summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
blob: e4b3de08b0403471bc450a2bced88a1ab560955e (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039
1040
1041
1042
1043
1044
1045
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
1123
1124
1125
1126
1127
1128
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
1137
1138
1139
1140
1141
1142
1143
1144
1145
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153
1154
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186
1187
1188
1189
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1197
1198
1199
1200
1201
1202
1203
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
1244
1245
1246
1247
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
1259
1260
1261
1262
1263
1264
1265
1266
1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
1289
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317
1318
1319
1320
1321
1322
1323
1324
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340
1341
1342
1343
1344
1345
1346
1347
1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353
1354
1355
1356
1357
1358
1359
1360
1361
1362
1363
1364
1365
1366
1367
1368
1369
1370
1371
1372
1373
1374
1375
1376
1377
1378
1379
1380
1381
1382
1383
1384
1385
/*
 * Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
 * J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
 * Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
 * Dug Song <dugsong@monkey.org>
 *
 * RPCSEC_GSS server authentication.
 * This implements RPCSEC_GSS as defined in rfc2203 (rpcsec_gss) and rfc2078
 * (gssapi)
 *
 * The RPCSEC_GSS involves three stages:
 *  1/ context creation
 *  2/ data exchange
 *  3/ context destruction
 *
 * Context creation is handled largely by upcalls to user-space.
 *  In particular, GSS_Accept_sec_context is handled by an upcall
 * Data exchange is handled entirely within the kernel
 *  In particular, GSS_GetMIC, GSS_VerifyMIC, GSS_Seal, GSS_Unseal are in-kernel.
 * Context destruction is handled in-kernel
 *  GSS_Delete_sec_context is in-kernel
 *
 * Context creation is initiated by a RPCSEC_GSS_INIT request arriving.
 * The context handle and gss_token are used as a key into the rpcsec_init cache.
 * The content of this cache includes some of the outputs of GSS_Accept_sec_context,
 * being major_status, minor_status, context_handle, reply_token.
 * These are sent back to the client.
 * Sequence window management is handled by the kernel.  The window size if currently
 * a compile time constant.
 *
 * When user-space is happy that a context is established, it places an entry
 * in the rpcsec_context cache. The key for this cache is the context_handle.
 * The content includes:
 *   uid/gidlist - for determining access rights
 *   mechanism type
 *   mechanism specific information, such as a key
 *
 */

#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>

#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/cache.h>

#ifdef RPC_DEBUG
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY	RPCDBG_AUTH
#endif

/* The rpcsec_init cache is used for mapping RPCSEC_GSS_{,CONT_}INIT requests
 * into replies.
 *
 * Key is context handle (\x if empty) and gss_token.
 * Content is major_status minor_status (integers) context_handle, reply_token.
 *
 */

static int netobj_equal(struct xdr_netobj *a, struct xdr_netobj *b)
{
	return a->len == b->len && 0 == memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->len);
}

#define	RSI_HASHBITS	6
#define	RSI_HASHMAX	(1<<RSI_HASHBITS)
#define	RSI_HASHMASK	(RSI_HASHMAX-1)

struct rsi {
	struct cache_head	h;
	struct xdr_netobj	in_handle, in_token;
	struct xdr_netobj	out_handle, out_token;
	int			major_status, minor_status;
};

static struct cache_head *rsi_table[RSI_HASHMAX];
static struct cache_detail rsi_cache;
static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old);
static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct rsi *item);

static void rsi_free(struct rsi *rsii)
{
	kfree(rsii->in_handle.data);
	kfree(rsii->in_token.data);
	kfree(rsii->out_handle.data);
	kfree(rsii->out_token.data);
}

static void rsi_put(struct kref *ref)
{
	struct rsi *rsii = container_of(ref, struct rsi, h.ref);
	rsi_free(rsii);
	kfree(rsii);
}

static inline int rsi_hash(struct rsi *item)
{
	return hash_mem(item->in_handle.data, item->in_handle.len, RSI_HASHBITS)
	     ^ hash_mem(item->in_token.data, item->in_token.len, RSI_HASHBITS);
}

static int rsi_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
{
	struct rsi *item = container_of(a, struct rsi, h);
	struct rsi *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsi, h);
	return netobj_equal(&item->in_handle, &tmp->in_handle)
		&& netobj_equal(&item->in_token, &tmp->in_token);
}

