bpf: Introduce BPF trampoline

Introduce BPF trampoline concept to allow kernel code to call into BPF programs
with practically zero overhead.  The trampoline generation logic is
architecture dependent.  It's converting native calling convention into BPF
calling convention.  BPF ISA is 64-bit (even on 32-bit architectures). The
registers R1 to R5 are used to pass arguments into BPF functions. The main BPF
program accepts only single argument "ctx" in R1. Whereas CPU native calling
convention is different. x86-64 is passing first 6 arguments in registers
and the rest on the stack. x86-32 is passing first 3 arguments in registers.
sparc64 is passing first 6 in registers. And so on.

The trampolines between BPF and kernel already exist.  BPF_CALL_x macros in
include/linux/filter.h statically compile trampolines from BPF into kernel
helpers. They convert up to five u64 arguments into kernel C pointers and
integers. On 64-bit architectures this BPF_to_kernel trampolines are nops. On
32-bit architecture they're meaningful.

The opposite job kernel_to_BPF trampolines is done by CAST_TO_U64 macros and
__bpf_trace_##call() shim functions in include/trace/bpf_probe.h. They convert
kernel function arguments into array of u64s that BPF program consumes via
R1=ctx pointer.

This patch set is doing the same job as __bpf_trace_##call() static
trampolines, but dynamically for any kernel function. There are ~22k global
kernel functions that are attachable via nop at function entry. The function
arguments and types are described in BTF.  The job of btf_distill_func_proto()
function is to extract useful information from BTF into "function model" that
architecture dependent trampoline generators will use to generate assembly code
to cast kernel function arguments into array of u64s.  For example the kernel
function eth_type_trans has two pointers. They will be casted to u64 and stored
into stack of generated trampoline. The pointer to that stack space will be
passed into BPF program in R1. On x86-64 such generated trampoline will consume
16 bytes of stack and two stores of %rdi and %rsi into stack. The verifier will
make sure that only two u64 are accessed read-only by BPF program. The verifier
will also recognize the precise type of the pointers being accessed and will
not allow typecasting of the pointer to a different type within BPF program.

The tracing use case in the datacenter demonstrated that certain key kernel
functions have (like tcp_retransmit_skb) have 2 or more kprobes that are always
active.  Other functions have both kprobe and kretprobe.  So it is essential to
keep both kernel code and BPF programs executing at maximum speed. Hence
generated BPF trampoline is re-generated every time new program is attached or
detached to maintain maximum performance.

To avoid the high cost of retpoline the attached BPF programs are called
directly. __bpf_prog_enter/exit() are used to support per-program execution
stats.  In the future this logic will be optimized further by adding support
for bpf_stats_enabled_key inside generated assembly code. Introduction of
preemptible and sleepable BPF programs will completely remove the need to call
to __bpf_prog_enter/exit().

Detach of a BPF program from the trampoline should not fail. To avoid memory
allocation in detach path the half of the page is used as a reserve and flipped
after each attach/detach. 2k bytes is enough to call 40+ BPF programs directly
which is enough for BPF tracing use cases. This limit can be increased in the
future.

BPF_TRACE_FENTRY programs have access to raw kernel function arguments while
BPF_TRACE_FEXIT programs have access to kernel return value as well. Often
kprobe BPF program remembers function arguments in a map while kretprobe
fetches arguments from a map and analyzes them together with return value.
BPF_TRACE_FEXIT accelerates this typical use case.

Recursion prevention for kprobe BPF programs is done via per-cpu
bpf_prog_active counter. In practice that turned out to be a mistake. It
caused programs to randomly skip execution. The tracing tools missed results
they were looking for. Hence BPF trampoline doesn't provide builtin recursion
prevention. It's a job of BPF program itself and will be addressed in the
follow up patches.

BPF trampoline is intended to be used beyond tracing and fentry/fexit use cases
in the future. For example to remove retpoline cost from XDP programs.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-5-ast@kernel.org

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/Makefile
index e1d9adb212f9..3f671bf617e8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/bpf/Makefile
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += syscall.o verifier.o inode.o helpers.o tnum.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += hashtab.o arraymap.o percpu_freelist.o bpf_lru_list.o lpm_trie.o map_in_map.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += local_storage.o queue_stack_maps.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += disasm.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_JIT) += trampoline.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += btf.o
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_NET),y)
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += devmap.o