diff options
33 files changed, 422 insertions, 350 deletions
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 5720854156db..5eccdcea2d1b 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop); - error = security_dentry_open(f, cred); + error = security_file_open(f, cred); if (error) goto cleanup_all; diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index fad48aab893b..1cc89e9df480 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ struct common_audit_data { #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD 8 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE 9 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY 10 - struct task_struct *tsk; union { struct path path; struct dentry *dentry; @@ -93,11 +92,6 @@ int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto); -/* Initialize an LSM audit data structure. */ -#define COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d, _t) \ - { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct common_audit_data)); \ - (_d)->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; } - void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a, void (*pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *), void (*post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 6e1dea93907a..ab0e091ce5fa 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -640,10 +640,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. * @file contains the file structure being received. * Return 0 if permission is granted. - * - * Security hook for dentry - * - * @dentry_open + * @file_open * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed * since inode_permission. @@ -1498,7 +1495,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*file_send_sigiotask) (struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); int (*file_receive) (struct file *file); - int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); + int (*file_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags); void (*task_free) (struct task_struct *task); @@ -1757,7 +1754,7 @@ int security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file); int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); int security_file_receive(struct file *file); -int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); +int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags); void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task); int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); @@ -2228,8 +2225,8 @@ static inline int security_file_receive(struct file *file) return 0; } -static inline int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, - const struct cred *cred) +static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file, + const struct cred *cred) { return 0; } diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index 7661576b6f45..596f125658f6 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <linux/cache.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <net/dst.h> +#include <net/flow.h> #include <net/xfrm.h> #include <net/ip.h> #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_STATISTICS diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index cc3520d39a78..3ae28db5a64f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = { static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) { struct common_audit_data *sa = ca; - struct task_struct *tsk = sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current; + struct task_struct *tsk = sa->aad->tsk ? sa->aad->tsk : current; if (aa_g_audit_header) { audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor="); @@ -149,6 +149,12 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) audit_log_format(ab, " name="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name); } + + if (sa->aad->tsk) { + audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm); + } + } /** @@ -205,7 +211,8 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) - (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current); + (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, + sa->aad->tsk ? sa->aad->tsk : current); if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) return complain_error(sa->aad->error); diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 088dba3bf7dc..887a5e948945 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task, int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, CAP); + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; sa.aad = &aad; - sa.tsk = task; sa.u.cap = cap; + sa.aad->tsk = task; sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE; sa.aad->error = error; diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 2f8fcba9ce4b..cf19d4093ca4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; sa.aad = &aad; aad.op = op, aad.fs.request = request; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index 3868b1e5d5ba..4b7e18951aea 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { void *profile; const char *name; const char *info; + struct task_struct *tsk; union { void *target; struct { diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index c3da93a5150d..cf1071b14232 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile, { struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; sa.aad = &aad; aad.op = OP_PTRACE; aad.target = target; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index e75829ba0ff9..7430298116d6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str) if (audit_enabled) { struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; sa.aad = &aad; aad.info = str; aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index ad05d391974d..032daab449b0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) AA_MAY_META_READ); } -static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, } else { struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; sa.aad = &aad; aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; aad.info = name; @@ -640,9 +640,9 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod, .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown, .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate, - .dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open, .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr, + .file_open = apparmor_file_open, .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission, .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security, .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security, diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 7f3f455d8eab..cf5fd220309b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info, { struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; sa.aad = &aad; aad.op = op; aad.name = name; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index deab7c7e8dc0..329b1fd30749 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name, struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; sa.aad = &aad; if (e) aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index 2fe8613efe33..e1f3d7ef2c54 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, struct common_audit_data sa; struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; sa.aad = &aad; aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT, aad.rlim.rlim = resource; diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 5bb21b1c448c..fca889676c5e 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static int cap_file_receive(struct file *file) return 0; } -static int cap_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int cap_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { return 