static int dup_to_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, char *src, int len)
{
	dst->len = len;
	dst->data = (len ? kmemdup(src, len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL);
	if (len && !dst->data)
		return -ENOMEM;
	return 0;
}

static inline int dup_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, struct xdr_netobj *src)
{
	return dup_to_netobj(dst, src->data, src->len);
}

static void rsi_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
{
	struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
	struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);

	new->out_handle.data = NULL;
	new->out_handle.len = 0;
	new->out_token.data = NULL;
	new->out_token.len = 0;
	new->in_handle.len = item->in_handle.len;
	item->in_handle.len = 0;
	new->in_token.len = item->in_token.len;
	item->in_token.len = 0;
	new->in_handle.data = item->in_handle.data;
	item->in_handle.data = NULL;
	new->in_token.data = item->in_token.data;
	item->in_token.data = NULL;
}

static void update_rsi(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
{
	struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
	struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);

	BUG_ON(new->out_handle.data || new->out_token.data);
	new->out_handle.len = item->out_handle.len;
	item->out_handle.len = 0;
	new->out_token.len = item->out_token.len;
	item->out_token.len = 0;
	new->out_handle.data = item->out_handle.data;
	item->out_handle.data = NULL;
	new->out_token.data = item->out_token.data;
	item->out_token.data = NULL;

	new->major_status = item->major_status;
	new->minor_status = item->minor_status;
}

static struct cache_head *rsi_alloc(void)
{
	struct rsi *rsii = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsii), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (rsii)
		return &rsii->h;
	else
		return NULL;
}

static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
		       struct cache_head *h,
		       char **bpp, int *blen)
{
	struct rsi *rsii = container_of(h, struct rsi, h);

	qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_handle.data, rsii->in_handle.len);
	qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_token.data, rsii->in_token.len);
	(*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
}


static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
		    char *mesg, int mlen)
{
	/* context token expiry major minor context token */
	char *buf = mesg;
	char *ep;
	int len;
	struct rsi rsii, *rsip = NULL;
	time_t expiry;
	int status = -EINVAL;

	memset(&rsii, 0, sizeof(rsii));
	/* handle */
	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
	if (len < 0)
		goto out;
	status = -ENOMEM;
	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_handle, buf, len))
		goto out;

	/* token */
	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
	status = -EINVAL;
	if (len < 0)
		goto out;
	status = -ENOMEM;
	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_token, buf, len))
		goto out;

	rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsii);
	if (!rsip)
		goto out;

	rsii.h.flags = 0;
	/* expiry */
	expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
	status = -EINVAL;
	if (expiry == 0)
		goto out;

	/* major/minor */
	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
	if (len < 0)
		goto out;
	if (len == 0) {
		goto out;
	} else {
		rsii.major_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
		if (*ep)
			goto out;
		len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
		if (len <= 0)
			goto out;
		rsii.minor_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
		if (*ep)
			goto out;

		/* out_handle */
		len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
		if (len < 0)
			goto out;
		status = -ENOMEM;
		if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_handle, buf, len))
			goto out;

		/* out_token */
		len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
		status = -EINVAL;
		if (len < 0)
			goto out;
		status = -ENOMEM;
		if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_token, buf, len))
			goto out;
	}
	rsii.h.expiry_time = expiry;
	rsip = rsi_update(&rsii, rsip);
	status = 0;
out:
	rsi_free(&rsii);
	if (rsip)
		cache_put(&rsip->h, &rsi_cache);
	else
		status = -ENOMEM;
	return status;
}

static struct cache_detail rsi_cache = {
	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
	.hash_size	= RSI_HASHMAX,
	.hash_table     = rsi_table,
	.name           = "auth.rpcsec.init",
	.cache_put      = rsi_put,
	.cache_request  = rsi_request,
	.cache_parse    = rsi_parse,
	.match		= rsi_match,
	.init		= rsi_init,
	.update		= update_rsi,
	.alloc		= rsi_alloc,
};

static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct rsi *item)
{
	struct cache_head *ch;
	int hash = rsi_hash(item);

	ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(&rsi_cache, &item->h, hash);
	if (ch)
		return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
	else
		return NULL;
}

static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old)
{
	struct cache_head *ch;
	int hash = rsi_hash(new);

	ch = sunrpc_cache_update(&rsi_cache, &new->h,
				 &old->h, hash);
	if (ch)
		return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
	else
		return NULL;
}


