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author | Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> | 2018-02-19 16:50:59 +0100 |
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committer | Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> | 2018-02-19 23:48:35 +0100 |
commit | 157a198d304224c12fa0d91d977a6619d021f5c6 (patch) | |
tree | 304d0f60c9f35127c468b78d2ae24467ab14949b /package/quagga/0006-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch | |
parent | 737278c2ccb607c4a5a8b3bb0d817c25a2dc2602 (diff) | |
download | buildroot-157a198d304224c12fa0d91d977a6619d021f5c6.tar.gz buildroot-157a198d304224c12fa0d91d977a6619d021f5c6.zip |
quagga: add upstream security fixes
Fixes the following security issues:
CVE-2018-5378
It was discovered that the Quagga BGP daemon, bgpd, does not
properly bounds check data sent with a NOTIFY to a peer, if an
attribute length is invalid. A configured BGP peer can take
advantage of this bug to read memory from the bgpd process or cause
a denial of service (daemon crash).
https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-0543.txt
CVE-2018-5379
It was discovered that the Quagga BGP daemon, bgpd, can double-free
memory when processing certain forms of UPDATE message, containing
cluster-list and/or unknown attributes, resulting in a denial of
service (bgpd daemon crash).
https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1114.txt
CVE-2018-5380
It was discovered that the Quagga BGP daemon, bgpd, does not
properly handle internal BGP code-to-string conversion tables.
https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1550.txt
CVE-2018-5381
It was discovered that the Quagga BGP daemon, bgpd, can enter an
infinite loop if sent an invalid OPEN message by a configured peer.
A configured peer can take advantage of this flaw to cause a denial
of service (bgpd daemon not responding to any other events; BGP
sessions will drop and not be reestablished; unresponsive CLI
interface).
https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1975.txt
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'package/quagga/0006-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | package/quagga/0006-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch | 112 |
1 files changed, 112 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/quagga/0006-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch b/package/quagga/0006-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e32817f06 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/quagga/0006-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From e69b535f92eafb599329bf725d9b4c6fd5d7fded Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org> +Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 19:52:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: Fix double free of unknown attribute + +Security issue: Quagga-2018-1114 +See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1114.txt + +It is possible for bgpd to double-free an unknown attribute. This can happen +via bgp_update_receive receiving an UPDATE with an invalid unknown attribute. +bgp_update_receive then will call bgp_attr_unintern_sub and bgp_attr_flush, +and the latter may try free an already freed unknown attr. + +* bgpd/bgp_attr.c: (transit_unintern) Take a pointer to the caller's storage + for the (struct transit *), so that transit_unintern can NULL out the + caller's reference if the (struct transit) is freed. + (cluster_unintern) By inspection, appears to have a similar issue. + (bgp_attr_unintern_sub) adjust for above. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> +--- + bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- + bgpd/bgp_attr.h | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c +index 9564637e..0c2806b5 100644 +--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c ++++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c +@@ -199,15 +199,17 @@ cluster_intern (struct cluster_list *cluster) + } + + void +-cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list *cluster) ++cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list **cluster) + { +- if (cluster->refcnt) +- cluster->refcnt--; ++ struct cluster_list *c = *cluster; ++ if (c->refcnt) ++ c->refcnt--; + +- if (cluster->refcnt == 0) ++ if (c->refcnt == 0) + { +- hash_release (cluster_hash, cluster); +- cluster_free (cluster); ++ hash_release (cluster_hash, c); ++ cluster_free (c); ++ *cluster = NULL; + } + } + +@@ -357,15 +359,18 @@ transit_intern (struct transit *transit) + } + + void +-transit_unintern (struct transit *transit) ++transit_unintern (struct transit **transit) + { +- if (transit->refcnt) +- transit->refcnt--; ++ struct transit *t = *transit; ++ ++ if (t->refcnt) ++ t->refcnt--; + +- if (transit->refcnt == 0) ++ if (t->refcnt == 0) + { +- hash_release (transit_hash, transit); +- transit_free (transit); ++ hash_release (transit_hash, t); ++ transit_free (t); ++ *transit = NULL; + } + } + +@@ -820,11 +825,11 @@ bgp_attr_unintern_sub (struct attr *attr) + UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES)); + + if (attr->extra->cluster) +- cluster_unintern (attr->extra->cluster); ++ cluster_unintern (&attr->extra->cluster); + UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST)); + + if (attr->extra->transit) +- transit_unintern (attr->extra->transit); ++ transit_unintern (&attr->extra->transit); + } + } + +diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.h b/bgpd/bgp_attr.h +index 9ff074b2..052acc7d 100644 +--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.h ++++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.h +@@ -187,10 +187,10 @@ extern unsigned long int attr_unknown_count (void); + + /* Cluster list prototypes. */ + extern int cluster_loop_check (struct cluster_list *, struct in_addr); +-extern void cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list *); ++extern void cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list **); + + /* Transit attribute prototypes. */ +-void transit_unintern (struct transit *); ++void transit_unintern (struct transit **); + + /* Below exported for unit-test purposes only */ + struct bgp_attr_parser_args { +-- +2.11.0 + |