diff options
| author | Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> | 2011-05-19 15:59:38 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> | 2011-05-19 15:59:38 -0700 |
| commit | d410fa4ef99112386de5f218dd7df7b4fca910b4 (patch) | |
| tree | e29fbc3f6d27b20d73d8feb4ed73f6767f2e18fe /Documentation/security | |
| parent | 61c4f2c81c61f73549928dfd9f3e8f26aa36a8cf (diff) | |
| download | blackbird-obmc-linux-d410fa4ef99112386de5f218dd7df7b4fca910b4.tar.gz blackbird-obmc-linux-d410fa4ef99112386de5f218dd7df7b4fca910b4.zip | |
Create Documentation/security/,
move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/
to Documentation/security/,
add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and
update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>
to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/security')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/00-INDEX | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/SELinux.txt | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/Smack.txt | 541 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/apparmor.txt | 39 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/credentials.txt | 581 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt | 202 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt | 145 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/keys.txt | 1290 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/tomoyo.txt | 55 |
9 files changed, 2898 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/00-INDEX b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..19bc49439cac --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +00-INDEX + - this file. +SELinux.txt + - how to get started with the SELinux security enhancement. +Smack.txt + - documentation on the Smack Linux Security Module. +apparmor.txt + - documentation on the AppArmor security extension. +credentials.txt + - documentation about credentials in Linux. +keys-request-key.txt + - description of the kernel key request service. +keys-trusted-encrypted.txt + - info on the Trusted and Encrypted keys in the kernel key ring service. +keys.txt + - description of the kernel key retention service. +tomoyo.txt + - documentation on the TOMOYO Linux Security Module. diff --git a/Documentation/security/SELinux.txt b/Documentation/security/SELinux.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..07eae00f3314 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/SELinux.txt @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +If you want to use SELinux, chances are you will want +to use the distro-provided policies, or install the +latest reference policy release from + http://oss.tresys.com/projects/refpolicy + +However, if you want to install a dummy policy for +testing, you can do using 'mdp' provided under +scripts/selinux. Note that this requires the selinux +userspace to be installed - in particular you will +need checkpolicy to compile a kernel, and setfiles and +fixfiles to label the filesystem. + + 1. Compile the kernel with selinux enabled. + 2. Type 'make' to compile mdp. + 3. Make sure that you are not running with + SELinux enabled and a real policy. If + you are, reboot with selinux disabled + before continuing. + 4. Run install_policy.sh: + cd scripts/selinux + sh install_policy.sh + +Step 4 will create a new dummy policy valid for your +kernel, with a single selinux user, role, and type. +It will compile the policy, will set your SELINUXTYPE to +dummy in /etc/selinux/config, install the compiled policy +as 'dummy', and relabel your filesystem. diff --git a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e9dab41c0fe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt @@ -0,0 +1,541 @@ + + + "Good for you, you've decided to clean the elevator!" + - The Elevator, from Dark Star + +Smack is the the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. +Smack is a kernel based implementation of mandatory access +control that includes simplicity in its primary design goals. + +Smack is not the only Mandatory Access Control scheme +available for Linux. Those new to Mandatory Access Control +are encouraged to compare Smack with the other mechanisms +available to determine which is best suited to the problem +at hand. + +Smack consists of three major components: + - The kernel + - A start-up script and a few modified applications + - Configuration data + +The kernel component of Smack is implemented as a Linux +Security Modules (LSM) module. It requires netlabel and +works best with file systems that support extended attributes, +although xattr support is not strictly required. +It is safe to run a Smack kernel under a "vanilla" distribution. +Smack kernels use the CIPSO IP option. Some network +configurations are intolerant of IP options and can impede +access to systems that use them as Smack does. + +The startup script etc-init.d-smack should be installed +in /etc/init.d/smack and should be invoked early in the +start-up process. On Fedora rc5.d/S02smack is recommended. +This script ensures that certain devices have the correct +Smack attributes and loads the Smack configuration if +any is defined. This script invokes two programs that +ensure configuration data is properly formatted. These +programs are /usr/sbin/smackload and /usr/sin/smackcipso. +The system will run just fine without these programs, +but it will be difficult to set access rules properly. + +A version of "ls" that provides a "-M" option to display +Smack labels on long listing is available. + +A hacked version of sshd that allows network logins by users +with specific Smack labels is available. This version does +not work for scp. You must set the /etc/ssh/sshd_config +line: + UsePrivilegeSeparation no + +The format of /etc/smack/usr is: + + username smack + +In keeping with the intent of Smack, configuration data is +minimal and not strictly required. The most important +configuration step is mounting the smackfs pseudo filesystem. + +Add this line to /etc/fstab: + + smackfs /smack smackfs smackfsdef=* 0 0 + +and create the /smack directory for mounting. + +Smack uses extended attributes (xattrs) to store file labels. +The command to set a Smack label on a file is: + + # attr -S -s SMACK64 -V "value" path + +NOTE: Smack labels are limited to 23 characters. The attr command + does not enforce this restriction and can be used to set + invalid Smack labels on files. + +If you don't do anything special all users will get the floor ("_") +label when they log in. If you do want to log in via the hacked ssh +at other labels use the attr command to set the smack value on the +home directory and its contents. + +You can add access rules in /etc/smack/accesses. They take the form: + + subjectlabel objectlabel access + +access is a combination of the letters rwxa which specify the +kind of access permitted a subject with subjectlabel on an +object with objectlabel. If there is no rule no access is allowed. + +A process can see the smack label it is running with by +reading /proc/self/attr/current. A privileged process can +set the process smack by writing there. + +Look for additional programs on http://schaufler-ca.com + +From the Smack Whitepaper: + +The Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel + +Casey Schaufler +casey@schaufler-ca.com + +Mandatory Access Control + +Computer systems employ a variety of schemes to constrain how information is +shared among the people and services using the machine. Some of these schemes +allow the program or user to decide what other programs or users are allowed +access to pieces of data. These schemes are called discretionary access +control mechanisms because the access control is specified at the discretion +of the user. Other schemes do not leave the decision regarding what a user or +program can access up to users or programs. These schemes are called mandatory +access control mechanisms because you don't have a choice regarding the users +or programs that have access to pieces of data. + +Bell & LaPadula + +From the middle of the 1980's until the turn of the century Mandatory Access +Control (MAC) was very closely associated with the Bell & LaPadula security +model, a mathematical description of the United States Department of Defense +policy for marking paper documents. MAC in this form enjoyed a following +within the Capital Beltway and Scandinavian supercomputer centers but was +often sited as failing to address general needs. + +Domain Type Enforcement + +Around the turn of the century Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) became popular. +This scheme organizes users, programs, and data into domains that are +protected from each other. This scheme has been widely deployed as a component +of popular Linux distributions. The administrative overhead required to +maintain this scheme and the detailed understanding of the whole system +necessary to provide a secure domain mapping leads to the scheme being +disabled or used in limited ways in the majority of cases. + +Smack + +Smack is a Mandatory Access Control mechanism designed to provide useful MAC +while avoiding the pitfalls of its predecessors. The limitations of Bell & +LaPadula are addressed by providing a scheme whereby access can be controlled +according to the requirements of the system and its purpose rather than those +imposed by an arcane government policy. The complexity of Domain Type +Enforcement and avoided by defining access controls in terms of the access +modes already in use. + +Smack Terminology + +The jargon used to talk about Smack will be familiar to those who have dealt +with other MAC systems and shouldn't be too difficult for the uninitiated to +pick up. There are four terms that are used in a specific way and that are +especially important: + + Subject: A subject is an active entity on the computer system. + On Smack a subject is a task, which is in turn the basic unit + of execution. + + Object: An object is a passive entity on the computer system. + On Smack files of all types, IPC, and tasks can be objects. + + Access: Any attempt by a subject to put information into or get + information from an object is an access. + + Label: Data that identifies the Mandatory Access Control + characteristics of a subject or an object. + +These definitions are consistent with the traditional use in the security +community. There are also some terms from Linux that are likely to crop up: + + Capability: A task that possesses a capability has permission to + violate an aspect of the system security policy, as identified by + the specific capability. A task that possesses one or more + capabilities is a privileged task, whereas a task with no + capabilities is an unprivileged task. + + Privilege: A task that is allowed to violate the system security + policy is said to have privilege. As of this writing a task can + have privilege either by possessing capabilities or by having an + effective user of root. + +Smack Basics + +Smack is an extension to a Linux system. It enforces additional restrictions +on what subjects can access which objects, based on the labels attached to +each of the subject and the object. + +Labels + +Smack labels are ASCII character strings, one to twenty-three characters in +length. Single character labels using special characters, that being anything +other than a letter or digit, are reserved for use by the Smack development +team. Smack labels are unstructured, case sensitive, and the only operation +ever performed on them is comparison for equality. Smack labels cannot +contain unprintable characters, the "/" (slash), the "\" (backslash), the "'" +(quote) and '"' (double-quote) characters. +Smack labels cannot begin with a '-', which is reserved for special options. + +There are some predefined labels: + + _ Pronounced "floor", a single underscore character. + ^ Pronounced "hat", a single circumflex character. + * Pronounced "star", a single asterisk character. + ? Pronounced "huh", a single question mark character. + @ Pronounced "Internet", a single at sign character. + +Every task on a Smack system is assigned a label. System tasks, such as +init(8) and systems daemons, are run with the floor ("_") label. User tasks +are assigned labels according to the specification found in the +/etc/smack/user configuration file. + +Access Rules + +Smack uses the traditional access modes of Linux. These modes are read, +execute, write, and occasionally append. There are a few cases where the +access mode may not be obvious. These include: + + Signals: A signal is a write operation from the subject task to + the object task. + Internet Domain IPC: Transmission of a packet is considered a + write operation from the source task to the destination task. + +Smack restricts access based on the label attached to a subject and the label +attached to the object it is trying to access. The rules enforced are, in +order: + + 1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied. + 2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^" + is permitted. + 3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_" + is permitted. + 4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted. + 5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same + label is permitted. + 6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded + rule set is permitted. + 7. Any other access is denied. + +Smack Access Rules + +With the isolation provided by Smack access separation is simple. There are +many interesting cases where limited access by subjects to objects with +different labels is desired. One example is the familiar spy model of +sensitivity, where a scientist working on a highly classified project would be +able to read documents of lower classifications and anything she writes will +be "born" highly classified. To accommodate such schemes Smack includes a +mechanism for specifying rules allowing access between labels. + +Access Rule Format + +The format of an access rule is: + + subject-label object-label access + +Where subject-label is the Smack label of the task, object-label is the Smack +label of the thing being accessed, and access is a string specifying the sort +of access allowed. The Smack labels are limited to 23 characters. The access +specification is searched for letters that describe access modes: + + a: indicates that append access should be granted. + r: indicates that read access should