Convert asserts to error logs where it makes sense

Change-Id: Idd15e39cc6be44c0865f13503bfa4482d77fcf0d
RTC:181899
Reviewed-on: http://ralgit01.raleigh.ibm.com/gerrit1/51042
Tested-by: Jenkins Server <pfd-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Baiocchi <mbaiocch@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jenkins OP Build CI <op-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jenkins OP HW <op-hw-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: FSP CI Jenkins <fsp-CI-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Gloff <mgloff@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas E. Bofferding <bofferdn@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel M. Crowell <dcrowell@us.ibm.com>

19 files changed, 807 insertions, 129 deletions

diff --git a/src/include/usr/pnor/pnor_reasoncodes.H b/src/include/usr/pnor/pnor_reasoncodes.H
index e9e98f9c5..589337a3b 100644
--- a/src/include/usr/pnor/pnor_reasoncodes.H
+++ b/src/include/usr/pnor/pnor_reasoncodes.H
@@ -182,6 +182,11 @@ namespace PNOR
         RC_NOT_A_LOADED_SECTION      = PNOR_COMP_ID | 0x35,
         RC_NOT_A_SUPPORTED_SECTION   = PNOR_COMP_ID | 0x36,
         RC_SECURE_UNLOAD_DISALLOWED  = PNOR_COMP_ID | 0x37,
+        RC_SECURE_TOTAL_SIZE_INVAL   = PNOR_COMP_ID | 0x38,
+        RC_SECURE_VADDR_MISMATCH     = PNOR_COMP_ID | 0x39,
+        RC_SECURE_SIZE_MISMATCH      = PNOR_COMP_ID | 0x3A,
+        RC_NOT_PAGE_ALIGNED          = PNOR_COMP_ID | 0x3B,
+        RC_SECURE_PRO_SIZE_MISMATCH  = PNOR_COMP_ID | 0x3C,
 
         //@fixme-RTC:131607-Temporary value to allow HWSV compile
         //termination_rc
diff --git a/src/include/usr/runtime/runtime_reasoncodes.H b/src/include/usr/runtime/runtime_reasoncodes.H
index 8bf056675..4ce07c0c2 100644
--- a/src/include/usr/runtime/runtime_reasoncodes.H
+++ b/src/include/usr/runtime/runtime_reasoncodes.H
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ namespace RUNTIME
         MOD_HDATSERVICE_MAPREGION       = 0x0B, /**< hdatservice.C */
         MOD_HDATSERVICE_GETINSTANCECOUNT = 0x0C, /**< hdatservice.C */
         MOD_HDATSERVICE_GETANDCHECKTUPLE = 0x0D, /**< hdatservice.C */
+        MOD_PREVERLIDMGR_LOAD_FROM_PNOR = 0x0E, /** preverifiedlidmgr.C **/
+        MOD_PREVERLIDMGR_LOAD_IMAGE = 0x0F, /** preverifiedlidmgr.C **/
 
         // customize_attrs_for_payload.C
         MOD_CUST_COMP_NON_PHYP_RT_TARGET = 0x12,
@@ -104,6 +106,14 @@ namespace RUNTIME
         RC_EXCEEDED_MEMORY             = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x27,
         RC_UNABLE_TO_PIN_ATTR_MEM      = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x28,
         RC_UNABLE_TO_UNPIN_ATTR_MEM    = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x29,
+        RC_TPM_HDAT_OUT_OF_SPACE       = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x2A,
+        RC_TPM_HDAT_ID_MISMATCH        = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x2B,
+        RC_TPM_HDAT_EYE_CATCH_MISMATCH = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x2C,
+        RC_TPM_MISSING_PROC            = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x2D,
+        RC_TPM_HDAT_BAD_VERSION        = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x2E,
+        RC_TPM_HDAT_BAD_NUM_I2C        = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x2F,
+        RC_INVALID_LID                 = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x30,
+        RC_PREVER_INVALID_SIZE         = RUNTIME_COMP_ID | 0x31,
     };
 
     enum UserDetailsTypes
diff --git a/src/include/usr/secureboot/header.H b/src/include/usr/secureboot/header.H
index eff1f6769..259d98467 100644
--- a/src/include/usr/secureboot/header.H
+++ b/src/include/usr/secureboot/header.H
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <pnor/pnorif.H>
 #include <util/singleton.H>
+#include <errl/errlentry.H>
+#include <errl/errlmanager.H>
 
 /** @file header.H
  *
@@ -64,9 +66,9 @@ namespace SECUREBOOT
              *      area preserved across the bootloader to HBB handoff to
              *      support extending HBB measurements to TPM
              *
-             *  @warning Asserts if header is already cached (code bug)
+             * @return Error handle if error; otherwise nullptr
              */
-            void loadHeader();
+            errlHndl_t loadHeader();
 
             /**
              *  @brief Return pointer to base image (HBB) header.
diff --git a/src/include/usr/secureboot/secure_reasoncodes.H b/src/include/usr/secureboot/secure_reasoncodes.H
index 21c195b77..49d42e15f 100644
--- a/src/include/usr/secureboot/secure_reasoncodes.H
+++ b/src/include/usr/secureboot/secure_reasoncodes.H
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ namespace SECUREBOOT
         MOD_SECURE_CONT_HDR_PARSE       = 0x0A,
         MOD_SECURE_CONT_HDR_CPY_INC     = 0x0B,
         MOD_SECURE_CONT_VALIDATE        = 0x0C,
+        MOD_SECURE_SET_SBE_SECURE_MODE  = 0x0D,
+        MOD_SECURE_GET_ALL_SEC_REGS     = 0x0E,
+        MOD_SECURE_LOAD_HEADER          = 0x0F,
    };
 
     enum SECUREReasonCode
@@ -61,6 +64,11 @@ namespace SECUREBOOT
         RC_SECROM_INVALID               = SECURE_COMP_ID | 0x0B,
         RC_CONT_HDR_NO_SPACE            = SECURE_COMP_ID | 0x0C,
         RC_CONT_HDR_INVALID             = SECURE_COMP_ID | 0x0D,
+        RC_SBE_INVALID_SEC_MODE         = SECURE_COMP_ID | 0x0E,
+        RC_DEVICE_WRITE_ERR             = SECURE_COMP_ID | 0x0F,
+        RC_PROC_NOT_SCOMABLE            = SECURE_COMP_ID | 0x10,
+        RC_DEVICE_READ_ERR              = SECURE_COMP_ID | 0x11,
+        RC_INVALID_BASE_HEADER          = SECURE_COMP_ID | 0x12,
 
         // Reason codes 0xA0 - 0xEF reserved for trustedboot_reasoncodes.H
     };
diff --git a/src/include/usr/secureboot/service.H b/src/include/usr/secureboot/service.H
index dc1fd5a78..7d8953cde 100644
--- a/src/include/usr/secureboot/service.H
+++ b/src/include/usr/secureboot/service.H
@@ -347,8 +347,11 @@ namespace SECUREBOOT
      *                     a value of 0 if SBE should check for security disable
      *                     requests and 1 if not. All other values are not
      *                     allowed and will be rejected via an assert.
+     *
+     *  @return errlHndl_t Error log handle; nullptr if success, pointer to
+     *      valid error log otherwise.
      */
-    void setSbeSecurityMode(uint8_t i_sbeSecurityMode);
+    errlHndl_t setSbeSecurityMode(uint8_t i_sbeSecurityMode);
 
