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| author | Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> | 2017-05-19 15:48:02 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> | 2017-05-22 00:00:13 +0200 |
| commit | a0c4cf0f9698ed109b97cb1e33f4070f505e3988 (patch) | |
| tree | eb68cfe8419f2b2b58352092abc2fb20fad192be | |
| parent | e6213e8ee68cbb637997ff02abe7945ec1cc168c (diff) | |
| download | buildroot-a0c4cf0f9698ed109b97cb1e33f4070f505e3988.tar.gz buildroot-a0c4cf0f9698ed109b97cb1e33f4070f505e3988.zip | |
libminiupnpc: add upstream security fix for CVE-2017-8798
CVE-2017-8798: Integer signedness error in MiniUPnP MiniUPnPc v1.4.20101221
through v2.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or
possibly have unspecified other impact.
For more details including a PoC, see:
https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2017-8798
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | package/libminiupnpc/0001-miniupnpc-Fix-CVE-2017-8798.patch | 59 |
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/libminiupnpc/0001-miniupnpc-Fix-CVE-2017-8798.patch b/package/libminiupnpc/0001-miniupnpc-Fix-CVE-2017-8798.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..25591fc4a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libminiupnpc/0001-miniupnpc-Fix-CVE-2017-8798.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From f0f1f4b22d6a98536377a1bb07e7c20e4703d229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thomas Bernard <miniupnp@free.fr> +Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 12:00:47 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] miniupnpc: Fix CVE-2017-8798 + +Thanks to tin/Team OSTStrom + +[Peter: drop Changelog.txt modification, convert to -p1 format] +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> +--- + miniupnpc/miniwget.c | 12 +++++++----- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/miniwget.c b/miniwget.c +index 37cb47b7..1eda57c5 100644 +--- a/miniwget.c ++++ b/miniwget.c +@@ -284,11 +284,12 @@ getHTTPResponse(int s, int * size, int * status_code) + goto end_of_stream; + } + } +- bytestocopy = ((int)chunksize < (n - i))?chunksize:(unsigned int)(n - i); ++ /* it is guaranteed that (n >= i) */ ++ bytestocopy = (chunksize < (unsigned int)(n - i))?chunksize:(unsigned int)(n - i); + if((content_buf_used + bytestocopy) > content_buf_len) + { + char * tmp; +- if(content_length >= (int)(content_buf_used + bytestocopy)) { ++ if((content_length >= 0) && ((unsigned int)content_length >= (content_buf_used + bytestocopy))) { + content_buf_len = content_length; + } else { + content_buf_len = content_buf_used + bytestocopy; +@@ -313,14 +314,15 @@ getHTTPResponse(int s, int * size, int * status_code) + { + /* not chunked */ + if(content_length > 0 +- && (int)(content_buf_used + n) > content_length) { ++ && (content_buf_used + n) > (unsigned int)content_length) { + /* skipping additional bytes */ + n = content_length - content_buf_used; + } + if(content_buf_used + n > content_buf_len) + { + char * tmp; +- if(content_length >= (int)(content_buf_used + n)) { ++ if(content_length >= 0 ++ && (unsigned int)content_length >= (content_buf_used + n)) { + content_buf_len = content_length; + } else { + content_buf_len = content_buf_used + n; +@@ -340,7 +342,7 @@ getHTTPResponse(int s, int * size, int * status_code) + } + } + /* use the Content-Length header value if available */ +- if(content_length > 0 && (int)content_buf_used >= content_length) ++ if(content_length > 0 && content_buf_used >= (unsigned int)content_length) + { + #ifdef DEBUG + printf("End of HTTP content\n"); |