be granted. + w: indicates that write access should be granted. + x: indicates that execute access should be granted. + +Uppercase values for the specification letters are allowed as well. +Access mode specifications can be in any order. Examples of acceptable rules +are: + + TopSecret Secret rx + Secret Unclass R + Manager Game x + User HR w + New Old rRrRr + Closed Off - + +Examples of unacceptable rules are: + + Top Secret Secret rx + Ace Ace r + Odd spells waxbeans + +Spaces are not allowed in labels. Since a subject always has access to files +with the same label specifying a rule for that case is pointless. Only +valid letters (rwxaRWXA) and the dash ('-') character are allowed in +access specifications. The dash is a placeholder, so "a-r" is the same +as "ar". A lone dash is used to specify that no access should be allowed. + +Applying Access Rules + +The developers of Linux rarely define new sorts of things, usually importing +schemes and concepts from other systems. Most often, the other systems are +variants of Unix. Unix has many endearing properties, but consistency of +access control models is not one of them. Smack strives to treat accesses as +uniformly as is sensible while keeping with the spirit of the underlying +mechanism. + +File system objects including files, directories, named pipes, symbolic links, +and devices require access permissions that closely match those used by mode +bit access. To open a file for reading read access is required on the file. To +search a directory requires execute access. Creating a file with write access +requires both read and write access on the containing directory. Deleting a +file requires read and write access to the file and to the containing +directory. It is possible that a user may be able to see that a file exists +but not any of its attributes by the circumstance of having read access to the +containing directory but not to the differently labeled file. This is an +artifact of the file name being data in the directory, not a part of the file. + +IPC objects, message queues, semaphore sets, and memory segments exist in flat +namespaces and access requests are only required to match the object in +question. + +Process objects reflect tasks on the system and the Smack label used to access +them is the same Smack label that the task would use for its own access +attempts. Sending a signal via the kill() system call is a write operation +from the signaler to the recipient. Debugging a process requires both reading +and writing. Creating a new task is an internal operation that results in two +tasks with identical Smack labels and requires no access checks. + +Sockets are data structures attached to processes and sending a packet from +one process to another requires that the sender have write access to the +receiver. The receiver is not required to have read access to the sender. + +Setting Access Rules + +The configuration file /etc/smack/accesses contains the rules to be set at +system startup. The contents are written to the special file /smack/load. +Rules can be written to /smack/load at any time and take effect immediately. +For any pair of subject and object labels there can be only one rule, with the +most recently specified overriding any earlier specification. + +The program smackload is provided to ensure data is formatted +properly when written to /smack/load. This program reads lines +of the form + + subjectlabel objectlabel mode. + +Task Attribute + +The Smack label of a process can be read from /proc/<pid>/attr/current. A +process can read its own Smack label from /proc/self/attr/current. A +privileged process can change its own Smack label by writing to +/proc/self/attr/current but not the label of another process. + +File Attribute + +The Smack label of a filesystem object is stored as an extended attribute +named SMACK64 on the file. This attribute is in the security namespace. It can +only be changed by a process with privilege. + +Privilege + +A process with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE is privileged. + +Smack Networking + +As mentioned before, Smack enforces access control on network protocol +transmissions. Every packet sent by a Smack process is tagged with its Smack +label. This is done by adding a CIPSO tag to the header of the IP packet. Each +packet received is expected to have a CIPSO tag that identifies the label and +if it lacks such a tag the network ambient label is assumed. Before the packet +is delivered a check is made to determine that a subject with the label on the +packet has write access to the receiving process and if that is not the case +the packet is dropped. + +CIPSO Configuration + +It is normally unnecessary to specify the CIPSO configuration. The default +values used by the system handle all internal cases. Smack will compose CIPSO +label values to match the Smack labels being used without administrative +intervention. Unlabeled packets that come into the system will be given the +ambient label. + +Smack requires configuration in the case where packets from a system that is +not smack that speaks CIPSO may be encountered. Usually this will be a Trusted +Solaris system, but there are other, less widely deployed systems out there. +CIPSO provides 3 important values, a Domain Of Interpretation (DOI), a level, +and a category set with each packet. The DOI is intended to identify a group +of systems that use compatible labeling schemes, and the DOI specified on the +smack system must match that of the remote system or packets will be +discarded. The DOI is 3 by default. The value can be read from /smack/doi and +can be changed by writing to /smack/doi. + +The label and category set are mapped to a Smack label as defined in +/etc/smack/cipso. + +A Smack/CIPSO mapping has the form: + + smack level [category [category]*] + +Smack does not expect the level or category sets to be related in any +particular way and does not assume or assign accesses based on them. Some +examples of mappings: + + TopSecret 7 + TS:A,B 7 1 2 + SecBDE 5 2 4 6 + RAFTERS 7 12 26 + +The ":" and "," characters are permitted in a Smack label but have no special +meaning. + +The mapping of Smack labels to CIPSO values is defined by writing to +/smack/cipso. Again, the format of data written to this special file +is highly restrictive, so the program smackcipso is provided to +ensure the writes are done properly. This program takes mappings +on the standard input and sends them to /smack/cipso properly. + +In addition to explicit mappings Smack supports direct CIPSO mappings. One +CIPSO level is used to indicate that the category set passed in the packet is +in fact an encoding of the Smack label. The level used is 250 by default. The +value can be read from /smack/direct and changed by writing to /smack/direct. + +Socket Attributes + +There are two attributes that are associated with sockets. These attributes +can only be set by privileged tasks, but any task can read them for their own +sockets. + + SMACK64IPIN: The Smack label of the task object. A privileged + program that will enforce policy may set this to the star label. + + SMACK64IPOUT: The Smack label transmitted with outgoing packets. + A privileged program may set this to match the label of another + task with which it hopes to communicate. + +Smack Netlabel Exceptions + +You will often find that your labeled application has to talk to the outside, +unlabeled world. To do this there's a special file /smack/netlabel where you can +add some exceptions in the form of : +@IP1 LABEL1 or +@IP2/MASK LABEL2 + +It means that your application will have unlabeled access to @IP1 if it has +write access on LABEL1, and access to the subnet @IP2/MASK if it has write +access on LABEL2. + +Entries in the /smack/netlabel file are matched by longest mask first, like in +classless IPv4 routing. + +A special label '@' and an option '-CIPSO' can be used there : +@ means Internet, any application with any label has access to it +-CIPSO means standard CIPSO networking + +If you don't know what CIPSO is and don't plan to use it, you can just do : +echo 127.0.0.1 -CIPSO > /smack/netlabel +echo 0.0.0.0/0 @ > /smack/netlabel + +If you use CIPSO on your 192.168.0.0/16 local network and need also unlabeled +Internet access, you can have : +echo 127.0.0.1 -CIPSO > /smack/netlabel +echo 192.168.0.0/16 -CIPSO > /smack/netlabel +echo 0.0.0.0/0 @ > /smack/netlabel + + +Writing Applications for Smack + +There are three sorts of applications that will run on a Smack system. How an +application interacts with Smack will determine what it will have to do to +work properly under Smack. + +Smack Ignorant Applications + +By far the majority of applications have no reason whatever to care about the +unique properties of Smack. Since invoking a program has no impact on the +Smack label associated with the process the only concern likely to arise is +whether the process has execute access to the program. + +Smack Relevant Applications + +Some programs can be improved by teaching them about Smack, but do not make +any security decisions themselves. The utility ls(1) is one example of such a +program. + +Smack Enforcing Applications + +These are special programs that not only know about Smack, but participate in +the enforcement of system policy. In most cases these are the programs that +set up user sessions. There are also network services that provide information +to processes running with various labels. + +File System Interfaces + +Smack maintains labels on file system objects using extended attributes. The +Smack label of a file, directory, or other file system object can be obtained +using getxattr(2). + + len = getxattr("/", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof (value)); + +will put the Smack label of the root directory into value. A privileged +process can set the Smack label of a file system object with setxattr(2). + + len = strlen("Rubble"); + rc = setxattr("/foo", "security.SMACK64", "Rubble", len, 0); + +will set the Smack label of /foo to "Rubble" if the program has appropriate +privilege. + +Socket Interfaces + +The socket attributes can be read using fgetxattr(2). + +A privileged process can set the Smack label of outgoing packets with +fsetxattr(2). + + len = strlen("Rubble"); + rc = fsetxattr(fd, "security.SMACK64IPOUT", "Rubble", len, 0); + +will set the Smack label "Rubble" on packets going out from the socket if the +program has appropriate privilege. + + rc = fsetxattr(fd, "security.SMACK64IPIN, "*", strlen("*"), 0); + +will set the Smack label "*" as the object label against which incoming +packets will be checked if the program has appropriate privilege. + +Administration + +Smack supports some mount options: + + smackfsdef=label: specifies the label to give files that lack + the Smack label extended attribute. + + smackfsroot=label: specifies the label to assign the root of the + file system if it lacks the Smack extended attribute. + + smackfshat=label: specifies a label that must have read access to + all labels set on the filesystem. Not yet enforced. + + smackfsfloor=label: specifies a label to which all labels set on the + filesystem must have read access. Not yet enforced. + +These mount options apply to all file system types. + +Smack auditing + +If you want Smack auditing of security events, you need to set CONFIG_AUDIT +in your kernel configuration. +By default, all denied events will be audited. You can change this behavior by +writing a single character to the /smack/logging file : +0 : no logging +1 : log denied (default) +2 : log accepted +3 : log denied & accepted + +Events are logged as 'key=value' pairs, for each event you at least will get +the subjet, the object, the rights requested, the action, the kernel function +that triggered the event, plus other pairs depending on the type of event +audited. diff --git a/Documentation/security/apparmor.txt b/Documentation/security/apparmor.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..93c1fd7d0635 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/apparmor.txt @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +--- What is AppArmor? --- + +AppArmor is MAC style security extension for the Linux kernel. It implements +a task centered policy, with task "profiles" being created and loaded +from user space. Tasks on the system that do not have a profile defined for +them run in an unconfined state which is equivalent to standard Linux DAC +permissions. + +--- How to enable/disable --- + +set CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + +If AppArmor should be selected as the default security module then + set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY="apparmor" + and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 + +Build the kernel + +If AppArmor is not the default security module it can be enabled by passing +security=apparmor on the kernel's command line. + +If AppArmor is the default security module it can be disabled by passing +apparmor=0, security=XXXX (where XXX is valid security module), on the +kernel's command line + +For AppArmor to enforce any restrictions beyond standard Linux DAC permissions +policy must be loaded into the kernel from user space (see the Documentation +and tools links). + +--- Documentation --- + +Documentation can be found on the wiki. + +--- Links --- + +Mailing List - apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com +Wiki - http://apparmor.wiki.kernel.org/ +User space tools - https://launchpad.net/apparmor +Kernel module - git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git diff --git a/Documentation/security/credentials.txt b/Documentation/security/credentials.