 }
 
diff --git a/src/include/usr/util/util_reasoncodes.H b/src/include/usr/util/util_reasoncodes.H
index 2b43b6757..587943bdd 100644
--- a/src/include/usr/util/util_reasoncodes.H
+++ b/src/include/usr/util/util_reasoncodes.H
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ namespace Util
         UTIL_MCL_REL_MEM        = 0x11,       // MasterContainerLidMgr::releaseMem
         UTIL_MCL_PROCESS_COMP   = 0x12,       // MasterContainerLidMgr::processComponent
         UTIL_MOD_GET_OBUS_PLL_BUCKET = 0x14,  // UtilCommonAttr::getObusPllBucket
+        UTIL_LIDMGR_CSTOR       = 0x15,       // UtilLidMgr::UtilLidMgr
     };
 
     enum ReasonCode
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ namespace Util
         UTIL_MCL_SIZE_MISMATCH           = UTIL_COMP_ID | 0x18,
         UTIL_ERC_NO_FREQ_LIST            = UTIL_COMP_ID | 0x1A,
         UTIL_ERC_NO_MATCHING_FREQ        = UTIL_COMP_ID | 0x1B,
+        UTIL_LIDMGR_INVAL_LID_REQUEST    = UTIL_COMP_ID | 0x1C,
     };
 };
 
diff --git a/src/include/usr/util/utillidmgr.H b/src/include/usr/util/utillidmgr.H
index c2ac2d9a0..a80f67876 100644
--- a/src/include/usr/util/utillidmgr.H
+++ b/src/include/usr/util/utillidmgr.H
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *  @par Detailed Description
      *      Ensures member variables are initialized to sane values.
      *      Sets the initial LID ID.
+     *      Note will shutdown if error occurs during updateLid and not Runtime
      *
      *  @param[in] i_lidId
      *                LID ID.
@@ -111,8 +112,8 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *                   LID ID.
      *
      *  @return     errlHndl_t
-     *                  return errl ==  NULL  -> success
-     *                  return errl !=  NULL  -> failure
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
     errlHndl_t setLidId(uint32_t i_lidId);
 
@@ -127,8 +128,8 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *                   Size of the LID in bytes.
      *
      *  @return     errlHndl_t
-     *                  return errl ==  NULL  -> success
-     *                  return errl !=  NULL  -> failure
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
     errlHndl_t getLidSize(size_t& o_lidSize);
 
@@ -150,8 +151,8 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *          for LID.
      *
      *  @return     errlHndl_t
-     *                  return errl ==  NULL  -> success
-     *                  return errl !=  NULL  -> failure
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
     errlHndl_t getLid(void* i_dest, size_t i_destSize);
 
@@ -173,8 +174,8 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *
      *
      *  @return     errlHndl_t
-     *                  return errl ==  NULL  -> success
-     *                  return errl !=  NULL  -> failure
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
     errlHndl_t getStoredLidImage(void*& o_pLidImage,
                                  size_t& o_lidImageSize);
@@ -187,8 +188,8 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *          Clears variables associated with storing the image.
      *
      *  @return     errlHndl_t
-     *                  return errl ==  NULL  -> success
-     *                  return errl !=  NULL  -> failure
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
     errlHndl_t releaseLidImage(void);
 
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      */
     inline const void* getLidVirtAddr() const
     {
-        const void* l_addr = NULL;
+        const void* l_addr = nullptr;
         // Get pointer to PNOR vaddr
         if (iv_isLidInPnor)
         {
@@ -239,8 +240,11 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *
      *  @param[in] i_lidId
      *                   LID ID.
+     *  @return     errlHndl_t
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
-    void updateLid(uint32_t i_lidId);
+    errlHndl_t updateLid(uint32_t i_lidId);
 
    /**
     *  @brief performs object cleanup when a new lidId is set
@@ -272,8 +276,8 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *                   Indicates image was found in PNOR
      *
      *  @return     errlHndl_t
-     *                  return errl ==  NULL  -> success
-     *                  return errl !=  NULL  -> failure
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
     errlHndl_t getLidSizePnor(size_t& o_lidSize, bool& o_imgInPnor);
 
@@ -302,8 +306,8 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *                   Indicates image was found in PNOR
      *
      *  @return     errlHndl_t
-     *                  return errl ==  NULL  -> success
-     *                  return errl !=  NULL  -> failure
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
     errlHndl_t getLidPnor(void* i_dest,
                           size_t i_destSize,
@@ -335,8 +339,8 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *            the mutex.
      *
      *  @return     errlHndl_t
-     *                  return errl ==  NULL  -> success
-     *                  return errl !=  NULL  -> failure
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
     errlHndl_t createMsgQueue();
 
@@ -370,8 +374,8 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *                    the fsp.
      *
      *  @return     errlHndl_t
-     *                  return errl ==  NULL  -> success
-     *                  return errl !=  NULL  -> failure
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
      */
     errlHndl_t  sendMboxMessage( MBOX_MSG_TYPE i_type, msg_t * i_msg  );
 
@@ -437,11 +441,15 @@ class UtilLidMgr
      *  @param[in] i_lidId          - lid id to search for
      *  @param[out] o_lidPnorInfo   - pnor section info associated with the lid
      *                                if it exists in pnor
+     *  @param[out] o_isLidInPnor   - True if lid is in a section, false otherwise
      *
-     *  @return bool - True if lid is in a section, false otherwise
+     *  @return     errlHndl_t
+     *                  return errl ==  nullptr  -> success
+     *                  return errl !=  nullptr  -> failure
     */
-    bool getLidPnorSectionInfo(uint32_t i_lidId,
-                               PNOR::SectionInfo_t &o_lidPnorInfo);
+    errlHndl_t getLidPnorSectionInfo(uint32_t i_lidId,
+                                     PNOR::SectionInfo_t &o_lidPnorInfo,
+                                     bool &o_isLidInPnor);
     /**
      * @brief LID fileName
      */
diff --git a/src/usr/errl/parser/genErrlParsers.pl b/src/usr/errl/parser/genErrlParsers.pl
index e1bf5b3eb..e0da36c07 100755
--- a/src/usr/errl/parser/genErrlParsers.pl
+++ b/src/usr/errl/parser/genErrlParsers.pl
@@ -472,6 +472,7 @@ foreach my $file (@filesToParse)
     #     * @userdata1      i_opType
     #     * @userdata2      addr
     #     * @devdesc        Invalid Operation type.
+    #     * @custdec        Firmware Error
     #     */
     # =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
     while (my $line = <PARSE_FILE>)
diff --git a/src/usr/pnor/pnorrp.C b/src/usr/pnor/pnorrp.C
index a874d3735..f596401e9 100644
--- a/src/usr/pnor/pnorrp.C
+++ b/src/usr/pnor/pnorrp.C
@@ -528,7 +528,33 @@ errlHndl_t PnorRP::getSectionInfo( PNOR::SectionId i_section,
                     break;
                 }
                 payloadTextSize = l_conHdr.payloadTextSize();
-                assert(payloadTextSize > 0,"Non-zero payload text size expected.");
+                if ( payloadTextSize <= 0)
+                {
+                    TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor, ERR_MRK"PnorRP::getSectionInfo: non-zero protected payload text size expected for section %s",
+                              o_info.name);
+
+                    /*@
+                     * @errortype
+                     * @moduleid         PNOR::MOD_PNORRP_GETSECTIONINFO
+                     * @reasoncode       PNOR::RC_SECTION_SIZE_IS_ZERO
+                     * @userdata1        PNOR section
+                     * @userdata2        Section's secure flag
+                     * @devdesc          Protected Payload Size is 0
+                     * @custdesc         Platform security problem detected
+                     */
+                    l_errhdl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                                        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                                        PNOR::MOD_PNORRP_GETSECTIONINFO,
+                                        PNOR::RC_SECTION_SIZE_IS_ZERO,
+                                        i_section,
+                                        o_info.secure,
+                                        true /*Add HB SW Callout*/);
+                    l_errhdl->collectTrace(PNOR_COMP_NAME);
+                    l_errhdl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+                    // set the return section to our invalid data
+                    id = PNOR::INVALID_SECTION;
+                    break;
+                }
 
                 // skip secure header for secure sections at this point in time
                 o_info.vaddr += PAGESIZE;
diff --git a/src/usr/pnor/spnorrp.C b/src/usr/pnor/spnorrp.C
index 29dd6de64..72a03d026 100644
--- a/src/usr/pnor/spnorrp.C
+++ b/src/usr/pnor/spnorrp.C
@@ -363,8 +363,33 @@ uint64_t SPnorRP::verifySections(SectionId i_id,
         l_info.size += PAGESIZE; // add a page to size to account for the header
 
