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author | Etienne Bergeron <etienneb@google.com> | 2016-06-07 20:15:35 +0000 |
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committer | Etienne Bergeron <etienneb@google.com> | 2016-06-07 20:15:35 +0000 |
commit | 22bfa83208e8ea51c827f4ab62792ddd7b63d8a6 (patch) | |
tree | f8de15994bcf23d6124d37bd84370ae411106654 /llvm/lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp | |
parent | 918a92881b6df5c23c2e436b8db252a808d96b67 (diff) | |
download | bcm5719-llvm-22bfa83208e8ea51c827f4ab62792ddd7b63d8a6.tar.gz bcm5719-llvm-22bfa83208e8ea51c827f4ab62792ddd7b63d8a6.zip |
[stack-protection] Add support for MSVC buffer security check
Summary:
This patch is adding support for the MSVC buffer security check implementation
The buffer security check is turned on with the '/GS' compiler switch.
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/8dbf701c.aspx
* To be added to clang here: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20347
Some overview of buffer security check feature and implementation:
* https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa290051(VS.71).aspx
* http://www.ksyash.com/2011/01/buffer-overflow-protection-3/
* http://blog.osom.info/2012/02/understanding-vs-c-compilers-buffer.html
For the following example:
```
int example(int offset, int index) {
char buffer[10];
memset(buffer, 0xCC, index);
return buffer[index];
}
```
The MSVC compiler is adding these instructions to perform stack integrity check:
```
push ebp
mov ebp,esp
sub esp,50h
[1] mov eax,dword ptr [__security_cookie (01068024h)]
[2] xor eax,ebp
[3] mov dword ptr [ebp-4],eax
push ebx
push esi
push edi
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
push eax
push 0CCh
lea ecx,[buffer]
push ecx
call _memset (010610B9h)
add esp,0Ch
mov eax,dword ptr [index]
movsx eax,byte ptr buffer[eax]
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
[4] mov ecx,dword ptr [ebp-4]
[5] xor ecx,ebp
[6] call @__security_check_cookie@4 (01061276h)
mov esp,ebp
pop ebp
ret
```
The instrumentation above is:
* [1] is loading the global security canary,
* [3] is storing the local computed ([2]) canary to the guard slot,
* [4] is loading the guard slot and ([5]) re-compute the global canary,
* [6] is validating the resulting canary with the '__security_check_cookie' and performs error handling.
Overview of the current stack-protection implementation:
* lib/CodeGen/StackProtector.cpp
* There is a default stack-protection implementation applied on intermediate representation.
* The target can overload 'getIRStackGuard' method if it has a standard location for the stack protector cookie.
* An intrinsic 'Intrinsic::stackprotector' is added to the prologue. It will be expanded by the instruction selection pass (DAG or Fast).
* Basic Blocks are added to every instrumented function to receive the code for handling stack guard validation and errors handling.
* Guard manipulation and comparison are added directly to the intermediate representation.
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp
* lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp
* There is an implementation that adds instrumentation during instruction selection (for better handling of sibbling calls).
* see long comment above 'class StackProtectorDescriptor' declaration.
* The target needs to override 'getSDagStackGuard' to activate SDAG stack protection generation. (note: getIRStackGuard MUST be nullptr).
* 'getSDagStackGuard' returns the appropriate stack guard (security cookie)
* The code is generated by 'SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp' and 'SelectionDAGISel.cpp'.
* include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h
* Contains function to retrieve the default Guard 'Value'; should be overriden by each target to select which implementation is used and provide Guard 'Value'.
* lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp
* Contains the x86 specialisation; Guard 'Value' used by the SelectionDAG algorithm.
Function-based Instrumentation:
* The MSVC doesn't inline the stack guard comparison in every function. Instead, a call to '__security_check_cookie' is added to the epilogue before every return instructions.
* To support function-based instrumentation, this patch is
* adding a function to get the function-based check (llvm 'Value', see include/llvm/Target/TargetLowering.h),
* If provided, the stack protection instrumentation won't be inlined and a call to that function will be added to the prologue.
* modifying (SelectionDAGISel.cpp) do avoid producing basic blocks used for inline instrumentation,
* generating the function-based instrumentation during the ISEL pass (SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp),
* if FastISEL (not SelectionDAG), using the fallback which rely on the same function-based implemented over intermediate representation (StackProtector.cpp).