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fc0366cbd7ce --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/credentials.txt @@ -0,0 +1,581 @@ + ==================== + CREDENTIALS IN LINUX + ==================== + +By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> + +Contents: + + (*) Overview. + + (*) Types of credentials. + + (*) File markings. + + (*) Task credentials. + + - Immutable credentials. + - Accessing task credentials. + - Accessing another task's credentials. + - Altering credentials. + - Managing credentials. + + (*) Open file credentials. + + (*) Overriding the VFS's use of credentials. + + +======== +OVERVIEW +======== + +There are several parts to the security check performed by Linux when one +object acts upon another: + + (1) Objects. + + Objects are things in the system that may be acted upon directly by + userspace programs. Linux has a variety of actionable objects, including: + + - Tasks + - Files/inodes + - Sockets + - Message queues + - Shared memory segments + - Semaphores + - Keys + + As a part of the description of all these objects there is a set of + credentials. What's in the set depends on the type of object. + + (2) Object ownership. + + Amongst the credentials of most objects, there will be a subset that + indicates the ownership of that object. This is used for resource + accounting and limitation (disk quotas and task rlimits for example). + + In a standard UNIX filesystem, for instance, this will be defined by the + UID marked on the inode. + + (3) The objective context. + + Also amongst the credentials of those objects, there will be a subset that + indicates the 'objective context' of that object. This may or may not be + the same set as in (2) - in standard UNIX files, for instance, this is the + defined by the UID and the GID marked on the inode. + + The objective context is used as part of the security calculation that is + carried out when an object is acted upon. + + (4) Subjects. + + A subject is an object that is acting upon another object. + + Most of the objects in the system are inactive: they don't act on other + objects within the system. Processes/tasks are the obvious exception: + they do stuff; they access and manipulate things. + + Objects other than tasks may under some circumstances also be subjects. + For instance an open file may send SIGIO to a task using the UID and EUID + given to it by a task that called fcntl(F_SETOWN) upon it. In this case, + the file struct will have a subjective context too. + + (5) The subjective context. + + A subject has an additional interpretation of its credentials. A subset + of its credentials forms the 'subjective context'. The subjective context + is used as part of the security calculation that is carried out when a + subject acts. + + A Linux task, for example, has the FSUID, FSGID and the supplementary + group list for when it is acting upon a file - which are quite separate + from the real UID and GID that normally form the objective context of the + task. + + (6) Actions. + + Linux has a number of actions available that a subject may perform upon an + object. The set of actions available depends on the nature of the subject + and the object. + + Actions include reading, writing, creating and deleting files; forking or + signalling and tracing tasks. + + (7) Rules, access control lists and security calculations. + + When a subject acts upon an object, a security calculation is made. This + involves taking the subjective context, the objective context and the + action, and searching one or more sets of rules to see whether the subject + is granted or denied permission to act in the desired manner on the + object, given those contexts. + + There are two main sources of rules: + + (a) Discretionary access control (DAC): + + Sometimes the object will include sets of rules as part of its + description. This is an 'Access Control List' or 'ACL'. A Linux + file may supply more than one ACL. + + A traditional UNIX file, for example, includes a permissions mask that + is an abbreviated ACL with three fixed classes of subject ('user', + 'group' and 'other'), each of which may be granted certain privileges + ('read', 'write' and 'execute' - whatever those map to for the object + in question). UNIX file permissions do not allow the arbitrary + specification of subjects, however, and so are of limited use. + + A Linux file might also sport a POSIX ACL. This is a list of rules + that grants various permissions to arbitrary subjects. + + (b) Mandatory access control (MAC): + + The system as a whole may have one or more sets of rules that get + applied to all subjects and objects, regardless of their source. + SELinux and Smack are examples of this. + + In the case of SELinux and Smack, each object is given a label as part + of its credentials. When an action is requested, they take the + subject label, the object label and the action and look for a rule + that says that this action is either granted or denied. + + +==================== +TYPES OF CREDENTIALS +==================== + +The Linux kernel supports the following types of credentials: + + (1) Traditional UNIX credentials. + + Real User ID + Real Group ID + + The UID and GID are carried by most, if not all, Linux objects, even if in + some cases it has to be invented (FAT or CIFS files for example, which are + derived from Windows). These (mostly) define the objective context of + that object, with tasks being slightly different in some cases. + + Effective, Saved and FS User ID + Effective, Saved and FS Group ID + Supplementary groups + + These are additional credentials used by tasks only. Usually, an + EUID/EGID/GROUPS will be used as the subjective context, and real UID/GID + will be used as the objective. For tasks, it should be noted that this is + not always true. + + (2) Capabilities. + + Set of permitted capabilities + Set of inheritable capabilities + Set of effective capabilities + Capability bounding set + + These are only carried by tasks. They indicate superior capabilities + granted piecemeal to a task that an ordinary task wouldn't otherwise have. + These are manipulated implicitly by changes to the traditional UNIX + credentials, but can also be manipulated directly by the capset() system + call. + + The permitted capabilities are those caps that the process might grant + itself to its effective or permitted sets through capset(). This + inheritable set might also be so constrained. + + The effective capabilities are the ones that a task is actually allowed to + make use of itself. + + The inheritable capabilities are the ones that may get passed across + execve(). + + The bounding set limits the capabilities that may be inherited across + execve(), especially when a binary is executed that will execute as UID 0. + + (3) Secure management flags (securebits). + + These are only carried by tasks. These govern the way the above + credentials are manipulated and inherited over certain operations such as + execve(). They aren't used directly as objective or subjective + credentials. + + (4) Keys and keyrings. + + These are only carried by tasks. They carry and cache security tokens + that don't fit into the other standard UNIX credentials. They are for + making such things as network filesystem keys available to the file + accesses performed by processes, without the necessity of ordinary + programs having to know about security details involved. + + Keyrings are a special type of key. They carry sets of other keys and can + be searched for the desired key. Each process may subscribe to a number + of keyrings: + + Per-thread keying + Per-process keyring + Per-session keyring + + When a process accesses a key, if not already present, it will normally be + cached on one of these keyrings for future accesses to find. + + For more information on using keys, see Documentation/security/keys.txt. + + (5) LSM + + The Linux Security Module allows extra controls to be placed over the + operations that a task may do. Currently Linux supports two main + alternate LSM options: SELinux and Smack. + + Both work by labelling the objects in a system and then applying sets of + rules (policies) that say what operations a task with one label may do to + an object with another label. + + (6) AF_KEY + + This is a socket-based approach to credential management for networking + stacks [RFC 2367]. It isn't discussed by this document as it doesn't + interact directly with task and file credentials; rather it keeps system + level credentials. + + +When a file is opened, part of the opening task's subjective context is +recorded in the file struct created. This allows operations using that file +struct to use those credentials instead of the subjective context of the task +that issued the operation. An example of this would be a file opened on a +network filesystem where the credentials of the opened file should be presented +to the server, regardless of who is actually doing a read or a write upon it. + + +============= +FILE MARKINGS +============= + +Files on disk or obtained over the network may have annotations that form the +objective security context of that file. Depending on the type of filesystem, +this may include one or more of the following: + + (*) UNIX UID, GID, mode; + + (*) Windows user ID; + + (*) Access control list; + + (*) LSM security label; + + (*) UNIX exec privilege escalation bits (SUID/SGID); + + (*) File capabilities exec privilege escalation bits. + +These are compared to the task's subjective security context, and certain +operations allowed or disallowed as a result. In the case of execve(), the +privilege escalation bits come into play, and may allow the resulting process +extra privileges, based on the annotations on the executable file. + + +================ +TASK CREDENTIALS +================ + +In Linux, all of a task's credentials are held in (uid, gid) or through +(groups, keys, LSM security) a refcounted structure of type 'struct cred'. +Each task points to its credentials by a pointer called 'cred' in its +task_struct. + +Once a set of credentials has been prepared and committed, it may not be +changed, barring the following exceptions: + + (1) its reference count may be changed; + + (2) the reference count on the group_info struct it points to may be changed; + + (3) the reference count on the security data it points to may be changed; + + (4) the reference count on any keyrings it points to may be changed; + + (5) any keyrings it points to may be revoked, expired or have their security + attributes changed; and + + (6) the contents of any keyrings to which it points may be changed (the whole + point of keyrings being a shared set of credentials, modifiable by anyone + with appropriate access). + +To alter anything in the cred struct, the copy-and-replace principle must be +adhered to. First take a copy, then alter the copy and then use RCU to change +the task pointer to make it point to the new copy. There are wrappers to aid +with this (see below). + +A task may only alter its _own_ credentials; it is no longer permitted for a +task to alter another's credentials. This means the capset() system call is no +longer permitted to take any PID other than the one of the current process. +Also keyctl_instantiate() and keyctl_negate() functions no longer permit +attachment to process-specific keyrings in the requesting process as the +instantiating process may need to create them. + + +IMMUTABLE CREDENTIALS +--------------------- + +Once a set of credentials has been made public (by calling commit_creds() for +example), it must be considered immutable, barring two exceptions: + + (1) The reference count may be altered. + + (2) Whilst the keyring subscriptions of a set of credentials may not be + changed, the keyrings subscribed to may have their contents altered. + +To catch accidental credential alteration at compile time, struct task_struct +has _const_ pointers to its credential sets, as does struct file. Furthermore, +certain functions such as get_cred() and put_cred() operate on const pointers, +thus rendering casts unnecessary, but require to temporarily ditch the const +qualification to be able to alter the reference count. + + +ACCESSING TASK CREDENTIALS +-------------------------- + +A task being able to alter only its own credentials permits the current process +to read or replace its own credentials without the need for any form of locking +- which simplifies things greatly. It can just call: + + const struct cred *current_cred() + +to get a pointer to its credentials structure, and it doesn't have to release +it afterwards. + +There are convenience wrappers for retrieving specific aspects of a task's +credentials (the value is simply returned in each case): + + uid_t current_uid(void) Current's real UID + gid_t current_gid(void) Current's real GID + uid_t current_euid(void) Current's effective UID + gid_t current_egid(void) Current's effective GID + uid_t current_fsuid(void) Current's file access UID + gid_t current_fsgid(void) Current's file access GID + kernel_cap_t current_cap(void) Current's effective capabilities + void *current_security(void) Current's LSM security pointer + struct user_struct *current_user(void) Current's user account + +There are also convenience wrappers for retrieving specific associated pairs of +a task's credentials: + + void current_uid_gid(uid_t *, gid_t *); + void current_euid_egid(uid_t *, gid_t *); + void current_fsuid_fsgid(uid_t *, gid_t *); + +which return these pairs of values through their arguments after retrieving +them from the current task's credentials. + + +In addition, there is a function for obtaining a reference on the current +process's current set of credentials: + + const struct cred *get_current_cred(void); + +and functions for getting references to one of the credentials that don't +actually live in struct cred: + + struct user_struct *get_current_user(void); + struct group_info *get_current_groups(void); + +which get references to the current process's user accounting structure and +supplementary groups list respectively. + +Once a reference has been obtained, it must be released with put_cred(), +free_uid() or put_group_info() as appropriate. + + +ACCESSING ANOTHER TASK'S CREDENTIALS +------------------------------------ + +Whilst a task may access its own credentials without the need for locking, the +same is not true of a task wanting to access another task's credentials. It +must use the RCU read lock and rcu_dereference(). + +The rcu_dereference() is wrapped by: + + const struct cred *__task_cred(struct task_struct *task); + +This should be used inside the RCU read lock, as in the following example: + + void foo(struct task_struct *t, struct foo_data *f) + { + const struct cred *tcred; + ... + rcu_read_lock(); + tcred = __task_cred(t); + f->uid = tcred->uid; + f->gid = tcred->gid; + f->groups = get_group_info(tcred->groups); + rcu_read_unlock(); + ... + } + +Should it be necessary to hold another task's credentials for a long period of +time, and possibly to sleep whilst doing so, then the caller should get a +reference on them using: + + const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task); + +This does all the RCU magic inside of it. The caller must call put_cred() on +the credentials so obtained when they're finished with. + + [*] Note: The result of __task_cred() should not be passed directly to + get_cred() as this may race with commit_cred(). + +There are a couple of convenience functions to access bits of another task's +credentials, hiding the RCU magic from the caller: + + uid_t task_uid(task) Task's real UID + uid_t task_euid(task) Task's effective UID + +If the caller is holding the RCU read lock at the time anyway, then: + + __task_cred(task)->uid + __task_cred(task)->euid + +should be used instead. Similarly, if multiple aspects of a task's credentials +need to be accessed, RCU read lock should be used, __task_cred() called, the +result stored in a temporary pointer and then the credential aspects called +from that before dropping the lock. This prevents the potentially expensive +RCU magic from being invoked multiple times. + +Should some other single aspect of another task's credentials need to be +accessed, then this can be used: + + task_cred_xxx(task, member) + +where 'member' is a non-pointer member of the cred struct. For instance: + + uid_t task_cred_xxx(task, suid); + +will retrieve 'struct cred::suid' from the task, doing the appropriate RCU +magic. This may not be used for pointer members as what they point to may +disappear the moment the RCU read lock is dropped. + + +ALTERING CREDENTIALS +-------------------- + +As previously mentioned, a task may only alter its own credentials, and may not +alter those of another task. This means that it doesn't need to use any +locking to alter its own credentials. + +To alter the current process's credentials, a function should first prepare a +new set of credentials by calling: + + struct cred *prepare_creds(void); + +this locks current->cred_replace_mutex and then allocates and constructs a +duplicate of the current process's credentials, returning with the mutex still +held if successful. It returns NULL if not successful (out of memory). + +The mutex prevents ptrace() from altering the ptrace state of a process whilst +security checks on credentials construction and changing is taking place as +the ptrace state may alter the outcome, particularly in the case of execve(). + +The new credentials set should be altered appropriately, and any security +checks and hooks done. Both the current and the proposed sets of credentials +are available for this purpose as current_cred() will return the current set +still at this point. + + +When the credential set is ready, it should be committed to the current process +by calling: + + int commit_creds(struct cred *new); + +This will alter various aspects of the credentials and the process, giving the +LSM a chance to do likewise, then it will use rcu_assign_pointer() to actually +commit the new credentials to current->cred, it will release +current->cred_replace_mutex to allow ptrace() to take place, and it will notify +the scheduler and others of the changes. + +This function is guaranteed to return 0, so that it can be tail-called at the +end of such functions as sys_setresuid(). + +Note that this function consumes the caller's reference to the new credentials. +The caller should _not_ call put_cred() on the new credentials afterwards. + +Furthermore, once this function has been called on a new set of credentials, +those credentials may _not_ be changed further. + + +Should the security checks fail or some other error occur after prepare_creds() +has been called, then the following function should be invoked: + + void abort_creds(struct cred *new); + +This releases the lock on current->cred_replace_mutex that prepare_creds() got +and then releases the new credentials. + + +A typical credentials alteration function would look something like this: + + int alter_suid(uid_t suid) + { + struct cred *new; + int ret; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + new->suid = suid; + ret = security_alter_suid(new); + if (ret < 0) { + abort_creds(new); + return ret; + } + + return commit_creds(new); + } + + +MANAGING CREDENTIALS +-------------------- + +There are some functions to help manage credentials: + + (*) void put_cred(const struct cred *cred); + + This releases a reference to the given set of credentials. If the + reference count reaches zero, the credentials will be scheduled for + destruction by the RCU system. + + (*) const struct cred *get_cred(const struct cred *cred); + + This gets a reference on a live set of credentials, returning a pointer to + that set of credentials. + + (*) struct cred *get_new_cred(struct cred *cred); + + This gets a reference on a set of credentials that is under construction + and is thus still mutable, returning a pointer to that set of credentials. + + +===================== +OPEN FILE CREDENTIALS +===================== + +When a new file is opened, a reference is obtained on the opening task's +credentials and this is attached to the file struct as 'f_cred' in place of +'f_uid' and 'f_gid'. Code that used to access file->f_uid and file->f_gid +should now access file->f_cred->fsuid and file->f_cred->fsgid. + +It is safe to access f_cred without the use of RCU or locking because the +pointer will not change over the lifetime of the file struct, and nor will the +contents of the cred struct pointed to, barring the exceptions listed above +(see the Task Credentials section). + + +======================================= +OVERRIDING THE VFS'S USE OF CREDENTIALS +======================================= + +Under some circumstances it is desirable to override the credentials used by +the VFS, and that can be done by calling into such as vfs_mkdir() with a +different set of credentials. This is done in the following places: + + (*) sys_faccessat(). + + (*) do_coredump(). + + (*) nfs4recover.c. diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..51987bfecfed --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ + =================== + KEY REQUEST SERVICE + =================== + +The key request service is part of the key retention service (refer to +Documentation/security/keys.txt). This document explains more fully how +the requesting algorithm works. + +The process starts by either the kernel requesting a service by calling +request_key*(): + + struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info); + +or: + + struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + size_t callout_len, + void *aux); + +or: + + struct key *request_key_async(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + size_t callout_len); + +or: + + struct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + size_t callout_len, + void *aux); + +Or by userspace invoking the request_key system call: + + key_serial_t request_key(const char *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + key_serial_t dest_keyring); + +The main difference between the access points is that the in-kernel interface +does not need to link the key to a keyring to prevent it from being immediately +destroyed. The kernel interface returns a pointer directly to the key, and +it's up to the caller to destroy the key. + +The request_key*_with_auxdata() calls are like the in-kernel request_key*() +calls, except that they permit auxiliary data to be passed to the upcaller (the +default is NULL). This is only useful for those key types that define their +own upcall mechanism rather than using /sbin/request-key. + +The two async in-kernel calls may return keys that are still in the process of +being constructed. The two non-async ones will wait for construction to +complete first. + +The userspace interface links the key to a keyring associated with the process +to prevent the key from going away, and returns the serial number of the key to +the caller. + + +The following example assumes that the key types involved don't define their +own upcall mechanisms. If they do, then those should be substituted for the +forking and execution of /sbin/request-key. + + +=========== +THE PROCESS +=========== + +A request proceeds in the following manner: + + (1) Process A calls request_key() [the userspace syscall calls the kernel + interface]. + + (2) request_key() searches the process's subscribed keyrings to see if there's + a suitable key there. If there is, it returns the key. If there isn't, + and callout_info is not set, an error is returned. Otherwise the process + proceeds to the next step. + + (3) request_key() sees that A doesn't have the desired key yet, so it creates + two things: + + (a) An uninstantiated key U of requested type and description. + + (b) An authorisation key V that refers to key U and notes that process A + is the context in which key U should be instantiated and secured, and + from which associated key requests may be satisfied. + + (4) request_key() then forks and executes /sbin/request-key with a new session + keyring that contains a link to auth key V. + + (5) /sbin/request-key assumes the authority associated with key U. + + (6) /sbin/request-key execs an appropriate program to perform the actual + instantiation. + + (7) The program may want to access another key from A's context (say a + Kerberos TGT key). It just requests the appropriate key, and the keyring + search notes that the session keyring has auth key V in its bottom level. + + This will permit it to then search the keyrings of process A with the + UID, GID, groups and security info of process A as if it was process A, + and come up with key W. + + (8) The program then does what it must to get the data with which to + instantiate key U, using key W as a reference (perhaps it contacts a + Kerberos server using the TGT) and then instantiates key U. + + (9) Upon instantiating key U, auth key V is automatically revoked so that it + may not be used again. + +(10) The program then exits 0 and request_key() deletes key V and returns key + U to the caller. + +This also extends further. If key W (step 7 above) didn't exist, key W would +be created uninstantiated, another auth key (X) would be created (as per step +3) and another copy of /sbin/request-key spawned (as per step 4); but the +context specified by auth key X will still be process A, as it was in auth key +V. + +This is because process A's keyrings can't simply be attached to +/sbin/request-key at the appropriate places because (a) execve will discard two +of them, and (b) it requires the same UID/GID/Groups all the way through. + + +==================================== +NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION AND REJECTION +==================================== + +Rather than instantiating a key, it is possible for the possessor of an +authorisation key to negatively instantiate a key that's under construction. +This is a short duration placeholder that causes any attempt at re-requesting +the key whilst it exists to fail with error ENOKEY if negated or the specified +error if rejected. + +This is provided to prevent excessive repeated spawning of /sbin/request-key +processes for a key that will never be obtainable. + +Should the /sbin/request-key process exit anything other than 0 or die on a +signal, the key under construction will be automatically negatively +instantiated for a short amount of time. + + +==================== +THE SEARCH ALGORITHM +==================== + +A search of any particular keyring proceeds in the following fashion: + + (1) When the key management code searches for a key (keyring_search_aux) it + firstly calls key_permission(SEARCH) on the keyring it's starting with, + if this denies permission, it doesn't search further. + + (2) It considers all the non-keyring keys within that keyring and, if any key + matches the criteria specified, calls key_permission(SEARCH) on it to see + if the key is allowed to be found. If it is, that key is returned; if + not, the search continues, and the error code is retained if of higher + priority than the one currently set. + + (3) It then considers all the keyring-type keys in the keyring it's currently + searching. It calls key_permission(SEARCH) on each keyring, and if this + grants permission, it recurses, executing steps (2) and (3) on that + keyring. + +The process stops immediately a valid key is found with permission granted to +use it. Any error from a previous match attempt is discarded and the key is +returned. + +When search_process_keyrings() is invoked, it performs the following searches +until one succeeds: + + (1) If extant, the process's thread keyring is searched. + + (2) If extant, the process's process keyring is searched. + + (3) The process's session keyring is searched. + + (4) If the process has assumed the authority associated with a request_key() + authorisation key then: + + (a) If extant, the calling process's thread keyring is searched. + + (b) If extant, the calling process's process keyring is searched. + + (c) The calling process's session keyring is searched. + +The moment one succeeds, all pending errors are discarded and the found key is +returned. + +Only if all these fail does the whole thing fail with the highest priority +error. Note that several errors may have come from LSM. + +The error priority is: + + EKEYREVOKED > EKEYEXPIRED > ENOKEY + +EACCES/EPERM are only returned on a direct search of a specific keyring where +the basal keyring does not grant Search permission. diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8fb79bc1ac4b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ + Trusted and Encrypted Keys + +Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the existing kernel +key ring service. Both of these new types are variable length symmetic keys, +and in both cases all keys are created in the kernel, and user space sees, +stores, and loads only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability +of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip for greater security, while Encrypted +Keys can be used on any system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded +in hex ascii for convenience, and are integrity verified. + +Trusted Keys use a TPM both to generate and to seal the keys. Keys are sealed +under a 2048 bit RSA key in the TPM, and optionally sealed to specified PCR +(integrity measurement) values, and only unsealed by the TPM, if PCRs and blob +integrity verifications match. A loaded Trusted Key can be updated with new +(future) PCR