         // it's a coding error if l_info.vaddr is not in secure space
-        assert(l_info.vaddr >= SBASE_VADDR, "Virtual address for section %s is"
-            " not in secure space. Bad ptr=0x%X", l_info.name, l_info.vaddr);
+        if (l_info.vaddr < SBASE_VADDR)
+        {
+            TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor,ERR_MRK"SPnorRP::verifySections Virtual address for section %s is not in secure space. Virtual address=0x%llX",
+                      l_info.name, l_info.vaddr);
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid        PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS
+             * @reasoncode      PNOR::RC_SECURE_VADDR_MISMATCH
+             * @userdata1       PNOR section
+             * @userdata2       PNOR section virtual address
+             * @devdesc         Virtual address of PNOR section is not in Secure Space
+             * @custdesc        Platform Security Error
+             */
+            l_errhdl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                            PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS,
+                            PNOR::RC_SECURE_VADDR_MISMATCH,
+                            TO_UINT64(i_id),
+                            l_info.vaddr,
+                            true);
+            SECUREBOOT::addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(l_errhdl);
+            l_errhdl->collectTrace(PNOR_COMP_NAME);
+            l_errhdl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+            break;
+        }
+
 
         // Note: A pointer to virtual memory in one PNOR space can be converted
         // to a pointer to any of the other two PNOR spaces and visa versa.
@@ -433,20 +458,65 @@ uint64_t SPnorRP::verifySections(SectionId i_id,
         TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor, "SPnorRP::verifySections "
                 "Total container size = 0x%.16llX", l_totalContainerSize);
 
-        assert(l_totalContainerSize >= PAGESIZE +
-               + l_info.secureProtectedPayloadSize,
-               "For section %s, total container size (%d) was less than header "
-               "size (4096) + payload text size (%d)",
-               l_info.name,
-               l_totalContainerSize,
-               l_info.secureProtectedPayloadSize);
-
-        assert(l_info.size >= l_totalContainerSize,
-               "For section %s, logical section size (%d) was less than total "
-               "container size (%d)",
-               l_info.name,
-               l_info.size,
-               l_totalContainerSize);
+        if (l_totalContainerSize <
+            (PAGESIZE + l_info.secureProtectedPayloadSize))
+        {
+            TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor,ERR_MRK"SPnorRP::verifySections For section %s, total container size (%d) was less than header "
+                      "size (4096) + payload text size (%d)",
+                      l_info.name,
+                      l_totalContainerSize,
+                      l_info.secureProtectedPayloadSize)
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid        PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS
+             * @reasoncode      PNOR::RC_SECURE_TOTAL_SIZE_INVAL
+             * @userdata1       PNOR section
+             * @userdata2       Protected Payload Size plus Header Size
+             * @devdesc         Total Container Size smaller than Protected Payload and Header size
+             * @custdesc        Failure in security subsystem
+             */
+            l_errhdl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                            PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS,
+                            PNOR::RC_SECURE_TOTAL_SIZE_INVAL,
+                            TO_UINT64(i_id),
+                            PAGESIZE + l_info.secureProtectedPayloadSize,
+                            true);
+            SECUREBOOT::addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(l_errhdl);
+            l_errhdl->collectTrace(PNOR_COMP_NAME);
+            l_errhdl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if (l_info.size < l_totalContainerSize)
+        {
+            TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor,ERR_MRK"SPnorRP::verifySections For section %s, logical section size (%d) was less than total container size (%d)",
+                      l_info.name,
+                      l_info.size,
+                      l_totalContainerSize);
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid        PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS
+             * @reasoncode      PNOR::RC_SECURE_SIZE_MISMATCH
+             * @userdata1       PNOR section
+             * @userdata2       Total Container Size
+             * @devdesc         PNOR section size smaller than total container size
+             * @custdesc        Failure in security subsystem
+             */
+            l_errhdl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                            PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS,
+                            PNOR::RC_SECURE_SIZE_MISMATCH,
+                            TO_UINT64(i_id),
+                            l_totalContainerSize,
+                            true);
+            SECUREBOOT::addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(l_errhdl);
+            l_errhdl->collectTrace(PNOR_COMP_NAME);
+            l_errhdl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+            break;
+        }
 
         TRACDCOMP(g_trac_pnor,"SPnorRP::verifySections did memcpy");
         TRACDBIN(g_trac_pnor,"SPnorRP::verifySections temp mem now: ",
@@ -505,7 +575,35 @@ uint64_t SPnorRP::verifySections(SectionId i_id,
         // store the payload text size in the section load record
         // Note: the text size we get back is now trusted
         io_rec->textSize = l_conHdr.payloadTextSize();
-        assert(io_rec->textSize == l_info.secureProtectedPayloadSize);
+        if (io_rec->textSize != l_info.secureProtectedPayloadSize)
+        {
+            TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor,ERR_MRK"SPnorRP::verifySections For section %s, verified protected size (%d) does not equal unverified size parsed by pnorrp (%d)",
+                      l_info.name,
+                      io_rec->textSize ,
+                      l_info.secureProtectedPayloadSize);
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid        PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS
+             * @reasoncode      PNOR::RC_SECURE_PRO_SIZE_MISMATCH
+             * @userdata1       PNOR section
+             * @userdata2       Protected Payload Size
+             * @devdesc         Verified Protected Payload size does not match what was parsed by PnorRp
+             * @custdesc        Failure in security subsystem
+             */
+            l_errhdl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                            PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS,
+                            PNOR::RC_SECURE_PRO_SIZE_MISMATCH,
+                            TO_UINT64(i_id),
+                            l_info.secureProtectedPayloadSize,
+                            true);
+            SECUREBOOT::addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(l_errhdl);
+            l_errhdl->collectTrace(PNOR_COMP_NAME);
+            l_errhdl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+            break;
+        }
+
         // Size of data loaded into Secure PnorRP vaddr space (Includes Header)
         size_t l_protectedSizeWithHdr = PAGESIZE + io_rec->textSize;
         TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor, "SPnorRP::verifySections Total Protected size with Header = 0x%.16llX",
@@ -562,13 +660,33 @@ uint64_t SPnorRP::verifySections(SectionId i_id,
                 unprotectedPayloadSize,
                 l_info.name);
 
-            // Split the mod math out of the assert as the trace would not
-            // display otherwise.
-            bool l_onPageBoundary = !(io_rec->textSize % PAGESIZE);
-            assert( l_onPageBoundary, "For section %s, payloadTextSize does "
-                    "not fall on a page boundary and there is an unprotected "
-                    "payload",
-                    l_info.name);
+            if ((io_rec->textSize % PAGESIZE))
+            {
+                TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor,ERR_MRK"SPnorRP::verifySections For section %s, payloadTextSize does not fall on a page boundary and there is an unprotected payload",
+                          l_info.name);
+                /*@
+                 * @errortype
+                 * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+                 * @moduleid        PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS
+                 * @reasoncode      PNOR::RC_NOT_PAGE_ALIGNED
+                 * @userdata1       PNOR section
+                 * @userdata2       Protected Payload Size
+                 * @devdesc         Protected Payload Size not Page aligned
+                 * @custdesc        Failure in security subsystem
+                 */
+                l_errhdl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                                ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                                PNOR::MOD_SPNORRP_VERIFYSECTIONS,
+                                PNOR::RC_NOT_PAGE_ALIGNED,
+                                TO_UINT64(i_id),
+                                io_rec->textSize,
+                                true);
+                SECUREBOOT::addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(l_errhdl);
+                l_errhdl->collectTrace(PNOR_COMP_NAME);
+                l_errhdl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+                break;
+            }
+
 
             l_errhdl = setPermission(io_rec->secAddr + l_protectedSizeWithHdr,
                                        unprotectedPayloadSize,
@@ -1144,16 +1262,28 @@ errlHndl_t PNOR::unloadSecureSection(const SectionId i_section)
     return loadUnloadSecureSection(i_section, PNOR::MSG_UNLOAD_SECTION);
 }
 
-void SPnorRP::processLabOverride(
+errlHndl_t SPnorRP::processLabOverride(
     const sb_flags_t& i_flags) const
 {
+    errlHndl_t l_errl = nullptr;
+
+    do{
     // Secure boot sbe security mode values are inverted with respect to the
     // lab override flag for the same logical meaning
     uint8_t securityMode =
         !(i_flags.hw_lab_override);
-    SECUREBOOT::setSbeSecurityMode(securityMode);
+    l_errl = SECUREBOOT::setSbeSecurityMode(securityMode);
+    if(l_errl)
+    {
+        TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor,ERR_MRK"SPnorRP::processLabOverride - lab security override policy failed");
+        break;
+    }
+
     TRACFCOMP(g_trac_pnor,INFO_MRK "Set lab security override policy to %s.",
         securityMode ? "*NO* override" : "override if requested");
+    } while(0);
+
+    return l_errl;
 }
 
 errlHndl_t SPnorRP::processFwKeyIndicators(
@@ -1162,11 +1292,17 @@ errlHndl_t SPnorRP::processFwKeyIndicators(
 {
     errlHndl_t pError = nullptr;
 
