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| author | Brett Grandbois <brett.grandbois@opengear.com> | 2018-06-11 07:36:58 +1000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com> | 2018-06-12 14:43:33 +1000 |
| commit | 18a47a31b46d916c58a31e8784a7c3a3abcae446 (patch) | |
| tree | 188d558019c4bde1e3f2e849d025d417bb4f393c /lib/security/openssl.c | |
| parent | 32952937bc5c3753ff2f8f4612da5ba51bf69759 (diff) | |
| download | talos-petitboot-18a47a31b46d916c58a31e8784a7c3a3abcae446.tar.gz talos-petitboot-18a47a31b46d916c58a31e8784a7c3a3abcae446.zip | |
lib/security: hard_lockdown flag to stop runtime disable of signed boot
Currently if signed-boot is enabled in configure the presence of the
LOCKDOWN_FILE is used as a runtime determination to perform the actual
verification. In some environments this may be acceptable or even the
intended operation but in other environments could be a security hole
since the removal of the file will then cause boot task verification.
Add a 'hard_lockdown' enable flag to generate a HARD_LOCKDOWN
preprocessor definition to force the system to always do a signed boot
verification for each boot task, which in the case of a missing file the
boot will fail.
Signed-off-by: Brett Grandbois <brett.grandbois@opengear.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/security/openssl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/security/openssl.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/lib/security/openssl.c b/lib/security/openssl.c index 03ea332..6454f8a 100644 --- a/lib/security/openssl.c +++ b/lib/security/openssl.c @@ -456,8 +456,10 @@ int lockdown_status(void) int ret = PB_LOCKDOWN_SIGN; PKCS12 *p12 = NULL; +#if !defined(HARD_LOCKDOWN) if (access(LOCKDOWN_FILE, F_OK) == -1) return PB_LOCKDOWN_NONE; +#endif /* determine lockdown type */ @@ -471,6 +473,6 @@ int lockdown_status(void) fclose(authorized_signatures_handle); } - return ret; + return ret; } |
