diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/digsig.c | 30 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 22 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 21 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/integrity.h | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/big_key.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/key.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyring.c | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 177 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 42 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 62 |
18 files changed, 265 insertions, 197 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 77ca965ab684..b4af4ebc5be2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -13,9 +13,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include <linux/err.h> -#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/rbtree.h> -#include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <linux/digsig.h> @@ -23,19 +21,11 @@ static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX]; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING -static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { - ".evm", - ".module", - ".ima", -}; -#else static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { "_evm", "_module", "_ima", }; -#endif int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen) @@ -45,7 +35,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, if (!keyring[id]) { keyring[id] = - request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL); + request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) { int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]); pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err); @@ -66,21 +56,3 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } - -int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) -{ - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - const struct user_struct *user = cred->user; - - keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0), - KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, - ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | - KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, user->uid_keyring); - if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id])) - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags); - else - pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%ld)\n", - keyring_name[id], PTR_ERR(keyring[id])); - return 0; -} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index dad8d4ca2437..81a27971d884 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -123,11 +123,3 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE For more information on integrity appraisal refer to: <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net> If unsure, say N. - -config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING - bool "Require all keys on the _ima keyring be signed" - depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING - default y - help - This option requires that all keys added to the _ima - keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index bf03c6a16cc8..0356e1d437ca 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ #include "../integrity.h" -enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; +enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN, + IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */ @@ -97,7 +98,8 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, const char *op, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename); int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash); -int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields, +int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, + struct ima_template_desc *desc, int num_fields, struct ima_digest_data *hash); int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash); void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, @@ -146,6 +148,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry); int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename); +void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf); /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 0e7540863fc2..c38bbce8c6a6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -22,6 +22,19 @@ #include "ima.h" /* + * ima_free_template_entry - free an existing template entry + */ +void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < entry->template_desc->num_fields; i++) + kfree(entry->template_data[i].data); + + kfree(entry); +} + +/* * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry */ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -37,6 +50,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (!*entry) return -ENOMEM; + (*entry)->template_desc = template_desc; for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) { struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i]; u32 len; @@ -51,10 +65,9 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, (*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len); (*entry)->template_data_len += len; } - (*entry)->template_desc = template_desc; return 0; out: - kfree(*entry); + ima_free_template_entry(*entry); *entry = NULL; return result; } @@ -94,6 +107,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, /* this function uses default algo */ hash.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; result = ima_calc_field_array_hash(&entry->template_data[0], + entry->template_desc, num_fields, &hash.hdr); if (result < 0) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, @@ -133,7 +147,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, } result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename); if (result < 0) - kfree(entry); + ima_free_template_entry(entry); err_out: integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, op, cause, result, 0); @@ -268,7 +282,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (!result || result == -EEXIST) iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; if (result < 0) - kfree(entry); + ima_free_template_entry(entry); } void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 46353ee517f6..734e9468aca0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -381,14 +381,3 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) } return result; } - -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING -static int __init init_ima_keyring(void) -{ - int ret; - - ret = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); - return 0; -} -late_initcall(init_ima_keyring); -#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 676e0292dfec..fdf60def52e9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) * Calculate the hash of template data */ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data, + struct ima_template_desc *td, int num_fields, struct ima_digest_data *hash, struct crypto_shash *tfm) @@ -160,9 +161,13 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data, return rc; for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) { - rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, - (const u8 *) &field_data[i].len, - sizeof(field_data[i].len)); + if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { + rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, + (const u8 *) &field_data[i].len, + sizeof(field_data[i].len)); + if (rc) + break; + } rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data, field_data[i].len); if (rc) @@ -175,7 +180,8 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data, return rc; } -int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields, +int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, + struct