From a056ab8c7a00a0ffc52e9573bf01257004c2d08c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Chinea Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 19:01:02 +0300 Subject: HSI: hsi: Introducing HSI framework Adds HSI framework in to the linux kernel. High Speed Synchronous Serial Interface (HSI) is a serial interface mainly used for connecting application engines (APE) with cellular modem engines (CMT) in cellular handsets. HSI provides multiplexing for up to 16 logical channels, low-latency and full duplex communication. Signed-off-by: Carlos Chinea Acked-by: Linus Walleij --- include/linux/hsi/hsi.h | 410 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 410 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/hsi/hsi.h (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/hsi/hsi.h b/include/linux/hsi/hsi.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4b178067f405 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/hsi/hsi.h @@ -0,0 +1,410 @@ +/* + * HSI core header file. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * Contact: Carlos Chinea + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA + * 02110-1301 USA + */ + +#ifndef __LINUX_HSI_H__ +#define __LINUX_HSI_H__ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* HSI message ttype */ +#define HSI_MSG_READ 0 +#define HSI_MSG_WRITE 1 + +/* HSI configuration values */ +enum { + HSI_MODE_STREAM = 1, + HSI_MODE_FRAME, +}; + +enum { + HSI_FLOW_SYNC, /* Synchronized flow */ + HSI_FLOW_PIPE, /* Pipelined flow */ +}; + +enum { + HSI_ARB_RR, /* Round-robin arbitration */ + HSI_ARB_PRIO, /* Channel priority arbitration */ +}; + +#define HSI_MAX_CHANNELS 16 + +/* HSI message status codes */ +enum { + HSI_STATUS_COMPLETED, /* Message transfer is completed */ + HSI_STATUS_PENDING, /* Message pending to be read/write (POLL) */ + HSI_STATUS_PROCEEDING, /* Message transfer is ongoing */ + HSI_STATUS_QUEUED, /* Message waiting to be served */ + HSI_STATUS_ERROR, /* Error when message transfer was ongoing */ +}; + +/* HSI port event codes */ +enum { + HSI_EVENT_START_RX, + HSI_EVENT_STOP_RX, +}; + +/** + * struct hsi_config - Configuration for RX/TX HSI modules + * @mode: Bit transmission mode (STREAM or FRAME) + * @channels: Number of channels to use [1..16] + * @speed: Max bit transmission speed (Kbit/s) + * @flow: RX flow type (SYNCHRONIZED or PIPELINE) + * @arb_mode: Arbitration mode for TX frame (Round robin, priority) + */ +struct hsi_config { + unsigned int mode; + unsigned int channels; + unsigned int speed; + union { + unsigned int flow; /* RX only */ + unsigned int arb_mode; /* TX only */ + }; +}; + +/** + * struct hsi_board_info - HSI client board info + * @name: Name for the HSI device + * @hsi_id: HSI controller id where the client sits + * @port: Port number in the controller where the client sits + * @tx_cfg: HSI TX configuration + * @rx_cfg: HSI RX configuration + * @platform_data: Platform related data + * @archdata: Architecture-dependent device data + */ +struct hsi_board_info { + const char *name; + unsigned int hsi_id; + unsigned int port; + struct hsi_config tx_cfg; + struct hsi_config rx_cfg; + void *platform_data; + struct dev_archdata *archdata; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_HSI_BOARDINFO +extern int hsi_register_board_info(struct hsi_board_info const *info, + unsigned int len); +#else +static inline int hsi_register_board_info(struct hsi_board_info const *info, + unsigned int len) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_HSI_BOARDINFO */ + +/** + * struct hsi_client - HSI client attached to an HSI port + * @device: Driver model representation of the device + * @tx_cfg: HSI TX configuration + * @rx_cfg: HSI RX configuration + * @hsi_start_rx: Called after incoming wake line goes high + * @hsi_stop_rx: Called after incoming wake line goes low + */ +struct hsi_client { + struct device device; + struct hsi_config tx_cfg; + struct hsi_config rx_cfg; + void (*hsi_start_rx)(struct hsi_client *cl); + void (*hsi_stop_rx)(struct hsi_client *cl); + /* private: */ + unsigned int pclaimed:1; + struct list_head link; +}; + +#define to_hsi_client(dev) container_of(dev, struct hsi_client, device) + +static inline void hsi_client_set_drvdata(struct hsi_client *cl, void *data) +{ + dev_set_drvdata(&cl->device, data); +} + +static inline void *hsi_client_drvdata(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + return dev_get_drvdata(&cl->device); +} + +/** + * struct hsi_client_driver - Driver associated to an HSI client + * @driver: Driver model representation of the driver + */ +struct hsi_client_driver { + struct device_driver driver; +}; + +#define to_hsi_client_driver(drv) container_of(drv, struct hsi_client_driver,\ + driver) + +int hsi_register_client_driver(struct hsi_client_driver *drv); + +static inline void hsi_unregister_client_driver(struct hsi_client_driver *drv) +{ + driver_unregister(&drv->driver); +} + +/** + * struct hsi_msg - HSI message descriptor + * @link: Free to use by the current descriptor owner + * @cl: HSI device client that issues the transfer + * @sgt: Head of the scatterlist array + * @context: Client context data associated to the transfer + * @complete: Transfer completion callback + * @destructor: Destructor to free resources when flushing + * @status: Status of the transfer when completed + * @actual_len: Actual length of data transfered on completion + * @channel: Channel were to TX/RX the message + * @ttype: Transfer type (TX if set, RX otherwise) + * @break_frame: if true HSI will send/receive a break frame. Data buffers are + * ignored in the request. + */ +struct hsi_msg { + struct list_head link; + struct hsi_client *cl; + struct sg_table sgt; + void *context; + + void (*complete)(struct hsi_msg *msg); + void (*destructor)(struct hsi_msg *msg); + + int status; + unsigned int actual_len; + unsigned int channel; + unsigned int ttype:1; + unsigned int break_frame:1; +}; + +struct hsi_msg *hsi_alloc_msg(unsigned int n_frag, gfp_t flags); +void hsi_free_msg(struct hsi_msg *msg); + +/** + * struct hsi_port - HSI port device + * @device: Driver model representation of the device + * @tx_cfg: Current TX path configuration + * @rx_cfg: Current RX path configuration + * @num: Port number + * @shared: Set when port can be shared by different clients + * @claimed: Reference count of clients which claimed the port + * @lock: Serialize port claim + * @async: Asynchronous transfer callback + * @setup: Callback to set the HSI client configuration + * @flush: Callback to clean the HW state and destroy all pending transfers + * @start_tx: Callback to inform that a client wants to TX data + * @stop_tx: Callback to inform that a client no longer wishes to TX data + * @release: Callback to inform that a client no longer uses the port + * @clients: List of hsi_clients using the port. + * @clock: Lock to serialize access to the clients list. + */ +struct hsi_port { + struct device device; + struct hsi_config tx_cfg; + struct hsi_config rx_cfg; + unsigned int num; + unsigned int shared:1; + int claimed; + struct mutex lock; + int (*async)(struct hsi_msg *msg); + int (*setup)(struct hsi_client *cl); + int (*flush)(struct hsi_client *cl); + int (*start_tx)(struct hsi_client *cl); + int (*stop_tx)(struct hsi_client *cl); + int (*release)(struct hsi_client *cl); + struct list_head clients; + spinlock_t clock; +}; + +#define to_hsi_port(dev) container_of(dev, struct hsi_port, device) +#define hsi_get_port(cl) to_hsi_port((cl)->device.parent) + +void hsi_event(struct hsi_port *port, unsigned int event); +int hsi_claim_port(struct hsi_client *cl, unsigned int share); +void hsi_release_port(struct hsi_client *cl); + +static inline int hsi_port_claimed(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + return cl->pclaimed; +} + +static inline void hsi_port_set_drvdata(struct hsi_port *port, void *data) +{ + dev_set_drvdata(&port->device, data); +} + +static inline void *hsi_port_drvdata(struct hsi_port *port) +{ + return dev_get_drvdata(&port->device); +} + +/** + * struct hsi_controller - HSI controller device + * @device: Driver model representation of the device + * @owner: Pointer to the module owning the controller + * @id: HSI controller ID + * @num_ports: Number of ports in the HSI controller + * @port: Array of HSI ports + */ +struct hsi_controller { + struct device device; + struct module *owner; + unsigned int id; + unsigned int num_ports; + struct hsi_port *port; +}; + +#define to_hsi_controller(dev) container_of(dev, struct hsi_controller, device) + +struct hsi_controller *hsi_alloc_controller(unsigned int n_ports, gfp_t flags); +void hsi_free_controller(struct hsi_controller *hsi); +int hsi_register_controller(struct hsi_controller *hsi); +void hsi_unregister_controller(struct hsi_controller *hsi); + +static inline void hsi_controller_set_drvdata(struct hsi_controller *hsi, + void *data) +{ + dev_set_drvdata(&hsi->device, data); +} + +static inline void *hsi_controller_drvdata(struct hsi_controller *hsi) +{ + return dev_get_drvdata(&hsi->device); +} + +static inline struct