+    do {
     if(i_sectionId == PNOR::SBE_IPL)
     {
         auto const * const headerFlags = i_header.sb_flags();
-        processLabOverride(*headerFlags);
+        pError = processLabOverride(*headerFlags);
+        if (pError)
+        {
+            break;
+        }
     }
+    } while(0);
 
     return pError;
 }
diff --git a/src/usr/pnor/spnorrp.H b/src/usr/pnor/spnorrp.H
index 1734c96f8..11da539ef 100644
--- a/src/usr/pnor/spnorrp.H
+++ b/src/usr/pnor/spnorrp.H
@@ -242,8 +242,11 @@ class SPnorRP
      *      the security settings.
      *
      *  @param[in] i_flags Various flags read from the secure header
+     *
+     *  @return errlHndl_t Error log handle; nullptr if success, pointer to
+     *      valid error log otherwise.
      */
-    void processLabOverride(
+    errlHndl_t processLabOverride(
         const sb_flags_t& i_flags) const;
 
     /**
diff --git a/src/usr/runtime/populate_hbruntime.C b/src/usr/runtime/populate_hbruntime.C
index ed23522d2..e22e4fa04 100644
--- a/src/usr/runtime/populate_hbruntime.C
+++ b/src/usr/runtime/populate_hbruntime.C
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ errlHndl_t mapPhysAddr(uint64_t i_addr,
                             i_addr,
                             i_size,
                             true);
+        l_elog->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
     }
 
     return l_elog;
@@ -196,7 +197,7 @@ errlHndl_t unmapVirtAddr(uint64_t i_addr)
          * @moduleid        RUNTIME::MOD_UNMAP_VIRT_ADDR
          * @reasoncode      RUNTIME::RC_UNMAP_FAIL
          * @userdata1       Virtual address we are trying to unmap
-         *
+         * @userdata2       0
          * @devdesc         Error unmapping a virtual memory map
          * @custdesc        Kernel failed to unmap memory
          */
@@ -205,7 +206,9 @@ errlHndl_t unmapVirtAddr(uint64_t i_addr)
                             RUNTIME::MOD_UNMAP_VIRT_ADDR,
                             RUNTIME::RC_UNMAP_FAIL,
                             i_addr,
+                            0,
                             true);
+        l_elog->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
     }
 
     return l_elog;
@@ -433,6 +436,7 @@ errlHndl_t fill_RsvMem_hbData(uint64_t & io_start_address,
                                 l_totalSizeAligned,
                                 io_size,
                                 true);
+            l_elog->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
             break;
         }
 
@@ -1332,18 +1336,97 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
 
     // make sure we have enough room
     auto const l_tpmDataCalculatedMax = HDAT::hdatTpmDataCalcMaxSize();
-    assert(l_dataSizeMax >= l_tpmDataCalculatedMax,
-        "Bug! The TPM data hdat section doesn't have enough space");
+    if(l_dataSizeMax < l_tpmDataCalculatedMax)
+    {
+
+       TRACFCOMP( g_trac_runtime, ERR_MRK "populate_TpmInfoByNode: The TPM data hdat section doesn't have enough space");
+
+        /*@
+         * @errortype
+         * @severity      ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+         * @moduleid      RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE
+         * @reasoncode    RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_OUT_OF_SPACE
+         * @userdata1     Size of hdat data struct
+         * @userdata2     Max size of hdat data struct
+         * @devdesc       The TPM data hdat section doesn't have enough space
+         * @custdesc      Platform security problem detected
+         */
+        l_elog = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                        RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE,
+                        RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_OUT_OF_SPACE,
+                        l_dataSizeMax,
+                        l_tpmDataCalculatedMax,
+                        true);
+        l_elog->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
+        break;
+    }
 
     // check that hdat structure format and eye catch were filled out
-    assert(l_hdatTpmData->hdatHdr.hdatStructId == HDAT::HDAT_HDIF_STRUCT_ID,
-        "Bug! The TPM data hdat struct format value doesn't match");
+    if(l_hdatTpmData->hdatHdr.hdatStructId != HDAT::HDAT_HDIF_STRUCT_ID)
+    {
+        TRACFCOMP( g_trac_runtime, ERR_MRK "populate_TpmInfoByNode: The TPM data hdat struct format value doesn't match");
+
+        /*@
+         * @errortype
+         * @severity      ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+         * @moduleid      RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE
+         * @reasoncode    RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_ID_MISMATCH
+         * @userdata1     hdat struct format value
+         * @userdata2     Expected hdat struct format value
+         * @devdesc       TPM data hdat struct format value doesn't match
+         * @custdesc      Platform security problem detected
+         */
+        l_elog = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                        RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE,
+                        RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_ID_MISMATCH,
+                        l_hdatTpmData->hdatHdr.hdatStructId,
+                        HDAT::HDAT_HDIF_STRUCT_ID,
+                        true);
+        l_elog->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
+        break;
+    }
 
     auto l_eyeCatchLen = strlen(HDAT::g_hdatTpmDataEyeCatch);
-    assert(memcmp(l_hdatTpmData->hdatHdr.hdatStructName,
-                  HDAT::g_hdatTpmDataEyeCatch,
-                  l_eyeCatchLen)==0,
-        "Bug! The TPM data hdat struct name eye catcher doesn't match");
+    if(memcmp(l_hdatTpmData->hdatHdr.hdatStructName,
+              HDAT::g_hdatTpmDataEyeCatch,
+              l_eyeCatchLen) != 0)
+    {
+
+        // Convert char strings to uin64_t for errorlogs
+        uint64_t l_eyeCatch = 0;
+        memcpy(&l_eyeCatch,
+               l_hdatTpmData->hdatHdr.hdatStructName,
+               strnlen(l_hdatTpmData->hdatHdr.hdatStructName,sizeof(uint64_t)));
+        uint64_t l_expectedEyeCatch = 0;
+        memcpy(&l_expectedEyeCatch,
+               HDAT::g_hdatTpmDataEyeCatch,
+               strnlen(HDAT::g_hdatTpmDataEyeCatch, sizeof(uint64_t)));
+
+        TRACFCOMP( g_trac_runtime, ERR_MRK "populate_TpmInfoByNode: The TPM data hdat struct name eye catcher (0x%X) doesn't match expected value (0x%X",
+                  l_eyeCatch, l_expectedEyeCatch);
+
+        /*@
+         * @errortype
+         * @severity      ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+         * @moduleid      RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE
+         * @reasoncode    RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_EYE_CATCH_MISMATCH
+         * @userdata1     hdat struct name eye catcher
+         * @userdata2     Expected hdat eye catch
+         * @devdesc       TPM data hdat struct name eye catcher doesn't match
+         * @custdesc      Platform security problem detected
+         */
+        l_elog = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+            RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE,
+            RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_EYE_CATCH_MISMATCH,
+            l_eyeCatch,
+            l_expectedEyeCatch,
+            true);
+        l_elog->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
+        break;
+    }
 
     l_hdatTpmData->hdatHdr.hdatInstance = HDAT::TpmDataInstance;
     l_hdatTpmData->hdatHdr.hdatVersion = HDAT::TpmDataVersion;
@@ -1414,7 +1497,31 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
             return hasSameI2cMaster(t);
         });
 
