rsync: security bump to version 3.1.3

Fixes CVE-2018-5764: remote attackers can bypass an
argument-sanitization protection mechanism

Drop upstream patches.

Add license file hash.

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 33 deletions

diff --git a/package/rsync/0004-Enforce-trailing-0-when-receiving-xattr-name-values.patch b/package/rsync/0004-Enforce-trailing-0-when-receiving-xattr-name-values.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index be9040010c..0000000000
--- a/package/rsync/0004-Enforce-trailing-0-when-receiving-xattr-name-values.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 47a63d90e71d3e19e0e96052bb8c6b9cb140ecc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Wayne Davison <wayned@samba.org>
-Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2017 11:33:15 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Enforce trailing \0 when receiving xattr name values. Fixes
- bug 13112.
-
-Fixes CVE-2017-16548
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
----
-Patch status: upstream commit 47a63d90e7
-
- xattrs.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xattrs.c b/xattrs.c
-index 68305d75..4867e6f5 100644
---- a/xattrs.c
-+++ b/xattrs.c
-@@ -824,6 +824,10 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
- 			out_of_memory("receive_xattr");
- 		name = ptr + dget_len + extra_len;
- 		read_buf(f, name, name_len);
-+		if (name_len < 1 || name[name_len-1] != '\0') {
-+			rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid xattr name received (missing trailing \\0).\n");
-+			exit_cleanup(RERR_FILEIO);
-+		}
- 		if (dget_len == datum_len)
- 			read_buf(f, ptr, dget_len);
- 		else {
--- 
-2.11.0
-