3.14.25-100.fc19.gnu

9 files changed, 15 insertions, 742 deletions

diff --git a/freed-ora/current/f19/KVM-x86-Don-t-report-guest-userspace-emulation-error.patch b/freed-ora/current/f19/KVM-x86-Don-t-report-guest-userspace-emulation-error.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3f0270c8f..000000000
--- a/freed-ora/current/f19/KVM-x86-Don-t-report-guest-userspace-emulation-error.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From eeb55bed9ae80e1e860a1451986ce2ee0e5e52a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
-Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 02:50:50 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to
- userspace
-
-Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
-user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
-userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
-The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
-the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
-
-This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
-reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
-
-Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
----
- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-index 9d292e8372d6..d6aeccf116fa 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-@@ -5002,7 +5002,7 @@ static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
- 
- 	++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation_fail;
- 	trace_kvm_emulate_insn_failed(vcpu);
--	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
-+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) && kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 0) {
- 		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
- 		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
--- 
-1.9.3
-
diff --git a/freed-ora/current/f19/kernel.spec b/freed-ora/current/f19/kernel.spec
index a04ee757a..c057646e7 100644
--- a/freed-ora/current/f19/kernel.spec
+++ b/freed-ora/current/f19/kernel.spec
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
 %if 0%{?released_kernel}
 
 # Do we have a -stable update to apply?
-%define stable_update 24
+%define stable_update 25
 # Is it a -stable RC?
 %define stable_rc 0
 # Set rpm version accordingly
@@ -819,21 +819,6 @@ Patch25111: 0002-ideapad-laptop-Change-Lenovo-Yoga-2-series-rfkill-ha.patch
 # CVE-2014-3690 rhbz 1153322 1155372
 Patch26060: x86-kvm-vmx-Preserve-CR4-across-VM-entry.patch
 
-#CVE-2014-3688 rhbz 1155745 1155751
-Patch26061: net-sctp-fix-skb_over_panic-when-receiving-malformed.patch
-
-#CVE-2014-3687 rhbz 1155731 1155738
-Patch26062: net-sctp-fix-panic-on-duplicate-ASCONF-chunks.patch
-
-#CVE-2014-3673 rhbz 1147850 1155727
-Patch26063: net-sctp-fix-remote-memory-pressure-from-excessive-q.patch
-
-#CVE-2014-7841 rhbz 1163087 1163095
-Patch26067: net-sctp-fix-NULL-pointer-dereference-in-af-from_add.patch
-
-#CVE-2014-7842 rhbz 1163762 1163767
-Patch26068: KVM-x86-Don-t-report-guest-userspace-emulation-error.patch
-
 # END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
 
 %endif
@@ -1595,21 +1580,6 @@ ApplyPatch 0002-ideapad-laptop-Change-Lenovo-Yoga-2-series-rfkill-ha.patch
 # CVE-2014-3690 rhbz 1153322 1155372
 ApplyPatch x86-kvm-vmx-Preserve-CR4-across-VM-entry.patch
 
-#CVE-2014-3688 rhbz 1155745 1155751
-ApplyPatch net-sctp-fix-skb_over_panic-when-receiving-malformed.patch
-
-#CVE-2014-3687 rhbz 1155731 1155738
-ApplyPatch net-sctp-fix-panic-on-duplicate-ASCONF-chunks.patch
-
-#CVE-2014-3673 rhbz 1147850 1155727
-ApplyPatch net-sctp-fix-remote-memory-pressure-from-excessive-q.patch
-
-#CVE-2014-7841 rhbz 1163087 1163095
-ApplyPatch net-sctp-fix-NULL-pointer-dereference-in-af-from_add.patch
-
-#CVE-2014-7842 rhbz 1163762 1163767
-ApplyPatch KVM-x86-Don-t-report-guest-userspace-emulation-error.patch
-
 # END OF PATCH APPLICATIONS
 
 %endif
@@ -2433,6 +2403,12 @@ fi
 # and build.
 
