diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'freed-ora/tags/f16/3.3.2-5.fc16.gnu/fcaps-clear-the-same-personality-flags-as-suid-when-.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | freed-ora/tags/f16/3.3.2-5.fc16.gnu/fcaps-clear-the-same-personality-flags-as-suid-when-.patch | 38 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/freed-ora/tags/f16/3.3.2-5.fc16.gnu/fcaps-clear-the-same-personality-flags-as-suid-when-.patch b/freed-ora/tags/f16/3.3.2-5.fc16.gnu/fcaps-clear-the-same-personality-flags-as-suid-when-.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1cf2ac208 --- /dev/null +++ b/freed-ora/tags/f16/3.3.2-5.fc16.gnu/fcaps-clear-the-same-personality-flags-as-suid-when-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2012 16:26:54 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps + are used + +If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous +personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared. +Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space +randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it +easier to attack. + +Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> +Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> +--- + security/commoncap.c | 5 +++++ + 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c +index 0cf4b53..0ecf4ba 100644 +--- a/security/commoncap.c ++++ b/security/commoncap.c +@@ -505,6 +505,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) + } + skip: + ++ /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ ++ if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) ++ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; ++ ++ + /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised + * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit + */ +-- +1.7.7.6 + |
