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author | H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> | 2014-03-17 16:36:28 -0700 |
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committer | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2014-03-19 22:22:06 -0400 |
commit | 83664a6928a420b5ccfc0cf23ddbfe3634fea271 (patch) | |
tree | b8849a88a88a0894c1131a0234100a98b0d73d02 /arch/blackfin/oprofile | |
parent | d20f78d252778e0fae8f8256e602bd682eb2185c (diff) | |
download | blackbird-obmc-linux-83664a6928a420b5ccfc0cf23ddbfe3634fea271.tar.gz blackbird-obmc-linux-83664a6928a420b5ccfc0cf23ddbfe3634fea271.zip |
random: Use arch_get_random_seed*() at init time and once a second
Use arch_get_random_seed*() in two places in the Linux random
driver (drivers/char/random.c):
1. During entropy pool initialization, use RDSEED in favor of RDRAND,
with a fallback to the latter. Entropy exhaustion is unlikely to
happen there on physical hardware as the machine is single-threaded
at that point, but could happen in a virtual machine. In that
case, the fallback to RDRAND will still provide more than adequate
entropy pool initialization.
2. Once a second, issue RDSEED and, if successful, feed it to the
entropy pool. To ensure an extra layer of security, only credit
half the entropy just in case.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/blackfin/oprofile')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions