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authorBrett Grandbois <brett.grandbois@opengear.com>2018-06-11 07:36:58 +1000
committerSamuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>2018-06-12 14:43:33 +1000
commit18a47a31b46d916c58a31e8784a7c3a3abcae446 (patch)
tree188d558019c4bde1e3f2e849d025d417bb4f393c /ui/ncurses/nc-cui.c
parent32952937bc5c3753ff2f8f4612da5ba51bf69759 (diff)
downloadtalos-petitboot-18a47a31b46d916c58a31e8784a7c3a3abcae446.zip
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lib/security: hard_lockdown flag to stop runtime disable of signed boot
Currently if signed-boot is enabled in configure the presence of the LOCKDOWN_FILE is used as a runtime determination to perform the actual verification. In some environments this may be acceptable or even the intended operation but in other environments could be a security hole since the removal of the file will then cause boot task verification. Add a 'hard_lockdown' enable flag to generate a HARD_LOCKDOWN preprocessor definition to force the system to always do a signed boot verification for each boot task, which in the case of a missing file the boot will fail. Signed-off-by: Brett Grandbois <brett.grandbois@opengear.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'ui/ncurses/nc-cui.c')
-rw-r--r--ui/ncurses/nc-cui.c4
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ui/ncurses/nc-cui.c b/ui/ncurses/nc-cui.c
index 20a9048..8a3f97d 100644
--- a/ui/ncurses/nc-cui.c
+++ b/ui/ncurses/nc-cui.c
@@ -61,10 +61,14 @@ static void cui_cancel_autoboot_on_exit(struct cui *cui);
static bool lockdown_active(void)
{
+#if defined(SIGNED_BOOT) && defined(HARD_LOCKDOWN)
+ return true;
+#else
bool lockdown = false;
if (access(LOCKDOWN_FILE, F_OK) != -1)
lockdown = true;
return lockdown;
+#endif
}
static void cui_start(void)
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