0; } @@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_open); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank); diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c index 90c129b0102f..8d8d97dbb389 100644 --- a/security/lsm_audit.c +++ b/security/lsm_audit.c @@ -213,12 +213,15 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, { struct task_struct *tsk = current; - if (a->tsk) - tsk = a->tsk; - if (tsk && tsk->pid) { - audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm); - } + /* + * To keep stack sizes in check force programers to notice if they + * start making this union too large! See struct lsm_network_audit + * as an example of how to deal with large data. + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(a->u) > sizeof(void *)*2); + + audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm); switch (a->type) { case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE: diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index bf619ffc9a4d..5497a57fba01 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -701,11 +701,11 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file) return security_ops->file_receive(file); } -int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { int ret; - ret = security_ops->dentry_open(file, cred); + ret = security_ops->file_open(file, cred); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 8ee42b2a5f19..68d82daed257 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -65,14 +65,8 @@ struct avc_cache { }; struct avc_callback_node { - int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms, - u32 *out_retained); + int (*callback) (u32 event); u32 events; - u32 ssid; - u32 tsid; - u16 tclass; - u32 perms; struct avc_callback_node *next; }; @@ -436,9 +430,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", - ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->denied ? "denied" : "granted"); - avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tclass, - ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->audited); + ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted"); + avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass, + ad->selinux_audit_data->audited); audit_log_format(ab, " for "); } @@ -452,25 +446,23 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; audit_log_format(ab, " "); - avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->ssid, - ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tsid, - ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tclass); + avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass); } /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */ -static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, +noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags) { struct common_audit_data stack_data; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; - struct selinux_late_audit_data slad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad; if (!a) { a = &stack_data; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE); - a->selinux_audit_data = &sad; + a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; } /* @@ -484,104 +476,34 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)) return -ECHILD; - slad.tclass = tclass; - slad.requested = requested; - slad.ssid = ssid; - slad.tsid = tsid; - slad.audited = audited; - slad.denied = denied; + sad.tclass = tclass; + sad.requested = requested; + sad.ssid = ssid; + sad.tsid = tsid; + sad.audited = audited; + sad.denied = denied; + + a->selinux_audit_data = &sad; - a->selinux_audit_data->slad = &slad; common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback); return 0; } /** - * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. - * @ssid: source security identifier - * @tsid: target security identifier - * @tclass: target security class - * @requested: requested permissions - * @avd: access vector decisions - * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit - * @a: auxiliary audit data - * @flags: VFS walk flags - * - * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance - * with the policy. This function is typically called by - * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be - * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit() - * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing. - * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must - * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released - * before calling the auditing code. - */ -inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a, - unsigned flags) -{ - u32 denied, audited; - denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; - if (unlikely(denied)) { - audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; - /* - * a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in - * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if - * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that - * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the - * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets - * assume: - * - * denied == READ - * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule) - * selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 - * - * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied - * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for - * ACCESS - */ - if (a && - a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny && - !(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) - audited = 0; - } else if (result) - audited = denied = requested; - else - audited = requested & avd->auditallow; - if (likely(!audited)) - return 0; - - return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, - requested, audited, denied, - a, flags); -} - -/** * avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events. * @callback: callback function * @events: security events - * @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD - * @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD - * @tclass: target security class - * @perms: permissions * - * Register a callback function for events in the set @events - * related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) - * and the permissions @perms, interpreting - * @perms based on @tclass. Returns %0 on success or - * -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback. + * Register a callback function for events in the set @events. + * Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory + * exists to add the callback. */ -int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms, - u32 *out_retained), - u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms) +int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events) { struct avc_callback_node *c; int rc = 0; - c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC); + c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL); if (!c) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -589,9 +511,6 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, c->callback = callback; c->events = events; - c->ssid = ssid; - c->tsid = tsid; - c->perms = perms; c->next = avc_callbacks; avc_callbacks = c; out: @@ -731,8 +650,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) { if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { - tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL); + tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); /* save the first error encountered for the return value and continue processing the callbacks */ if (!rc) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 0b06685787b9..fa2341b68331 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1420,16 +1420,13 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int