values, so keys are easily migrated to new pcr values, such as +when the kernel and initramfs are updated. The same key can have many saved +blobs under different PCR values, so multiple boots are easily supported. + +By default, trusted keys are sealed under the SRK, which has the default +authorization value (20 zeros). This can be set at takeownership time with the +trouser's utility: "tpm_takeownership -u -z". + +Usage: + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen [options]" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob [pcrlock=pcrnum]" ring + keyctl update key "update [options]" + keyctl print keyid + + options: + keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK) + keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i + (40 ascii zeros) + blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... + (40 ascii zeros) + blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... + (40 ascii zeros) + pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) + pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob + migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, + default 1 (resealing allowed) + +"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard +TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. +Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits), the upper limit is to fit +within the 2048 bit SRK (RSA) keylength, with all necessary structure/padding. + +Encrypted keys do not depend on a TPM, and are faster, as they use AES for +encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel generated random +numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified 'master' key. The +'master' key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main +disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, +they are only as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key +should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in +boot. + +Usage: + keyctl add encrypted name "new key-type:master-key-name keylen" ring + keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name" + +where 'key-type' is either 'trusted' or 'user'. + +Examples of trusted and encrypted key usage: + +Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u + 440502848 + + $ keyctl show + Session Keyring + -3 --alswrv 500 500 keyring: _ses + 97833714 --alswrv 500 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.500 + 440502848 --alswrv 500 500 \_ trusted: kmk + + $ keyctl print 440502848 + 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915 + 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b + 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722 + a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec + d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d + dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0 + f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b + e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba + + $ keyctl pipe 440502848 > kmk.blob + +Load a trusted key from the saved blob: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u + 268728824 + + $ keyctl print 268728824 + 0101000000000000000001005d01b7e3f4a6be5709930f3b70a743cbb42e0cc95e18e915 + 3f60da455bbf1144ad12e4f92b452f966929f6105fd29ca28e4d4d5a031d068478bacb0b + 27351119f822911b0a11ba3d3498ba6a32e50dac7f32894dd890eb9ad578e4e292c83722 + a52e56a097e6a68b3f56f7a52ece0cdccba1eb62cad7d817f6dc58898b3ac15f36026fec + d568bd4a706cb60bb37be6d8f1240661199d640b66fb0fe3b079f97f450b9ef9c22c6d5d + dd379f0facd1cd020281dfa3c70ba21a3fa6fc2471dc6d13ecf8298b946f65345faa5ef0 + f1f8fff03ad0acb083725535636addb08d73dedb9832da198081e5deae84bfaf0409c22b + e4a8aea2b607ec96931e6f4d4fe563ba + +Reseal a trusted key under new pcr values: + + $ keyctl update 268728824 "update pcrinfo=`cat pcr.blob`" + $ keyctl print 268728824 + 010100000000002c0002800093c35a09b70fff26e7a98ae786c641e678ec6ffb6b46d805 + 77c8a6377aed9d3219c6dfec4b23ffe3000001005d37d472ac8a44023fbb3d18583a4f73 + d3a076c0858f6f1dcaa39ea0f119911ff03f5406df4f7f27f41da8d7194f45c9f4e00f2e + df449f266253aa3f52e55c53de147773e00f0f9aca86c64d94c95382265968c354c5eab4 + 9638c5ae99c89de1e0997242edfb0b501744e11ff9762dfd951cffd93227cc513384e7e6 + e782c29435c7ec2edafaa2f4c1fe6e7a781b59549ff5296371b42133777dcc5b8b971610 + 94bc67ede19e43ddb9dc2baacad374a36feaf0314d700af0a65c164b7082401740e489c9 + 7ef6a24defe4846104209bf0c3eced7fa1a672ed5b125fc9d8cd88b476a658a4434644ef + df8ae9a178e9f83ba9f08d10fa47e4226b98b0702f06b3b8 + +Create and save an encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk": + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u + 159771175 + + $ keyctl print 159771175 + trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55 + be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64 + 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc + + $ keyctl pipe 159771175 > evm.blob + +Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u + 831684262 + + $ keyctl print 831684262 + trusted:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382dbbc55 + be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e024717c64 + 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc + + +The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high +quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a +trusted key provides strong guarantees that the EVM key has not been +compromised by a user level problem, and when sealed to specific boot PCR +values, protects against boot and offline attacks. Other uses for trusted and +encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption are anticipated. diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4d75931d2d79 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1290 @@ + ============================ + KERNEL KEY RETENTION SERVICE + ============================ + +This service allows cryptographic keys, authentication tokens, cross-domain +user mappings, and similar to be cached in the kernel for the use of +filesystems and other kernel services. + +Keyrings are permitted; these are a special type of key that can hold links to +other keys. Processes each have three standard keyring subscriptions that a +kernel service can search for relevant keys. + +The key service can be configured on by enabling: + + "Security options"/"Enable access key retention support" (CONFIG_KEYS) + +This document has the following sections: + + - Key overview + - Key service overview + - Key access permissions + - SELinux support + - New procfs files + - Userspace system call interface + - Kernel services + - Notes on accessing payload contents + - Defining a key type + - Request-key callback service + - Garbage collection + + +============ +KEY OVERVIEW +============ + +In this context, keys represent units of cryptographic data, authentication +tokens, keyrings, etc.. These are represented in the kernel by struct key. + +Each key has a number of attributes: + + - A serial number. + - A type. + - A description (for matching a key in a search). + - Access control information. + - An expiry time. + - A payload. + - State. + + + (*) Each key is issued a serial number of type key_serial_t that is unique for + the lifetime of that key. All serial numbers are positive non-zero 32-bit + integers. + + Userspace programs can use a key's serial numbers as a way to gain access + to it, subject to permission checking. + + (*) Each key is of a defined "type". Types must be registered inside the + kernel by a kernel service (such as a filesystem) before keys of that type + can be added or used. Userspace programs cannot define new types directly. + + Key types are represented in the kernel by struct key_type. This defines a + number of operations that can be performed on a key of that type. + + Should a type be removed from the system, all the keys of that type will + be invalidated. + + (*) Each key has a description. This should be a printable string. The key + type provides an operation to perform a match between the description on a + key and a criterion string. + + (*) Each key has an owner user ID, a group ID and a permissions mask. These + are used to control what a process may do to a key from userspace, and + whether a kernel service will be able to find the key. + + (*) Each key can be set to expire at a specific time by the key type's + instantiation function. Keys can also be immortal. + + (*) Each key can have a payload. This is a quantity of data that represent the + actual "key". In the case of a keyring, this is a list of keys to which + the keyring links; in the case of a user-defined key, it's an arbitrary + blob of data. + + Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact, just be a + value stored in the struct key itself. + + When a key is instantiated, the key type's instantiation function is + called with a blob of data, and that then creates the key's payload in + some way. + + Similarly, when userspace wants to read back the contents of the key, if + permitted, another key type operation will be called to convert the key's + attached payload back into a blob of data. + + (*) Each key can be in one of a number of basic states: + + (*) Uninstantiated. The key exists, but does not have any data attached. + Keys being requested from userspace will be in this state. + + (*) Instantiated. This is the normal state. The key is fully formed, and + has data attached. + + (*) Negative. This is a relatively short-lived state. The key acts as a + note saying that a previous call out to userspace failed, and acts as + a throttle on key lookups. A negative key can be updated to a normal + state. + + (*) Expired. Keys can have lifetimes set. If their lifetime is exceeded, + they traverse to this state. An expired key can be updated back to a + normal state. + + (*) Revoked. A key is put in this state by userspace action. It can't be + found or operated upon (apart from by unlinking it). + + (*) Dead. The key's type was unregistered, and so the key is now useless. + +Keys in the last three states are subject to garbage collection. See the +section on "Garbage collection". + + +==================== +KEY SERVICE OVERVIEW +==================== + +The key service provides a number of features besides keys: + + (*) The key service defines two special key types: + + (+) "keyring" + + Keyrings are special keys that contain a list of other keys. Keyring + lists can be modified using various system calls. Keyrings should not + be given a payload when created. + + (+) "user" + + A key of this type has a description and a payload that are arbitrary + blobs of data. These can be created, updated and read by userspace, + and aren't intended for use by kernel services. + + (*) Each process subscribes to three keyrings: a thread-specific keyring, a + process-specific keyring, and a session-specific keyring. + + The thread-specific keyring is discarded from the child when any sort of + clone, fork, vfork or execve occurs. A new keyring is created only when + required. + + The process-specific keyring is replaced with an empty one in the child on + clone, fork, vfork unless CLONE_THREAD is supplied, in which case it is + shared. execve also discards the process's process keyring and creates a + new one. + + The session-specific keyring is persistent across clone, fork, vfork and + execve, even when the latter executes a set-UID or set-GID binary. A + process can, however, replace its current session keyring with a new one + by using PR_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. It is permitted to request an anonymous + new one, or to attempt to create or join one of a specific name. + + The ownership of the thread keyring changes when the real UID and GID of + the thread changes. + + (*) Each user ID resident in the system holds two special keyrings: a user + specific keyring and a default user session keyring. The default session + keyring is initialised with a link to the user-specific keyring. + + When a process changes its real UID, if it used to have no session key, it + will be subscribed to the default session key for the new UID. + + If a process attempts to access its session key when it doesn't have one, + it will be subscribed to the default for its current UID. + + (*) Each user has two quotas against which the keys they own are tracked. One + limits the total number of keys and keyrings, the other limits the total + amount of description and payload space that can be consumed. + + The user can view information on this and other statistics through procfs + files. The root user may also alter the quota limits through sysctl files + (see the section "New procfs files"). + + Process-specific and thread-specific keyrings are not counted towards a + user's quota. + + If a system call that modifies a key or keyring in some way would put the + user over quota, the operation is refused and error EDQUOT is returned. + + (*) There's a system call interface by which userspace programs can create and + manipulate keys and keyrings. + + (*) There's a kernel interface by which services can register types and search + for keys. + + (*) There's a way for the a search done from the kernel to call back to + userspace to request a key that can't be found in a process's keyrings. + + (*) An optional filesystem is available through which the key database can be + viewed and manipulated. + + +====================== +KEY ACCESS PERMISSIONS +====================== + +Keys have an owner user ID, a group access ID, and a permissions mask. The mask +has up to eight bits each for possessor, user, group and other access. Only +six of each set of eight bits are defined. These permissions granted are: + + (*) View + + This permits a key or keyring's attributes to be viewed - including key + type and description. + + (*) Read + + This permits a key's payload to be viewed or a keyring's list of linked + keys. + + (*) Write + + This permits a key's payload to be instantiated or updated, or it allows a + link to be added to or removed from a keyring. + + (*) Search + + This permits keyrings to be searched and keys to be found. Searches can + only recurse into nested keyrings that have search permission set. + + (*) Link + + This permits a key or keyring to be linked to. To create a link from a + keyring to a key, a process must have Write permission on the keyring and + Link permission on the key. + + (*) Set Attribute + + This permits a key's UID, GID and permissions mask to be