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/* IBM_PROLOG_BEGIN_TAG */
/* This is an automatically generated prolog. */
/* */
/* $Source: src/usr/secureboot/runtime/rt_secureboot.C $ */
/* */
/* OpenPOWER HostBoot Project */
/* */
/* Contributors Listed Below - COPYRIGHT 2016,2017 */
/* [+] International Business Machines Corp. */
/* */
/* */
/* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); */
/* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. */
/* You may obtain a copy of the License at */
/* */
/* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 */
/* */
/* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software */
/* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, */
/* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or */
/* implied. See the License for the specific language governing */
/* permissions and limitations under the License. */
/* */
/* IBM_PROLOG_END_TAG */
/**
* @file rt_secureboot.C
* @brief Provides runtime API for secure container verification
*/
#include <runtime/interface.h>
#include <config.h>
#include "common/securetrace.H"
#include <secureboot/service.H>
#include <secureboot/secure_reasoncodes.H>
#include <errl/errlmanager.H>
#include <runtime/rt_targeting.H>
#include <targeting/common/commontargeting.H>
#include <targeting/common/targetservice.H>
#include <devicefw/userif.H>
namespace SECUREBOOT
{
using namespace TARGETING;
#if defined(CONFIG_SECUREBOOT) && defined(__HOSTBOOT_RUNTIME)
bool enabled()
{
errlHndl_t l_errl = nullptr;
uint64_t l_regValue = 0;
size_t l_size = sizeof(l_regValue);
TargetService& tS = targetService();
Target* masterProcChipTargetHandle = nullptr;
do
{
l_errl = tS.queryMasterProcChipTargetHandle(
masterProcChipTargetHandle);
if (l_errl)
{
errlCommit(l_errl, SECURE_COMP_ID);
break;
}
l_errl = deviceRead(masterProcChipTargetHandle,
&l_regValue, l_size,
DEVICE_SCOM_ADDRESS(
static_cast<uint64_t>(ProcSecurity::SwitchRegister)));
if (l_errl)
{
errlCommit(l_errl, SECURE_COMP_ID);
break;
}
assert(l_size == sizeof(l_regValue));
} while (0);
// if there was an error l_regValue is zero, so we return false.
// Unfortunately this is all we can do. These shouldn't fail.
return l_regValue & static_cast<uint64_t>(ProcSecurity::SabBit);
}
#endif
#ifdef __HOSTBOOT_RUNTIME
bool allowAttrOverrides()
{
bool retVal = false;
if (enabled())
{
// Check attribute to see if overrides are allowed in secure mode
TARGETING::TargetService& tS = TARGETING::targetService();
TARGETING::Target* sys = nullptr;
(void) tS.getTopLevelTarget( sys );
assert(sys, "SECUREBOOT::allowAttrOverrides() system target is NULL");
retVal = sys->getAttr<
TARGETING::ATTR_ALLOW_ATTR_OVERRIDES_IN_SECURE_MODE>();
SB_INF("SECUREBOOT::allowAttrOverrides: Inside Attr check: retVal=0x%X",
retVal);
}
else
{
// Allow Attribute Overrides in unsecure mode
retVal = true;
}
return retVal;
}
#endif
int verify_container(
const void* i_pContainer,
const void* i_pHwKeyHash,
const size_t i_hwKeyHashSize)
{
int rc = 0;
SB_ENTER(
"verify_container: "
"container ptr = %p, "
"HW keys' hash ptr = %p, "
"HW keys' hash size = %d",
i_pContainer,i_pHwKeyHash,i_hwKeyHashSize);
// TODO: RTC 156485
// Implement guts of verify_container
SB_EXIT(
"verify_container: rc = %d",rc);
return rc;
}
struct registerSecurebootRt
{
registerSecurebootRt()
{
auto pRtIntf = getRuntimeInterfaces();
#ifdef CONFIG_SECUREBOOT
pRtIntf->verify_container = &verify_container;
#else
pRtIntf->verify_container = nullptr;
#endif
}
};
registerSecurebootRt g_registerSecurebootRt;
} // end of SECUREBOOT namespace
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