-        assert(itr != l_procList.end(), "Bug! TPM must have a processor.");
+        if(itr == l_procList.end())
+        {
+            TRACFCOMP( g_trac_runtime, ERR_MRK "populate_TpmInfoByNode: TPM does not have a processor.");
+
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity      ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid      RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE
+             * @reasoncode    RUNTIME::RC_TPM_MISSING_PROC
+             * @userdata1     Number of processors
+             * @userdata2     0
+             * @devdesc       TPM does not have a processor
+             * @custdesc      Platform security problem detected
+             */
+            l_elog = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE,
+                RUNTIME::RC_TPM_MISSING_PROC,
+                l_procList.size(),
+                0,
+                true);
+            l_elog->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
+            break;
+        }
+
         auto l_proc = *itr;
 
         l_tpmInstInfo->hdatChipId = l_proc->getAttr<
@@ -1498,6 +1605,10 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
         // Note: We don't advance the current offset, because the size of the
         // DRTM event log is zero
     }
+    if (l_elog)
+    {
+        break;
+    }
 
     // populate second part of pointer pair for secure boot TPM info
     l_hdatTpmData->hdatSbTpmInfo.hdatSize = l_currOffset - l_sbTpmInfoStart;
@@ -1578,9 +1689,32 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
         auto l_pcrd = reinterpret_cast<const HDAT::hdatSpPcrd_t*>(l_pcrdAddr);
 
         // Check the version of the PCRD section header
-        assert(l_pcrd->hdatHdr.hdatVersion >= HDAT::TpmDataMinRqrdPcrdVersion,
-            "Bad PCRD section version 0x%X - must be 0x1 or greater",
-            l_pcrd->hdatHdr.hdatVersion);
+        if(l_pcrd->hdatHdr.hdatVersion < HDAT::TpmDataMinRqrdPcrdVersion)
+        {
+            TRACFCOMP( g_trac_runtime, ERR_MRK "populate_TpmInfoByNode: Bad PCRD section version 0x%X - must be 0x%X or greater",
+                      l_pcrd->hdatHdr.hdatVersion,
+                       HDAT::TpmDataMinRqrdPcrdVersion);
+
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity      ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid      RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE
+             * @reasoncode    RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_BAD_VERSION
+             * @userdata1     hdat version
+             * @userdata2     Expected support version
+             * @devdesc       Bad PCRD section version
+             * @custdesc      Platform security problem detected
+             */
+            l_elog = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE,
+                RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_BAD_VERSION,
+                l_pcrd->hdatHdr.hdatVersion,
+                HDAT::TpmDataMinRqrdPcrdVersion,
+                true);
+            l_elog->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
+            break;
+        }
 
         // Get offset for the i2c array header
         auto i2cAryOff =
@@ -1598,9 +1732,31 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
            reinterpret_cast<HDAT::hdatHDIFDataArray_t*>(l_pcrdAddr + i2cAryOff);
 
         // make sure the array count is within reasonable limits
-        assert(l_hostI2cPcrdHdrPtr->hdatArrayCnt <= HDAT_PCRD_MAX_I2C_DEV,
-            "HDAT PCRD reported more than the max number of i2c devices! Count:%d",
-            l_hostI2cPcrdHdrPtr->hdatArrayCnt);
+        if(l_hostI2cPcrdHdrPtr->hdatArrayCnt > HDAT_PCRD_MAX_I2C_DEV)
+        {
+            TRACFCOMP( g_trac_runtime, ERR_MRK "populate_TpmInfoByNode: HDAT PCRD reported more than the max number of i2c devices! Count:%d",
+                       l_hostI2cPcrdHdrPtr->hdatArrayCnt);
+
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity      ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid      RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE
+             * @reasoncode    RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_BAD_NUM_I2C
+             * @userdata1     hdat array count
+             * @userdata2     max number of i2c devices
+             * @devdesc       HDAT PCRD reported more than the max number of i2c devices
+             * @custdesc      Platform security problem detected
+             */
+            l_elog = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                RUNTIME::MOD_POPULATE_TPMINFOBYNODE,
+                RUNTIME::RC_TPM_HDAT_BAD_NUM_I2C,
+                l_hostI2cPcrdHdrPtr->hdatArrayCnt,
+                HDAT_PCRD_MAX_I2C_DEV,
+                true);
+            l_elog->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
+            break;
+        }
 
         // Get the pointer to the first element in the i2c array
         // This is the address of the header plus the offset given in the header
@@ -1649,7 +1805,7 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
                     l_linkId,
                     0,
                     true);
-
+                err->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
                 SECUREBOOT::handleSecurebootFailure(err);
 
                 assert(false,"Bug! handleSecurebootFailure shouldn't return!");
@@ -1728,6 +1884,7 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
                     l_i2cDev->hdatI2cLinkId,
                     0,
                     true);
+                err->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
                 ERRORLOG::errlCommit(err, RUNTIME_COMP_ID);
             }
             else
@@ -1757,6 +1914,7 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
                         l_i2cDev->hdatI2cLinkId,
                         0,
                         true);
+                    err->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
                     ERRORLOG::errlCommit(err, RUNTIME_COMP_ID);
                 }
                 else // found a match
@@ -1769,6 +1927,10 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
         } // for each link ID in the current PCRD instance
 
     } // for each instance
+    if (l_elog)
+    {
+        break;
+    }
 
     if (!l_i2cTargetList.empty())
     {
@@ -1816,6 +1978,7 @@ errlHndl_t populate_TpmInfoByNode()
                 ),
                 TARGETING::get_huid(i2cDevItr->masterChip),
                 true);
+            err->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
             ERRORLOG::errlCommit(err, RUNTIME_COMP_ID);
         }
     }
@@ -2116,6 +2279,7 @@ errlHndl_t persistent_rwAttrRuntimeCheck( void )
                         l_rc,
                         rc,
                         true /* Add HB Software Callout */);
+        l_err->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
     }
     else
     {
@@ -2156,6 +2320,7 @@ errlHndl_t persistent_rwAttrRuntimeCheck( void )
                         l_rc,
                         rc,
                         true /* Add HB Software Callout */);
+            l_err->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
         }
     }
 
diff --git a/src/usr/runtime/preverifiedlidmgr.C b/src/usr/runtime/preverifiedlidmgr.C
index e4ec082ac..e28e56af7 100644
--- a/src/usr/runtime/preverifiedlidmgr.C
+++ b/src/usr/runtime/preverifiedlidmgr.C
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <targeting/common/attributes.H>
 #include <secureboot/containerheader.H>
 #include <runtime/common/runtime_utils.H>
+#include <runtime/runtime_reasoncodes.H>
 
 extern trace_desc_t *g_trac_runtime;
 
@@ -189,7 +190,31 @@ errlHndl_t PreVerifiedLidMgr::_loadFromPnor(const PNOR::SectionId i_sec,
     auto l_lids = Util::getPnorSecLidIds(i_sec);
     TRACDCOMP( g_trac_runtime, "PreVerifiedLidMgr::_loadFromPnor - getPnorSecLidIds lid = 0x%X, containerLid = 0x%X",
                l_lids.lid, l_lids.containerLid);
-    assert(l_lids.lid != Util::INVALID_LIDID,"Pnor Section = %s not associated with any Lids", PNOR::SectionIdToString(i_sec));
+    if(l_lids.lid == Util::INVALID_LIDID)
+    {
+        TRACFCOMP( g_trac_runtime, ERR_MRK "PreVerifiedLidMgr::_loadFromPnor - Pnor Section = %s not associated with any Lids",
+                   PNOR::SectionIdToString(i_sec));
+
+        /*@
+         * @errortype
+         * @severity      ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+         * @moduleid      RUNTIME::MOD_PREVERLIDMGR_LOAD_FROM_PNOR
+         * @reasoncode    RUNTIME::RC_INVALID_LID
+         * @userdata1     PNOR section
+         * @userdata2     Lid id mapped from PNOR section
+         * @devdesc       Trying to load invalid lid
+         * @custdesc      Platform security problem detected
+         */
+        l_errl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+            RUNTIME::MOD_PREVERLIDMGR_LOAD_FROM_PNOR,
+            RUNTIME::RC_INVALID_LID,
+            i_sec,
+            l_lids.lid,
+            true);
+        l_errl->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
+        break;
+    }
 