 %changelog
+* Sat Nov 22 2014 Alexandre Oliva <lxoliva@fsfla.org> -libre
+- GNU Linux-libre 3.14.25-gnu.
+
+* Fri Nov 21 2014 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> - 3.14.25-100
+- Linux v3.14.25
+
 * Sat Nov 15 2014 Alexandre Oliva <lxoliva@fsfla.org> -libre
 - GNU Linux-libre 3.14.24-gnu.
 
diff --git a/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-NULL-pointer-dereference-in-af-from_add.patch b/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-NULL-pointer-dereference-in-af-from_add.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 34dae532b..000000000
--- a/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-NULL-pointer-dereference-in-af-from_add.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 17:54:26 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in
- af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
-
-An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
-in the form of:
-
-  ------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
-
-While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
-in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
-inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
-IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
-parameter.
-
-So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
-or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
-and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
-dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
-
-The trace for the log:
-
-BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
-IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
-PGD 0
-Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
-[...]
-Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
-RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>]  [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
-[...]
-Call Trace:
- <IRQ>
- [<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
- [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
- [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
- [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
- [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
-[...]
-
-A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
-other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
-possibly return with NULL.
-
-Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
-Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
-Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
-Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
----
- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
-index ab734be8cb20..9f32741abb1c 100644
---- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
-+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
-@@ -2609,6 +2609,9 @@ do_addr_param:
- 		addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
- 
- 		af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
-+		if (af == NULL)
-+			break;
-+
- 		af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param,
- 				    htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
- 
--- 
-1.9.3
-
diff --git a/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-panic-on-duplicate-ASCONF-chunks.patch b/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-panic-on-duplicate-ASCONF-chunks.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 815ea7d17..000000000
--- a/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-panic-on-duplicate-ASCONF-chunks.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 22:55:32 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] net: sctp: fix panic on duplicate ASCONF chunks
-
-Upstream commit b69040d8e39f20d5215a03502a8e8b4c6ab78395 CVE-2014-3687
-
-When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
-form of ...
-
-  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
-  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
-  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
-  ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
-
-... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
-need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
-
-The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
-ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
-same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
-not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
-idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
-and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
-
-Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
-is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
-
-While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
-!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
-we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
-ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
-queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
-changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
-chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
-this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
-
-Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
-continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
-we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
-do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
-the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
-another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
-with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
-crashing the kernel.
-
-Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
-that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
-queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
-but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
-before transmission.
-
-Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
-
-Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
-Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
----
- include/net/sctp/sctp.h | 5 +++++
- net/sctp/associola.c    | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/include/net/sctp/sctp.h b/include/net/sctp/sctp.h
-index 9fbd856e6713..856f01cb51dd 100644
---- a/include/net/sctp/sctp.h
-+++ b/include/net/sctp/sctp.h
-@@ -426,6 +426,11 @@ static inline void sctp_assoc_pending_pmtu(struct sock *sk, struct sctp_associat
- 	asoc->pmtu_pending = 0;
- }
- 
-+static inline bool sctp_chunk_pending(const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
-+{
-+	return !list_empty(&chunk->list);
-+}
-+
- /* Walk through a list of TLV parameters.  Don't trust the
-  * individual parameter lengths and instead depend on
-  * the chunk length to indicate when to stop.  Make sure
-diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
-index a88b8524846e..f791edd64d6c 100644
---- a/net/sctp/associola.c
-+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
-@@ -1668,6 +1668,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(
- 	 * ack chunk whose serial number matches that of the request.
- 	 */
- 	list_for_each_entry(ack, &asoc->asconf_ack_list, transmitted_list) {
-+		if (sctp_chunk_pending(ack))
-+			continue;
- 		if (ack->subh.addip_hdr->serial == serial) {
- 			sctp_chunk_hold(ack);
- 			return ack;
--- 
-1.9.3
-
diff --git a/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-remote-memory-pressure-from-excessive-q.patch b/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-remote-memory-pressure-from-excessive-q.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a017be159..000000000