Modifications
* adding support for MSVC (lib/Target/X86/X86ISelLowering.cpp)
* adding support function-based instrumentation (lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGBuilder.cpp, .h)
Results
* IR generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /Od /c -mllvm -print-isel-input
```
```
*** Final LLVM Code input to ISel ***
; Function Attrs: nounwind sspstrong
define i32 @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"(i32 %offset, i32 %index) #0 {
entry:
%StackGuardSlot = alloca i8* <<<-- Allocated guard slot
%0 = call i8* @llvm.stackguard() <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
call void @llvm.stackprotector(i8* %0, i8** %StackGuardSlot) <<<-- Prologue intrinsic call (store to Guard slot)
%index.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%offset.addr = alloca i32, align 4
%buffer = alloca [10 x i8], align 1
store i32 %index, i32* %index.addr, align 4
store i32 %offset, i32* %offset.addr, align 4
%arraydecay = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 0
%1 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %arraydecay, i8 -52, i32 %1, i32 1, i1 false)
%2 = load i32, i32* %index.addr, align 4
%arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i8], [10 x i8]* %buffer, i32 0, i32 %2
%3 = load i8, i8* %arrayidx, align 1
%conv = sext i8 %3 to i32
%4 = load volatile i8*, i8** %StackGuardSlot <<<-- Loading Guard slot
call void @__security_check_cookie(i8* %4) <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
ret i32 %conv
}
```
* SelectionDAG generated instrumentation:
```
clang-cl /GS test.cc /O1 /c /FA
```
```
"?example@@YAHHH@Z": # @"\01?example@@YAHHH@Z"
# BB#0: # %entry
pushl %esi
subl $16, %esp
movl ___security_cookie, %eax <<<-- Loading Stack Guard value
movl 28(%esp), %esi
movl %eax, 12(%esp) <<<-- Store to Guard slot
leal 2(%esp), %eax
pushl %esi
pushl $204
pushl %eax
calll _memset
addl $12, %esp
movsbl 2(%esp,%esi), %esi
movl 12(%esp), %ecx <<<-- Loading Guard slot
calll @__security_check_cookie@4 <<<-- Epilogue function-based check
movl %esi, %eax
addl $16, %esp
popl %esi
retl
```
Reviewers: kcc, pcc, eugenis, rnk
Subscribers: majnemer, llvm-commits, hans, thakis, rnk
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D20346
llvm-svn: 272053
Diffstat (limited to 'llvm/lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | llvm/lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp | 30 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/llvm/lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp b/llvm/lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp index 0ae1a95b875..918c013c798 100644 --- a/llvm/lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp +++ b/llvm/lib/CodeGen/SelectionDAG/SelectionDAGISel.cpp @@ -1463,8 +1463,12 @@ void SelectionDAGISel::SelectAllBasicBlocks(const Function &Fn) { LowerArguments(Fn); } } - if (getAnalysis<StackProtector>().shouldEmitSDCheck(*LLVMBB)) - SDB->SPDescriptor.initialize(LLVMBB, FuncInfo->MBBMap[LLVMBB]); + if (getAnalysis<StackProtector>().shouldEmitSDCheck(*LLVMBB)) { + bool FunctionBasedInstrumentation = + TLI->getSSPStackGuardCheck(*Fn.getParent()); + SDB->SPDescriptor.initialize(LLVMBB, FuncInfo->MBBMap[LLVMBB], + FunctionBasedInstrumentation); + } if (Begin != BI) ++NumDAGBlocks; @@ -1552,7 +1556,7 @@ static bool MIIsInTerminatorSequence(const MachineInstr *MI) { /// terminator, but additionally the copies that move the vregs into the /// physical registers. static MachineBasicBlock::iterator -FindSplitPointForStackProtector(MachineBasicBlock *BB, DebugLoc DL) { +FindSplitPointForStackProtector(MachineBasicBlock *BB) { MachineBasicBlock::iterator SplitPoint = BB->getFirstTerminator(); // if (SplitPoint == BB->begin()) @@ -1593,7 +1597,23 @@ SelectionDAGISel::FinishBasicBlock() { } // Handle stack protector. - if (SDB->SPDescriptor.shouldEmitStackProtector()) { + if (SDB->SPDescriptor.shouldEmitFunctionBasedCheckStackProtector()) { + // The target provides a guard check function. There is no need to + // generate error handling code or to split current basic block. + MachineBasicBlock *ParentMBB = SDB->SPDescriptor.getParentMBB(); + + // Add load and check to the basicblock. + FuncInfo->MBB = ParentMBB; + FuncInfo->InsertPt = + FindSplitPointForStackProtector(ParentMBB); + SDB->visitSPDescriptorParent(SDB->SPDescriptor, ParentMBB); + CurDAG->setRoot(SDB->getRoot()); + SDB->clear(); + CodeGenAndEmitDAG(); + + // Clear the Per-BB State. + SDB->SPDescriptor.resetPerBBState(); + } else if (SDB->SPDescriptor.shouldEmitStackProtector()) { MachineBasicBlock *ParentMBB = SDB->SPDescriptor.getParentMBB(); MachineBasicBlock *SuccessMBB = SDB->SPDescriptor.getSuccessMBB(); @@ -1604,7 +1624,7 @@ SelectionDAGISel::FinishBasicBlock() { // register allocation issues caused by us splitting the parent mbb. The // register allocator will clean up said virtual copies later on. MachineBasicBlock::iterator SplitPoint = - FindSplitPointForStackProtector(ParentMBB, SDB->getCurDebugLoc()); + FindSplitPointForStackProtector(ParentMBB); // Splice the terminator of ParentMBB into SuccessMBB. SuccessMBB->splice(SuccessMBB->end(), ParentMBB, |