diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch | 329 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 329 deletions
diff --git a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch b/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3dfc51af7..000000000 --- a/import-layers/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2016-1907_3.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,329 +0,0 @@ -From ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org> -Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 23:04:47 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit - -eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted - forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by - Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@ - -Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938 -Upstream-Status: Backport -CVE: CVE-2016-1907 - -[YOCTO #8935] - -Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> - ---- - clientloop.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- - clientloop.h | 4 +-- - mux.c | 22 ++++++------ - ssh.c | 23 +++++------- - 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) - -Index: openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.c -=================================================================== ---- openssh-7.1p2.orig/clientloop.c -+++ openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.c -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.276 2015/10/20 03:36:35 mmcc Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.279 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ - /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland -@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis - { - size_t i, dlen; - -+ if (display == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ - dlen = strlen(display); - for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) { - if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) && -@@ -301,34 +304,33 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis - - #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" - #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 --void -+int - client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, - u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) - { -- char cmd[1024]; -- char line[512]; -- char xdisplay[512]; -+ char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512]; -+ char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX]; - static char proto[512], data[512]; - FILE *f; -- int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i; -- char xauthdir[PATH_MAX] = "", xauthfile[PATH_MAX] = ""; -+ int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i, r; - struct stat st; - u_int now, x11_timeout_real; - - *_proto = proto; - *_data = data; -- proto[0] = data[0] = '\0'; -+ proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0'; - -- if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) { -- debug("No xauth program."); -- } else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { -- logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data", -+ if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { -+ logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding", - display); -- } else { -- if (display == NULL) { -- debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set"); -- return; -- } -+ return -1; -+ } -+ if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) { -+ debug("No xauth program."); -+ xauth_path = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (xauth_path != NULL) { - /* - * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does - * not match an authorization entry. For this we -@@ -337,43 +339,60 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display - * is not perfect. - */ - if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) { -- snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", -- display + 10); -+ if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", -+ display + 10)) < 0 || -+ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) { -+ error("%s: display name too long", __func__); -+ return -1; -+ } - display = xdisplay; - } - if (trusted == 0) { -- mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX); - /* -+ * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie. -+ * - * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive - * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to - * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server. - */ -+ mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir)); -+ if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) { -+ error("%s: mkdtemp: %s", -+ __func__, strerror(errno)); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ do_unlink = 1; -+ if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile), -+ "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 || -+ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) { -+ error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__); -+ unlink(xauthfile); -+ rmdir(xauthdir); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK) - x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX; - else - x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK; -- if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) { -- do_unlink = 1; -- snprintf(xauthfile, PATH_MAX, "%s/xauthfile", -- xauthdir); -- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), -- "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO -- " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, -- xauth_path, xauthfile, display, -- x11_timeout_real); -- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); -- if (x11_refuse_time == 0) { -- now = monotime() + 1; -- if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) -- x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; -- else -- x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; -- channel_set_x11_refuse_time( -- x11_refuse_time); -- } -- if (system(cmd) == 0) -- generated = 1; -+ if ((r = snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), -+ "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO -+ " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, -+ xauth_path, xauthfile, display, -+ x11_timeout_real)) < 0 || -+ (size_t)r >= sizeof(cmd)) -+ fatal("%s: cmd too long", __func__); -+ debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd); -+ if (x11_refuse_time == 0) { -+ now = monotime() + 1; -+ if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) -+ x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; -+ else -+ x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; -+ channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time); - } -+ if (system(cmd) == 0) -+ generated = 1; - } - - /* -@@ -395,9 +414,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display - got_data = 1; - if (f) - pclose(f); -- } else -- error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " -- "xauth key data not generated"); -+ } - } - - if (do_unlink) { -@@ -405,6 +422,13 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display - rmdir(xauthdir); - } - -+ /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */ -+ if (!trusted && !got_data) { -+ error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " -+ "xauth key data not generated"); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - /* - * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some - * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the -@@ -427,6 +451,8 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display - rnd >>= 8; - } - } -+ -+ return 0; - } - - /* -Index: openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.h -=================================================================== ---- openssh-7.1p2.orig/clientloop.h -+++ openssh-7.1p2/clientloop.h -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.31 2013/06/02 23:36:29 dtucker Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.32 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ - - /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> -@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ - - /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */ - int client_loop(int, int, int); --void client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int, -+int client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int, - char **, char **); - void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *); - void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *, -Index: openssh-7.1p2/mux.c -=================================================================== ---- openssh-7.1p2.orig/mux.c -+++ openssh-7.1p2/mux.c -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.54 2015/08/19 23:18:26 djm Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.58 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ - /* - * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org> - * -@@ -1354,16 +1354,18 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, - char *proto, *data; - - /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ -- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, -+ if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, - options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, -- &proto, &data); -- /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ -- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " -- "spoofing."); -- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, -- data, 1); -- client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); -- /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ -+ &proto, &data) == 0) { -+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ -+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " -+ "spoofing."); -+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, -+ data, 1); -+ /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ -+ client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", -+ CONFIRM_WARN); -+ } - } - - if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) { -Index: openssh-7.1p2/ssh.c -=================================================================== ---- openssh-7.1p2.orig/ssh.c -+++ openssh-7.1p2/ssh.c -@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ --/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.420 2015/07/30 00:01:34 djm Exp $ */ -+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.433 2016/01/13 23:04:47 djm Exp $ */ - /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland -@@ -1604,6 +1604,7 @@ ssh_session(void) - struct winsize ws; - char *cp; - const char *display; -+ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; - - /* Enable compression if requested. */ - if (options.compression) { -@@ -1674,13 +1675,9 @@ ssh_session(void) - display = getenv("DISPLAY"); - if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) - debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); -- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { -- char *proto, *data; -- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ -- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, -- options.forward_x11_trusted, -- options.forward_x11_timeout, -- &proto, &data); -+ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display, -+ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, -+ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { - /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ - debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " - "spoofing."); -@@ -1770,6 +1767,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, - extern char **environ; - const char *display; - int interactive = tty_flag; -+ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; - - if (!success) - return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */ -@@ -1777,12 +1775,9 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, - display = getenv("DISPLAY"); - if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) - debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); -- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { -- char *proto, *data; -- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ -- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, -- options.forward_x11_trusted, -- options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data); -+ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display, -+ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, -+ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { - /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ - debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " - "spoofing."); |