ima_template_desc *desc, int num_fields, struct ima_digest_data *hash) { struct crypto_shash *tfm; @@ -185,7 +191,8 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, int num_fields, if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); - rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, num_fields, hash, tfm); + rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, desc, num_fields, + hash, tfm); ima_free_tfm(tfm); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index d47a7c86a21d..db01125926bd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) struct ima_template_entry *e; int namelen; u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; + bool is_ima_template = false; int i; /* get entry */ @@ -145,14 +146,21 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen); /* 5th: template length (except for 'ima' template) */ - if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) + if (strcmp(e->template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) + is_ima_template = true; + + if (!is_ima_template) ima_putc(m, &e->template_data_len, sizeof(e->template_data_len)); /* 6th: template specific data */ for (i = 0; i < e->template_desc->num_fields; i++) { - e->template_desc->fields[i]->field_show(m, IMA_SHOW_BINARY, - &e->template_data[i]); + enum ima_show_type show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY; + struct ima_template_field *field = e->template_desc->fields[i]; + + if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0) + show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN; + field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]); } return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 15f34bd40abe..37122768554a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr); if (result < 0) { audit_cause = "hashing_error"; - kfree(entry); goto err_out; } } @@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, boot_aggregate_name); if (result < 0) - kfree(entry); + ima_free_template_entry(entry); return; err_out: integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 4e5da990630b..635695f6a185 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static struct ima_template_field *lookup_template_field(const char *field_id) return NULL; } -static int template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt) +static int template_fmt_size(const char *template_fmt) { char c; int template_fmt_len = strlen(template_fmt); @@ -106,22 +106,29 @@ static int template_fmt_size(char *template_fmt) return j + 1; } -static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt, +static int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt, struct ima_template_field ***fields, int *num_fields) { - char *c, *template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt; + char *c, *template_fmt_copy, *template_fmt_ptr; int template_num_fields = template_fmt_size(template_fmt); int i, result = 0; if (template_num_fields > IMA_TEMPLATE_NUM_FIELDS_MAX) return -EINVAL; + /* copying is needed as strsep() modifies the original buffer */ + template_fmt_copy = kstrdup(template_fmt, GFP_KERNEL); + if (template_fmt_copy == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + *fields = kzalloc(template_num_fields * sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL); if (*fields == NULL) { result = -ENOMEM; goto out; } + + template_fmt_ptr = template_fmt_copy; for (i = 0; (c = strsep(&template_fmt_ptr, "|")) != NULL && i < template_num_fields; i++) { struct ima_template_field *f = lookup_template_field(c); @@ -133,10 +140,12 @@ static int template_desc_init_fields(char *template_fmt, (*fields)[i] = f; } *num_fields = i; - return 0; out: - kfree(*fields); - *fields = NULL; + if (result < 0) { + kfree(*fields); + *fields = NULL; + } + kfree(template_fmt_copy); return result; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 6d66ad6ed265..c38adcc910fb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -109,9 +109,12 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m, enum data_formats datafmt, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { - ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32)); + if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN) + ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32)); + if (!field_data->len) return; + ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len); } @@ -125,6 +128,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m, ima_show_template_data_ascii(m, show, datafmt, field_data); break; case IMA_SHOW_BINARY: + case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN: ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data); break; default: diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index b9e7c133734a..2fb5e53e927f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -137,19 +137,12 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *data, int datalen); - -int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id); #else static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } - -static int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) -{ - return 0; -} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index 7f44c3207a9b..8137b27d641d 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) * * TODO: Encrypt the stored data with a temporary key. */ - file = shmem_file_setup("", datalen, 0); + file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", datalen, 0); if (IS_ERR(file)) { ret = PTR_ERR(file); goto err_quota; diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 55d110f0aced..6e21c11e48bc 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, } /* allocate and initialise the key and its description */ - key = kmem_cache_alloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL); + key = kmem_cache_zalloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key) goto no_memory_2; @@ -293,18 +293,12 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, key->uid = uid; key->gid = gid; key->perm = perm; - key->flags = 0; - key->expiry = 0; - key->payload.data = NULL; - key->security = NULL; if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA; if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED) key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED; - memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data)); - #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC; #endif diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 69f0cb7bab7e..d46cbc5e335e 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static u64 mult_64x32_and_fold(u64 x, u32 y) static unsigned long hash_key_type_and_desc(const struct keyring_index_key *index_key) { const unsigned level_shift = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP; - const unsigned long level_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK; + const unsigned long fan_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK; const char *description = index_key->description; unsigned long hash, type; u32 piece; @@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ static unsigned long hash_key_type_and_desc(const struct keyring_index_key *inde * ordinary keys by making sure the lowest level segment in the hash is * zero for keyrings and non-zero otherwise. */ - if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) == 0) + if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & fan_mask) == 0) return hash | (hash >> (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - level_shift)) | 1; - if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) != 0) - return (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~level_mask; + if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & fan_mask) != 0) + return (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~fan_mask; return hash; } @@ -279,12 +279,11 @@ static bool keyring_compare_object(const void *object, const void *data) * Compare the index keys of a pair of objects and determine the bit position * at which they differ - if they differ. */ -static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *_a, const void *_b) +static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *object, const void *data) { - const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(_a); - const struct key *key_b = keyring_ptr_to_key(_b); + const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); const struct keyring_index_key *a = &key_a->index_key; - const struct keyring_index_key *b = &key_b->index_key; + const struct keyring_index_key *b = data; unsigned long seg_a, seg_b; int level, i; @@ -691,8 +690,8 @@ descend_to_node: smp_read_barrier_depends(); ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node); BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)); - node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr); } + node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr); begin_node: kdebug("begin_node"); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 794c3ca49eac..419491d8e7d2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ +#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -95,10 +96,6 @@ #include "audit.h" #include "avc_ss.h" -#define SB_TYPE_FMT "%s%s%s" -#define SB_SUBTYPE(sb) (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0]) -#define SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb) sb->s_type->name, SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? "." : "", SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? sb->s_subtype : "" - extern struct security_operations *security_ops; /* SECMARK reference count */ @@ -413,8 +410,8 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") has no " - "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " + "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; } @@ -422,22 +419,22 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " - SB_TYPE_FMT") has no security xattr handler\n", - sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); + "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", + sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); else printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " - SB_TYPE_FMT") getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, - SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), -rc); + "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, + sb->s_type->name, -rc); goto out; } } if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), unknown behavior\n", - sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", + sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); else - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), %s\n", - sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), + printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", + sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; @@ -600,6 +597,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int rc = 0, i; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; + const char *name = sb->s_type->name; struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; @@ -658,8 +656,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" - "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n", - mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc); + "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", + mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); goto out; } switch (flags[i]) { @@ -806,8 +804,7 @@ out: out_double_mount: rc = -EINVAL; printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " - "security settings for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id, - SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); + "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name); goto out; } @@ -2480,8 +2477,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" - "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n", - mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc); + "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", + mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); goto out_free_opts; } rc = -EINVAL; @@ -2519,8 +2516,8 @@ out_free_secdata: return rc; out_bad_option: printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options " - "during remount (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id, - SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb)); + "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, + sb->s_type->name); goto out_free_opts; } @@ -3828,7 +3825,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) u32 nlbl_sid; u32 nlbl_type; - err = selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); + err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); @@ -3846,6 +3843,30 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) return 0; } +/** + * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection + * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID + * @skb_sid: the packet's SID + * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID + * + * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is + * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create + * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy + * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) +{ + int err = 0; + + if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) + err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); + else + *conn_sid = sk_sid; + + return err; +} + /* socket security operations */ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, @@ -4452,7 +4473,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; u16 family = sk->sk_family; - u32 newsid; + u32 connsid; u32 peersid; /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ @@ -4462,16 +4483,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); if (err) return err; - if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { - req->secid = sksec->sid; - req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; - } else { - err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid); - if (err) - return err; - req->secid = newsid; - req->peer_secid = peersid; - } + err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid); + if (err) + return err; + req->secid = connsid; + req->peer_secid = peersid; return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); } @@ -4731,6 +4747,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { + struct sock *sk; u32 sid; if (!netlbl_enabled()) @@ -4739,8 +4756,27 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ - if (skb->sk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security; + sk = skb->sk; + if (sk) { + struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) + /* if the socket is the listening state then this + * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to + * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and + * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't + * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on + * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent. + * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is + * as any IP option based labeling should be copied + * from the initial connection request (in the IP + * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a + * security label in the packet itself this is the + * best we can do. */ + return NF_ACCEPT; + + /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ + sksec = sk->sk_security; sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; @@ -4810,27 +4846,36 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); + + secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); + peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); + if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + sk = skb->sk; + #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks * when the packet is on it's final way out. * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst - * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */ - if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL) + * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. + * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the + * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing + * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do; + * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per + * connection. */ + if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL && + !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) return NF_ACCEPT; #endif - secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); - peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); - if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) - return NF_ACCEPT; - /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the - * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local - * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label - * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */ - sk = skb->sk; if (sk == NULL) { + /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming + * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet + * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded + * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */ if (skb->skb_iif) { secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) @@ -4839,7 +4884,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } + } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { + /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the + * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In + * this particular case the correct security label is assigned + * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't + * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent + * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only + * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in + * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output() + * for similar problems. */ + u32 skb_sid; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL + * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM + * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final" + * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied + * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely + * pass the packet. */ + if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) { + switch (family) { + case PF_INET: + if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) + return NF_ACCEPT; + break; + case PF_INET6: + if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) + return NF_ACCEPT; + default: + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); + } + } + if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } else { + /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the + * associated socket. */ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 0dec76c64cf5..48c3cc94c168 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto); int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); +int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid); static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) { @@ -79,11 +80,12 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) { } -#endif -static inline int selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) { - return selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0); + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + return 0; } +#endif #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index ee470a0b5c27..d106733ad987 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2334,50 +2334,16 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb) struct ocontext *c; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name; - const char *subtype = (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0]) ? sb->s_subtype : NULL; - struct ocontext *base = NULL; read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - for (c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; c; c = c->next) { - char *sub; - int baselen; - - baselen = strlen(fstype); - - /* if base does not match, this is not the one */ - if (strncmp(fstype, c->u.name, baselen)) - continue; - - /* if there is no subtype, this is the one! */ - if (!subtype) - break; - - /* skip past the base in this entry */ - sub = c->u.name + baselen; - - /* entry is only a base. save it. keep looking for subtype */ - if (sub[0] == '\0') { - base = c; - continue; - } - - /* entry is not followed by a subtype, so it is not a match */ - if (sub[0] != '.') - continue; - - /* whew, we found a subtype of this fstype */ - sub++; /* move past '.' */ - - /* exact match of fstype AND subtype */ - if (!strcmp(subtype, sub)) + c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; + while (c) { + if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0) break; + c = c->next; } - /* in case we had found an fstype match but no subtype match */ - if (!c) - c = base; - if (c) { sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior; if (!c->sid[0]) { diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index a91d205ec0c6..0462cb3ff0a7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -209,19 +209,26 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, NULL) ? 0 : 1); } -/* - * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the - * incoming packet. - */ -int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) +static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb) { - u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL; - struct sec_path *sp; + struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); + struct xfrm_state *x; - if (skb == NULL) - goto out; + if (dst == NULL) + return SECSID_NULL; + x = dst->xfrm; + if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + return SECSID_NULL; + + return x->security->ctx_sid; +} + +static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb, + u32 *sid, int ckall) +{ + u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL; + struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp; - sp = skb->sp; if (sp) { int i; @@ -248,6 +255,30 @@ out: } /* + * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the + * incoming packet. + */ +int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall) +{ + if (skb == NULL) { + *sid = SECSID_NULL; + return 0; + } + return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall); +} + +int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) +{ + int rc; + + rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0); + if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL) + *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb); + + return rc; +} + +/* * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy. */ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, @@ -327,19 +358,22 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, return rc; ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!ctx) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; ctx->ctx_sid = secid; ctx->ctx_len = str_len; memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len); - kfree(ctx_str); x->security = ctx; atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); - return 0; +out: + kfree(ctx_str); + return rc; } /* |