hsi_port *hsi_find_port_num(struct hsi_controller *hsi, + unsigned int num) +{ + return (num < hsi->num_ports) ? &hsi->port[num] : NULL; +} + +/* + * API for HSI clients + */ +int hsi_async(struct hsi_client *cl, struct hsi_msg *msg); + +/** + * hsi_id - Get HSI controller ID associated to a client + * @cl: Pointer to a HSI client + * + * Return the controller id where the client is attached to + */ +static inline unsigned int hsi_id(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + return to_hsi_controller(cl->device.parent->parent)->id; +} + +/** + * hsi_port_id - Gets the port number a client is attached to + * @cl: Pointer to HSI client + * + * Return the port number associated to the client + */ +static inline unsigned int hsi_port_id(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + return to_hsi_port(cl->device.parent)->num; +} + +/** + * hsi_setup - Configure the client's port + * @cl: Pointer to the HSI client + * + * When sharing ports, clients should either relay on a single + * client setup or have the same setup for all of them. + * + * Return -errno on failure, 0 on success + */ +static inline int hsi_setup(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + if (!hsi_port_claimed(cl)) + return -EACCES; + return hsi_get_port(cl)->setup(cl); +} + +/** + * hsi_flush - Flush all pending transactions on the client's port + * @cl: Pointer to the HSI client + * + * This function will destroy all pending hsi_msg in the port and reset + * the HW port so it is ready to receive and transmit from a clean state. + * + * Return -errno on failure, 0 on success + */ +static inline int hsi_flush(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + if (!hsi_port_claimed(cl)) + return -EACCES; + return hsi_get_port(cl)->flush(cl); +} + +/** + * hsi_async_read - Submit a read transfer + * @cl: Pointer to the HSI client + * @msg: HSI message descriptor of the transfer + * + * Return -errno on failure, 0 on success + */ +static inline int hsi_async_read(struct hsi_client *cl, struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + msg->ttype = HSI_MSG_READ; + return hsi_async(cl, msg); +} + +/** + * hsi_async_write - Submit a write transfer + * @cl: Pointer to the HSI client + * @msg: HSI message descriptor of the transfer + * + * Return -errno on failure, 0 on success + */ +static inline int hsi_async_write(struct hsi_client *cl, struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + msg->ttype = HSI_MSG_WRITE; + return hsi_async(cl, msg); +} + +/** + * hsi_start_tx - Signal the port that the client wants to start a TX + * @cl: Pointer to the HSI client + * + * Return -errno on failure, 0 on success + */ +static inline int hsi_start_tx(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + if (!hsi_port_claimed(cl)) + return -EACCES; + return hsi_get_port(cl)->start_tx(cl); +} + +/** + * hsi_stop_tx - Signal the port that the client no longer wants to transmit + * @cl: Pointer to the HSI client + * + * Return -errno on failure, 0 on success + */ +static inline int hsi_stop_tx(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + if (!hsi_port_claimed(cl)) + return -EACCES; + return hsi_get_port(cl)->stop_tx(cl); +} +#endif /* __LINUX_HSI_H__ */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4e69fc22753fcce1d9275b5517ef3646ffeffcf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andras Domokos Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2010 17:18:53 +0300 Subject: HSI: hsi_char: Add HSI char device driver Add HSI char device driver to the kernel. Signed-off-by: Andras Domokos Signed-off-by: Carlos Chinea --- drivers/hsi/clients/hsi_char.c | 802 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/hsi/hsi_char.h | 63 ++++ 2 files changed, 865 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/hsi/clients/hsi_char.c create mode 100644 include/linux/hsi/hsi_char.h (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/drivers/hsi/clients/hsi_char.c b/drivers/hsi/clients/hsi_char.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..88a050df2389 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/hsi/clients/hsi_char.c @@ -0,0 +1,802 @@ +/* + * HSI character device driver, implements the character device + * interface. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * Contact: Andras Domokos + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA + * 02110-1301 USA + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define HSC_DEVS 16 /* Num of channels */ +#define HSC_MSGS 4 + +#define HSC_RXBREAK 0 + +#define HSC_ID_BITS 6 +#define HSC_PORT_ID_BITS 4 +#define HSC_ID_MASK 3 +#define HSC_PORT_ID_MASK 3 +#define HSC_CH_MASK 0xf + +/* + * We support up to 4 controllers that can have up to 4 + * ports, which should currently be more than enough. + */ +#define HSC_BASEMINOR(id, port_id) \ + ((((id) & HSC_ID_MASK) << HSC_ID_BITS) | \ + (((port_id) & HSC_PORT_ID_MASK) << HSC_PORT_ID_BITS)) + +enum { + HSC_CH_OPEN, + HSC_CH_READ, + HSC_CH_WRITE, + HSC_CH_WLINE, +}; + +enum { + HSC_RX, + HSC_TX, +}; + +struct hsc_client_data; +/** + * struct hsc_channel - hsi_char internal channel data + * @ch: channel number + * @flags: Keeps state of the channel (open/close, reading, writing) + * @free_msgs_list: List of free HSI messages/requests + * @rx_msgs_queue: List of pending RX requests + * @tx_msgs_queue: List of pending TX requests + * @lock: Serialize access to the lists + * @cl: reference to the associated hsi_client + * @cl_data: reference to the client data that this channels belongs to + * @rx_wait: RX requests wait queue + * @tx_wait: TX requests wait queue + */ +struct hsc_channel { + unsigned int ch; + unsigned long flags; + struct list_head free_msgs_list; + struct list_head rx_msgs_queue; + struct list_head tx_msgs_queue; + spinlock_t lock; + struct hsi_client *cl; + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data; + wait_queue_head_t rx_wait; + wait_queue_head_t tx_wait; +}; + +/** + * struct hsc_client_data - hsi_char internal client data + * @cdev: Characther device associated to the hsi_client + * @lock: Lock to serialize open/close access + * @flags: Keeps track of port state (rx hwbreak armed) + * @usecnt: Use count for claiming the HSI port (mutex protected) + * @cl: Referece to the HSI client + * @channels: Array of channels accessible by the client + */ +struct hsc_client_data { + struct cdev cdev; + struct mutex lock; + unsigned long flags; + unsigned int usecnt; + struct hsi_client *cl; + struct hsc_channel channels[HSC_DEVS]; +}; + +/* Stores the major number dynamically allocated for hsi_char */ +static unsigned int hsc_major; +/* Maximum buffer size that hsi_char will accept from userspace */ +static unsigned int max_data_size = 0x1000; +module_param(max_data_size, uint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_data_size, "max read/write data size [4,8..65536] (^2)"); + +static void hsc_add_tail(struct hsc_channel *channel, struct hsi_msg *msg, + struct list_head *queue) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&channel->lock, flags); + list_add_tail(&msg->link, queue); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&channel->lock, flags); +} + +static struct hsi_msg *hsc_get_first_msg(struct hsc_channel *channel, + struct list_head *queue) +{ + struct hsi_msg *msg = NULL; + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&channel->lock, flags); + + if (list_empty(queue)) + goto out; + + msg = list_first_entry(queue, struct hsi_msg, link); + list_del(&msg->link); +out: + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&channel->lock, flags); + + return msg; +} + +static inline void hsc_msg_free(struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + kfree(sg_virt(msg->sgt.sgl)); + hsi_free_msg(msg); +} + +static void hsc_free_list(struct list_head *list) +{ + struct hsi_msg *msg, *tmp; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(msg, tmp, list, link) { + list_del(&msg->link); + hsc_msg_free(msg); + } +} + +static void hsc_reset_list(struct hsc_channel *channel, struct list_head *l) +{ + unsigned long flags; + LIST_HEAD(list); + + spin_lock_irqsave(&channel->lock, flags); + list_splice_init(l, &list); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&channel->lock, flags); + + hsc_free_list(&list); +} + +static inline struct hsi_msg *hsc_msg_alloc(unsigned int alloc_size) +{ + struct hsi_msg *msg; + void *buf; + + msg = hsi_alloc_msg(1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!msg) + goto out; + buf = kmalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) { + hsi_free_msg(msg); + goto out; + } + sg_init_one(msg->sgt.sgl, buf, alloc_size); + /* Ignore false positive, due to sg pointer handling */ + kmemleak_ignore(buf); + + return msg; +out: + return NULL; +} + +static inline int hsc_msgs_alloc(struct hsc_channel *channel) +{ + struct hsi_msg *msg; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < HSC_MSGS; i++) { + msg = hsc_msg_alloc(max_data_size); + if (!msg) + goto out; + msg->channel = channel->ch; + list_add_tail(&msg->link, &channel->free_msgs_list); + } + + return 0; +out: + hsc_free_list(&channel->free_msgs_list); + + return -ENOMEM; +} + +static inline unsigned int hsc_msg_len_get(struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + return msg->sgt.sgl->length; +} + +static inline void hsc_msg_len_set(struct hsi_msg *msg, unsigned int len) +{ + msg->sgt.sgl->length = len; +} + +static void hsc_rx_completed(struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data = hsi_client_drvdata(msg->cl); + struct hsc_channel *channel = cl_data->channels + msg->channel; + + if (test_bit(HSC_CH_READ, &channel->flags)) { + hsc_add_tail(channel, msg, &channel->rx_msgs_queue); + wake_up(&channel->rx_wait); + } else { + hsc_add_tail(channel, msg, &channel->free_msgs_list); + } +} + +static void hsc_rx_msg_destructor(struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + msg->status = HSI_STATUS_ERROR; + hsc_msg_len_set(msg, 0); + hsc_rx_completed(msg); +} + +static void hsc_tx_completed(struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data = hsi_client_drvdata(msg->cl); + struct hsc_channel *channel = cl_data->channels + msg->channel; + + if (test_bit(HSC_CH_WRITE, &channel->flags)) { + hsc_add_tail(channel, msg, &channel->tx_msgs_queue); + wake_up(&channel->tx_wait); + } else { + hsc_add_tail(channel, msg, &channel->free_msgs_list); + } +} + +static void hsc_tx_msg_destructor(struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + msg->status = HSI_STATUS_ERROR; + hsc_msg_len_set(msg, 0); + hsc_tx_completed(msg); +} + +static void hsc_break_req_destructor(struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data = hsi_client_drvdata(msg->cl); + + hsi_free_msg(msg); + clear_bit(HSC_RXBREAK, &cl_data->flags); +} + +static void hsc_break_received(struct hsi_msg *msg) +{ + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data = hsi_client_drvdata(msg->cl); + struct hsc_channel *channel = cl_data->channels; + int i, ret; + + /* Broadcast HWBREAK on all channels */ + for (i = 0; i < HSC_DEVS; i++, channel++) { + struct hsi_msg *msg2; + + if (!test_bit(HSC_CH_READ, &channel->flags)) + continue; + msg2 = hsc_get_first_msg(channel, &channel->free_msgs_list); + if (!msg2) + continue; + clear_bit(HSC_CH_READ, &channel->flags); + hsc_msg_len_set(msg2, 0); + msg2->status = HSI_STATUS_COMPLETED; + hsc_add_tail(channel, msg2, &channel->rx_msgs_queue); + wake_up(&channel->rx_wait); + } + hsi_flush(msg->cl); + ret = hsi_async_read(msg->cl, msg); + if (ret < 0) + hsc_break_req_destructor(msg); +} + +static int hsc_break_request(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data = hsi_client_drvdata(cl); + struct hsi_msg *msg; + int ret; + + if (test_and_set_bit(HSC_RXBREAK, &cl_data->flags)) + return -EBUSY; + + msg = hsi_alloc_msg(0, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!msg) { + clear_bit(HSC_RXBREAK, &cl_data->flags); + return -ENOMEM; + } + msg->break_frame = 1; + msg->complete = hsc_break_received; + msg->destructor = hsc_break_req_destructor; + ret = hsi_async_read(cl, msg); + if (ret < 0) + hsc_break_req_destructor(msg); + + return ret; +} + +static int hsc_break_send(struct hsi_client *cl) +{ + struct hsi_msg *msg; + int ret; + + msg = hsi_alloc_msg(0, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!msg) + return -ENOMEM; + msg->break_frame = 1; + msg->complete = hsi_free_msg; + msg->destructor = hsi_free_msg; + ret = hsi_async_write(cl, msg); + if (ret < 0) + hsi_free_msg(msg); + + return ret; +} + +static int hsc_rx_set(struct hsi_client *cl, struct hsc_rx_config *rxc) +{ + struct hsi_config tmp; + int ret; + + if ((rxc->mode != HSI_MODE_STREAM) && (rxc->mode != HSI_MODE_FRAME)) + return -EINVAL; + if ((rxc->channels == 0) || (rxc->channels > HSC_DEVS)) + return -EINVAL; + if (rxc->channels & (rxc->channels - 1)) + return -EINVAL; + if ((rxc->flow != HSI_FLOW_SYNC) && (rxc->flow != HSI_FLOW_PIPE)) + return -EINVAL; + tmp = cl->rx_cfg; + cl->rx_cfg.mode = rxc->mode; + cl->rx_cfg.channels = rxc->channels; + cl->rx_cfg.flow = rxc->flow; + ret = hsi_setup(cl); + if (ret < 0) { + cl->rx_cfg = tmp; + return ret; + } + if (rxc->mode == HSI_MODE_FRAME) + hsc_break_request(cl); + + return ret; +} + +static inline void hsc_rx_get(struct hsi_client *cl, struct hsc_rx_config *rxc) +{ + rxc->mode = cl->rx_cfg.mode; + rxc->channels = cl->rx_cfg.channels; + rxc->flow = cl->rx_cfg.flow; +} + +static int hsc_tx_set(struct hsi_client *cl, struct hsc_tx_config *txc) +{ + struct hsi_config tmp; + int ret; + + if ((txc->mode != HSI_MODE_STREAM) && (txc->mode != HSI_MODE_FRAME)) + return -EINVAL; + if ((txc->channels == 0) || (txc->channels > HSC_DEVS)) + return -EINVAL; + if (txc->channels & (txc->channels - 1)) + return -EINVAL; + if ((txc->arb_mode != HSI_ARB_RR) && (txc->arb_mode != HSI_ARB_PRIO)) + return -EINVAL; + tmp = cl->tx_cfg; + cl->tx_cfg.mode = txc->mode; + cl->tx_cfg.channels = txc->channels; + cl->tx_cfg.speed = txc->speed; + cl->tx_cfg.arb_mode = txc->arb_mode; + ret = hsi_setup(cl); + if (ret < 0) { + cl->tx_cfg = tmp; + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} + +static inline void hsc_tx_get(struct hsi_client *cl, struct hsc_tx_config *txc) +{ + txc->mode = cl->tx_cfg.mode; + txc->channels = cl->tx_cfg.channels; + txc->speed = cl->tx_cfg.speed; + txc->arb_mode = cl->tx_cfg.arb_mode; +} + +static ssize_t hsc_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t len, + loff_t *ppos __maybe_unused) +{ + struct hsc_channel *channel = file->private_data; + struct hsi_msg *msg; + ssize_t ret; + + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if (!IS_ALIGNED(len, sizeof(u32))) + return -EINVAL; + if (len > max_data_size) + len = max_data_size; + if (channel->ch >= channel->cl->rx_cfg.channels) + return -ECHRNG; + if (test_and_set_bit(HSC_CH_READ, &channel->flags)) + return -EBUSY; + msg = hsc_get_first_msg(channel, &channel->free_msgs_list); + if (!msg) { + ret = -ENOSPC; + goto out; + } + hsc_msg_len_set(msg, len); + msg->complete = hsc_rx_completed; + msg->destructor = hsc_rx_msg_destructor; + ret = hsi_async_read(channel->cl, msg); + if (ret < 0) { + hsc_add_tail(channel, msg, &channel->free_msgs_list); + goto out; + } + + ret = wait_event_interruptible(channel->rx_wait, + !list_empty(&channel->rx_msgs_queue)); + if (ret < 0) { + clear_bit(HSC_CH_READ, &channel->flags); + hsi_flush(channel->cl); + return -EINTR; + } + + msg = hsc_get_first_msg(channel, &channel->rx_msgs_queue); + if (msg) { + if (msg->status != HSI_STATUS_ERROR) { + ret = copy_to_user((void __user *)buf, + sg_virt(msg->sgt.sgl), hsc_msg_len_get(msg)); + if (ret) + ret = -EFAULT; + else + ret = hsc_msg_len_get(msg); + } else { + ret = -EIO; + } + hsc_add_tail(channel, msg, &channel->free_msgs_list); + } +out: + clear_bit(HSC_CH_READ, &channel->flags); + + return ret; +} + +static ssize_t hsc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t len, + loff_t *ppos __maybe_unused) +{ + struct hsc_channel *channel = file->private_data; + struct hsi_msg *msg; + ssize_t ret; + + if ((len == 0) || !IS_ALIGNED(len, sizeof(u32))) + return -EINVAL; + if (len > max_data_size) + len = max_data_size; + if (channel->ch >= channel->cl->tx_cfg.channels) + return -ECHRNG; + if (test_and_set_bit(HSC_CH_WRITE, &channel->flags)) + return -EBUSY; + msg = hsc_get_first_msg(channel, &channel->free_msgs_list); + if (!msg) { + clear_bit(HSC_CH_WRITE, &channel->flags); + return -ENOSPC; + } + if (copy_from_user(sg_virt(msg->sgt.sgl), (void __user *)buf, len)) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + hsc_msg_len_set(msg, len); + msg->complete = hsc_tx_completed; + msg->destructor = hsc_tx_msg_destructor; + ret = hsi_async_write(channel->cl, msg); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = wait_event_interruptible(channel->tx_wait, + !list_empty(&channel->tx_msgs_queue)); + if (ret < 0) { + clear_bit(HSC_CH_WRITE, &channel->flags); + hsi_flush(channel->cl); + return -EINTR; + } + + msg = hsc_get_first_msg(channel, &channel->tx_msgs_queue); + if (msg) { + if (msg->status == HSI_STATUS_ERROR) + ret = -EIO; + else + ret = hsc_msg_len_get(msg); + + hsc_add_tail(channel, msg, &channel->free_msgs_list); + } +out: + clear_bit(HSC_CH_WRITE, &channel->flags); + + return ret; +} + +static long hsc_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + struct hsc_channel *channel = file->private_data; + unsigned int state; + struct hsc_rx_config rxc; + struct hsc_tx_config txc; + long ret = 0; + + switch (cmd) { + case HSC_RESET: + hsi_flush(channel->cl); + break; + case HSC_SET_PM: + if (copy_from_user(&state, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(state))) + return -EFAULT; + if (state == HSC_PM_DISABLE) { + if (test_and_set_bit(HSC_CH_WLINE, &channel->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + ret = hsi_start_tx(channel->cl); + } else if (state == HSC_PM_ENABLE) { + if (!test_and_clear_bit(HSC_CH_WLINE, &channel->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + ret = hsi_stop_tx(channel->cl); + } else { + ret = -EINVAL; + } + break; + case HSC_SEND_BREAK: + return hsc_break_send(channel->cl); + case HSC_SET_RX: + if (copy_from_user(&rxc, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(rxc))) + return -EFAULT; + return hsc_rx_set(channel->cl, &rxc); + case HSC_GET_RX: + hsc_rx_get(channel->cl, &rxc); + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &rxc, sizeof(rxc))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + case HSC_SET_TX: + if (copy_from_user(&txc, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(txc))) + return -EFAULT; + return hsc_tx_set(channel->cl, &txc); + case HSC_GET_TX: + hsc_tx_get(channel->cl, &txc); + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &txc, sizeof(txc))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + default: + return -ENOIOCTLCMD; + } + + return ret; +} + +static inline void __hsc_port_release(struct hsc_client_data *cl_data) +{ + BUG_ON(cl_data->usecnt == 0); + + if (--cl_data->usecnt == 0) { + hsi_flush(cl_data->cl); + hsi_release_port(cl_data->cl); + } +} + +static int hsc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data; + struct hsc_channel *channel; + int ret = 0; + + pr_debug("open, minor = %d\n", iminor(inode)); + + cl_data = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct hsc_client_data, cdev); + mutex_lock(&cl_data->lock); + channel = cl_data->channels + (iminor(inode) & HSC_CH_MASK); + + if (test_and_set_bit(HSC_CH_OPEN, &channel->flags)) { + ret = -EBUSY; + goto out; + } + /* + * Check if we have already claimed the port associated to the HSI + * client. If not then try to claim it, else increase its refcount + */ + if (cl_data->usecnt == 0) { + ret = hsi_claim_port(cl_data->cl, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + hsi_setup(cl_data->cl); + } + cl_data->usecnt++; + + ret = hsc_msgs_alloc(channel); + if (ret < 0) { + __hsc_port_release(cl_data); + goto out; + } + + file->private_data = channel; + mutex_unlock(&cl_data->lock); + + return ret; +out: + mutex_unlock(&cl_data->lock); + + return ret; +} + +static int hsc_release(struct inode *inode __maybe_unused, struct file *file) +{ + struct hsc_channel *channel = file->private_data; + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data = channel->cl_data; + + mutex_lock(&cl_data->lock); + file->private_data = NULL; + if (test_and_clear_bit(HSC_CH_WLINE, &channel->flags)) + hsi_stop_tx(channel->cl); + __hsc_port_release(cl_data); + hsc_reset_list(channel, &channel->rx_msgs_queue); + hsc_reset_list(channel, &channel->tx_msgs_queue); + hsc_reset_list(channel, &channel->free_msgs_list); + clear_bit(HSC_CH_READ, &channel->flags); + clear_bit(HSC_CH_WRITE, &channel->flags); + clear_bit(HSC_CH_OPEN, &channel->flags); + wake_up(&channel->rx_wait); + wake_up(&channel->tx_wait); + mutex_unlock(&cl_data->lock); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct file_operations hsc_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .read = hsc_read, + .write = hsc_write, + .unlocked_ioctl = hsc_ioctl, + .open = hsc_open, + .release = hsc_release, +}; + +static void __devinit hsc_channel_init(struct hsc_channel *channel) +{ + init_waitqueue_head(&channel->rx_wait); + init_waitqueue_head(&channel->tx_wait); + spin_lock_init(&channel->lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&channel->free_msgs_list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&channel->rx_msgs_queue); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&channel->tx_msgs_queue); +} + +static int __devinit hsc_probe(struct device *dev) +{ + const char devname[] = "hsi_char"; + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data; + struct hsc_channel *channel; + struct hsi_client *cl = to_hsi_client(dev); + unsigned int hsc_baseminor; + dev_t hsc_dev; + int ret; + int i; + + cl_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*cl_data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cl_data) { + dev_err(dev, "Could not allocate hsc_client_data\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + hsc_baseminor = HSC_BASEMINOR(hsi_id(cl), hsi_port_id(cl)); + if (!hsc_major) { + ret = alloc_chrdev_region(&hsc_dev, hsc_baseminor, + HSC_DEVS, devname); + if (ret > 0) + hsc_major = MAJOR(hsc_dev); + } else { + hsc_dev = MKDEV(hsc_major, hsc_baseminor); + ret = register_chrdev_region(hsc_dev, HSC_DEVS, devname); + } + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Device %s allocation failed %d\n", + hsc_major ? "minor" : "major", ret); + goto out1; + } + mutex_init(&cl_data->lock); + hsi_client_set_drvdata(cl, cl_data); + cdev_init(&cl_data->cdev, &hsc_fops); + cl_data->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE; + cl_data->cl = cl; + for (i = 0, channel = cl_data->channels; i < HSC_DEVS; i++, channel++) { + hsc_channel_init(channel); + channel->ch = i; + channel->cl = cl; + channel->cl_data = cl_data; + } + + /* 1 hsi client -> N char devices (one for each channel) */ + ret = cdev_add(&cl_data->cdev, hsc_dev, HSC_DEVS); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "Could not add char device %d\n", ret); + goto out2; + } + + return 0; +out2: + unregister_chrdev_region(hsc_dev, HSC_DEVS); +out1: + kfree(cl_data); + + return ret; +} + +static int __devexit hsc_remove(struct device *dev) +{ + struct hsi_client *cl = to_hsi_client(dev); + struct hsc_client_data *cl_data = hsi_client_drvdata(cl); + dev_t hsc_dev = cl_data->cdev.dev; + + cdev_del(&cl_data->cdev); + unregister_chrdev_region(hsc_dev, HSC_DEVS); + hsi_client_set_drvdata(cl, NULL); + kfree(cl_data); + + return 0; +} + +static struct hsi_client_driver hsc_driver = { + .driver = { + .name = "hsi_char", + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .probe = hsc_probe, + .remove = __devexit_p(hsc_remove), + }, +}; + +static int __init hsc_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if ((max_data_size < 4) || (max_data_size > 0x10000) || + (max_data_size & (max_data_size - 1))) { + pr_err("Invalid max read/write data size"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ret = hsi_register_client_driver(&hsc_driver); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Error while registering HSI/SSI driver %d", ret); + return ret; + } + + pr_info("HSI/SSI char device loaded\n"); + + return 0; +} +module_init(hsc_init); + +static void __exit hsc_exit(void) +{ + hsi_unregister_client_driver(&hsc_driver); + pr_info("HSI char device removed\n"); +} +module_exit(hsc_exit); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Andras Domokos "); +MODULE_ALIAS("hsi:hsi_char"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HSI character device"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/include/linux/hsi/hsi_char.h b/include/linux/hsi/hsi_char.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..76160b4f455d --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/hsi/hsi_char.h @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* + * Part of the HSI character device driver. + * + * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation. All rights reserved. + * + * Contact: Andras Domokos + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA + * 02110-1301 USA + */ + + +#ifndef __HSI_CHAR_H +#define __HSI_CHAR_H + +#define HSI_CHAR_MAGIC 'k' +#define HSC_IOW(num, dtype) _IOW(HSI_CHAR_MAGIC, num, dtype) +#define HSC_IOR(num, dtype) _IOR(HSI_CHAR_MAGIC, num, dtype) +#define HSC_IOWR(num, dtype) _IOWR(HSI_CHAR_MAGIC, num, dtype) +#define HSC_IO(num) _IO(HSI_CHAR_MAGIC, num) + +#define HSC_RESET HSC_IO(16) +#define HSC_SET_PM HSC_IO(17) +#define HSC_SEND_BREAK HSC_IO(18) +#define HSC_SET_RX HSC_IOW(19, struct hsc_rx_config) +#define HSC_GET_RX HSC_IOW(20, struct hsc_rx_config) +#define HSC_SET_TX HSC_IOW(21, struct hsc_tx_config) +#define HSC_GET_TX HSC_IOW(22, struct hsc_tx_config) + +#define HSC_PM_DISABLE 0 +#define HSC_PM_ENABLE 1 + +#define HSC_MODE_STREAM 1 +#define HSC_MODE_FRAME 2 +#define HSC_FLOW_SYNC 0 +#define HSC_ARB_RR 0 +#define HSC_ARB_PRIO 1 + +struct hsc_rx_config { + uint32_t mode; + uint32_t flow; + uint32_t channels; +}; + +struct hsc_tx_config { + uint32_t mode; + uint32_t channels; + uint32_t speed; + uint32_t arb_mode; +}; + +#endif /* __HSI_CHAR_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From f9e402016de91c2444e46ecfd706880969b1ae9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andras Domokos Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2010 12:04:21 +0300 Subject: HSI: hsi_char: Add HSI char device kernel configuration Add HSI character device kernel configuration Signed-off-by: Andras Domokos Signed-off-by: Carlos Chinea --- drivers/hsi/Kconfig | 2 ++ drivers/hsi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/hsi/clients/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++ drivers/hsi/clients/Makefile | 5 +++++ include/linux/Kbuild | 1 + include/linux/hsi/Kbuild | 1 + 6 files changed, 23 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/hsi/clients/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/hsi/clients/Makefile create mode 100644 include/linux/hsi/Kbuild (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/drivers/hsi/Kconfig b/drivers/hsi/Kconfig index 937062e8bcd0..d94e38dd80c7 100644 --- a/drivers/hsi/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/hsi/Kconfig @@ -14,4 +14,6 @@ config HSI_BOARDINFO bool default y +source "drivers/hsi/clients/Kconfig" + endif # HSI diff --git a/drivers/hsi/Makefile b/drivers/hsi/Makefile index ed94a3a334a4..9d5d33f90de2 100644 --- a/drivers/hsi/Makefile +++ b/drivers/hsi/Makefile @@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_HSI_BOARDINFO) += hsi_boardinfo.o obj-$(CONFIG_HSI) += hsi.o +obj-y += clients/ diff --git a/drivers/hsi/clients/Kconfig b/drivers/hsi/clients/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3bacd275f479 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/hsi/clients/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# +# HSI clients configuration +# + +comment "HSI clients" + +config HSI_CHAR + tristate "HSI/SSI character driver" + depends on HSI + ---help--- + If you say Y here, you will enable the HSI/SSI character driver. + This driver provides a simple character device interface for + serial communication with the cellular modem over HSI/SSI bus. diff --git a/drivers/hsi/clients/Makefile b/drivers/hsi/clients/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..327c0e27c8b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/hsi/clients/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# +# Makefile for HSI clients +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_HSI_CHAR) += hsi_char.o diff --git a/include/linux/Kbuild b/include/linux/Kbuild index 619b5657af77..3171939e6261 100644 --- a/include/linux/Kbuild +++ b/include/linux/Kbuild @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ header-y += can/ header-y += caif/ header-y += dvb/ header-y += hdlc/ +header-y += hsi/ header-y += isdn/ header-y += mmc/ header-y += nfsd/ diff --git a/include/linux/hsi/Kbuild b/include/linux/hsi/Kbuild new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..271a770b4784 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/hsi/Kbuild @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +header-y += hsi_char.h -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5276e16bb6f35412583518d6f04651dd9dc114be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Engelhardt Date: Sat, 14 Jan 2012 17:38:55 +0100 Subject: netfilter: ipset: avoid use of kernel-only types When using the xt_set.h header in userspace, one will get these gcc reports: ipset/ip_set.h:184:1: error: unknown type name "u16" In file included from libxt_SET.c:21:0: netfilter/xt_set.h:61:2: error: unknown type name "u32" netfilter/xt_set.h:62:2: error: unknown type name "u32" Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/linux/netfilter/xt_set.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/xt_set.h b/include/linux/netfilter/xt_set.h index c0405ac92870..e3a9978f259f 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter/xt_set.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter/xt_set.h @@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ struct xt_set_info_target_v1 { struct xt_set_info_target_v2 { struct xt_set_info add_set; struct xt_set_info del_set; - u32 flags; - u32 timeout; + __u32 flags; + __u32 timeout; }; #endif /*_XT_SET_H*/ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 09e79d6ea65d66e0a5e9ba76865320e74832dc7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2012 22:52:00 +0000 Subject: eql: dont rely on HZ=100 HZ is more likely to be 1000 these days. timer handlers are run from softirq, no need to disable bh skb priority 1 is TC_PRIO_FILLER Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/eql.c | 7 ++++--- include/linux/if_eql.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/drivers/net/eql.c b/drivers/net/eql.c index a59cf961a436..f219d38acf58 100644 --- a/drivers/net/eql.c +++ b/drivers/net/eql.c @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ static void eql_timer(unsigned long param) equalizer_t *eql = (equalizer_t *) param; struct list_head *this, *tmp, *head; - spin_lock_bh(&eql->queue.lock); + spin_lock(&eql->queue.lock); head = &eql->queue.all_slaves; list_for_each_safe(this, tmp, head) { slave_t *slave = list_entry(this, slave_t, list); @@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static void eql_timer(unsigned long param) } } - spin_unlock_bh(&eql->queue.lock); + spin_unlock(&eql->queue.lock); eql->timer.expires = jiffies + EQL_DEFAULT_RESCHED_IVAL; add_timer(&eql->timer); @@ -341,7 +342,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t eql_slave_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) struct net_device *slave_dev = slave->dev; skb->dev = slave_dev; - skb->priority = 1; + skb->priority = TC_PRIO_FILLER; slave->bytes_queued += skb->len; dev_queue_xmit(skb); dev->stats.tx_packets++; diff --git a/include/linux/if_eql.h b/include/linux/if_eql.h index 79c4f268410d..18a5d02a8644 100644 --- a/include/linux/if_eql.h +++ b/include/linux/if_eql.h @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #define EQL_DEFAULT_SLAVE_PRIORITY 28800 #define EQL_DEFAULT_MAX_SLAVES 4 #define EQL_DEFAULT_MTU 576 -#define EQL_DEFAULT_RESCHED_IVAL 100 +#define EQL_DEFAULT_RESCHED_IVAL HZ #define EQL_ENSLAVE (SIOCDEVPRIVATE) #define EQL_EMANCIPATE (SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 1) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 613c4578d4079a14dbee76ef7e0c80f635522fe3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Szyprowski Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 16:36:27 +0200 Subject: common: dma-mapping: introduce generic alloc() and free() methods Introduce new generic alloc and free methods with attributes argument. Existing alloc_coherent and free_coherent can be implemented on top of the new calls with NULL attributes argument. Later also dma_alloc_non_coherent can be implemented using DMA_ATTR_NONCOHERENT attribute as well as dma_alloc_writecombine with separate DMA_ATTR_WRITECOMBINE attribute. This way the drivers will get more generic, platform independent way of allocating dma buffers with specific parameters. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski Acked-by: Kyungmin Park Reviewed-by: David Gibson Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann --- include/linux/dma-mapping.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h index e13117cbd2f7..8cc7f95289ac 100644 --- a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h +++ b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h @@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ struct dma_map_ops { dma_addr_t *dma_handle, gfp_t gfp); void (*free_coherent)(struct device *dev, size_t size, void *vaddr, dma_addr_t dma_handle); + void* (*alloc)(struct device *dev, size_t size, + dma_addr_t *dma_handle, gfp_t gfp, + struct dma_attrs *attrs); + void (*free)(struct device *dev, size_t size, + void *vaddr, dma_addr_t dma_handle, + struct dma_attrs *attrs); dma_addr_t (*map_page)(struct device *dev, struct page *page, unsigned long offset, size_t size, enum dma_data_direction dir, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 645ae3bce3e62541f8dc2701dde2a2791d842b6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Szyprowski Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2011 16:55:57 +0100 Subject: common: dma-mapping: remove old alloc_coherent and free_coherent methods Remove old, unused alloc_coherent and free_coherent methods from dma_map_ops structure. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski Acked-by: Kyungmin Park Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann --- include/linux/dma-mapping.h | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h index 8cc7f95289ac..2fc413a873ea 100644 --- a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h +++ b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h @@ -9,10 +9,6 @@ #include struct dma_map_ops { - void* (*alloc_coherent)(struct device *dev, size_t size, - dma_addr_t *dma_handle, gfp_t gfp); - void (*free_coherent)(struct device *dev, size_t size, - void *vaddr, dma_addr_t dma_handle); void* (*alloc)(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *dma_handle, gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9adc537452e1e341cabd39a02d4788d3c510b0e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Szyprowski Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2011 16:55:33 +0100 Subject: common: dma-mapping: introduce mmap method Introduce new generic mmap method with attributes argument. This method lets drivers to create a userspace mapping for a DMA buffer in generic, architecture independent way. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski Acked-by: Kyungmin Park Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann --- include/linux/dma-mapping.