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authorBaruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>2015-05-04 21:04:40 +0300
committerPeter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>2015-05-04 20:51:41 +0200
commit39a4a79d8aad8e5bf754f360efd15442894dcaf1 (patch)
tree0a51ab36486cf0919f08161b8c651da3df903022 /package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
parent476c6c6e093f1986e65cb922316c02491cd9b753 (diff)
downloadbuildroot-39a4a79d8aad8e5bf754f360efd15442894dcaf1.tar.gz
buildroot-39a4a79d8aad8e5bf754f360efd15442894dcaf1.zip
wpa_supplicant: apply upstream security patches
This commit adds patches for three different upstream security advisories. No CVE numbers stated. http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/wps-upnp-http-chunked-transfer-encoding.txt http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/integer-underflow-in-ap-mode-wmm-action-frame.txt http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/eap-pwd-missing-payload-length-validation.txt Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch')
-rw-r--r--package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch50
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d9dccf9116
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
+
+strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
+resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
+result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
+argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
+
+This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
+has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
+would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
+upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
+(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
+
+Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
+rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
+larger than the maximum configured body length.
+
+Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
+reporting this issue.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
+---
+ src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
+index 2f08f37275c0..d2855e32fd0f 100644
+--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
+@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
+ goto bad;
+ h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
++ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
++ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
++ h->chunk_size);
++ goto bad;
++ }
+ /* throw away chunk header
+ * so we have only real data
+ */
+--
+2.1.4
+
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