diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch | 43 |
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch b/package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5bf9b89d17 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/spice/0002-Prevent-integer-overflows-in-capability-checks.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:40:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent integer overflows in capability checks + +The limits for capabilities are specified using 32 bit unsigned integers. +This could cause possible integer overflows causing buffer overflows. +For instance the sum of num_common_caps and num_caps can be 0 avoiding +additional checks. +As the link message is now capped to 4096 and the capabilities are +contained in the link message limit the capabilities to 1024 +(capabilities are expressed in number of uint32_t items). + +[Peter: fixes CVE-2016-9578] +Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> +Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> +--- + server/reds.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c +index 86a33d53..91504544 100644 +--- a/server/reds.c ++++ b/server/reds.c +@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque) + link_mess->num_channel_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps); + link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps); + ++ /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities, ++ * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */ ++ if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 1024) { ++ reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA); ++ reds_link_free(link); ++ return; ++ } ++ + num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps; + caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset); + +-- +2.11.0 + |
