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author | Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> | 2017-07-14 16:02:03 +0200 |
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committer | Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> | 2017-07-14 19:29:31 +0200 |
commit | 31bd29fe093a258755929a23d764b02323fcdc46 (patch) | |
tree | 4093e373f33241491c83703588c18ad5c0a4e96d /package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch | |
parent | 45c468f6a5980c59252d2e1025f39eee9cf76aa8 (diff) | |
download | buildroot-31bd29fe093a258755929a23d764b02323fcdc46.tar.gz buildroot-31bd29fe093a258755929a23d764b02323fcdc46.zip |
spice: add upstream security fixes for CVE-2017-7506
Fixes CVE-2017-7506 - Possible buffer overflow via invalid monitor
configurations.
For more details, see:
https://marc.info/?l=oss-security&m=150001782924095
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch | 48 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch b/package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..212645b44f --- /dev/null +++ b/package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From a957a90baf2c62d31f3547e56bba7d0e812d2331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] reds: Avoid buffer overflows handling monitor + configuration + +It was also possible for a malicious client to set +VDAgentMonitorsConfig::num_of_monitors to a number larger +than the actual size of VDAgentMOnitorsConfig::monitors. +This would lead to buffer overflows, which could allow the guest to +read part of the host memory. This might cause write overflows in the +host as well, but controlling the content of such buffers seems +complicated. + +Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> +--- + server/reds.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c +index e1c8c108..3a42c375 100644 +--- a/server/reds.c ++++ b/server/reds.c +@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( + VDAgentMessage *msg_header; + VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config; + RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config; ++ uint32_t max_monitors; + + // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through + // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows +@@ -1028,6 +1029,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( + goto overflow; + } + monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header)); ++ // limit the monitor number to avoid buffer overflows ++ max_monitors = (msg_header->size - sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) / ++ sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig); ++ if (monitors_config->num_of_monitors > max_monitors) { ++ goto overflow; ++ } + spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); + red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); + reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); +-- +2.11.0 + |