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"Indirect Thunks"
There are applications for indirect call/branch thunks other than retpoline for Spectre v2, e.g.,
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/load-value-injection
Therefore it makes sense to refactor X86RetpolineThunks as a more general capability.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D76810
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Existing clients are converted to use MachineModuleInfoWrapperPass. The
new interface is for defining a new pass manager API in CodeGen.
Reviewers: fedor.sergeev, philip.pfaffe, chandlerc, arsenm
Reviewed By: arsenm, fedor.sergeev
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64183
llvm-svn: 373240
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llvm-svn: 373081
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Summary:
This is patch is part of a series to introduce an Alignment type.
See this thread for context: http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2019-July/133851.html
See this patch for the introduction of the type: https://reviews.llvm.org/D64790
Reviewers: courbet
Subscribers: arsenm, sdardis, nemanjai, jvesely, nhaehnle, hiraditya, kbarton, jrtc27, MaskRay, atanasyan, jsji, llvm-commits
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D67620
llvm-svn: 372231
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Summary:
This patch renames functions that takes or returns alignment as log2, this patch will help with the transition to llvm::Align.
The renaming makes it explicit that we deal with log(alignment) instead of a power of two alignment.
A few renames uncovered dubious assignments:
- `MirParser`/`MirPrinter` was expecting powers of two but `MachineFunction` and `MachineBasicBlock` were using deal with log2(align). This patch fixes it and updates the documentation.
- `MachineBlockPlacement` exposes two flags (`align-all-blocks` and `align-all-nofallthru-blocks`) supposedly interpreted as power of two alignments, internally these values are interpreted as log2(align). This patch updates the documentation,
- `MachineFunctionexposes` exposes `align-all-functions` also interpreted as power of two alignment, internally this value is interpreted as log2(align). This patch updates the documentation,
Reviewers: lattner, thegameg, courbet
Subscribers: dschuff, arsenm, jyknight, dylanmckay, sdardis, nemanjai, jvesely, nhaehnle, javed.absar, hiraditya, kbarton, fedor.sergeev, asb, rbar, johnrusso, simoncook, apazos, sabuasal, niosHD, jrtc27, MaskRay, zzheng, edward-jones, atanasyan, rogfer01, MartinMosbeck, brucehoult, the_o, dexonsmith, PkmX, jocewei, jsji, Jim, s.egerton, llvm-commits, courbet
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D65945
llvm-svn: 371045
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to reflect the new license.
We understand that people may be surprised that we're moving the header
entirely to discuss the new license. We checked this carefully with the
Foundation's lawyer and we believe this is the correct approach.
Essentially, all code in the project is now made available by the LLVM
project under our new license, so you will see that the license headers
include that license only. Some of our contributors have contributed
code under our old license, and accordingly, we have retained a copy of
our old license notice in the top-level files in each project and
repository.
llvm-svn: 351636
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Summary:
The main challenge here is that X86InstrInfo::AnalyzeBranch doesn't
understand the way we're using a CALL instruction as a branch, so we
can't list the CallTarget MBB as a successor of the entry block. If we
don't list it as a successor, then the AsmPrinter doesn't print a label
for the MBB.
Fix the issue by inserting our own label at the beginning of the call
target block. We can rely on the AsmPrinter to always emit it, even
though the block appears to be unreachable, but address-taken.
Fixes PR38391.
Reviewers: thegameg, chandlerc, echristo
Subscribers: hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D53653
llvm-svn: 345426
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subtarget features for indirect calls and indirect branches.
This is in preparation for enabling *only* the call retpolines when
using speculative load hardening.
I've continued to use subtarget features for now as they continue to
seem the best fit given the lack of other retpoline like constructs so
far.
The LLVM side is pretty simple. I'd like to eventually get rid of the
old feature, but not sure what backwards compatibility issues that will
cause.
This does remove the "implies" from requesting an external thunk. This
always seemed somewhat questionable and is now clearly not desirable --
you specify a thunk the same way no matter which set of things are
getting retpolines.
I really want to keep this nicely isolated from end users and just an
LLVM implementation detail, so I've moved the `-mretpoline` flag in
Clang to no longer rely on a specific subtarget feature by that name and
instead to be directly handled. In some ways this is simpler, but in
order to preserve existing behavior I've had to add some fallback code
so that users who relied on merely passing -mretpoline-external-thunk
continue to get the same behavior. We should eventually remove this
I suspect (we have never tested that it works!) but I've not done that
in this patch.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D51150
llvm-svn: 340515
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The DEBUG() macro is very generic so it might clash with other projects.
The renaming was done as follows:
- git grep -l 'DEBUG' | xargs sed -i 's/\bDEBUG\s\?(/LLVM_DEBUG(/g'
- git diff -U0 master | ../clang/tools/clang-format/clang-format-diff.py -i -p1 -style LLVM
- Manual change to APInt
- Manually chage DOCS as regex doesn't match it.
In the transition period the DEBUG() macro is still present and aliased
to the LLVM_DEBUG() one.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D43624
llvm-svn: 332240
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While running the lit tests for the most recent version of D45916
(https://reviews.llvm.org/D45916), I found that a couple tests for this pass
suddenly started segfaulting. Since the outliner wasn't actually doing anything
to the code in either of these tests I got curious.
I found that the pass doesn’t completely create the machine-level constructs
necessary to actually add a MachineFunction and MachineBasicBlock to the
module. This patch adds in those missing bits. After this, adding the
outliner before this pass won’t cause it to segfault.
You can recreate this behaviour by adding the MachineOutliner directly before
the pass and having it return false immediately.
https://reviews.llvm.org/D46330
llvm-svn: 331307
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Follow-up to r325049
llvm-svn: 325085
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Summary:
Instead of solving the hard problem of how to pass the callee to the indirect
jump thunk without a register, just use a CSR. At a call boundary, there's
nothing stopping us from using a CSR to hold the callee as long as we save and
restore it in the prologue.
Also, add tests for this mregparm=3 case. I wrote execution tests for
__llvm_retpoline_push, but they never got committed as lit tests, either
because I never rewrote them or because they got lost in merge conflicts.
Reviewers: chandlerc, dwmw2
Subscribers: javed.absar, kristof.beyls, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D43214
llvm-svn: 325049
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Summary:
This removes the need for a machine module pass using some deeply
questionable hacks. This should address PR36123 which is a case where in
full LTO the memory usage of a machine module pass actually ended up
being significant.
We should revert this on trunk as soon as we understand and fix the
memory usage issue, but we should include this in any backports of
retpolines themselves.
Reviewers: echristo, MatzeB
Subscribers: sanjoy, mcrosier, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D42726
llvm-svn: 323915
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speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
llvm-svn: 323155
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