diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch | 43 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch b/package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5bf9b89d17..0000000000 --- a/package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:40:10 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Prevent integer overflows in capability checks - -The limits for capabilities are specified using 32 bit unsigned integers. -This could cause possible integer overflows causing buffer overflows. -For instance the sum of num_common_caps and num_caps can be 0 avoiding -additional checks. -As the link message is now capped to 4096 and the capabilities are -contained in the link message limit the capabilities to 1024 -(capabilities are expressed in number of uint32_t items). - -[Peter: fixes CVE-2016-9578] -Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com> -Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> ---- - server/reds.c | 8 ++++++++ - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index 86a33d53..91504544 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque) - link_mess->num_channel_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps); - link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps); - -+ /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities, -+ * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */ -+ if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 1024) { -+ reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA); -+ reds_link_free(link); -+ return; -+ } -+ - num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps; - caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset); - --- -2.11.0 - |