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author | Brett Grandbois <brett.grandbois@opengear.com> | 2018-06-11 07:36:58 +1000 |
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committer | Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com> | 2018-06-12 14:43:33 +1000 |
commit | 18a47a31b46d916c58a31e8784a7c3a3abcae446 (patch) | |
tree | 188d558019c4bde1e3f2e849d025d417bb4f393c /configure.ac | |
parent | 32952937bc5c3753ff2f8f4612da5ba51bf69759 (diff) | |
download | talos-petitboot-18a47a31b46d916c58a31e8784a7c3a3abcae446.tar.gz talos-petitboot-18a47a31b46d916c58a31e8784a7c3a3abcae446.zip |
lib/security: hard_lockdown flag to stop runtime disable of signed boot
Currently if signed-boot is enabled in configure the presence of the
LOCKDOWN_FILE is used as a runtime determination to perform the actual
verification. In some environments this may be acceptable or even the
intended operation but in other environments could be a security hole
since the removal of the file will then cause boot task verification.
Add a 'hard_lockdown' enable flag to generate a HARD_LOCKDOWN
preprocessor definition to force the system to always do a signed boot
verification for each boot task, which in the case of a missing file the
boot will fail.
Signed-off-by: Brett Grandbois <brett.grandbois@opengear.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'configure.ac')
-rw-r--r-- | configure.ac | 8 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 9eb0855..ed2ea82 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -239,6 +239,14 @@ AC_ARG_VAR( AS_IF([test "x$VERIFY_DIGEST" = x], [VERIFY_DIGEST="sha256"]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(VERIFY_DIGEST, "$VERIFY_DIGEST", [openssl verify dgst]) +AC_ARG_ENABLE([hard-lockdown], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-hard-lockdown], + [if signed boot configured, the absence of the + LOCKDOWN_FILE does not disable signed boot at + runtime @<:@default=no@:>@])], + [AC_DEFINE(HARD_LOCKDOWN, 1, [Enable hard lockdown])], + []) + AC_ARG_ENABLE( [busybox], [AS_HELP_STRING( |