changed. + +For changing the ownership, group ID or permissions mask, being the owner of +the key or having the sysadmin capability is sufficient. + + +=============== +SELINUX SUPPORT +=============== + +The security class "key" has been added to SELinux so that mandatory access +controls can be applied to keys created within various contexts. This support +is preliminary, and is likely to change quite significantly in the near future. +Currently, all of the basic permissions explained above are provided in SELinux +as well; SELinux is simply invoked after all basic permission checks have been +performed. + +The value of the file /proc/self/attr/keycreate influences the labeling of +newly-created keys. If the contents of that file correspond to an SELinux +security context, then the key will be assigned that context. Otherwise, the +key will be assigned the current context of the task that invoked the key +creation request. Tasks must be granted explicit permission to assign a +particular context to newly-created keys, using the "create" permission in the +key security class. + +The default keyrings associated with users will be labeled with the default +context of the user if and only if the login programs have been instrumented to +properly initialize keycreate during the login process. Otherwise, they will +be labeled with the context of the login program itself. + +Note, however, that the default keyrings associated with the root user are +labeled with the default kernel context, since they are created early in the +boot process, before root has a chance to log in. + +The keyrings associated with new threads are each labeled with the context of +their associated thread, and both session and process keyrings are handled +similarly. + + +================ +NEW PROCFS FILES +================ + +Two files have been added to procfs by which an administrator can find out +about the status of the key service: + + (*) /proc/keys + + This lists the keys that are currently viewable by the task reading the + file, giving information about their type, description and permissions. + It is not possible to view the payload of the key this way, though some + information about it may be given. + + The only keys included in the list are those that grant View permission to + the reading process whether or not it possesses them. Note that LSM + security checks are still performed, and may further filter out keys that + the current process is not authorised to view. + + The contents of the file look like this: + + SERIAL FLAGS USAGE EXPY PERM UID GID TYPE DESCRIPTION: SUMMARY + 00000001 I----- 39 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _uid_ses.0: 1/4 + 00000002 I----- 2 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _uid.0: empty + 00000007 I----- 1 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _pid.1: empty + 0000018d I----- 1 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _pid.412: empty + 000004d2 I--Q-- 1 perm 1f3f0000 32 -1 keyring _uid.32: 1/4 + 000004d3 I--Q-- 3 perm 1f3f0000 32 -1 keyring _uid_ses.32: empty + 00000892 I--QU- 1 perm 1f000000 0 0 user metal:copper: 0 + 00000893 I--Q-N 1 35s 1f3f0000 0 0 user metal:silver: 0 + 00000894 I--Q-- 1 10h 003f0000 0 0 user metal:gold: 0 + + The flags are: + + I Instantiated + R Revoked + D Dead + Q Contributes to user's quota + U Under construction by callback to userspace + N Negative key + + This file must be enabled at kernel configuration time as it allows anyone + to list the keys database. + + (*) /proc/key-users + + This file lists the tracking data for each user that has at least one key + on the system. Such data includes quota information and statistics: + + [root@andromeda root]# cat /proc/key-users + 0: 46 45/45 1/100 13/10000 + 29: 2 2/2 2/100 40/10000 + 32: 2 2/2 2/100 40/10000 + 38: 2 2/2 2/100 40/10000 + + The format of each line is + <UID>: User ID to which this applies + <usage> Structure refcount + <inst>/<keys> Total number of keys and number instantiated + <keys>/<max> Key count quota + <bytes>/<max> Key size quota + + +Four new sysctl files have been added also for the purpose of controlling the +quota limits on keys: + + (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys + /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes + + These files hold the maximum number of keys that root may have and the + maximum total number of bytes of data that root may have stored in those + keys. + + (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys + /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes + + These files hold the maximum number of keys that each non-root user may + have and the maximum total number of bytes of data that each of those + users may have stored in their keys. + +Root may alter these by writing each new limit as a decimal number string to +the appropriate file. + + +=============================== +USERSPACE SYSTEM CALL INTERFACE +=============================== + +Userspace can manipulate keys directly through three new syscalls: add_key, +request_key and keyctl. The latter provides a number of functions for +manipulating keys. + +When referring to a key directly, userspace programs should use the key's +serial number (a positive 32-bit integer). However, there are some special +values available for referring to special keys and keyrings that relate to the +process making the call: + + CONSTANT VALUE KEY REFERENCED + ============================== ====== =========================== + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING -1 thread-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING -2 process-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING -3 session-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING -4 UID-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING -5 UID-session keyring + KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING -6 GID-specific keyring + KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY -7 assumed request_key() + authorisation key + + +The main syscalls are: + + (*) Create a new key of given type, description and payload and add it to the + nominated keyring: + + key_serial_t add_key(const char *type, const char *desc, + const void *payload, size_t plen, + key_serial_t keyring); + + If a key of the same type and description as that proposed already exists + in the keyring, this will try to update it with the given payload, or it + will return error EEXIST if that function is not supported by the key + type. The process must also have permission to write to the key to be able + to update it. The new key will have all user permissions granted and no + group or third party permissions. + + Otherwise, this will attempt to create a new key of the specified type and + description, and to instantiate it with the supplied payload and attach it + to the keyring. In this case, an error will be generated if the process + does not have permission to write to the keyring. + + The payload is optional, and the pointer can be NULL if not required by + the type. The payload is plen in size, and plen can be zero for an empty + payload. + + A new keyring can be generated by setting type "keyring", the keyring name + as the description (or NULL) and setting the payload to NULL. + + User defined keys can be created by specifying type "user". It is + recommended that a user defined key's description by prefixed with a type + ID and a colon, such as "krb5tgt:" for a Kerberos 5 ticket granting + ticket. + + Any other type must have been registered with the kernel in advance by a + kernel service such as a filesystem. + + The ID of the new or updated key is returned if successful. + + + (*) Search the process's keyrings for a key, potentially calling out to + userspace to create it. + + key_serial_t request_key(const char *type, const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + key_serial_t dest_keyring); + + This function searches all the process's keyrings in the order thread, + process, session for a matching key. This works very much like + KEYCTL_SEARCH, including the optional attachment of the discovered key to + a keyring. + + If a key cannot be found, and if callout_info is not NULL, then + /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain a key. The + callout_info string will be passed as an argument to the program. + + See also Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt. + + +The keyctl syscall functions are: + + (*) Map a special key ID to a real key ID for this process: + + key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID, key_serial_t id, + int create); + + The special key specified by "id" is looked up (with the key being created + if necessary) and the ID of the key or keyring thus found is returned if + it exists. + + If the key does not yet exist, the key will be created if "create" is + non-zero; and the error ENOKEY will be returned if "create" is zero. + + + (*) Replace the session keyring this process subscribes to with a new one: + + key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, const char *name); + + If name is NULL, an anonymous keyring is created attached to the process + as its session keyring, displacing the old session keyring. + + If name is not NULL, if a keyring of that name exists, the process + attempts to attach it as the session keyring, returning an error if that + is not permitted; otherwise a new keyring of that name is created and + attached as the session keyring. + + To attach to a named keyring, the keyring must have search permission for + the process's ownership. + + The ID of the new session keyring is returned if successful. + + + (*) Update the specified key: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_UPDATE, key_serial_t key, const void *payload, + size_t plen); + + This will try to update the specified key with the given payload, or it + will return error EOPNOTSUPP if that function is not supported by the key + type. The process must also have permission to write to the key to be able + to update it. + + The payload is of length plen, and may be absent or empty as for + add_key(). + + + (*) Revoke a key: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_REVOKE, key_serial_t key); + + This makes a key unavailable for further operations. Further attempts to + use the key will be met with error EKEYREVOKED, and the key will no longer + be findable. + + + (*) Change the ownership of a key: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_CHOWN, key_serial_t key, uid_t uid, gid_t gid); + + This function permits a key's owner and group ID to be changed. Either one + of uid or gid can be set to -1 to suppress that change. + + Only the superuser can change a key's owner to something other than the + key's current owner. Similarly, only the superuser can change a key's + group ID to something other than the calling process's group ID or one of + its group list members. + + + (*) Change the permissions mask on a key: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key_serial_t key, key_perm_t perm); + + This function permits the owner of a key or the superuser to change the + permissions mask on a key. + + Only bits the available bits are permitted; if any other bits are set, + error EINVAL will be returned. + + + (*) Describe a key: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_DESCRIBE, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, + size_t buflen); + + This function returns a summary of the key's attributes (but not its + payload data) as a string in the buffer provided. + + Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could + produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more + than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy + will take place. + + A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be + successful. + + If successful, a string is placed in the buffer in the following format: + + <type>;<uid>;<gid>;<perm>;<description> + + Where type and description are strings, uid and gid are decimal, and perm + is hexadecimal. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if + the buffer is sufficiently big. + + This can be parsed with + + sscanf(buffer, "%[^;];%d;%d;%o;%s", type, &uid, &gid, &mode, desc); + + + (*) Clear out a keyring: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_CLEAR, key_serial_t keyring); + + This function clears the list of keys attached to a keyring. The calling + process must have write permission on the keyring, and it must be a + keyring (or else error ENOTDIR will result). + + + (*) Link a key into a keyring: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, key_serial_t keyring, key_serial_t key); + + This function creates a link from the keyring to the key. The process must + have write permission on the keyring and must have link permission on the + key. + + Should the keyring not be a keyring, error ENOTDIR will result; and if the + keyring is full, error ENFILE will result. + + The link procedure checks the nesting of the keyrings, returning ELOOP if + it appears too deep or EDEADLK if the link would introduce a cycle. + + Any links within the keyring to keys that match the new key in terms of + type and description will be discarded from the keyring as the new one is + added. + + + (*) Unlink a key or keyring from another keyring: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_UNLINK, key_serial_t keyring, key_serial_t key); + + This function looks through the keyring for the first link to the + specified key, and removes it if found. Subsequent links to that key are + ignored. The process must have write permission on the keyring. + + If the keyring is not a keyring, error ENOTDIR will result; and if the key + is not present, error ENOENT will be the result. + + + (*) Search a keyring tree for a key: + + key_serial_t keyctl(KEYCTL_SEARCH, key_serial_t keyring, + const char *type, const char *description, + key_serial_t dest_keyring); + + This searches the keyring tree headed by the specified keyring until a key + is found that matches the type and description criteria. Each keyring is + checked for keys before recursion into its children occurs. + + The process must have search permission on the top level keyring, or else + error EACCES will result. Only keyrings that the process has search + permission on will be recursed into, and only keys and keyrings for which + a process has search permission can