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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-07-03 14:04:58 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-07-03 14:04:58 -0700 |
commit | f39d420f672f99ad9a0fe7deb951a0030d4f0d9e (patch) | |
tree | 450e229a4305362f72cc5461aab8af4f2f5d023e /security/integrity/ima | |
parent | fe489bf4505ae26d3c6d6a1f1d3064c2a9c5cd85 (diff) | |
parent | 572e5b018ba68d634f30aef71cf04d85c884aa05 (diff) | |
download | blackbird-obmc-linux-f39d420f672f99ad9a0fe7deb951a0030d4f0d9e.tar.gz blackbird-obmc-linux-f39d420f672f99ad9a0fe7deb951a0030d4f0d9e.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this update, Smack learns to love IPv6 and to mount a filesystem
with a transmutable hierarchy (i.e. security labels are inherited
from parent directory upon creation rather than creating process).
The rest of the changes are maintenance"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Remove unused header file
tpm: tpm_i2c_infinion: Don't modify i2c_client->driver
evm: audit integrity metadata failures
integrity: move integrity_audit_msg()
evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl on tmpfs
maintainers: add Dmitry Kasatkin
Smack: Fix the bug smackcipso can't set CIPSO correctly
Smack: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference at smk_netlbl_mls()
Smack: Add smkfstransmute mount option
Smack: Improve access check performance
Smack: Local IPv6 port based controls
tpm: fix regression caused by section type conflict of tpm_dev_release() in ppc builds
maintainers: Remove Kent from maintainers
tpm: move TPM_DIGEST_SIZE defintion
tpm_tis: missing platform_driver_unregister() on error in init_tis()
security: clarify cap_inode_getsecctx description
apparmor: no need to delay vfree()
apparmor: fix fully qualified name parsing
apparmor: fix setprocattr arg processing for onexec
apparmor: localize getting the security context to a few macros
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c | 64 |
4 files changed, 0 insertions, 91 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index d232c73647ae..39196abaff0d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -38,18 +38,6 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10. -config IMA_AUDIT - bool "Enables auditing support" - depends on IMA - depends on AUDIT - default y - help - This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which - allows informational auditing messages to be enabled - at boot. If this option is selected, informational integrity - auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on - the kernel command line. - config IMA_LSM_RULES bool depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 3f2ca6bdc384..56dfee7cbf61 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -7,5 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o -ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index a41c9c18e5e0..b3dd616560f7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -62,20 +62,6 @@ struct ima_queue_entry { }; extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */ -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT -/* declarations */ -void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, - const char *cause, int result, int info); -#else -static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *fname, - const char *op, const char *cause, - int result, int info) -{ -} -#endif - /* Internal IMA function definitions */ int ima_init(void); void ima_cleanup(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c deleted file mode 100644 index c586faae8fd6..000000000000 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation - * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. - * - * File: integrity_audit.c - * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem - */ - -#include <linux/fs.h> -#include <linux/gfp.h> -#include <linux/audit.h> -#include "ima.h" - -static int ima_audit; - -/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */ -static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str) -{ - unsigned long audit; - - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit)) - ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0; - return 1; -} -__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup); - -void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, - const char *cause, int result, int audit_info) -{ - struct audit_buffer *ab; - - if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */ - return; - - ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno); - audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", - current->pid, - from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_cred()->uid), - from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), - audit_get_sessionid(current)); - audit_log_task_context(ab); - audit_log_format(ab, " op="); - audit_log_string(ab, op); - audit_log_format(ab, " cause="); - audit_log_string(ab, cause); - audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); - if (fname) { - audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname); - } - if (inode) { - audit_log_format(ab, " dev="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); - audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); - } - audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result); - audit_log_end(ab); -} |