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-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2017-15107.patch263
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 263 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2017-15107.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2017-15107.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 701101bcb..000000000
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2017-15107.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,263 +0,0 @@
-From 5a56e1b78a753d3295564daddc9ce389cc69fd68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
-Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 12:26:08 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] DNSSEC fix for wildcard NSEC records. CVE-2017-15107 applies.
-
-It's OK for NSEC records to be expanded from wildcards,
-but in that case, the proof of non-existence is only valid
-starting at the wildcard name, *.<domain> NOT the name expanded
-from the wildcard. Without this check it's possible for an
-attacker to craft an NSEC which wrongly proves non-existence
-in a domain which includes a wildcard for NSEC.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [http://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=4fe6744a220eddd3f1749b40cac3dfc510787de6]
-CVE: CVE-2017-15107
-Signed-off-by: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>
----
- CHANGELOG | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
- src/dnssec.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 2 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
-index 075fe1a6..5226dce8 100644
---- a/CHANGELOG
-+++ b/CHANGELOG
-@@ -1,3 +1,47 @@
-+version 2.79
-+ Fix parsing of CNAME arguments, which are confused by extra spaces.
-+ Thanks to Diego Aguirre for spotting the bug.
-+
-+ Where available, use IP_UNICAST_IF or IPV6_UNICAST_IF to bind
-+ upstream servers to an interface, rather than SO_BINDTODEVICE.
-+ Thanks to Beniamino Galvani for the patch.
-+
-+ Always return a SERVFAIL answer to DNS queries without the
-+ recursion desired bit set, UNLESS acting as an authoritative
-+ DNS server. This avoids a potential route to cache snooping.
-+
-+ Add support for Ed25519 signatures in DNSSEC validation.
-+
-+ No longer support RSA/MD5 signatures in DNSSEC validation,
-+ since these are not secure. This behaviour is mandated in
-+ RFC-6944.
-+
-+ Fix incorrect error exit code from dhcp_release6 utility.
-+ Thanks Gaudenz Steinlin for the bug report.
-+
-+ Use SIGINT (instead of overloading SIGHUP) to turn on DNSSEC
-+ time validation when --dnssec-no-timecheck is in use.
-+ Note that this is an incompatible change from earlier releases.
-+
-+ Allow more than one --bridge-interface option to refer to an
-+ interface, so that we can use
-+ --bridge-interface=int1,alias1
-+ --bridge-interface=int1,alias2
-+ as an alternative to
-+ --bridge-interface=int1,alias1,alias2
-+ Thanks to Neil Jerram for work on this.
-+
-+ Fix for DNSSEC with wildcard-derived NSEC records.
-+ It's OK for NSEC records to be expanded from wildcards,
-+ but in that case, the proof of non-existence is only valid
-+ starting at the wildcard name, *.<domain> NOT the name expanded
-+ from the wildcard. Without this check it's possible for an
-+ attacker to craft an NSEC which wrongly proves non-existence.
-+ Thanks to Ralph Dolmans for finding this, and co-ordinating
-+ the vulnerability tracking and fix release.
-+ CVE-2017-15107 applies.
-+
-+
- version 2.78
- Fix logic of appending ".<layer>" to PXE basename. Thanks to Chris
- Novakovic for the patch.
-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index a74d01ab..1417be56 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -424,15 +424,17 @@ static void from_wire(char *name)
- static int count_labels(char *name)
- {
- int i;
--
-+ char *p;
-+
- if (*name == 0)
- return 0;
-
-- for (i = 0; *name; name++)
-- if (*name == '.')
-+ for (p = name, i = 0; *p; p++)
-+ if (*p == '.')