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h index 2fc413a873ea..b903a20867f7 100644 --- a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h +++ b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ struct dma_map_ops { void (*free)(struct device *dev, size_t size, void *vaddr, dma_addr_t dma_handle, struct dma_attrs *attrs); + int (*mmap)(struct device *, struct vm_area_struct *, + void *, dma_addr_t, size_t, struct dma_attrs *attrs); + dma_addr_t (*map_page)(struct device *dev, struct page *page, unsigned long offset, size_t size, enum dma_data_direction dir, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8a4134322bd429d24f71147eb59a47a981e8f63a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Szyprowski Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2011 09:30:47 +0100 Subject: common: DMA-mapping: add WRITE_COMBINE attribute DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE specifies that writes to the mapping may be buffered to improve performance. It will be used by the replacement for ARM/ARV32 specific dma_alloc_writecombine() function. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski Acked-by: Kyungmin Park Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann --- Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt | 10 ++++++++++ include/linux/dma-attrs.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt b/Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt index b768cc0e402b..811a5d458dae 100644 --- a/Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt +++ b/Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt @@ -31,3 +31,13 @@ may be weakly ordered, that is that reads and writes may pass each other. Since it is optional for platforms to implement DMA_ATTR_WEAK_ORDERING, those that do not will simply ignore the attribute and exhibit default behavior. + +DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE +---------------------- + +DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE specifies that writes to the mapping may be +buffered to improve performance. + +Since it is optional for platforms to implement DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE, +those that do not will simply ignore the attribute and exhibit default +behavior. diff --git a/include/linux/dma-attrs.h b/include/linux/dma-attrs.h index 71ad34eca6e3..ada61e1abf29 100644 --- a/include/linux/dma-attrs.h +++ b/include/linux/dma-attrs.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ enum dma_attr { DMA_ATTR_WRITE_BARRIER, DMA_ATTR_WEAK_ORDERING, + DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE, DMA_ATTR_MAX, }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 64d70fe5d3640e1a89790ed21120921278f8cb86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Szyprowski Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 07:55:56 +0200 Subject: common: DMA-mapping: add NON-CONSISTENT attribute DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT lets the platform to choose to return either consistent or non-consistent memory as it sees fit. By using this API, you are guaranteeing to the platform that you have all the correct and necessary sync points for this memory in the driver. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski Acked-by: Kyungmin Park Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann --- Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/dma-attrs.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt b/Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt index 811a5d458dae..5c72eed89563 100644 --- a/Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt +++ b/Documentation/DMA-attributes.txt @@ -41,3 +41,11 @@ buffered to improve performance. Since it is optional for platforms to implement DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE, those that do not will simply ignore the attribute and exhibit default behavior. + +DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT +----------------------- + +DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT lets the platform to choose to return either +consistent or non-consistent memory as it sees fit. By using this API, +you are guaranteeing to the platform that you have all the correct and +necessary sync points for this memory in the driver. diff --git a/include/linux/dma-attrs.h b/include/linux/dma-attrs.h index ada61e1abf29..547ab568d3ae 100644 --- a/include/linux/dma-attrs.h +++ b/include/linux/dma-attrs.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ enum dma_attr { DMA_ATTR_WRITE_BARRIER, DMA_ATTR_WEAK_ORDERING, DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE, + DMA_ATTR_NON_CONSISTENT, DMA_ATTR_MAX, }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From fe2e39d8782d885755139304d8dba0b3e5bfa878 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 23:29:45 +0200 Subject: firmware_class: Rework usermodehelper check Instead of two functions, read_lock_usermodehelper() and usermodehelper_is_disabled(), used in combination, introduce usermodehelper_read_trylock() that will only return with umhelper_sem held if usermodehelper_disabled is unset (and will return -EAGAIN otherwise) and make _request_firmware() use it. Rename read_unlock_usermodehelper() to usermodehelper_read_unlock() to follow the naming convention of the new function. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org --- drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 11 +++++------ include/linux/kmod.h | 5 ++--- kernel/kmod.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c index 6c9387d646ec..deee871e509c 100644 --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c @@ -533,12 +533,10 @@ static int _request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, return 0; } - read_lock_usermodehelper(); - - if (WARN_ON(usermodehelper_is_disabled())) { + retval = usermodehelper_read_trylock(); + if (WARN_ON(retval)) { dev_err(device, "firmware: %s will not be loaded\n", name); - retval = -EBUSY; - goto out; + goto out_nolock; } if (uevent) @@ -573,8 +571,9 @@ static int _request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, fw_destroy_instance(fw_priv); out: - read_unlock_usermodehelper(); + usermodehelper_read_unlock(); +out_nolock: if (retval) { release_firmware(firmware); *firmware_p = NULL; diff --git a/include/linux/kmod.h b/include/linux/kmod.h index 9efeae679106..97d22c3e08b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/kmod.h +++ b/include/linux/kmod.h @@ -114,8 +114,7 @@ extern void usermodehelper_init(void); extern int usermodehelper_disable(void); extern void usermodehelper_enable(void); -extern bool usermodehelper_is_disabled(void); -extern void read_lock_usermodehelper(void); -extern void read_unlock_usermodehelper(void); +extern int usermodehelper_read_trylock(void); +extern void usermodehelper_read_unlock(void); #endif /* __LINUX_KMOD_H__ */ diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index 957a7aab8ebc..4079ac1d5e79 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -339,17 +339,24 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(running_helpers_waitq); */ #define RUNNING_HELPERS_TIMEOUT (5 * HZ) -void read_lock_usermodehelper(void) +int usermodehelper_read_trylock(void) { + int ret = 0; + down_read(&umhelper_sem); + if (usermodehelper_disabled) { + up_read(&umhelper_sem); + ret = -EAGAIN; + } + return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(read_lock_usermodehelper); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usermodehelper_read_trylock); -void read_unlock_usermodehelper(void) +void usermodehelper_read_unlock(void) { up_read(&umhelper_sem); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(read_unlock_usermodehelper); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usermodehelper_read_unlock); /** * usermodehelper_disable - prevent new helpers from being started @@ -390,15 +397,6 @@ void usermodehelper_enable(void) up_write(&umhelper_sem); } -/** - * usermodehelper_is_disabled - check if new helpers are allowed to be started - */ -bool usermodehelper_is_disabled(void) -{ - return usermodehelper_disabled; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usermodehelper_is_disabled); - static void helper_lock(void) { atomic_inc(&running_helpers); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9b78c1da60b3c62ccdd1509f0902ad19ceaf776b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 23:30:02 +0200 Subject: firmware_class: Do not warn that system is not ready from async loads If firmware is requested asynchronously, by calling request_firmware_nowait(), there is no reason to fail the request (and warn the user) when the system is (presumably temporarily) unready to handle it (because user space is not available yet or frozen). For this reason, introduce an alternative routine for read-locking umhelper_sem, usermodehelper_read_lock_wait(), that will wait for usermodehelper_disabled to be unset (possibly with a timeout) and make request_firmware_work_func() use it instead of usermodehelper_read_trylock(). Accordingly, modify request_firmware() so that it uses usermodehelper_read_trylock() to acquire umhelper_sem and remove the code related to that lock from _request_firmware(). Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org --- drivers/base/firmware_class.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------- include/linux/kmod.h | 1 + kernel/kmod.