--- a/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-remote-memory-pressure-from-excessive-q.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 22:55:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
-
-Upstream commit 26b87c7881006311828bb0ab271a551a62dcceb4 CVE-2014-3688
-
-This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
-example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
-in the form of ...
-
-  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
-  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
-  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
-  ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
-  [...]
-  ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
-
-... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
-ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
-ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
-since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
-only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
-packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
-chunks which it eats up one by one.
-
-We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
-malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
-chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
-previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
-into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
-the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
-header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
-tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
-and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
-point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
-the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
-then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
-queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
-serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
-excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
-
-The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
-with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
-2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
-with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
-point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
-chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
-but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
-case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
-queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
-
-In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
-in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
-not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
-the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
-the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
-approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
-infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
-side-effect interpreter run.
-
-One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
-invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
-possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
-flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
-as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
-going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
-I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
-look good now.
-
-Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
-
-Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
-Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
----
- net/sctp/inqueue.c      | 33 +++++++--------------------------
- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c |  3 +++
- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/sctp/inqueue.c b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
-index 4de12afa13d4..7e8a16c77039 100644
---- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
-+++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
-@@ -140,18 +140,9 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue)
- 		} else {
- 			/* Nothing to do. Next chunk in the packet, please. */
- 			ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_end;
--
- 			/* Force chunk->skb->data to chunk->chunk_end.  */
--			skb_pull(chunk->skb,
--				 chunk->chunk_end - chunk->skb->data);
--
--			/* Verify that we have at least chunk headers
--			 * worth of buffer left.
--			 */
--			if (skb_headlen(chunk->skb) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) {
--				sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
--				chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL;
--			}
-+			skb_pull(chunk->skb, chunk->chunk_end - chunk->skb->data);
-+			/* We are guaranteed to pull a SCTP header. */
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-@@ -187,24 +178,14 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue)
- 	skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
- 	chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid.  */
- 
--	if (chunk->chunk_end < skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
-+	if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) <
-+	    skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
- 		/* This is not a singleton */
- 		chunk->singleton = 0;
- 	} else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
--		/* RFC 2960, Section 6.10  Bundling
--		 *
--		 * Partial chunks MUST NOT be placed in an SCTP packet.
--		 * If the receiver detects a partial chunk, it MUST drop
--		 * the chunk.
--		 *
--		 * Since the end of the chunk is past the end of our buffer
--		 * (which contains the whole packet, we can freely discard
--		 * the whole packet.
--		 */
--		sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
--		chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL;
--
--		return NULL;
-+		/* Discard inside state machine. */
-+		chunk->pdiscard = 1;
-+		chunk->chunk_end = skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb);
- 	} else {
- 		/* We are at the end of the packet, so mark the chunk
- 		 * in case we need to send a SACK.
-diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
-index bdea3dfbad31..3ee27b7704ff 100644
---- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
-+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
-@@ -170,6 +170,9 @@ sctp_chunk_length_valid(struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
- {
- 	__u16 chunk_length = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
- 
-+	/* Previously already marked? */
-+	if (unlikely(chunk->pdiscard))
-+		return 0;
- 	if (unlikely(chunk_length < required_length))
- 		return 0;
- 
--- 
-1.9.3
-
diff --git a/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-skb_over_panic-when-receiving-malformed.patch b/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-skb_over_panic-when-receiving-malformed.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cf42fdea7..000000000
--- a/freed-ora/current/f19/net-sctp-fix-skb_over_panic-when-receiving-malformed.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,341 +0,0 @@
-From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 22:55:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF
- chunks
-
-Upstream commit 9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74 CVE-2014-3673