- i++;
-
-- return i+1;
-+ /* Don't count empty first label. */
-+ return *name == '.' ? i : i+1;
- }
-
- /* Implement RFC1982 wrapped compare for 32-bit numbers */
-@@ -1405,8 +1407,8 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const char *b)
- }
- }
-
--static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count,
-- char *workspace1, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
-+static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, unsigned char **labels, int nsec_count,
-+ char *workspace1_in, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
- {
- int i, rc, rdlen;
- unsigned char *p, *psave;
-@@ -1419,6 +1421,9 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
- /* Find NSEC record that proves name doesn't exist */
- for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
- {
-+ char *workspace1 = workspace1_in;
-+ int sig_labels, name_labels;
-+
- p = nsecs[i];
- if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
- return 0;
-@@ -1427,7 +1432,27 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
- psave = p;
- if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 10))
- return 0;
--
-+
-+ /* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard
-+ as name for computation. */
-+ sig_labels = *labels[i];
-+ name_labels = count_labels(workspace1);
-+
-+ if (sig_labels < name_labels)
-+ {
-+ int k;
-+ for (k = name_labels - sig_labels; k != 0; k--)
-+ {
-+ while (*workspace1 != '.' && *workspace1 != 0)
-+ workspace1++;
-+ if (k != 1 && *workspace1 == '.')
-+ workspace1++;
-+ }
-+
-+ workspace1--;
-+ *workspace1 = '*';
-+ }
-+
- rc = hostname_cmp(workspace1, name);
-
- if (rc == 0)
-@@ -1825,24 +1850,26 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-
- static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, char *wildname, int *nons)
- {
-- static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL;
-- static int nsecset_sz = 0;
-+ static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL, **rrsig_labels = NULL;
-+ static int nsecset_sz = 0, rrsig_labels_sz = 0;
-
- int type_found = 0;
-- unsigned char *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
-+ unsigned char *auth_start, *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
- int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
-
- /* Move to NS section */
- if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
- return 0;
-+
-+ auth_start = p;
-
- for (nsecs_found = 0, i = ntohs(header->nscount); i != 0; i--)
- {
- unsigned char *pstart = p;
-
-- if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
-+ if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 10))
- return 0;
--
-+
- GETSHORT(type, p);
- GETSHORT(class, p);
- p += 4; /* TTL */
-@@ -1859,7 +1886,69 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
- if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz, nsecs_found))
- return 0;
-
-- nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
-+ if (type == T_NSEC)
-+ {
-+ /* If we're looking for NSECs, find the corresponding SIGs, to
-+ extract the labels value, which we need in case the NSECs
-+ are the result of wildcard expansion.
-+ Note that the NSEC may not have been validated yet
-+ so if there are multiple SIGs, make sure the label value
-+ is the same in all, to avoid be duped by a rogue one.
-+ If there are no SIGs, that's an error */
-+ unsigned char *p1 = auth_start;
-+ int res, j, rdlen1, type1, class1;
-+
-+ if (!expand_workspace(&rrsig_labels, &rrsig_labels_sz, nsecs_found))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = NULL;
-+
-+ for (j = ntohs(header->nscount); j != 0; j--)
-+ {
-+ if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, 0, 10)))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ GETSHORT(type1, p1);
-+ GETSHORT(class1, p1);
-+ p1 += 4; /* TTL */
-+ GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
-+
-+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (res == 1 && class1 == qclass && type1 == T_RRSIG)
-+ {
-+ int type_covered;
-+ unsigned char *psav = p1;
-+
-+ if (rdlen < 18)
-+ return 0; /* bad packet */
-+
-+ GETSHORT(type_covered, p1);
-+
-+ if (type_covered == T_NSEC)
-+ {
-+ p1++; /* algo */
-+
-+ /* labels field must be the same in every SIG we find. */
-+ if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
-+ rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = p1;
-+ else if (*rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] != *p1) /* algo */
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ p1 = psav;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Must have found at least one sig. */
-+ if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
- }
-
- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-@@ -1867,7 +1956,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
- }
-
- if (type_found == T_NSEC)
-- return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
-+ return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, rrsig_labels, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
- else if (type_found == T_NSEC3)
- return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname, nons);
- else
---
-2.19.0
-
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