/*
 * The rpcsec_context cache is used to store a context that is
 * used in data exchange.
 * The key is a context handle. The content is:
 *  uid, gidlist, mechanism, service-set, mech-specific-data
 */

#define	RSC_HASHBITS	10
#define	RSC_HASHMAX	(1<<RSC_HASHBITS)
#define	RSC_HASHMASK	(RSC_HASHMAX-1)

#define GSS_SEQ_WIN	128

struct gss_svc_seq_data {
	/* highest seq number seen so far: */
	int			sd_max;
	/* for i such that sd_max-GSS_SEQ_WIN < i <= sd_max, the i-th bit of
	 * sd_win is nonzero iff sequence number i has been seen already: */
	unsigned long		sd_win[GSS_SEQ_WIN/BITS_PER_LONG];
	spinlock_t		sd_lock;
};

struct rsc {
	struct cache_head	h;
	struct xdr_netobj	handle;
	struct svc_cred		cred;
	struct gss_svc_seq_data	seqdata;
	struct gss_ctx		*mechctx;
};

static struct cache_head *rsc_table[RSC_HASHMAX];
static struct cache_detail rsc_cache;
static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old);
static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct rsc *item);

static void rsc_free(struct rsc *rsci)
{
	kfree(rsci->handle.data);
	if (rsci->mechctx)
		gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
	if (rsci->cred.cr_group_info)
		put_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
}

static void rsc_put(struct kref *ref)
{
	struct rsc *rsci = container_of(ref, struct rsc, h.ref);

	rsc_free(rsci);
	kfree(rsci);
}

static inline int
rsc_hash(struct rsc *rsci)
{
	return hash_mem(rsci->handle.data, rsci->handle.len, RSC_HASHBITS);
}

static int
rsc_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
{
	struct rsc *new = container_of(a, struct rsc, h);
	struct rsc *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsc, h);

	return netobj_equal(&new->handle, &tmp->handle);
}

static void
rsc_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
{
	struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
	struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);

	new->handle.len = tmp->handle.len;
	tmp->handle.len = 0;
	new->handle.data = tmp->handle.data;
	tmp->handle.data = NULL;
	new->mechctx = NULL;
	new->cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
}

static void
update_rsc(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
{
	struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
	struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);

	new->mechctx = tmp->mechctx;
	tmp->mechctx = NULL;
	memset(&new->seqdata, 0, sizeof(new->seqdata));
	spin_lock_init(&new->seqdata.sd_lock);
	new->cred = tmp->cred;
	tmp->cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
}

static struct cache_head *
rsc_alloc(void)
{
	struct rsc *rsci = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsci), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (rsci)
		return &rsci->h;
	else
		return NULL;
}

static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
		     char *mesg, int mlen)
{
	/* contexthandle expiry [ uid gid N <n gids> mechname ...mechdata... ] */
	char *buf = mesg;
	int len, rv;
	struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
	time_t expiry;
	int status = -EINVAL;
	struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;

	memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
	/* context handle */
	len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
	if (len < 0) goto out;
	status = -ENOMEM;
	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, buf, len))
		goto out;

	rsci.h.flags = 0;
	/* expiry */
	expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
	status = -EINVAL;
	if (expiry == 0)
		goto out;

	rscp = rsc_lookup(&rsci);
	if (!rscp)
		goto out;

	/* uid, or NEGATIVE */
	rv = get_int(&mesg, &rsci.cred.cr_uid);
	if (rv == -EINVAL)
		goto out;
	if (rv == -ENOENT)
		set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci.h.flags);
	else {
		int N, i;

		/* gid */
		if (get_int(&mesg, &rsci.cred.cr_gid))
			goto out;

		/* number of additional gid's */
		if (get_int(&mesg, &N))
			goto out;
		status = -ENOMEM;
		rsci.cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N);
		if (rsci.cred.cr_group_info == NULL)
			goto out;

		/* gid's */
		status = -EINVAL;
		for (i=0; i<N; i++) {
			gid_t gid;
			if (get_int(&mesg, &gid))
				goto out;
			GROUP_AT(rsci.cred.cr_group_info, i) = gid;
		}