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c index 60290671f04a..72c644b191a4 100644 --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c @@ -81,6 +81,11 @@ enum { static int loading_timeout = 60; /* In seconds */ +static inline long firmware_loading_timeout(void) +{ + return loading_timeout > 0 ? loading_timeout * HZ : MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; +} + /* fw_lock could be moved to 'struct firmware_priv' but since it is just * guarding for corner cases a global lock should be OK */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(fw_lock); @@ -541,31 +546,22 @@ static void _request_firmware_cleanup(const struct firmware **firmware_p) static int _request_firmware(const struct firmware *firmware, const char *name, struct device *device, - bool uevent, bool nowait) + bool uevent, bool nowait, long timeout) { struct firmware_priv *fw_priv; - int retval; - - retval = usermodehelper_read_trylock(); - if (WARN_ON(retval)) { - dev_err(device, "firmware: %s will not be loaded\n", name); - return retval; - } + int retval = 0; if (uevent) dev_dbg(device, "firmware: requesting %s\n", name); fw_priv = fw_create_instance(firmware, name, device, uevent, nowait); - if (IS_ERR(fw_priv)) { - retval = PTR_ERR(fw_priv); - goto out; - } + if (IS_ERR(fw_priv)) + return PTR_ERR(fw_priv); if (uevent) { - if (loading_timeout > 0) + if (timeout != MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT) mod_timer(&fw_priv->timeout, - round_jiffies_up(jiffies + - loading_timeout * HZ)); + round_jiffies_up(jiffies + timeout)); kobject_uevent(&fw_priv->dev.kobj, KOBJ_ADD); } @@ -582,9 +578,6 @@ static int _request_firmware(const struct firmware *firmware, mutex_unlock(&fw_lock); fw_destroy_instance(fw_priv); - -out: - usermodehelper_read_unlock(); return retval; } @@ -613,7 +606,14 @@ request_firmware(const struct firmware **firmware_p, const char *name, if (ret <= 0) return ret; - ret = _request_firmware(*firmware_p, name, device, true, false); + ret = usermodehelper_read_trylock(); + if (WARN_ON(ret)) { + dev_err(device, "firmware: %s will not be loaded\n", name); + } else { + ret = _request_firmware(*firmware_p, name, device, true, false, + firmware_loading_timeout()); + usermodehelper_read_unlock(); + } if (ret) _request_firmware_cleanup(firmware_p); @@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int request_firmware_work_func(void *arg) { struct firmware_work *fw_work = arg; const struct firmware *fw; + long timeout; int ret; if (!arg) { @@ -659,8 +660,16 @@ static int request_firmware_work_func(void *arg) if (ret <= 0) goto out; - ret = _request_firmware(fw, fw_work->name, fw_work->device, - fw_work->uevent, true); + timeout = usermodehelper_read_lock_wait(firmware_loading_timeout()); + if (timeout) { + ret = _request_firmware(fw, fw_work->name, fw_work->device, + fw_work->uevent, true, timeout); + usermodehelper_read_unlock(); + } else { + dev_dbg(fw_work->device, "firmware: %s loading timed out\n", + fw_work->name); + ret = -EAGAIN; + } if (ret) _request_firmware_cleanup(&fw); diff --git a/include/linux/kmod.h b/include/linux/kmod.h index 97d22c3e08b1..b087377ae2c4 100644 --- a/include/linux/kmod.h +++ b/include/linux/kmod.h @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ extern void usermodehelper_init(void); extern int usermodehelper_disable(void); extern void usermodehelper_enable(void); extern int usermodehelper_read_trylock(void); +extern long usermodehelper_read_lock_wait(long timeout); extern void usermodehelper_read_unlock(void); #endif /* __LINUX_KMOD_H__ */ diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index 4079ac1d5e79..da7fcca279f9 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -333,6 +333,12 @@ static atomic_t running_helpers = ATOMIC_INIT(0); */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(running_helpers_waitq); +/* + * Used by usermodehelper_read_lock_wait() to wait for usermodehelper_disabled + * to become 'false'. + */ +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(usermodehelper_disabled_waitq); + /* * Time to wait for running_helpers to become zero before the setting of * usermodehelper_disabled in usermodehelper_disable() fails @@ -352,12 +358,50 @@ int usermodehelper_read_trylock(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usermodehelper_read_trylock); +long usermodehelper_read_lock_wait(long timeout) +{ + DEFINE_WAIT(wait); + + if (timeout < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + down_read(&umhelper_sem); + for (;;) { + prepare_to_wait(&usermodehelper_disabled_waitq, &wait, + TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); + if (!usermodehelper_disabled) + break; + + up_read(&umhelper_sem); + + timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout); + if (!timeout) + break; + + down_read(&umhelper_sem); + } + finish_wait(&usermodehelper_disabled_waitq, &wait); + return timeout; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usermodehelper_read_lock_wait); + void usermodehelper_read_unlock(void) { up_read(&umhelper_sem); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usermodehelper_read_unlock); +/** + * usermodehelper_enable - allow new helpers to be started again + */ +void usermodehelper_enable(void) +{ + down_write(&umhelper_sem); + usermodehelper_disabled = 0; + wake_up(&usermodehelper_disabled_waitq); + up_write(&umhelper_sem); +} + /** * usermodehelper_disable - prevent new helpers from being started */ @@ -381,22 +425,10 @@ int usermodehelper_disable(void) if (retval) return 0; - down_write(&umhelper_sem); - usermodehelper_disabled = 0; - up_write(&umhelper_sem); + usermodehelper_enable(); return -EAGAIN; } -/** - * usermodehelper_enable - allow new helpers to be started again - */ -void usermodehelper_enable(void) -{ - down_write(&umhelper_sem); - usermodehelper_disabled = 0; - up_write(&umhelper_sem); -} - static void helper_lock(void) { atomic_inc(&running_helpers); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 247bc03742545fec2f79939a3b9f738392a0f7b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 23:30:28 +0200 Subject: PM / Sleep: Mitigate race between the freezer and request_firmware() There is a race condition between the freezer and request_firmware() such that if request_firmware() is run on one CPU and freeze_processes() is run on another CPU and usermodehelper_disable() called by it succeeds to grab umhelper_sem for writing before usermodehelper_read_trylock() called from request_firmware() acquires it for reading, the request_firmware() will fail and trigger a WARN_ON() complaining that it was called at a wrong time. However, in fact, it wasn't called at a wrong time and freeze_processes() simply happened to be executed simultaneously. To avoid this race, at least in some cases, modify usermodehelper_read_trylock() so that it doesn't fail if the freezing of tasks has just started and hasn't been completed yet. Instead, during the freezing of tasks, it will try to freeze the task that has called it so that it can wait until user space is thawed without triggering the scary warning. For this purpose, change usermodehelper_disabled so that it can take three different values, UMH_ENABLED (0), UMH_FREEZING and UMH_DISABLED. The first one means that usermode helpers are enabled, the last one means "hard disable" (i.e. the system is not ready for usermode helpers to be used) and the second one is reserved for the freezer. Namely, when freeze_processes() is started, it sets usermodehelper_disabled to UMH_FREEZING which tells usermodehelper_read_trylock() that it shouldn't fail just yet and should call try_to_freeze() if woken up and cannot return immediately. This way all freezable tasks that happen to call request_firmware() right before freeze_processes() is started and lose the race for umhelper_sem with it will be frozen and will sleep until thaw_processes() unsets usermodehelper_disabled. [For the non-freezable callers of request_firmware() the race for umhelper_sem against freeze_processes() is unfortunately unavoidable.] Reported-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org --- include/linux/kmod.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/kmod.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- kernel/power/process.