     // Only load if not previously done.
     if( isLidLoaded(l_lids.containerLid) && isLidLoaded(l_lids.lid) )
@@ -229,9 +254,36 @@ errlHndl_t PreVerifiedLidMgr::_loadFromPnor(const PNOR::SectionId i_sec,
         if ( (l_lids.lid != Util::INVALID_LIDID) &&
              !isLidLoaded(l_lids.lid))
         {
+            // Ensure there is content besides the header and that the size is
+            // valid
+            if(i_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
+            {
+                TRACFCOMP( g_trac_runtime, ERR_MRK "PreVerifiedLidMgr::_loadFromPnor - PNOR Section %s size 0x%X is not greater than the header size 0x%X, thus missing actual content to pre-verify",
+                           PNOR::SectionIdToString(i_sec), i_size, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+                /*@
+                 * @errortype
+                 * @severity      ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+                 * @moduleid      RUNTIME::MOD_PREVERLIDMGR_LOAD_FROM_PNOR
+                 * @reasoncode    RUNTIME::RC_PREVER_INVALID_SIZE
+                 * @userdata1     PNOR section
+                 * @userdata2     Size of section including header
+                 * @devdesc       No content after Section header or size was parsed from secure header incorrectly.
+                 * @custdesc      Platform security problem detected
+                 */
+                l_errl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                    ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                    RUNTIME::MOD_PREVERLIDMGR_LOAD_FROM_PNOR,
+                    RUNTIME::RC_PREVER_INVALID_SIZE,
+                    i_sec,
+                    i_size,
+                    true);
+                l_errl->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
+                break;
+            }
+
             char l_lidStr[Util::lidIdStrLength] {};
             snprintf (l_lidStr, Util::lidIdStrLength, "%08X",l_lids.lid);
-            assert(i_size > PAGE_SIZE, "PreVerifiedLidMgr::_loadFromPnor - caller did not include size of header for total size");
             l_errl = RUNTIME::setNextHbRsvMemEntry(HDAT::RHB_TYPE_VERIFIED_LIDS,
                                                    cv_pResvMemInfo->rangeId,
                                                    cv_pResvMemInfo->curAddr+PAGE_SIZE,
@@ -443,7 +495,7 @@ errlHndl_t PreVerifiedLidMgr::loadImage(const uint64_t i_imgAddr,
     // out.
     if(cv_addFakeHdrs)
     {
-        TRACDCOMP(g_trac_runtime, "PreVerifiedLidMgr::loadImage fake header load");
+        TRACFCOMP(g_trac_runtime, "PreVerifiedLidMgr::loadImage inject fake header before image without one");
         SECUREBOOT::ContainerHeader l_fakeHdr;
         l_errl = l_fakeHdr.setFakeHeader(i_imgSize,
                                       PNOR::SectionIdToString(cv_curPnorSecId));
@@ -455,9 +507,34 @@ errlHndl_t PreVerifiedLidMgr::loadImage(const uint64_t i_imgAddr,
         memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(l_tmpVaddr),
                l_fakeHdr.fakeHeader(),
                PAGE_SIZE);
+
+        if(i_imgSize <= PAGE_SIZE)
+        {
+            TRACFCOMP( g_trac_runtime, ERR_MRK "PreVerifiedLidMgr::loadImage - Image size 0x%X is not greater than the header size 0x%X, thus no space to inject fake header",
+                       i_imgSize, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity      ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid      RUNTIME::MOD_PREVERLIDMGR_LOAD_IMAGE
+             * @reasoncode    RUNTIME::RC_PREVER_INVALID_SIZE
+             * @userdata1     Size of section including space for header
+             * @userdata2     Size of header
+             * @devdesc       No space left for fake header injection
+             * @custdesc      Platform security problem detected
+             */
+            l_errl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                RUNTIME::MOD_PREVERLIDMGR_LOAD_IMAGE,
+                RUNTIME::RC_PREVER_INVALID_SIZE,
+                i_imgSize,
+                PAGE_SIZE,
+                true);
+            l_errl->collectTrace(RUNTIME_COMP_NAME);
+            break;
+        }
         // Include rest of image after header
         // NOTE: Do not use aligned size for memcpy
-        assert(i_imgSize > PAGE_SIZE, "PreVerifiedLidMgr::loadImage - caller did not include size of header for total size");
         memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(l_tmpVaddr+PAGE_SIZE),
                reinterpret_cast<void*>(i_imgAddr),
                i_imgSize-PAGE_SIZE);
diff --git a/src/usr/secureboot/base/header.C b/src/usr/secureboot/base/header.C
index 77d756934..58f08c632 100644
--- a/src/usr/secureboot/base/header.C
+++ b/src/usr/secureboot/base/header.C
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
 #include <kernel/console.H>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <kernel/bltohbdatamgr.H>
+#include "../common/securetrace.H"
+#include "../common/errlud_secure.H"
+#include <secureboot/secure_reasoncodes.H>
 
 namespace SECUREBOOT
 {
@@ -36,15 +39,44 @@ namespace SECUREBOOT
         return Singleton<Header>::instance();
     }
 
-    void Header::loadHeader()
+    errlHndl_t Header::loadHeader()
     {
+        errlHndl_t l_errl = nullptr;
+
+        do {
+
         const void* const pHeader = g_BlToHbDataManager.getHbbHeader();
 
         // Fatal code bug if called with nullptr pointer
-        assert(pHeader != nullptr,
-            "BUG! In Header::loadHeader(), expected valid address for base "
-            "image header, but got nullptr.");
+        if (pHeader == nullptr)
+        {
+            SB_ERR("Header::loadHeader(), expected valid address for base image header, but got nullptr.");
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid        SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_LOAD_HEADER
+             * @reasoncode      SECUREBOOT::RC_INVALID_BASE_HEADER
+             * @userdata1       0
+             * @userdata2       0
+             * @devdesc         Hostboot Base Image Header not valid
+             * @custdesc        Firmware Error
+             */
+            l_errl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                            SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_LOAD_HEADER,
+                            SECUREBOOT::RC_INVALID_BASE_HEADER,
+                            0,
+                            0,
+                            true);
+            addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(l_errl);
+            l_errl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+            break;
+        }
+
         _set(pHeader);
+        } while(0);
+
+        return l_errl;
     }
 
     void Header::_set(
diff --git a/src/usr/secureboot/base/service.C b/src/usr/secureboot/base/service.C
index 21900a5fa..1f5b5d83d 100644
--- a/src/usr/secureboot/base/service.C
+++ b/src/usr/secureboot/base/service.C
@@ -234,8 +234,6 @@ errlHndl_t getAllSecurityRegisters(std::vector<SecureRegisterValues> & o_regs,
                                   DEVICE_FSI_ADDRESS(op_addr) );
             }
 
-            assert(op_actual_size == op_expected_size,"getAllSecurityRegisters: BUG! size returned from device write (%d) is not the expected size of %d", op_actual_size, op_expected_size);
-
             if( err )
             {
                 // Something failed on the read.  Commit the error
@@ -249,6 +247,33 @@ errlHndl_t getAllSecurityRegisters(std::vector<SecureRegisterValues> & o_regs,
                 errlCommit( err, SECURE_COMP_ID );
                 continue;
             }
+
+            if (op_actual_size != op_expected_size)
+            {
+                SB_ERR("getAllSecurityRegisters: size returned from device write (%d) is not the expected size of %d",
+                       op_actual_size, op_expected_size);
+                /*@
+                 * @errortype
+                 * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+                 * @moduleid        SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_GET_ALL_SEC_REGS
+                 * @reasoncode      SECUREBOOT::RC_DEVICE_WRITE_ERR
+                 * @userdata1       Actual size written
+                 * @userdata2       Expected size written
+                 * @devdesc         Device write did not return expected size
+                 * @custdesc        Firmware Error
+                 */
+                err = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                                ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                                SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_GET_ALL_SEC_REGS,
+                                SECUREBOOT::RC_DEVICE_WRITE_ERR,
+                                op_actual_size,
+                                op_expected_size,
+                                true);
+                addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(err);
+                err->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+                break;
+            }
+
             // push back result
             l_secRegValues.tgt=procTgt;
             l_secRegValues.addr=op_addr;
@@ -316,7 +341,11 @@ void* initializeBase(void* unused)
 #endif
 
         // Load original header.
-        Singleton<Header>::instance().loadHeader();
+        l_errl = Singleton<Header>::instance().loadHeader();
+        if (l_errl)
+        {
+            break;
+        }
     } while(0);
 
     return l_errl;
@@ -613,11 +642,43 @@ uint8_t getSbeSecurityMode()
     return g_sbeSecurityMode;
 }
 