		/* mech name */
		len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
		if (len < 0)
			goto out;
		gm = gss_mech_get_by_name(buf);
		status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
		if (!gm)
			goto out;

		status = -EINVAL;
		/* mech-specific data: */
		len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
		if (len < 0)
			goto out;
		status = gss_import_sec_context(buf, len, gm, &rsci.mechctx);
		if (status)
			goto out;
	}
	rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
	rscp = rsc_update(&rsci, rscp);
	status = 0;
out:
	gss_mech_put(gm);
	rsc_free(&rsci);
	if (rscp)
		cache_put(&rscp->h, &rsc_cache);
	else
		status = -ENOMEM;
	return status;
}

static struct cache_detail rsc_cache = {
	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
	.hash_size	= RSC_HASHMAX,
	.hash_table	= rsc_table,
	.name		= "auth.rpcsec.context",
	.cache_put	= rsc_put,
	.cache_parse	= rsc_parse,
	.match		= rsc_match,
	.init		= rsc_init,
	.update		= update_rsc,
	.alloc		= rsc_alloc,
};

static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct rsc *item)
{
	struct cache_head *ch;
	int hash = rsc_hash(item);

	ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(&rsc_cache, &item->h, hash);
	if (ch)
		return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
	else
		return NULL;
}

static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old)
{
	struct cache_head *ch;
	int hash = rsc_hash(new);

	ch = sunrpc_cache_update(&rsc_cache, &new->h,
				 &old->h, hash);
	if (ch)
		return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
	else
		return NULL;
}


static struct rsc *
gss_svc_searchbyctx(struct xdr_netobj *handle)
{
	struct rsc rsci;
	struct rsc *found;

	memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
	if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, handle->data, handle->len))
		return NULL;
	found = rsc_lookup(&rsci);
	rsc_free(&rsci);
	if (!found)
		return NULL;
	if (cache_check(&rsc_cache, &found->h, NULL))
		return NULL;
	return found;
}

/* Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in RFC 2203. */
static int
gss_check_seq_num(struct rsc *rsci, int seq_num)
{
	struct gss_svc_seq_data *sd = &rsci->seqdata;

	spin_lock(&sd->sd_lock);
	if (seq_num > sd->sd_max) {
		if (seq_num >= sd->sd_max + GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
			memset(sd->sd_win,0,sizeof(sd->sd_win));
			sd->sd_max = seq_num;
		} else while (sd->sd_max < seq_num) {
			sd->sd_max++;
			__clear_bit(sd->sd_max % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
		}
		__set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
		goto ok;
	} else if (seq_num <= sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
		goto drop;
	}
	/* sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN < seq_num <= sd_max */
	if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win))
		goto drop;
ok:
	spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
	return 1;
drop:
	spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
	return 0;
}

static inline u32 round_up_to_quad(u32 i)
{
	return (i + 3 ) & ~3;
}

static inline int
svc_safe_getnetobj(struct kvec *argv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
{
	int l;

	if (argv->iov_len < 4)
		return -1;
	o->len = svc_getnl(argv);
	l = round_up_to_quad(o->len);
	if (argv->iov_len < l)
		return -1;
	o->data = argv->iov_base;
	argv->iov_base += l;
	argv->iov_len -= l;
	return 0;
}

static inline int
svc_safe_putnetobj(struct kvec *resv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
{
	u8 *p;

	if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
		return -1;
	svc_putnl(resv, o->len);
	p = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
	resv->iov_len += round_up_to_quad(o->len);
	if (resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE)
		return -1;
	memcpy(p, o->data, o->len);
	memset(p + o->len, 0, round_up_to_quad(o->len) - o->len);
	return 0;
}

/* Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success.
 * Otherwise, return SVC_DROP (in the case of a bad sequence number)
 * or return SVC_DENIED and indicate error in authp.
 */
static int
gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
		  __be32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp)
{
	struct gss_ctx		*ctx_id = rsci->mechctx;
	struct xdr_buf		rpchdr;
	struct xdr_netobj	checksum;
	u32			flavor = 0;
	struct kvec		*argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
	struct kvec		iov;

	/* data to compute the checksum over: */
	iov.iov_base = rpcstart;
	iov.iov_len = (u8 *)argv->iov_base - (u8 *)rpcstart;
	xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &rpchdr);

