be used properly anymore without special tools!
+
+Host NVM upgrade on Apple Macs is not supported.
+
+Once the NVM image has been downloaded, you need to plug in a
+Thunderbolt device so that the host controller appears. It does not
+matter which device is connected (unless you are upgrading NVM on a
+device - then you need to connect that particular device).
+
+Note OEM-specific method to power the controller up ("force power") may
+be available for your system in which case there is no need to plug in a
+Thunderbolt device.
+
+After that we can write the firmware to the non-active parts of the NVM
+of the host or device. As an example here is how Intel NUC6i7KYK (Skull
+Canyon) Thunderbolt controller NVM is upgraded::
+
+  # dd if=KYK_TBT_FW_0018.bin of=/sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-0/nvm_non_active0/nvmem
+
+Once the operation completes we can trigger NVM authentication and
+upgrade process as follows::
+
+  # echo 1 > /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-0/nvm_authenticate
+
+If no errors are returned, the host controller shortly disappears. Once
+it comes back the driver notices it and initiates a full power cycle.
+After a while the host controller appears again and this time it should
+be fully functional.
+
+We can verify that the new NVM firmware is active by running following
+commands::
+
+  # cat /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-0/nvm_authenticate
+  0x0
+  # cat /sys/bus/thunderbolt/devices/0-0/nvm_version
+  18.0
+
+If ``nvm_authenticate`` contains anything else than 0x0 it is the error
+code from the last authentication cycle, which means the authentication
+of the NVM image failed.
+
+Note names of the NVMem devices ``nvm_activeN`` and ``nvm_non_activeN``
+depends on the order they are registered in the NVMem subsystem. N in
+the name is the identifier added by the NVMem subsystem.
+
+Upgrading NVM when host controller is in safe mode
+--------------------------------------------------
+If the existing NVM is not properly authenticated (or is missing) the
+host controller goes into safe mode which means that only available
+functionality is flashing new NVM image. When in this mode the reading
+``nvm_version`` fails with ``ENODATA`` and the device identification
+information is missing.
+
+To recover from this mode, one needs to flash a valid NVM image to the
+host host controller in the same way it is done in the previous chapter.