-void setSbeSecurityMode(uint8_t i_sbeSecurityMode)
+errlHndl_t setSbeSecurityMode(uint8_t i_sbeSecurityMode)
 {
-    assert(i_sbeSecurityMode == 0 || i_sbeSecurityMode == 1,
-        "SBE Security Mode can only be set to 0 or 1");
+    errlHndl_t l_errl = nullptr;
+
+    do {
+    // Ensure a valid mode
+    if (i_sbeSecurityMode != 0 && i_sbeSecurityMode != 1)
+    {
+        SB_ERR("SBE Security Mode can only be set to 0 or 1");
+
+        /*@
+         * @errortype
+         * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+         * @moduleid        SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_SET_SBE_SECURE_MODE
+         * @reasoncode      SECUREBOOT::RC_SBE_INVALID_SEC_MODE
+         * @userdata1       Security mode to set
+         * @userdata2       0
+         * @devdesc         Invalid SBE security mode
+         * @custdesc        Platform security problem detected
+         */
+        l_errl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                        SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_SET_SBE_SECURE_MODE,
+                        SECUREBOOT::RC_SBE_INVALID_SEC_MODE,
+                        i_sbeSecurityMode,
+                        0,
+                        true);
+        l_errl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+        addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(l_errl);
+        break;
+    }
+
     g_sbeSecurityMode = i_sbeSecurityMode;
+
+    } while(0);
+
+    return l_errl;
 }
 
 } //namespace SECUREBOOT
diff --git a/src/usr/secureboot/base/settings.C b/src/usr/secureboot/base/settings.C
index eb25aea11..4ebb77dd1 100644
--- a/src/usr/secureboot/base/settings.C
+++ b/src/usr/secureboot/base/settings.C
@@ -284,9 +284,31 @@ namespace SECUREBOOT
             break;
         }
 
-        assert(actSize == expSize,
-            "writeSecurityRegister: BUG! size returned from device write (%d) "
-            "is not the expected size of %d",actSize,expSize);
+        if(actSize != expSize)
+        {
+            SB_ERR("writeSecurityRegister: size returned from device write (%d) is not the expected size of %d",
+                   actSize, expSize);
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid        SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_WRITE_REG
+             * @reasoncode      SECUREBOOT::RC_DEVICE_WRITE_ERR
+             * @userdata1       Actual size written
+             * @userdata2       Expected size written
+             * @devdesc         Device write did not return expected size
+             * @custdesc        Firmware Error
+             */
+            pError = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                            SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_WRITE_REG,
+                            SECUREBOOT::RC_DEVICE_WRITE_ERR,
+                            actSize,
+                            expSize,
+                            true);
+            pError->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+            addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(pError);
+            break;
+        }
 
         } while(0);
 
@@ -341,10 +363,30 @@ namespace SECUREBOOT
         }
 
         // Make sure the processor is SCOMable
-        if (i_pProc != MASTER_PROCESSOR_CHIP_TARGET_SENTINEL)
+        if (i_pProc != MASTER_PROCESSOR_CHIP_TARGET_SENTINEL &&
+            !i_pProc->getAttr<ATTR_SCOM_SWITCHES>().useXscom)
         {
-            assert(i_pProc->getAttr<ATTR_SCOM_SWITCHES>().useXscom,
-                "Bug! Processor security register read too early.");
+            SB_ERR("readSecurityRegister: Processor security register read too early");
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid        SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_READ_REG
+             * @reasoncode      SECUREBOOT::RC_PROC_NOT_SCOMABLE
+             * @userdata1       Use XSCOM bool
+             * @userdata2       Target's HUID
+             * @devdesc         Processor security register read too early
+             * @custdesc        Firmware Error
+             */
+            l_errl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                            SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_READ_REG,
+                            SECUREBOOT::RC_PROC_NOT_SCOMABLE,
+                            i_pProc->getAttr<ATTR_SCOM_SWITCHES>().useXscom,
+                            TO_UINT64(get_huid(i_pProc)),
+                            true);
+            l_errl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+            addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(l_errl);
+            break;
         }
 
         // Read security switch setting from processor.
@@ -356,9 +398,32 @@ namespace SECUREBOOT
         {
             break;
         }
-        assert(size == sizeof(o_regValue),
-            "size returned from device read is not the expected size of %i",
-                                                           sizeof(o_regValue));
+
+        if (size != sizeof(o_regValue))
+        {
+            SB_ERR("readSecurityRegister: size returned from device read (%d) is not the expected size of %d",
+                   size, sizeof(o_regValue));
+            /*@
+             * @errortype
+             * @severity        ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE
+             * @moduleid        SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_READ_REG
+             * @reasoncode      SECUREBOOT::RC_DEVICE_READ_ERR
+             * @userdata1       Actual size read
+             * @userdata2       Expected size read
+             * @devdesc         Processor security register read too early
+             * @custdesc        Firmware Error
+             */
+            l_errl = new ERRORLOG::ErrlEntry(
+                            ERRORLOG::ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                            SECUREBOOT::MOD_SECURE_READ_REG,
+                            SECUREBOOT::RC_DEVICE_READ_ERR,
+                            size,
+                            sizeof(o_regValue),
+                            true);
+            l_errl->collectTrace(SECURE_COMP_NAME);
+            addSecureUserDetailsToErrlog(l_errl);
+            break;
+        }
 
         } while(0);
 
diff --git a/src/usr/util/runtime/utillidmgr_rt.C b/src/usr/util/runtime/utillidmgr_rt.C
index 05f15c3c4..e5d381a2c 100644
--- a/src/usr/util/runtime/utillidmgr_rt.C
+++ b/src/usr/util/runtime/utillidmgr_rt.C
@@ -41,8 +41,17 @@ UtilLidMgr::UtilLidMgr(uint32_t i_lidId) :
     iv_isLidInPnor(false), iv_lidBuffer(nullptr), iv_lidSize(0),
     iv_isLidInVFS(false), iv_isLidInHbResvMem(false)
 {
+    errlHndl_t l_err = nullptr;
     iv_spBaseServicesEnabled = INITSERVICE::spBaseServicesEnabled();
-    updateLid(i_lidId);
+    l_err = updateLid(i_lidId);
+    if (l_err)
+    {
+        UTIL_FT(ERR_MRK"UtilLidMgr::UtilLidMgr() cstor failed to update Lid (0x%X)",
+                i_lidId);
+        errlCommit(l_err,UTIL_COMP_ID);
+        // Set to invalid lid id and allow to continue
+        iv_lidId = Util::INVALID_LIDID;
+    }
 }
 
 UtilLidMgr::~UtilLidMgr()
@@ -61,10 +70,20 @@ errlHndl_t UtilLidMgr::setLidId(uint32_t i_lidId)
 {
     errlHndl_t l_err = nullptr;
 
+    do {
     //must call cleanup before updateLid
     l_err = cleanup();
+    if (l_err)
+    {
+        break;
+    }
 
-    updateLid(i_lidId);
+    l_err = updateLid(i_lidId);
+    if (l_err)
+    {
+        break;
+    }
+    } while(0);
 
     return l_err;
 }
@@ -280,17 +299,19 @@ errlHndl_t UtilLidMgr::cleanup()
     return l_err;
 }
 
-void UtilLidMgr::updateLid(uint32_t i_lidId)
+errlHndl_t UtilLidMgr::updateLid(uint32_t i_lidId)
 {
     UTIL_FT("UtilLidMgr::updateLid - i_lidId=0x%.8X", i_lidId);
     iv_lidId = i_lidId;
+    errlHndl_t l_err = nullptr;
+
+    do {
 