	*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
	if (argv->iov_len < 4)
		return SVC_DENIED;
	flavor = svc_getnl(argv);
	if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS)
		return SVC_DENIED;
	if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &checksum))
		return SVC_DENIED;

	if (rqstp->rq_deferred) /* skip verification of revisited request */
		return SVC_OK;
	if (gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
		*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
		return SVC_DENIED;
	}

	if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ) {
		dprintk("RPC:       svcauth_gss: discarding request with "
				"large sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq);
		*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
		return SVC_DENIED;
	}
	if (!gss_check_seq_num(rsci, gc->gc_seq)) {
		dprintk("RPC:       svcauth_gss: discarding request with "
				"old sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq);
		return SVC_DROP;
	}
	return SVC_OK;
}

static int
gss_write_null_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
	__be32     *p;

	svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_NULL);
	p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
	/* don't really need to check if head->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE ... */
	*p++ = 0;
	if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
		return -1;
	return 0;
}

static int
gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq)
{
	__be32			xdr_seq;
	u32			maj_stat;
	struct xdr_buf		verf_data;
	struct xdr_netobj	mic;
	__be32			*p;
	struct kvec		iov;

	svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_GSS);
	xdr_seq = htonl(seq);

	iov.iov_base = &xdr_seq;
	iov.iov_len = sizeof(xdr_seq);
	xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data);
	p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
	mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
	maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &mic);
	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
		return -1;
	*p++ = htonl(mic.len);
	memset((u8 *)p + mic.len, 0, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
	p += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len);
	if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
		return -1;
	return 0;
}

struct gss_domain {
	struct auth_domain	h;
	u32			pseudoflavor;
};

static struct auth_domain *
find_gss_auth_domain(struct gss_ctx *ctx, u32 svc)
{
	char *name;

	name = gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(ctx->mech_type, svc);
	if (!name)
		return NULL;
	return auth_domain_find(name);
}

static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss;

int
svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name)
{
	struct gss_domain	*new;
	struct auth_domain	*test;
	int			stat = -ENOMEM;

	new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!new)
		goto out;
	kref_init(&new->h.ref);
	new->h.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!new->h.name)
		goto out_free_dom;
	new->h.flavour = &svcauthops_gss;
	new->pseudoflavor = pseudoflavor;

	test = auth_domain_lookup(name, &new->h);
	if (test != &new->h) { /* XXX Duplicate registration? */
		auth_domain_put(&new->h);
		/* dangling ref-count... */
		goto out;
	}
	return 0;

out_free_dom:
	kfree(new);
out:
	return stat;
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor);

static inline int
read_u32_from_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, int base, u32 *obj)
{
	__be32  raw;
	int     status;

	status = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, base, &raw, sizeof(*obj));
	if (status)
		return status;
	*obj = ntohl(raw);
	return 0;
}

/* It would be nice if this bit of code could be shared with the client.
 * Obstacles:
 *	The client shouldn't malloc(), would have to pass in own memory.
 *	The server uses base of head iovec as read pointer, while the
 *	client uses separate pointer. */
static int
unwrap_integ_data(struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
{
	int stat = -EINVAL;
	u32 integ_len, maj_stat;
	struct xdr_netobj mic;
	struct xdr_buf integ_buf;

	integ_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
	if (integ_len & 3)
		return stat;
	if (integ_len > buf->len)
		return stat;
	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len))
		BUG();
	/* copy out mic... */
	if (read_u32_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len, &mic.len))
		BUG();
	if (mic.len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
		return stat;
	mic.data = kmalloc(mic.len, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!mic.data)
		return stat;
	if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len + 4, mic.data, mic.len))
		goto out;
	maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
		goto out;
	if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
		goto out;
	stat = 0;
out:
	kfree(mic.data);
	return stat;
}

static inline int
total_buf_len(struct xdr_buf *buf)
{
	return buf->head[0].iov_len + buf->page_len + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
}

static void
fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad)
{
	if (buf->page_len == 0) {
		/* We need to adjust head and buf->len in tandem in this
		 * case to make svc_defer() work--it finds the original
		 * buffer start using buf->len - buf->head[0].iov_len. */
		buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
	}
}

static int
unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
{
	u32 priv_len, maj_stat;
	int pad, saved_len, remaining_len, offset;

	rqstp->rq_splice_ok = 0;

	priv_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
	if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
		/* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
		 * check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
		goto out_seq;
	}
	/* buf->len is the number of bytes from the original start of the
	 * request to the end, where head[0].iov_len is just the bytes
	 * not yet read from the head, so these two values are different: */
	remaining_len = total_buf_len(buf);
	if (priv_len > remaining_len)
		return -EINVAL;
	pad = remaining_len - priv_len;
	buf->len -= pad;
	fix_priv_head(buf, pad);