be matched. If the specified keyring + is not a keyring, ENOTDIR will result. + + If the search succeeds, the function will attempt to link the found key + into the destination keyring if one is supplied (non-zero ID). All the + constraints applicable to KEYCTL_LINK apply in this case too. + + Error ENOKEY, EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED will be returned if the search + fails. On success, the resulting key ID will be returned. + + + (*) Read the payload data from a key: + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_READ, key_serial_t keyring, char *buffer, + size_t buflen); + + This function attempts to read the payload data from the specified key + into the buffer. The process must have read permission on the key to + succeed. + + The returned data will be processed for presentation by the key type. For + instance, a keyring will return an array of key_serial_t entries + representing the IDs of all the keys to which it is subscribed. The user + defined key type will return its data as is. If a key type does not + implement this function, error EOPNOTSUPP will result. + + As much of the data as can be fitted into the buffer will be copied to + userspace if the buffer pointer is not NULL. + + On a successful return, the function will always return the amount of data + available rather than the amount copied. + + + (*) Instantiate a partially constructed key. + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, key_serial_t key, + const void *payload, size_t plen, + key_serial_t keyring); + long keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV, key_serial_t key, + const struct iovec *payload_iov, unsigned ioc, + key_serial_t keyring); + + If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a + key, userspace should use this call to supply data for the key before the + invoked process returns, or else the key will be marked negative + automatically. + + The process must have write access on the key to be able to instantiate + it, and the key must be uninstantiated. + + If a keyring is specified (non-zero), the key will also be linked into + that keyring, however all the constraints applying in KEYCTL_LINK apply in + this case too. + + The payload and plen arguments describe the payload data as for add_key(). + + The payload_iov and ioc arguments describe the payload data in an iovec + array instead of a single buffer. + + + (*) Negatively instantiate a partially constructed key. + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_NEGATE, key_serial_t key, + unsigned timeout, key_serial_t keyring); + long keyctl(KEYCTL_REJECT, key_serial_t key, + unsigned timeout, unsigned error, key_serial_t keyring); + + If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a + key, userspace should use this call mark the key as negative before the + invoked process returns if it is unable to fulfil the request. + + The process must have write access on the key to be able to instantiate + it, and the key must be uninstantiated. + + If a keyring is specified (non-zero), the key will also be linked into + that keyring, however all the constraints applying in KEYCTL_LINK apply in + this case too. + + If the key is rejected, future searches for it will return the specified + error code until the rejected key expires. Negating the key is the same + as rejecting the key with ENOKEY as the error code. + + + (*) Set the default request-key destination keyring. + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING, int reqkey_defl); + + This sets the default keyring to which implicitly requested keys will be + attached for this thread. reqkey_defl should be one of these constants: + + CONSTANT VALUE NEW DEFAULT KEYRING + ====================================== ====== ======================= + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE -1 No change + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT 0 Default[1] + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING 1 Thread keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING 2 Process keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING 3 Session keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING 4 User keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING 5 User session keyring + KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING 6 Group keyring + + The old default will be returned if successful and error EINVAL will be + returned if reqkey_defl is not one of the above values. + + The default keyring can be overridden by the keyring indicated to the + request_key() system call. + + Note that this setting is inherited across fork/exec. + + [1] The default is: the thread keyring if there is one, otherwise + the process keyring if there is one, otherwise the session keyring if + there is one, otherwise the user default session keyring. + + + (*) Set the timeout on a key. + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT, key_serial_t key, unsigned timeout); + + This sets or clears the timeout on a key. The timeout can be 0 to clear + the timeout or a number of seconds to set the expiry time that far into + the future. + + The process must have attribute modification access on a key to set its + timeout. Timeouts may not be set with this function on negative, revoked + or expired keys. + + + (*) Assume the authority granted to instantiate a key + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY, key_serial_t key); + + This assumes or divests the authority required to instantiate the + specified key. Authority can only be assumed if the thread has the + authorisation key associated with the specified key in its keyrings + somewhere. + + Once authority is assumed, searches for keys will also search the + requester's keyrings using the requester's security label, UID, GID and + groups. + + If the requested authority is unavailable, error EPERM will be returned, + likewise if the authority has been revoked because the target key is + already instantiated. + + If the specified key is 0, then any assumed authority will be divested. + + The assumed authoritative key is inherited across fork and exec. + + + (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key. + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, + size_t buflen) + + This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context + attached to a key in the buffer provided. + + Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could + produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more + than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy + will take place. + + A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is + sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is + in force then an empty string will be returned. + + A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be + successful. + + + (*) Install the calling process's session keyring on its parent. + + long keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); + + This functions attempts to install the calling process's session keyring + on to the calling process's parent, replacing the parent's current session + keyring. + + The calling process must have the same ownership as its parent, the + keyring must have the same ownership as the calling process, the calling + process must have LINK permission on the keyring and the active LSM module + mustn't deny permission, otherwise error EPERM will be returned. + + Error ENOMEM will be returned if there was insufficient memory to complete + the operation, otherwise 0 will be returned to indicate success. + + The keyring will be replaced next time the parent process leaves the + kernel and resumes executing userspace. + + +=============== +KERNEL SERVICES +=============== + +The kernel services for key management are fairly simple to deal with. They can +be broken down into two areas: keys and key types. + +Dealing with keys is fairly straightforward. Firstly, the kernel service +registers its type, then it searches for a key of that type. It should retain +the key as long as it has need of it, and then it should release it. For a +filesystem or device file, a search would probably be performed during the open +call, and the key released upon close. How to deal with conflicting keys due to +two different users opening the same file is left to the filesystem author to +solve. + +To access the key manager, the following header must be #included: + + <linux/key.h> + +Specific key types should have a header file under include/keys/ that should be +used to access that type. For keys of type "user", for example, that would be: + + <keys/user-type.h> + +Note that there are two different types of pointers to keys that may be +encountered: + + (*) struct key * + + This simply points to the key structure itself. Key structures will be at + least four-byte aligned. + + (*) key_ref_t + + This is equivalent to a struct key *, but the least significant bit is set + if the caller "possesses" the key. By "possession" it is meant that the + calling processes has a searchable link to the key from one of its + keyrings. There are three functions for dealing with these: + + key_ref_t make_key_ref(const struct key *key, + unsigned long possession); + + struct key *key_ref_to_ptr(const key_ref_t key_ref); + + unsigned long is_key_possessed(const key_ref_t key_ref); + + The first function constructs a key reference from a key pointer and + possession information (which must be 0 or 1 and not any other value). + + The second function retrieves the key pointer from a reference and the + third retrieves the possession flag. + +When accessing a key's payload contents, certain precautions must be taken to +prevent access vs modification races. See the section "Notes on accessing +payload contents" for more information. + +(*) To search for a key, call: + + struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info); + + This is used to request a key or keyring with a description that matches + the description specified according to the key type's match function. This + permits approximate matching to occur. If callout_string is not NULL, then + /sbin/request-key will be invoked in an attempt to obtain the key from + userspace. In that case, callout_string will be passed as an argument to + the program. + + Should the function fail error ENOKEY, EKEYEXPIRED or EKEYREVOKED will be + returned. + + If successful, the key will have been attached to the default keyring for + implicitly obtained request-key keys, as set by KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING. + + See also Documentation/security/keys-request-key.txt. + + +(*) To search for a key, passing auxiliary data to the upcaller, call: + + struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const void *callout_info, + size_t callout_len, + void *aux); + + This is identical to request_key(), except that the auxiliary data is + passed to the key_type->request_key() op if it exists, and the callout_info + is a blob of length callout_len, if given (the length may be 0). + + +(*) A key can be requested asynchronously by calling one of: + + struct key *request_key_async(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const void *callout_info, + size_t callout_len); + + or: + + struct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + size_t callout_len, + void *aux); + + which are asynchronous equivalents of request_key() and + request_key_with_auxdata() respectively. + + These two functions return with the key potentially still under + construction. To wait for construction completion, the following should be + called: + + int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr); + + The function will wait for the key to finish being constructed and then + invokes key_validate() to return an appropriate value to indicate the state + of the key (0 indicates the key is usable). + + If intr is true, then the wait can be interrupted by a signal, in which + case error ERESTARTSYS will be returned. + + +(*) When it is no longer required, the key should be released using: + + void key_put(struct key *key); + + Or: + + void key_ref_put(key_ref_t key_ref); + + These can be called from interrupt context. If CONFIG_KEYS is not set then + the argument will not be parsed. + + +(*) Extra references can be made to a key by calling the following function: + + struct key *key_get(struct key *key); + + These need to be disposed of by calling key_put() when they've been + finished with. The key pointer passed in will be returned. If the pointer + is NULL or CONFIG_KEYS is not set then the key will not be dereferenced and + no increment will take place. + + +(*) A key's serial number can be obtained by calling: + + key_serial_t key_serial(struct key *key); + + If key is NULL or if CONFIG_KEYS is not set then 0 will be returned (in the + latter case without parsing the argument). + + +(*) If a keyring was found in the search, this can be further searched by: + + key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring_ref, + const struct key_type *type, + const char *description) + + This searches the keyring tree specified for a matching key. Error ENOKEY + is returned upon failure (use IS_ERR/PTR_ERR to determine). If successful, + the returned key will need to be released. + + The possession attribute from the keyring reference is used to control + access through the permissions mask and is propagated to the returned key + reference pointer if successful. + + +(*) To check the validity of a key, this function can be called: + + int validate_key(struct key *key); + + This checks that the key in question hasn't expired or and hasn't been + revoked. Should the key be invalid, error EKEYEXPIRED or EKEYREVOKED will + be returned. If the key is NULL or if CONFIG_KEYS is not set then 0 will be + returned (in the latter case without parsing the argument). + + +(*) To register a key type, the following function should be called: + + int register_key_type(struct key_type *type); + + This will return error EEXIST if a type of the same name is already + present. + + +(*) To unregister a key type, call: + + void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *type); + + +Under some circumstances, it may be desirable to deal with a bundle of keys. +The facility provides access to the keyring type for managing such a bundle: + + struct key_type key_type_keyring; + +This can be used with a function such as request_key() to