-
-Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
-ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
-it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
-special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
-
-skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
- head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
- end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
- ------------[ cut here ]------------
-kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
-[...]
-Call Trace:
- <IRQ>
- [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
- [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
- [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
- [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
- [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
- [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
- [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
- [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
- [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
- [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
- [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
- [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
- [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
- [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
- [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
- [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
- [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
-
-This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
-connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
-example, ...
-
-  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
-  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
-  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
-  ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
-
-... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
-
-  1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
-  2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
-
-... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
-Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
-This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
-could be used just as well.
-
-The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
-parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
-up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
-sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
-WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
-
-In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
-sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
-address that is also the source address of the packet containing
-the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
-failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
-sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
-sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
-skb.
-
-When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
-with ...
-
-  length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
-  asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
-
-... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
-in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
-parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
-for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
-which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
-
-Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
-INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
-in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
-that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
-more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
-missized addresses.
-
-Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
-
-Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
-Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
-Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
----
- include/net/sctp/sm.h    |  6 +--
- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c  | 18 +--------
- 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/net/sctp/sm.h b/include/net/sctp/sm.h
-index 7f4eeb340a54..72a31db47ded 100644
---- a/include/net/sctp/sm.h
-+++ b/include/net/sctp/sm.h
-@@ -248,9 +248,9 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_update_ip(struct sctp_association *,
- 					      int, __be16);
- struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_set_prim(struct sctp_association *asoc,
- 					     union sctp_addr *addr);
--int sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
--		       struct sctp_paramhdr *param_hdr, void *chunk_end,
--		       struct sctp_paramhdr **errp);
-+bool sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-+			struct sctp_chunk *chunk, bool addr_param_needed,
-+			struct sctp_paramhdr **errp);
- struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
- 				       struct sctp_chunk *asconf);
- int sctp_process_asconf_ack(struct sctp_association *asoc,
-diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
-index ae0e616a7ca5..ab734be8cb20 100644
---- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
-+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
-@@ -3110,50 +3110,63 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
- 	return SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
- }
- 
--/* Verify the ASCONF packet before we process it.  */
--int sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
--		       struct sctp_paramhdr *param_hdr, void *chunk_end,
--		       struct sctp_paramhdr **errp) {
--	sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param;
-+/* Verify the ASCONF packet before we process it. */
-+bool sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-+			struct sctp_chunk *chunk, bool addr_param_needed,
-+			struct sctp_paramhdr **errp)
-+{
-+	sctp_addip_chunk_t *addip = (sctp_addip_chunk_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr;
- 	union sctp_params param;
--	int length, plen;
--
--	param.v = (sctp_paramhdr_t *) param_hdr;
--	while (param.v <= chunk_end - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) {
--		length = ntohs(param.p->length);
--		*errp = param.p;
-+	bool addr_param_seen = false;
- 
--		if (param.v > chunk_end - length ||
--		    length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
--			return 0;
-+	sctp_walk_params(param, addip, addip_hdr.params) {
-+		size_t length = ntohs(param.p->length);
- 
-+		*errp = param.p;
- 		switch (param.p->type) {
-+		case SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE:
-+			break;
-+		case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
-+			if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv4addr_param_t))
-+				return false;
-+			addr_param_seen = true;
-+			break;
-+		case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
-+			if (length != sizeof(sctp_ipv6addr_param_t))
-+				return false;
-+			addr_param_seen = true;
-+			break;
- 		case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
- 		case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:
- 		case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
--			asconf_param = (sctp_addip_param_t *)param.v;
--			plen = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
--			if (plen < sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t) +