	/* Maybe it would be better to give gss_unwrap a length parameter: */
	saved_len = buf->len;
	buf->len = priv_len;
	maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, buf);
	pad = priv_len - buf->len;
	buf->len = saved_len;
	buf->len -= pad;
	/* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries.
	 * In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to
	 * move it around. */
	/* XXX: This is very inefficient.  It would be better to either do
	 * this while we encrypt, or maybe in the receive code, if we can peak
	 * ahead and work out the service and mechanism there. */
	offset = buf->head[0].iov_len % 4;
	if (offset) {
		buf->buflen = RPCSVC_MAXPAYLOAD;
		xdr_shift_buf(buf, offset);
		fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
	}
	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
		return -EINVAL;
out_seq:
	if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
		return -EINVAL;
	return 0;
}

struct gss_svc_data {
	/* decoded gss client cred: */
	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred	clcred;
	/* save a pointer to the beginning of the encoded verifier,
	 * for use in encryption/checksumming in svcauth_gss_release: */
	__be32				*verf_start;
	struct rsc			*rsci;
};

static int
svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
	struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
	struct rsc *rsci = svcdata->rsci;
	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &svcdata->clcred;
	int stat;

	/*
	 * A gss export can be specified either by:
	 * 	export	*(sec=krb5,rw)
	 * or by
	 * 	export gss/krb5(rw)
	 * The latter is deprecated; but for backwards compatibility reasons
	 * the nfsd code will still fall back on trying it if the former
	 * doesn't work; so we try to make both available to nfsd, below.
	 */
	rqstp->rq_gssclient = find_gss_auth_domain(rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_svc);
	if (rqstp->rq_gssclient == NULL)
		return SVC_DENIED;
	stat = svcauth_unix_set_client(rqstp);
	if (stat == SVC_DROP)
		return stat;
	return SVC_OK;
}

static inline int
gss_write_init_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsi *rsip)
{
	struct rsc *rsci;
	int        rc;

	if (rsip->major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
		return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
	rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&rsip->out_handle);
	if (rsci == NULL) {
		rsip->major_status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
		return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
	}
	rc = gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
	cache_put(&rsci->h, &rsc_cache);
	return rc;
}

/*
 * Accept an rpcsec packet.
 * If context establishment, punt to user space
 * If data exchange, verify/decrypt
 * If context destruction, handle here
 * In the context establishment and destruction case we encode
 * response here and return SVC_COMPLETE.
 */
static int
svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
{
	struct kvec	*argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
	struct kvec	*resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
	u32		crlen;
	struct xdr_netobj tmpobj;
	struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
	struct rsc	*rsci = NULL;
	struct rsi	*rsip, rsikey;
	__be32		*rpcstart;
	__be32		*reject_stat = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
	int		ret;

	dprintk("RPC:       svcauth_gss: argv->iov_len = %zd\n",
			argv->iov_len);

	*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
	if (!svcdata)
		svcdata = kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!svcdata)
		goto auth_err;
	rqstp->rq_auth_data = svcdata;
	svcdata->verf_start = NULL;
	svcdata->rsci = NULL;
	gc = &svcdata->clcred;

	/* start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here:
	 * xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour
	 */
	rpcstart = argv->iov_base;
	rpcstart -= 7;

	/* credential is:
	 *   version(==1), proc(0,1,2,3), seq, service (1,2,3), handle
	 * at least 5 u32s, and is preceeded by length, so that makes 6.
	 */

	if (argv->iov_len < 5 * 4)
		goto auth_err;
	crlen = svc_getnl(argv);
	if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_GSS_VERSION)
		goto auth_err;
	gc->gc_proc = svc_getnl(argv);
	gc->gc_seq = svc_getnl(argv);
	gc->gc_svc = svc_getnl(argv);
	if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &gc->gc_ctx))
		goto auth_err;
	if (crlen != round_up_to_quad(gc->gc_ctx.len) + 5 * 4)
		goto auth_err;

	if ((gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) && (rqstp->rq_proc != 0))
		goto auth_err;