cap, int audit) { struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct av_decision avd; u16 sclass; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); int rc; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.tsk = current; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; ad.u.cap = cap; switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { @@ -1488,20 +1485,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags); } -static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred, - struct inode *inode, - u32 perms, - unsigned flags) -{ - struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; - - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); - ad.u.inode = inode; - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags); -} - /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ @@ -1511,11 +1494,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); } @@ -1528,11 +1509,9 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, { struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); } @@ -1551,13 +1530,11 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = file->f_path; - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, @@ -1587,7 +1564,6 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; int rc; dsec = dir->i_security; @@ -1596,9 +1572,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, sid = tsec->sid; newsid = tsec->create_sid; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, @@ -1643,7 +1618,6 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, { struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int rc; @@ -1651,9 +1625,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, dsec = dir->i_security; isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; av = DIR__SEARCH; av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); @@ -1688,7 +1661,6 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, { struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; @@ -1699,8 +1671,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode); new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, @@ -1986,7 +1957,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; int rc; @@ -2032,8 +2002,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return rc; } - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path; if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) || @@ -2123,8 +2092,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { - struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; struct tty_struct *tty; struct fdtable *fdt; @@ -2136,21 +2103,17 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, spin_lock(&tty_files_lock); if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { struct tty_file_private *file_priv; - struct inode *inode; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. - Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather + Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct tty_file_private, list); file = file_priv->file; - inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, - FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) { + if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) drop_tty = 1; - } } spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock); tty_kref_put(tty); @@ -2160,10 +2123,6 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, no_tty(); /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ - - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - spin_lock(&files->file_lock); for (;;) { unsigned long set, i; @@ -2500,7 +2459,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; int rc; rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); @@ -2511,8 +2469,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) return 0; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); } @@ -2521,10 +2478,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); } @@ -2684,14 +2639,35 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); } +static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, + u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied, + unsigned flags) +{ + struct common_audit_data ad; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + int rc; + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; + ad.u.inode = inode; + + rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, + audited, denied, &ad, flags); + if (rc) + return rc; + return 0; +} + static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 perms; bool from_access; unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + u32 sid; + struct av_decision avd; + int rc, rc2; + u32 audited, denied; from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); @@ -2700,22 +2676,34 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (!mask) return 0; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.inode = inode; + validate_creds(cred); - if (from_access) - ad.selinux_audit_data->auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS; + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags); + sid = cred_sid(cred); + isec = inode->i_security; + + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); + audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, + from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, + &denied); + if (likely(!audited)) + return rc; + + rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags); + if (rc2) + return rc2; + return rc; } static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; + __u32 av = FILE__WRITE; /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { @@ -2729,7 +2717,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); - return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE); + if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) + av |= FILE__OPEN; + + return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); } static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) @@ -2771,7 +2762,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; @@ -2785,8 +2775,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) return -EPERM; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, @@ -2796,8 +2785,25 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid); if (rc == -EINVAL) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + struct audit_buffer *ab; + size_t audit_size; + const char *str; + + /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the + * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ + str = value; + if (str[size - 1] == '\0') + audit_size = size - 1; + else + audit_size = size; + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); + audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context="); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); + audit_log_end(ab); + return rc; + } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); } if (rc) @@ -2977,7 +2983,7 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno()) - /* No change since dentry_open check. */ + /* No change since file_open check. */ return 0; return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); @@ -3236,15 +3242,13 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } -static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; - struct inode *inode; struct inode_security_struct *isec; - inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; fsec = file->f_security; - isec = inode->i_security; + isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security; /* * Save inode label and policy sequence number * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission @@ -3262,7 +3266,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ - return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0); + return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ @@ -3381,12 +3385,10 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { u32 sid; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; sid = task_sid(current); - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD; ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, @@ -3759,15 +3761,13 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u32 tsid = task_sid(task); if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = sk; @@ -3847,7 +3847,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in char *addrp; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; @@ -3874,8 +3873,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in snum, &sid); if (err) goto out; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = family; @@ -3909,8 +3907,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in if (err) goto out; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = family; @@ -3945,7 +3942,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; @@ -3971,8 +3967,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ? TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; @@ -4064,12 +4059,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; int err; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other; @@ -4098,11 +4091,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; @@ -4140,12 +4131,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; @@ -4175,7 +4164,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; @@ -4200,8 +4188,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return 0; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; @@ -4539,7 +4526,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 secmark_active; u8 netlbl_active; @@ -4557,8 +4543,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; @@ -4648,7 +4633,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk = skb->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 proto; @@ -4657,8 +4641,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, return NF_ACCEPT; sksec = sk->sk_security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; @@ -4683,7 +4666,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u32 peer_sid; struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; @@ -4730,8 +4712,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; @@ -4849,13 +4830,11 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = ipc_perms->security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); @@ -4876,7 +4855,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -4886,8 +4864,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) isec = msq->q_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, @@ -4908,13 +4885,11 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = msq->q_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, @@ -4954,7 +4929,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -4975,8 +4949,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, return rc; } - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; /* Can this process write to the queue? */ @@ -5001,15 +4974,13 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = task_sid(target); int rc; isec = msq->q_perm.security; msec = msg->security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, @@ -5025,7 +4996,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -5035,8 +5005,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) isec = shp->shm_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, @@ -5057,13 +5026,11 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = shp->shm_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, @@ -5121,7 +5088,6 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -5131,8 +5097,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) isec = sma->sem_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, @@ -5153,13 +5118,11 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = sma->sem_perm.security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, @@ -5339,8 +5302,23 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, } error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + struct audit_buffer *ab; + size_t audit_size; + + /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the + * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ + if (str[size - 1] == '\0') + audit_size = size - 1; + else + audit_size = size; + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); + audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context="); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); + audit_log_end(ab); + return error; + } error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &sid); } @@ -5600,7 +5578,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask, .file_receive = selinux_file_receive, - .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open, + .file_open = selinux_file_open, .task_create = selinux_task_create, .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 1931370233d7..92d0ab561db8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct avc_cache_stats { /* * We only need this data after we have decided to send an audit message. */ -struct selinux_late_audit_data { +struct selinux_audit_data { u32 ssid; u32 tsid; u16 tclass; @@ -60,28 +60,86 @@ struct selinux_late_audit_data { }; /* - * We collect this at the beginning or during an selinux security operation - */ -struct selinux_audit_data { - /* - * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the - * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage. - */ - u32 auditdeny; - struct selinux_late_audit_data *slad; -}; - -/* * AVC operations */ void __init avc_init(void); -int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd, - int result, - struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags); +static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd, + int result, + u32 auditdeny, + u32 *deniedp) +{ + u32 denied, audited; + denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; + if (unlikely(denied)) { + audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; + /* + * auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in + * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if + * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that + * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the + * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets + * assume: + * + * denied == READ + * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule) + * auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 + * + * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied + * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for + * ACCESS + */ + if (auditdeny && !(auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) + audited = 0; + } else if (result) + audited = denied = requested; + else + audited = requested & avd->auditallow; + *deniedp = denied; + return audited; +} + +int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, + struct common_audit_data *a, + unsigned flags); + +/** + * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions. + * @ssid: source security identifier + * @tsid: target security identifier + * @tclass: target security class + * @requested: requested permissions + * @avd: access vector decisions + * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit + * @a: auxiliary audit data + * @flags: VFS walk flags + * + * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance + * with the policy. This function is typically called by + * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be + * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit() + * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing. + * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must + * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released + * before calling the auditing code. + */ +static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 requested, + struct av_decision *avd, + int result, + struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags) +{ + u32 audited, denied; + audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied); + if (likely(!audited)) + return 0; + return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, + requested, audited, denied, + a, flags); +} #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, @@ -112,11 +170,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void); #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64 #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128 -int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms, - u32 *out_retained), - u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 perms); +int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events); /* Exported to selinuxfs */ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index d871e8ad2103..dde2005407aa 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -31,13 +31,15 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY 24 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS 25 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS 26 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE #else -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE #endif /* Mask for just the mount related flags */ diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c index 326f22cbe405..47a49d1a6f6a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netif.c +++ b/security/selinux/netif.c @@ -252,8 +252,7 @@ static void sel_netif_flush(void) spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); } -static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netif_flush(); @@ -292,8 +291,7 @@ static __init int sel_netif_init(void) register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier); - err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); if (err) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err); diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c index 86365857c088..28f911cdd7c7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netnode.c +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c @@ -297,8 +297,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_flush(void) spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock); } -static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netnode_flush(); @@ -320,8 +319,7 @@ static __init int sel_netnode_init(void) sel_netnode_hash[iter].size = 0; } - ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); if (ret != 0) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret); diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c index 7b9eb1faf68b..d35379781c2c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netport.c +++ b/security/selinux/netport.c @@ -234,8 +234,7 @@ static void sel_netport_flush(void) spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock); } -static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netport_flush(); @@ -257,8 +256,7 @@ static __init int sel_netport_init(void) sel_netport_hash[iter].size = 0; } - ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); if (ret != 0) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index d7018bfa1f00..4e93f9ef970b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = { .read = sel_read_policy, .mmap = sel_mmap_policy, .release = sel_release_policy, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, @@ -1232,6 +1233,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void) kfree(bool_pending_names[i]); kfree(bool_pending_names); kfree(bool_pending_values); + bool_num = 0; bool_pending_names = NULL; bool_pending_values = NULL; @@ -1532,11 +1534,6 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir) return 0; } -static inline unsigned int sel_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) -{ - return a / b - (a % b < 0); -} - static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class) { return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET; @@ -1544,7 +1541,7 @@ static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class) static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino) { - return sel_div(ino & SEL_INO_MASK, SEL_VEC_MAX + 1); + return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) / (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1); } static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm) @@ -1831,7 +1828,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO}, [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO}, [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO}, - [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUSR}, + [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO}, /* last one */ {""} }; ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h index 45e8fb0515f8..212e3479a0d9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h @@ -74,6 +74,26 @@ out: return rc; } +/* + * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'. + */ +static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, struct context *src) +{ + int rc; + + dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[1].sens; + rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat); + if (rc) + goto out; + + dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens; + rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat); + if (rc) + ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat); +out: + return rc; +} + static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2) { return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) && diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index fbf9c5816c71..40de8d3f208e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -517,6 +517,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, { struct range_trans rtr; struct mls_range *r; + struct class_datum *cladatum; + int default_range = 0; if (!policydb.mls_enabled) return 0; @@ -530,6 +532,28 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, r = hashtab_search(policydb.range_tr, &rtr); if (r) return mls_range_set(newcontext, r); + + if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) { + cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; + if (cladatum) + default_range = cladatum->default_range; + } + + switch (default_range) { + case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW: + return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext); + case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH: + return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext); + case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH: + return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext); + case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW: + return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext); + case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH: + return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext); + case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH: + return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext); + } + /* Fallthrough */ case AVTAB_CHANGE: if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index a7f61d52f05c..9cd9b7c661ec 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = { .sym_num = SYM_NUM, .