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Enforcement Technology)
Do not commit the llvm/test/ExecutionEngine/MCJIT/cet-code-model-lager.ll because it will
cause build bot fail(not suitable for window 32 target).
Summary:
This patch comes from H.J.'s https://github.com/hjl-tools/llvm-project/commit/2bd54ce7fa9e94fcd1118b948e14d1b6fc54dfd2
**This patch fix the failed llvm unit tests which running on CET machine. **(e.g. ExecutionEngine/MCJIT/MCJITTests)
The reason we enable IBT at "JIT compiled with CET" is mainly that: the JIT don't know the its caller program is CET enable or not.
If JIT's caller program is non-CET, it is no problem JIT generate CET code or not.
But if JIT's caller program is CET enabled, JIT must generate CET code or it will cause Control protection exceptions.
I have test the patch at llvm-unit-test and llvm-test-suite at CET machine. It passed.
and H.J. also test it at building and running VNCserver(Virtual Network Console), it works too.
(if not apply this patch, VNCserver will crash at CET machine.)
Reviewers: hjl.tools, craig.topper, LuoYuanke, annita.zhang, pengfei
Reviewed By: LuoYuanke
Subscribers: tstellar, efriedma, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Tags: #llvm
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D76900
(cherry picked from commit 01a32f2bd3fad4331cebe9f4faa270d7c082d281)
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Summary:
Bug fix for https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45182
Exception handle may indirectly jump to catch pad, So we should add ENDBR instruction before catch pad instructions.
Reviewers: craig.topper, hjl.tools, LuoYuanke, annita.zhang, pengfei
Reviewed By: LuoYuanke
Subscribers: hiraditya, llvm-commits
Patch By: Xiang Zhang (xiangzhangllvm)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D76190
(cherry picked from commit 974d649f8eaf3026ccb9d1b77bdec55da25366e5)
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(I'm currently trying to debug a strange error message I get when
pushing to github, despite the pushes being successful).
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llvm-svn: 369803
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CET-IBT enabled
Return-twice functions will indirectly jump after the caller's position.
So when CET-IBT is enable, we should make sure these is endbr*
instructions follow these Return-twice function caller. Like GCC does.
Patch by Xiang Zhang (xiangzhangllvm)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D61881
llvm-svn: 361342
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to reflect the new license.
We understand that people may be surprised that we're moving the header
entirely to discuss the new license. We checked this carefully with the
Foundation's lawyer and we believe this is the correct approach.
Essentially, all code in the project is now made available by the LLVM
project under our new license, so you will see that the license headers
include that license only. Some of our contributors have contributed
code under our old license, and accordingly, we have retained a copy of
our old license notice in the top-level files in each project and
repository.
llvm-svn: 351636
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This patch aims to match the changes introduced in gcc by
https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-cvs/2018-04/msg00534.html. The
IBT feature definition is removed, with the IBT instructions
being freely available on all X86 targets. The shadow stack
instructions are also being made freely available, and the
use of all these CET instructions is controlled by the module
flags derived from the -fcf-protection clang option. The hasSHSTK
option remains since clang uses it to determine availability of
shadow stack instruction intrinsics, but it is no longer directly used.
Comes with a clang patch (D46881).
Patch by mike.dvoretsky
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D46882
llvm-svn: 332705
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X86 Supports Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) as part of Control-Flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
IBT instruments ENDBR instructions used to specify valid targets of indirect call / jmp.
The `nocf_check` attribute has two roles in the context of X86 IBT technology:
1. Appertains to a function - do not add ENDBR instruction at the beginning of the function.
2. Appertains to a function pointer - do not track the target function of this pointer by adding nocf_check prefix to the indirect-call instruction.
This patch implements `nocf_check` context for Indirect Branch Tracking.
It also auto generates `nocf_check` prefixes before indirect branchs to jump tables that are guarded by range checks.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41879
llvm-svn: 327767
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NDEBUG.
This has the advantage of making release only builds more warning
free and there's no need to make this routine a class function if
it isn't using class members anyhow.
llvm-svn: 325967
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CET (Control-Flow Enforcement Technology) introduces a new mechanism called IBT (Indirect Branch Tracking).
According to IBT, each Indirect branch should land on dedicated ENDBR instruction (End Branch).
The new pass adds ENDBR instructions for every indirect jmp/call (including jumps using jump tables / switches).
For more information, please see the following:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40482
Change-Id: Icb754489faf483a95248f96982a4e8b1009eb709
llvm-svn: 322062
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