	/*
	 * We've successfully parsed the credential. Let's check out the
	 * verifier.  An AUTH_NULL verifier is allowed (and required) for
	 * INIT and CONTINUE_INIT requests. AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS is required for
	 * PROC_DATA and PROC_DESTROY.
	 *
	 * AUTH_NULL verifier is 0 (AUTH_NULL), 0 (length).
	 * AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS verifier is:
	 *   6 (AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS), length, checksum.
	 * checksum is calculated over rpcheader from xid up to here.
	 */
	*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
	switch (gc->gc_proc) {
	case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
	case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
		if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4)
			goto auth_err;
		if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL)
			goto auth_err;
		if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0)
			goto auth_err;
		break;
	case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
	case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
		*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
		rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&gc->gc_ctx);
		if (!rsci)
			goto auth_err;
		switch (gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc, authp)) {
		case SVC_OK:
			break;
		case SVC_DENIED:
			goto auth_err;
		case SVC_DROP:
			goto drop;
		}
		break;
	default:
		*authp = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred;
		goto auth_err;
	}

	/* now act upon the command: */
	switch (gc->gc_proc) {
	case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
	case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
		*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
		if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0)
			goto auth_err;
		memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey));
		if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx))
			goto drop;
		*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
		if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) {
			kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
			goto auth_err;
		}
		if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_token, &tmpobj)) {
			kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
			goto drop;
		}

		rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsikey);
		rsi_free(&rsikey);
		if (!rsip) {
			goto drop;
		}
		switch(cache_check(&rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle)) {
		case -EAGAIN:
		case -ETIMEDOUT:
		case -ENOENT:
			goto drop;
		case 0:
			if (gss_write_init_verf(rqstp, rsip))
				goto drop;
			if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
				goto drop;
			svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
			if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_handle))
				goto drop;
			if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
				goto drop;
			svc_putnl(resv, rsip->major_status);
			svc_putnl(resv, rsip->minor_status);
			svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
			if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_token))
				goto drop;
		}
		goto complete;
	case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
		if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
			goto auth_err;
		set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci->h.flags);
		if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
			goto drop;
		svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
		goto complete;
	case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
		*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
		svcdata->verf_start = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
		if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
			goto auth_err;
		rqstp->rq_cred = rsci->cred;
		get_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
		*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
		switch (gc->gc_svc) {
		case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
			break;
		case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
			if (unwrap_integ_data(&rqstp->rq_arg,
					gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
				goto auth_err;
			/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
			svc_putnl(resv, 0);
			svc_putnl(resv, 0);
			break;
		case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
			if (unwrap_priv_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
					gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
				goto auth_err;
			/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
			svc_putnl(resv, 0);
			svc_putnl(resv, 0);
			break;
		default:
			goto auth_err;
		}
		svcdata->rsci = rsci;
		cache_get(&rsci->h);
		rqstp->rq_flavor = gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(
					rsci->mechctx->mech_type, gc->gc_svc);
		ret = SVC_OK;
		goto out;
	}
auth_err:
	/* Restore write pointer to original value: */
	xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, reject_stat);
	ret = SVC_DENIED;
	goto out;
complete:
	ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
	goto out;
drop:
	ret = SVC_DROP;
out:
	if (rsci)
		cache_put(&rsci->h, &rsc_cache);
	return ret;
}

static __be32 *
svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(struct xdr_buf *resbuf, struct gss_svc_data *gsd)
{
	__be32 *p;
	u32 verf_len;

	p = gsd->verf_start;
	gsd->verf_start = NULL;

	/* If the reply stat is nonzero, don't wrap: */
	if (*(p-1) != rpc_success)
		return NULL;
	/* Skip the verifier: */
	p += 1;
	verf_len = ntohl(*p++);
	p += XDR_QUADLEN(verf_len);
	/* move accept_stat to right place: */
	memcpy(p, p + 2, 4);
	/* Also don't wrap if the accept stat is nonzero: */
	if (*p != rpc_success) {
		resbuf->head[0].iov_len -= 2 * 4;
		return NULL;
	}
	p++;
	return p;
}

static inline int
svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
	struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
	struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
	struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
	struct xdr_netobj mic;
	struct kvec *resv;
	__be32 *p;
	int integ_offset, integ_len;
	int stat = -EINVAL;