--			    sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
--				return 0;
-+			/* In ASCONF chunks, these need to be first. */
-+			if (addr_param_needed && !addr_param_seen)
-+				return false;
-+			length = ntohs(param.addip->param_hdr.length);
-+			if (length < sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t) +
-+				     sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
-+				return false;
- 			break;
- 		case SCTP_PARAM_SUCCESS_REPORT:
- 		case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
- 			if (length != sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t))
--				return 0;
--
-+				return false;
- 			break;
- 		default:
--			break;
-+			/* This is unkown to us, reject! */
-+			return false;
- 		}
--
--		param.v += WORD_ROUND(length);
- 	}
- 
--	if (param.v != chunk_end)
--		return 0;
-+	/* Remaining sanity checks. */
-+	if (addr_param_needed && !addr_param_seen)
-+		return false;
-+	if (!addr_param_needed && addr_param_seen)
-+		return false;
-+	if (param.v != chunk->chunk_end)
-+		return false;
- 
--	return 1;
-+	return true;
- }
- 
- /* Process an incoming ASCONF chunk with the next expected serial no. and
-@@ -3162,16 +3175,17 @@ int sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
- struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
- 				       struct sctp_chunk *asconf)
- {
-+	sctp_addip_chunk_t *addip = (sctp_addip_chunk_t *) asconf->chunk_hdr;
-+	bool all_param_pass = true;
-+	union sctp_params param;
- 	sctp_addiphdr_t		*hdr;
- 	union sctp_addr_param	*addr_param;
- 	sctp_addip_param_t	*asconf_param;
- 	struct sctp_chunk	*asconf_ack;
--
- 	__be16	err_code;
- 	int	length = 0;
- 	int	chunk_len;
- 	__u32	serial;
--	int	all_param_pass = 1;
- 
- 	chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
- 	hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data;
-@@ -3199,9 +3213,14 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
- 		goto done;
- 
- 	/* Process the TLVs contained within the ASCONF chunk. */
--	while (chunk_len > 0) {
-+	sctp_walk_params(param, addip, addip_hdr.params) {
-+		/* Skip preceeding address parameters. */
-+		if (param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS ||
-+		    param.p->type == SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS)
-+			continue;
-+
- 		err_code = sctp_process_asconf_param(asoc, asconf,
--						     asconf_param);
-+						     param.addip);
- 		/* ADDIP 4.1 A7)
- 		 * If an error response is received for a TLV parameter,
- 		 * all TLVs with no response before the failed TLV are
-@@ -3209,28 +3228,20 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
- 		 * the failed response are considered unsuccessful unless
- 		 * a specific success indication is present for the parameter.
- 		 */
--		if (SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR != err_code)
--			all_param_pass = 0;
--
-+		if (err_code != SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR)
-+			all_param_pass = false;
- 		if (!all_param_pass)
--			sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack,
--						 asconf_param->crr_id, err_code,
--						 asconf_param);
-+			sctp_add_asconf_response(asconf_ack, param.addip->crr_id,
-+						 err_code, param.addip);
- 
- 		/* ADDIP 4.3 D11) When an endpoint receiving an ASCONF to add
- 		 * an IP address sends an 'Out of Resource' in its response, it
- 		 * MUST also fail any subsequent add or delete requests bundled
- 		 * in the ASCONF.
- 		 */
--		if (SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW == err_code)
-+		if (err_code == SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW)
- 			goto done;
--
--		/* Move to the next ASCONF param. */
--		length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
--		asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
--		chunk_len -= length;
- 	}
--
- done:
- 	asoc->peer.addip_serial++;
- 
-diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
-index c8f606324134..bdea3dfbad31 100644
---- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
-+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
-@@ -3591,9 +3591,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net,
- 	struct sctp_chunk	*asconf_ack = NULL;
- 	struct sctp_paramhdr	*err_param = NULL;
- 	sctp_addiphdr_t		*hdr;
--	union sctp_addr_param	*addr_param;
- 	__u32			serial;
--	int			length;
- 
- 	if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
- 		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
-@@ -3618,17 +3616,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net,
- 	hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)chunk->skb->data;
- 	serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
- 
--	addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)hdr->params;
--	length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
--	if (length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
--		return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
--			   (void *)addr_param, commands);
--
- 	/* Verify the ASCONF chunk before processing it. */
--	if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
--			    (sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
--			    (void *)chunk->chunk_end,
--			    &err_param))
-+	if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc, chunk, true, &err_param))
- 		return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
- 						  (void *)err_param, commands);
- 
-@@ -3745,10 +3734,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net,
- 	rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
- 
- 	/* Verify the ASCONF-ACK chunk before processing it. */
--	if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
--	    (sctp_paramhdr_t *)addip_hdr->params,
--	    (void *)asconf_ack->chunk_end,
--	    &err_param))
-+	if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc, asconf_ack, false, &err_param))
- 		return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
- 			   (void *)err_param, commands);
- 
--- 
-1.9.3
-
diff --git a/freed-ora/current/f19/patch-3.14-gnu-3.14.24-gnu.xz.sign b/freed-ora/current/f19/patch-3.14-gnu-3.14.24-gnu.xz.sign
deleted file mode 100644
index 884655044..000000000
--- a/freed-ora/current/f19/patch-3.14-gnu-3.14.24-gnu.xz.sign
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-Version: GnuPG v2
-
-iEYEABECAAYFAlRmmEQACgkQvLfPh359R6dNwACfUymkYqlqCJexsnIQluV92JRh
-cQ4AoKjEc9Y6lj1fjeF+VuN+UxkTyH4m
-=YaGK
------END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/freed-ora/current/f19/patch-3.14-gnu-3.14.25-gnu.xz.sign b/freed-ora/current/f19/patch-3.14-gnu-3.14.25-gnu.xz.sign
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..78e802d50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/freed-ora/current/f19/patch-3.14-gnu-3.14.25-gnu.xz.sign
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v2
+
+iEYEABECAAYFAlRwBlkACgkQvLfPh359R6dWEgCbBz8zZYI/JtdoyfXg8ic+KJkH
+r0AAnR3TleWYcaSxCHr1Z1QGW8nzdcYG
+=p2oY
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/freed-ora/current/f19/sources b/freed-ora/current/f19/sources
index 830be7c55..d7867fafc 100644
--- a/freed-ora/current/f19/sources
+++ b/freed-ora/current/f19/sources
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 c108ec52eeb2a9b9ddbb8d12496ff25f  linux-libre-3.14-gnu.tar.xz
-f7f316d788b9aadf95f66cc53fa250b3  patch-3.14-gnu-3.14.24-gnu.xz
+59534e128d353044e27b7f1a296836f6  patch-3.14-gnu-3.14.25-gnu.xz