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CET-IBT enabled
Return-twice functions will indirectly jump after the caller's position.
So when CET-IBT is enable, we should make sure these is endbr*
instructions follow these Return-twice function caller. Like GCC does.
Patch by Xiang Zhang (xiangzhangllvm)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D61881
llvm-svn: 361342
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to reflect the new license.
We understand that people may be surprised that we're moving the header
entirely to discuss the new license. We checked this carefully with the
Foundation's lawyer and we believe this is the correct approach.
Essentially, all code in the project is now made available by the LLVM
project under our new license, so you will see that the license headers
include that license only. Some of our contributors have contributed
code under our old license, and accordingly, we have retained a copy of
our old license notice in the top-level files in each project and
repository.
llvm-svn: 351636
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This patch aims to match the changes introduced in gcc by
https://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-cvs/2018-04/msg00534.html. The
IBT feature definition is removed, with the IBT instructions
being freely available on all X86 targets. The shadow stack
instructions are also being made freely available, and the
use of all these CET instructions is controlled by the module
flags derived from the -fcf-protection clang option. The hasSHSTK
option remains since clang uses it to determine availability of
shadow stack instruction intrinsics, but it is no longer directly used.
Comes with a clang patch (D46881).
Patch by mike.dvoretsky
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D46882
llvm-svn: 332705
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X86 Supports Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) as part of Control-Flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
IBT instruments ENDBR instructions used to specify valid targets of indirect call / jmp.
The `nocf_check` attribute has two roles in the context of X86 IBT technology:
1. Appertains to a function - do not add ENDBR instruction at the beginning of the function.
2. Appertains to a function pointer - do not track the target function of this pointer by adding nocf_check prefix to the indirect-call instruction.
This patch implements `nocf_check` context for Indirect Branch Tracking.
It also auto generates `nocf_check` prefixes before indirect branchs to jump tables that are guarded by range checks.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41879
llvm-svn: 327767
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NDEBUG.
This has the advantage of making release only builds more warning
free and there's no need to make this routine a class function if
it isn't using class members anyhow.
llvm-svn: 325967
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CET (Control-Flow Enforcement Technology) introduces a new mechanism called IBT (Indirect Branch Tracking).
According to IBT, each Indirect branch should land on dedicated ENDBR instruction (End Branch).
The new pass adds ENDBR instructions for every indirect jmp/call (including jumps using jump tables / switches).
For more information, please see the following:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40482
Change-Id: Icb754489faf483a95248f96982a4e8b1009eb709
llvm-svn: 322062
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