	p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
	if (p == NULL)
		goto out;
	integ_offset = (u8 *)(p + 1) - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
	integ_len = resbuf->len - integ_offset;
	BUG_ON(integ_len % 4);
	*p++ = htonl(integ_len);
	*p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
	if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset,
				integ_len))
		BUG();
	if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
		if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
			goto out_err;
		resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
						+ resbuf->head[0].iov_len;
		resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
		resv = &resbuf->tail[0];
	} else {
		resv = &resbuf->tail[0];
	}
	mic.data = (u8 *)resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len + 4;
	if (gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &integ_buf, &mic))
		goto out_err;
	svc_putnl(resv, mic.len);
	memset(mic.data + mic.len, 0,
			round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
	resv->iov_len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
	/* not strictly required: */
	resbuf->len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
	BUG_ON(resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE);
out:
	stat = 0;
out_err:
	return stat;
}

static inline int
svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
	struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
	struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
	struct page **inpages = NULL;
	__be32 *p, *len;
	int offset;
	int pad;

	p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
	if (p == NULL)
		return 0;
	len = p++;
	offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
	*p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
	inpages = resbuf->pages;
	/* XXX: Would be better to write some xdr helper functions for
	 * nfs{2,3,4}xdr.c that place the data right, instead of copying: */
	if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base) {
		BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base >= resbuf->head[0].iov_base
							+ PAGE_SIZE);
		BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base < resbuf->head[0].iov_base);
		if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_len + resbuf->head[0].iov_len
				+ 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
			return -ENOMEM;
		memmove(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE,
			resbuf->tail[0].iov_base,
			resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
		resbuf->tail[0].iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
	}
	if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
		if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + 2*RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
			return -ENOMEM;
		resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
			+ resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
		resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
	}
	if (gss_wrap(gsd->rsci->mechctx, offset, resbuf, inpages))
		return -ENOMEM;
	*len = htonl(resbuf->len - offset);
	pad = 3 - ((resbuf->len - offset - 1)&3);
	p = (__be32 *)(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
	memset(p, 0, pad);
	resbuf->tail[0].iov_len += pad;
	resbuf->len += pad;
	return 0;
}

static int
svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
	struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
	struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
	struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
	int stat = -EINVAL;

	if (gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
		goto out;
	/* Release can be called twice, but we only wrap once. */
	if (gsd->verf_start == NULL)
		goto out;
	/* normally not set till svc_send, but we need it here: */
	/* XXX: what for?  Do we mess it up the moment we call svc_putu32
	 * or whatever? */
	resbuf->len = total_buf_len(resbuf);
	switch (gc->gc_svc) {
	case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
		break;
	case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
		stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(rqstp);
		if (stat)
			goto out_err;
		break;
	case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
		stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(rqstp);
		if (stat)
			goto out_err;
		break;
	default:
		goto out_err;
	}

out:
	stat = 0;
out_err:
	if (rqstp->rq_client)
		auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client);
	rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
	if (rqstp->rq_gssclient)
		auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_gssclient);
	rqstp->rq_gssclient = NULL;
	if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info)
		put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info);
	rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
	if (gsd->rsci)
		cache_put(&gsd->rsci->h, &rsc_cache);
	gsd->rsci = NULL;

	return stat;
}

static void
svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom)
{
	struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);

	kfree(dom->name);
	kfree(gd);
}

static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = {
	.name		= "rpcsec_gss",
	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
	.flavour	= RPC_AUTH_GSS,
	.accept		= svcauth_gss_accept,
	.release	= svcauth_gss_release,
	.domain_release = svcauth_gss_domain_release,
	.set_client	= svcauth_gss_set_client,
};

int
gss_svc_init(void)
{
	int rv = svc_auth_register(RPC_AUTH_GSS, &svcauthops_gss);
	if (rv == 0) {
		cache_register(&rsc_cache);
		cache_register(&rsi_cache);
	}
	return rv;
}

void
gss_svc_shutdown(void)
{
	if (cache_unregister(&rsc_cache))
		printk(KERN_ERR "auth_rpcgss: failed to unregister rsc cache\n");
	if (cache_unregister(&rsi_cache))
		printk(KERN_ERR "auth_rpcgss: failed to unregister rsi cache\n");
	svc_auth_unregister(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
}
OpenPOWER on IntegriCloud