find a specific +keyring in a process's keyrings. A keyring thus found can then be searched +with keyring_search(). Note that it is not possible to use request_key() to +search a specific keyring, so using keyrings in this way is of limited utility. + + +=================================== +NOTES ON ACCESSING PAYLOAD CONTENTS +=================================== + +The simplest payload is just a number in key->payload.value. In this case, +there's no need to indulge in RCU or locking when accessing the payload. + +More complex payload contents must be allocated and a pointer to them set in +key->payload.data. One of the following ways must be selected to access the +data: + + (1) Unmodifiable key type. + + If the key type does not have a modify method, then the key's payload can + be accessed without any form of locking, provided that it's known to be + instantiated (uninstantiated keys cannot be "found"). + + (2) The key's semaphore. + + The semaphore could be used to govern access to the payload and to control + the payload pointer. It must be write-locked for modifications and would + have to be read-locked for general access. The disadvantage of doing this + is that the accessor may be required to sleep. + + (3) RCU. + + RCU must be used when the semaphore isn't already held; if the semaphore + is held then the contents can't change under you unexpectedly as the + semaphore must still be used to serialise modifications to the key. The + key management code takes care of this for the key type. + + However, this means using: + + rcu_read_lock() ... rcu_dereference() ... rcu_read_unlock() + + to read the pointer, and: + + rcu_dereference() ... rcu_assign_pointer() ... call_rcu() + + to set the pointer and dispose of the old contents after a grace period. + Note that only the key type should ever modify a key's payload. + + Furthermore, an RCU controlled payload must hold a struct rcu_head for the + use of call_rcu() and, if the payload is of variable size, the length of + the payload. key->datalen cannot be relied upon to be consistent with the + payload just dereferenced if the key's semaphore is not held. + + +=================== +DEFINING A KEY TYPE +=================== + +A kernel service may want to define its own key type. For instance, an AFS +filesystem might want to define a Kerberos 5 ticket key type. To do this, it +author fills in a key_type struct and registers it with the system. + +Source files that implement key types should include the following header file: + + <linux/key-type.h> + +The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: + + (*) const char *name + + The name of the key type. This is used to translate a key type name + supplied by userspace into a pointer to the structure. + + + (*) size_t def_datalen + + This is optional - it supplies the default payload data length as + contributed to the quota. If the key type's payload is always or almost + always the same size, then this is a more efficient way to do things. + + The data length (and quota) on a particular key can always be changed + during instantiation or update by calling: + + int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen); + + With the revised data length. Error EDQUOT will be returned if this is not + viable. + + + (*) int (*vet_description)(const char *description); + + This optional method is called to vet a key description. If the key type + doesn't approve of the key description, it may return an error, otherwise + it should return 0. + + + (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); + + This method is called to attach a payload to a key during construction. + The payload attached need not bear any relation to the data passed to this + function. + + If the amount of data attached to the key differs from the size in + keytype->def_datalen, then key_payload_reserve() should be called. + + This method does not have to lock the key in order to attach a payload. + The fact that KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED is not set in key->flags prevents + anything else from gaining access to the key. + + It is safe to sleep in this method. + + + (*) int (*update)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); + + If this type of key can be updated, then this method should be provided. + It is called to update a key's payload from the blob of data provided. + + key_payload_reserve() should be called if the data length might change + before any changes are actually made. Note that if this succeeds, the type + is committed to changing the key because it's already been altered, so all + memory allocation must be done first. + + The key will have its semaphore write-locked before this method is called, + but this only deters other writers; any changes to the key's payload must + be made under RCU conditions, and call_rcu() must be used to dispose of + the old payload. + + key_payload_reserve() should be called before the changes are made, but + after all allocations and other potentially failing function calls are + made. + + It is safe to sleep in this method. + + + (*) int (*match)(const struct key *key, const void *desc); + + This method is called to match a key against a description. It should + return non-zero if the two match, zero if they don't. + + This method should not need to lock the key in any way. The type and + description can be considered invariant, and the payload should not be + accessed (the key may not yet be instantiated). + + It is not safe to sleep in this method; the caller may hold spinlocks. + + + (*) void (*revoke)(struct key *key); + + This method is optional. It is called to discard part of the payload + data upon a key being revoked. The caller will have the key semaphore + write-locked. + + It is safe to sleep in this method, though care should be taken to avoid + a deadlock against the key semaphore. + + + (*) void (*destroy)(struct key *key); + + This method is optional. It is called to discard the payload data on a key + when it is being destroyed. + + This method does not need to lock the key to access the payload; it can + consider the key as being inaccessible at this time. Note that the key's + type may have been changed before this function is called. + + It is not safe to sleep in this method; the caller may hold spinlocks. + + + (*) void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *p); + + This method is optional. It is called during /proc/keys reading to + summarise a key's description and payload in text form. + + This method will be called with the RCU read lock held. rcu_dereference() + should be used to read the payload pointer if the payload is to be + accessed. key->datalen cannot be trusted to stay consistent with the + contents of the payload. + + The description will not change, though the key's state may. + + It is not safe to sleep in this method; the RCU read lock is held by the + caller. + + + (*) long (*read)(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); + + This method is optional. It is called by KEYCTL_READ to translate the + key's payload into something a blob of data for userspace to deal with. + Ideally, the blob should be in the same format as that passed in to the + instantiate and update methods. + + If successful, the blob size that could be produced should be returned + rather than the size copied. + + This method will be called with the key's semaphore read-locked. This will + prevent the key's payload changing. It is not necessary to use RCU locking + when accessing the key's payload. It is safe to sleep in this method, such + as might happen when the userspace buffer is accessed. + + + (*) int (*request_key)(struct key_construction *cons, const char *op, + void *aux); + + This method is optional. If provided, request_key() and friends will + invoke this function rather than upcalling to /sbin/request-key to operate + upon a key of this type. + + The aux parameter is as passed to request_key_async_with_auxdata() and + similar or is NULL otherwise. Also passed are the construction record for + the key to be operated upon and the operation type (currently only + "create"). + + This method is permitted to return before the upcall is complete, but the + following function must be called under all circumstances to complete the + instantiation process, whether or not it succeeds, whether or not there's + an error: + + void complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error); + + The error parameter should be 0 on success, -ve on error. The + construction record is destroyed by this action and the authorisation key + will be revoked. If an error is indicated, the key under construction + will be negatively instantiated if it wasn't already instantiated. + + If this method returns an error, that error will be returned to the + caller of request_key*(). complete_request_key() must be called prior to + returning. + + The key under construction and the authorisation key can be found in the + key_construction struct pointed to by cons: + + (*) struct key *key; + + The key under construction. + + (*) struct key *authkey; + + The authorisation key. + + +============================ +REQUEST-KEY CALLBACK SERVICE +============================ + +To create a new key, the kernel will attempt to execute the following command +line: + + /sbin/request-key create <key> <uid> <gid> \ + <threadring> <processring> <sessionring> <callout_info> + +<key> is the key being constructed, and the three keyrings are the process +keyrings from the process that caused the search to be issued. These are +included for two reasons: + + (1) There may be an authentication token in one of the keyrings that is + required to obtain the key, eg: a Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket. + + (2) The new key should probably be cached in one of these rings. + +This program should set it UID and GID to those specified before attempting to +access any more keys. It may then look around for a user specific process to +hand the request off to (perhaps a path held in placed in another key by, for +example, the KDE desktop manager). + +The program (or whatever it calls) should finish construction of the key by +calling KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV, which also permits it to +cache the key in one of the keyrings (probably the session ring) before +returning. Alternatively, the key can be marked as negative with KEYCTL_NEGATE +or KEYCTL_REJECT; this also permits the key to be cached in one of the +keyrings. + +If it returns with the key remaining in the unconstructed state, the key will +be marked as being negative, it will be added to the session keyring, and an +error will be returned to the key requestor. + +Supplementary information may be provided from whoever or whatever invoked this +service. This will be passed as the <callout_info> parameter. If no such +information was made available, then "-" will be passed as this parameter +instead. + + +Similarly, the kernel may attempt to update an expired or a soon to expire key +by executing: + + /sbin/request-key update <key> <uid> <gid> \ + <threadring> <processring> <sessionring> + +In this case, the program isn't required to actually attach the key to a ring; +the rings are provided for reference. + + +================== +GARBAGE COLLECTION +================== + +Dead keys (for which the type has been removed) will be automatically unlinked +from those keyrings that point to them and deleted as soon as possible by a +background garbage collector. + +Similarly, revoked and expired keys will be garbage collected, but only after a +certain amount of time has passed. This time is set as a number of seconds in: + + /proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay diff --git a/Documentation/security/tomoyo.txt b/Documentation/security/tomoyo.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..200a2d37cbc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/tomoyo.txt @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +--- What is TOMOYO? --- + +TOMOYO is a name-based MAC extension (LSM module) for the Linux kernel. + +LiveCD-based tutorials are available at +http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/ubuntu10.04-live/ +http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/centos5-live/ . +Though these tutorials use non-LSM version of TOMOYO, they are useful for you +to know what TOMOYO is. + +--- How to enable TOMOYO? --- + +Build the kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO=y and pass "security=tomoyo" on +kernel's command line. + +Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ for details. + +--- Where is documentation? --- + +User <-> Kernel interface documentation is available at +http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/policy-reference.html . + +Materials we prepared for seminars and symposiums are available at +http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/?category_id=532&language_id=1 . +Below lists are chosen from three aspects. + +What is TOMOYO? + TOMOYO Linux Overview + http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-takeda.pdf + TOMOYO Linux: pragmatic and manageable security for Linux + http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/freedomhectaipei-tomoyo.pdf + TOMOYO Linux: A Practical Method to Understand and Protect Your Own Linux Box + http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/PacSec2007-en-no-demo.pdf + +What can TOMOYO do? + Deep inside TOMOYO Linux + http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-kumaneko.pdf + The role of "pathname based access control" in security. + http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008-bof.pdf + +History of TOMOYO? + Realities of Mainlining + http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008.pdf + +--- What is future plan? --- + +We believe that inode based security and name based security are complementary +and both should be used together. But unfortunately, so far, we cannot enable +multiple LSM modules at the same time. We feel sorry that you have to give up +SELinux/SMACK/AppArmor etc. when you want to use TOMOYO. + +We hope that LSM becomes stackable in future. Meanwhile, you can use non-LSM +version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/ . +LSM version of TOMOYO is a subset of non-LSM version of TOMOYO. We are planning +to port non-LSM version's functionalities to LSM versions. |