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, }; static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) @@ -1306,6 +1316,23 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) goto bad; } + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) { + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3); + if (rc) + goto bad; + + cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]); + } + + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) { + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1); + if (rc) + goto bad; + cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + } + rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, cladatum); if (rc) goto bad; @@ -2832,6 +2859,23 @@ static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr) if (rc) return rc; + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) { + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_user); + buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_role); + buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_range); + + rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 3, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) { + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_type); + rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + return 0; } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index b846c0387180..da637471d4ce 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -60,6 +60,20 @@ struct class_datum { struct symtab permissions; /* class-specific permission symbol table */ struct constraint_node *constraints; /* constraints on class permissions */ struct constraint_node *validatetrans; /* special transition rules */ +/* Options how a new object user, role, and type should be decided */ +#define DEFAULT_SOURCE 1 +#define DEFAULT_TARGET 2 + char default_user; + char default_role; + char default_type; +/* Options how a new object range should be decided */ +#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW 1 +#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH 2 +#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH 3 +#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW 4 +#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH 5 +#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH 6 + char default_range; }; /* Role attributes */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 185f849a26f6..4321b8fc8863 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1018,9 +1018,11 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3 if (context->len) { *scontext_len = context->len; - *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!(*scontext)) - return -ENOMEM; + if (scontext) { + *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!(*scontext)) + return -ENOMEM; + } return 0; } @@ -1389,6 +1391,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, u32 *out_sid, bool kern) { + struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL; struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext; struct role_trans *roletr = NULL; struct avtab_key avkey; @@ -1437,12 +1440,20 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, goto out_unlock; } + if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) + cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; + /* Set the user identity. */ switch (specified) { case AVTAB_TRANSITION: case AVTAB_CHANGE: - /* Use the process user identity. */ - newcontext.user = scontext->user; + if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) { + newcontext.user = tcontext->user; + } else { + /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */ + /* Use the process user identity. */ + newcontext.user = scontext->user; + } break; case AVTAB_MEMBER: /* Use the related object owner. */ @@ -1450,16 +1461,31 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, break; } - /* Set the role and type to default values. */ - if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) { - /* Use the current role and type of process. */ + /* Set the role to default values. */ + if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) { newcontext.role = scontext->role; - newcontext.type = scontext->type; + } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) { + newcontext.role = tcontext->role; } else { - /* Use the well-defined object role. */ - newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL; - /* Use the type of the related object. */ + if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) + newcontext.role = scontext->role; + else + newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL; + } + + /* Set the type to default values. */ + if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) { + newcontext.type = scontext->type; + } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) { newcontext.type = tcontext->type; + } else { + if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) { + /* Use the type of process. */ + newcontext.type = scontext->type; + } else { + /* Use the type of the related object. */ + newcontext.type = tcontext->type; + } } /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */ @@ -3018,8 +3044,7 @@ out: static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules; -static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event) { int err = 0; @@ -3032,8 +3057,7 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void) { int err; - err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, - SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); if (err) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err); diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 5e031a2e4c36..cc361b8f3d13 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func, char type) { - memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a)); + memset(&a->sad, 0, sizeof(a->sad)); a->a.type = type; a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad; a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 952b1f41fc78..d583c0545808 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) } /** - * smack_dentry_open - Smack dentry open processing + * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing * @file: the object * @cred: unused * @@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) * * Returns 0 */ -static int smack_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { struct inode_smack *isp = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security; @@ -3487,7 +3487,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask, .file_receive = smack_file_receive, - .dentry_open = smack_dentry_open, + .file_open = smack_file_open, .cred_alloc_blank = smack_cred_alloc_blank, .cred_free = smack_cred_free, diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 620d37c159a3..c2d04a50f76a 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -319,14 +319,14 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, } /** - * tomoyo_dentry_open - Target for security_dentry_open(). + * tomoyo_file_open - Target for security_file_open(). * * @f: Pointer to "struct file". * @cred: Pointer to "struct cred". * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred) +static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred) { int flags = f->f_flags; /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */ @@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = { .bprm_set_creds = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds, .bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security, .file_fcntl = tomoyo_file_fcntl, - .dentry_open = tomoyo_dentry_open, + .file_open = tomoyo_file_open, .path_truncate = tomoyo_path_truncate, .path_unlink = tomoyo_path_unlink, .path_mkdir = tomoyo_path_mkdir, |