     // First check if lid is already in hostboot reserved memory
     // In securemode the lid is pre-verified
     if (TARGETING::is_sapphire_load() && lidInHbResvMem(iv_lidId))
     {
         UTIL_FT("UtilLidMgr::updateLid - lid in Hb Resv Mem");
-        getLidPnorSectionInfo(iv_lidId, iv_lidPnorInfo);
         iv_isLidInHbResvMem = true;
     }
     // Check if PNOR is access is supported
@@ -304,10 +325,18 @@ void UtilLidMgr::updateLid(uint32_t i_lidId)
         UTIL_FT("UtilLidMgr::updateLid - lid in PNOR");
         // If it's in PNOR it's not technically a lid
         // so use a slightly different extension
-        iv_isLidInPnor = getLidPnorSectionInfo(iv_lidId, iv_lidPnorInfo);
+        l_err = getLidPnorSectionInfo(iv_lidId, iv_lidPnorInfo, iv_isLidInPnor);
+        if (l_err)
+        {
+            break;
+        }
     }
     sprintf(iv_lidFileName, "%x.lidbin", iv_lidId);
     iv_isLidInVFS  = VFS::module_exists(iv_lidFileName);
+
+    } while (0);
+
+    return l_err;
 }
 
 const uint32_t * UtilLidMgr::getLidList(size_t * o_num)
diff --git a/src/usr/util/utillidmgr.C b/src/usr/util/utillidmgr.C
index d69d02d0b..5f329b2d4 100644
--- a/src/usr/util/utillidmgr.C
+++ b/src/usr/util/utillidmgr.C
@@ -56,19 +56,48 @@ UtilLidMgr::UtilLidMgr(uint32_t i_lidId)
 ,iv_lidImageSize(0)
 ,iv_lidSize(0)
 {
+    errlHndl_t l_err = nullptr;
     iv_spBaseServicesEnabled = INITSERVICE::spBaseServicesEnabled();
-    updateLid(i_lidId);
+    l_err = updateLid(i_lidId);
+    if (l_err)
+    {
+        uint64_t l_reasonCode = l_err->reasonCode();
+        UTIL_FT(ERR_MRK"UtilLidMgr::UtilLidMgr() Failed to update Lid (0x%X) shutting down rc=0x%08X",
+                i_lidId, l_reasonCode);
+        errlCommit(l_err,UTIL_COMP_ID);
+        INITSERVICE::doShutdown(l_reasonCode);
+    }
+
+    // On non-FSP based systems only get LIDs from either PNOR or VFS
+    if ( (iv_spBaseServicesEnabled == false) &&
+         (iv_isLidInPnor == false) &&
+         (iv_isLidInVFS == false)
+       )
+    {
+        UTIL_FT(ERR_MRK"UtilLidMgr::UtilLidMgr() Requested lid 0x%X not in PNOR or VFS which is required on non-FSP based systems",
+                i_lidId);
+
+        /*@
+         *   @errortype
+         *   @moduleid      Util::UTIL_LIDMGR_CSTOR
+         *   @reasoncode    Util::UTIL_LIDMGR_INVAL_LID_REQUEST
+         *   @userdata1     LID ID
+         *   @userdata2     0
+         *   @devdesc       Lid not in PNOR or VFS for non-FSP systems
+         *   @custdesc      Firmware encountered an internal error.
+         */
+        l_err = new ErrlEntry(
+                        ERRL_SEV_UNRECOVERABLE,
+                        Util::UTIL_LIDMGR_CSTOR,
+                        Util::UTIL_LIDMGR_INVAL_LID_REQUEST,
+                        i_lidId,
+                        0,
+                        true /*Add HB Software Callout*/);
+        l_err->collectTrace(UTIL_COMP_NAME);
+        errlCommit(l_err,UTIL_COMP_ID);
+        INITSERVICE::doShutdown(Util::UTIL_LIDMGR_INVAL_LID_REQUEST);
+    }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECUREBOOT
-    // In SECUREBOOT mode ensure that OpenPower systems only get LIDs from
-    // either PNOR or VFS where we can trust the security
-    assert( !(( iv_spBaseServicesEnabled == false  ) &&
-              ( iv_isLidInPnor           == false ) &&
-              ( iv_isLidInVFS            == false )
-             ), "UtilLidMgr::UtilLidMgr: Secureboot: OpenPower requesting LID "
-                "that is not in PNOR or VFS"
-          );
-#endif
 }
 
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@@ -892,28 +921,47 @@ errlHndl_t UtilLidMgr::setLidId(uint32_t i_lidId)
 {
     errlHndl_t l_err = nullptr;
 
+    do {
     //must call cleanup before updateLid
     l_err = cleanup();
+    if (l_err)
+    {
+        break;
+    }
 
-    updateLid(i_lidId);
+    l_err = updateLid(i_lidId);
+    if (l_err)
+    {
+        break;
+    }
+    } while(0);
 
     return l_err;
 }
 
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-void UtilLidMgr::updateLid(uint32_t i_lidId)
+errlHndl_t UtilLidMgr::updateLid(uint32_t i_lidId)
 {
     iv_lidId = i_lidId;
+    errlHndl_t l_err = nullptr;
+
+    do {
 
     //if it's in PNOR, it's not technically lid, so use a slightly
     //different extension.
     sprintf(iv_lidFileName, "%x.lidbin", iv_lidId);
-    iv_isLidInPnor = getLidPnorSectionInfo(iv_lidId, iv_lidPnorInfo);
+    l_err = getLidPnorSectionInfo(iv_lidId, iv_lidPnorInfo, iv_isLidInPnor);
+    if (l_err)
+    {
+        UTIL_FT("UtilLidMgr::updateLid - getLidPnorSectionInfo failed");
+        break;
+    }
     UTIL_DT(INFO_MRK "UtilLidMgr: LID 0x%.8X in pnor: %d",
               iv_lidId ,iv_isLidInPnor);
     iv_isLidInVFS = VFS::module_exists(iv_lidFileName);
+    } while(0);
 
-    return;
+    return l_err;
 }
 
diff --git a/src/usr/util/utillidpnor.C b/src/usr/util/utillidpnor.C
index 25c90c73e..c7118c915 100644
--- a/src/usr/util/utillidpnor.C
+++ b/src/usr/util/utillidpnor.C
@@ -97,11 +97,12 @@ PNOR::SectionId getLidPnorSection(const LidId i_lid)
 
 } // end Util namespace
 
-bool UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo(uint32_t i_lidId,
-                                       PNOR::SectionInfo_t &o_lidPnorInfo)
+errlHndl_t UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo(const uint32_t i_lidId,
+                                             PNOR::SectionInfo_t &o_lidPnorInfo,
+                                             bool &o_isLidInPnor)
 {
     errlHndl_t l_err = nullptr;
-    bool l_lidInPnor = false;
+    o_isLidInPnor = false;
 
     // Search if a lid id maps to pnor section
     auto l_secId = Util::getLidPnorSection(static_cast<Util::LidId>(i_lidId));
@@ -141,20 +142,19 @@ bool UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo(uint32_t i_lidId,
             o_lidPnorInfo.id = PNOR::INVALID_SECTION;
             delete l_err;
             l_err = nullptr;
-            UTIL_FT("UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo Lid 0x%X ignore getSectionInfo error",
+            UTIL_FT("UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo Lid 0x%X ignore getSectionInfo INVALID_SECTION error",
                     i_lidId);
             break;
         }
         else if (l_err)
         {
-            UTIL_FT(ERR_MRK"UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo Lid 0x%X getSectionInfo error shutting down rc=0x%08X",
+            UTIL_FT(ERR_MRK"UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo Lid 0x%X getSectionInfo failed rc=0x%08X",
                     l_err->reasonCode());
-            errlCommit(l_err, UTIL_COMP_ID);
             break;
         }
         else
         {
-            l_lidInPnor = true;
+            o_isLidInPnor = true;
             UTIL_FT("UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo Lid 0x%X in PNOR", i_lidId);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECUREBOOT
 #ifndef __HOSTBOOT_RUNTIME
@@ -165,14 +165,11 @@ bool UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo(uint32_t i_lidId,
 
                 // Load the secure section
                 l_err = loadSecureSection(l_secId);
-
-                // If secure section fails to load log the error and assert
                 if (l_err)
                 {
-                    errlCommit(l_err, UTIL_COMP_ID);
-                    assert(false,"UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo: attempt to "
-                                 "load Secure Section %d failed",
-                                 l_secId);
+                     UTIL_FT("UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo loadSecureSection failed for Section %d",
+                             l_secId);
+                     break;
                 }
 
                 // In Secureboot, rather than using the whole partition size,
@@ -189,5 +186,5 @@ bool UtilLidMgr::getLidPnorSectionInfo(uint32_t i_lidId,
     }
     } while(0);
 
-    return l_lidInPnor;
+    return l_err;
 }