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/kmod.h b/include/linux/kmod.h index b087377ae2c4..dd99c329e161 100644 --- a/include/linux/kmod.h +++ b/include/linux/kmod.h @@ -110,10 +110,27 @@ call_usermodehelper(char *path, char **argv, char **envp, int wait) extern struct ctl_table usermodehelper_table[]; +enum umh_disable_depth { + UMH_ENABLED = 0, + UMH_FREEZING, + UMH_DISABLED, +}; + extern void usermodehelper_init(void); -extern int usermodehelper_disable(void); -extern void usermodehelper_enable(void); +extern int __usermodehelper_disable(enum umh_disable_depth depth); +extern void __usermodehelper_set_disable_depth(enum umh_disable_depth depth); + +static inline int usermodehelper_disable(void) +{ + return __usermodehelper_disable(UMH_DISABLED); +} + +static inline void usermodehelper_enable(void) +{ + __usermodehelper_set_disable_depth(UMH_ENABLED); +} + extern int usermodehelper_read_trylock(void); extern long usermodehelper_read_lock_wait(long timeout); extern void usermodehelper_read_unlock(void); diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index da7fcca279f9..05698a7415fe 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static void __call_usermodehelper(struct work_struct *work) * land has been frozen during a system-wide hibernation or suspend operation). * Should always be manipulated under umhelper_sem acquired for write. */ -static int usermodehelper_disabled = 1; +static enum umh_disable_depth usermodehelper_disabled = UMH_DISABLED; /* Number of helpers running */ static atomic_t running_helpers = ATOMIC_INIT(0); @@ -347,13 +347,30 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(usermodehelper_disabled_waitq); int usermodehelper_read_trylock(void) { + DEFINE_WAIT(wait); int ret = 0; down_read(&umhelper_sem); - if (usermodehelper_disabled) { + for (;;) { + prepare_to_wait(&usermodehelper_disabled_waitq, &wait, + TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + if (!usermodehelper_disabled) + break; + + if (usermodehelper_disabled == UMH_DISABLED) + ret = -EAGAIN; + up_read(&umhelper_sem); - ret = -EAGAIN; + + if (ret) + break; + + schedule(); + try_to_freeze(); + + down_read(&umhelper_sem); } + finish_wait(&usermodehelper_disabled_waitq, &wait); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usermodehelper_read_trylock); @@ -392,25 +409,35 @@ void usermodehelper_read_unlock(void) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usermodehelper_read_unlock); /** - * usermodehelper_enable - allow new helpers to be started again + * __usermodehelper_set_disable_depth - Modify usermodehelper_disabled. + * depth: New value to assign to usermodehelper_disabled. + * + * Change the value of usermodehelper_disabled (under umhelper_sem locked for + * writing) and wakeup tasks waiting for it to change. */ -void usermodehelper_enable(void) +void __usermodehelper_set_disable_depth(enum umh_disable_depth depth) { down_write(&umhelper_sem); - usermodehelper_disabled = 0; + usermodehelper_disabled = depth; wake_up(&usermodehelper_disabled_waitq); up_write(&umhelper_sem); } /** - * usermodehelper_disable - prevent new helpers from being started + * __usermodehelper_disable - Prevent new helpers from being started. + * @depth: New value to assign to usermodehelper_disabled. + * + * Set usermodehelper_disabled to @depth and wait for running helpers to exit. */ -int usermodehelper_disable(void) +int __usermodehelper_disable(enum umh_disable_depth depth) { long retval; + if (!depth) + return -EINVAL; + down_write(&umhelper_sem); - usermodehelper_disabled = 1; + usermodehelper_disabled = depth; up_write(&umhelper_sem); /* @@ -425,7 +452,7 @@ int usermodehelper_disable(void) if (retval) return 0; - usermodehelper_enable(); + __usermodehelper_set_disable_depth(UMH_ENABLED); return -EAGAIN; } diff --git a/kernel/power/process.c b/kernel/power/process.c index 56eaac7e88ab..19db29f67558 100644 --- a/kernel/power/process.c +++ b/kernel/power/process.c @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ int freeze_processes(void) { int error; - error = usermodehelper_disable(); + error = __usermodehelper_disable(UMH_FREEZING); if (error) return error; @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ int freeze_processes(void) error = try_to_freeze_tasks(true); if (!error) { printk("done."); + __usermodehelper_set_disable_depth(UMH_DISABLED); oom_killer_disable(); } printk("\n"); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c4772d192c70b61d52262b0db76f7abd8aeb51c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MyungJoo Ham Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 23:31:24 +0200 Subject: PM / QoS: add pm_qos_update_request_timeout() API The new API, pm_qos_update_request_timeout() is to provide a timeout with pm_qos_update_request. For example, pm_qos_update_request_timeout(req, 100, 1000), means that QoS request on req with value 100 will be active for 1000 microseconds. After 1000 microseconds, the QoS request thru req is reset. If there were another pm_qos_update_request(req, x) during the 1000 us, this new request with value x will override as this is another request on the same req handle. A new request on the same req handle will always override the previous request whether it is the conventional request or it is the new timeout request. Signed-off-by: MyungJoo Ham Signed-off-by: Kyungmin Park Acked-by: Mark Gross Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki --- include/linux/pm_qos.h | 4 ++++ kernel/power/qos.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/pm_qos.h b/include/linux/pm_qos.h index 2e9191a712f3..233149cb19f4 100644 --- a/include/linux/pm_qos.h +++ b/include/linux/pm_qos.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include enum { PM_QOS_RESERVED = 0, @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ enum { struct pm_qos_request { struct plist_node node; int pm_qos_class; + struct delayed_work work; /* for pm_qos_update_request_timeout */ }; struct dev_pm_qos_request { @@ -73,6 +75,8 @@ void pm_qos_add_request(struct pm_qos_request *req, int pm_qos_class, s32 value); void pm_qos_update_request(struct pm_qos_request *req, s32 new_value); +void pm_qos_update_request_timeout(struct pm_qos_request *req, + s32 new_value, unsigned long timeout_us); void pm_qos_remove_request(struct pm_qos_request *req); int pm_qos_request(int pm_qos_class); diff --git a/kernel/power/qos.c b/kernel/power/qos.c index d6d6dbd1ecc0..6a031e684026 100644 --- a/kernel/power/qos.c +++ b/kernel/power/qos.c @@ -229,6 +229,21 @@ int pm_qos_request_active(struct pm_qos_request *req) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pm_qos_request_active); +/** + * pm_qos_work_fn - the timeout handler of pm_qos_update_request_timeout + * @work: work struct for the delayed work (timeout) + * + * This cancels the timeout request by falling back to the default at timeout. + */ +static void pm_qos_work_fn(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct pm_qos_request *req = container_of(to_delayed_work(work), + struct pm_qos_request, + work); + + pm_qos_update_request(req, PM_QOS_DEFAULT_VALUE); +} + /** * pm_qos_add_request - inserts new qos request into the list * @req: pointer to a preallocated handle @@ -253,6 +268,7 @@ void pm_qos_add_request(struct pm_qos_request *req, return; } req->pm_qos_class = pm_qos_class; + INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&req->work, pm_qos_work_fn); pm_qos_update_target(pm_qos_array[pm_qos_class]->constraints, &req->node, PM_QOS_ADD_REQ, value); } @@ -279,6 +295,9 @@ void pm_qos_update_request(struct pm_qos_request *req, return; } + if (delayed_work_pending(&req->work)) + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&req->work); + if (new_value != req->node.prio) pm_qos_update_target( pm_qos_array[req->pm_qos_class]->constraints, @@ -286,6 +305,34 @@ void pm_qos_update_request(struct pm_qos_request *req, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pm_qos_update_request); +/** + * pm_qos_update_request_timeout - modifies an existing qos request temporarily. + * @req : handle to list element holding a pm_qos request to use + * @new_value: defines the temporal qos request + * @timeout_us: the effective duration of this qos request in usecs. + * + * After timeout_us, this qos request is cancelled automatically. + */ +void pm_qos_update_request_timeout(struct pm_qos_request *req, s32 new_value, + unsigned long timeout_us) +{ + if (!req) + return; + if (WARN(!pm_qos_request_active(req), + "%s called for unknown object.", __func__)) + return; + + if (delayed_work_pending(&req->work)) + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&req->work); + + if (new_value != req->node.prio) + pm_qos_update_target( + pm_qos_array[req->pm_qos_class]->constraints, + &req->node, PM_QOS_UPDATE_REQ, new_value); + + schedule_delayed_work(&req->work, usecs_to_jiffies(timeout_us)); +} + /** * pm_qos_remove_request - modifies an existing qos request * @req: handle to request list element @@ -305,6 +352,9 @@ void pm_qos_remove_request(struct pm_qos_request *req) return; } + if (delayed_work_pending(&req->work)) + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&req->work); + pm_qos_update_target(pm_qos_array[req->pm_qos_class]->constraints, &req->node, PM_QOS_REMOVE_REQ, PM_QOS_DEFAULT_VALUE); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 615399c84d1b8d8d8752629e5e5ab4e5044d6918 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rusty Russell Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:38:31 +1030 Subject: cpumask: remove old cpu_*_map. These are obsolete: cpu_*_mask provides (const) pointers. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell --- include/linux/cpumask.h | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/cpumask.h b/include/linux/cpumask.h index 1ffdb9856bb9..a2c819d3c96e 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpumask.h +++ b/include/linux/cpumask.h @@ -764,12 +764,6 @@ static inline const struct cpumask *get_cpu_mask(unsigned int cpu) * */ #ifndef CONFIG_DISABLE_OBSOLETE_CPUMASK_FUNCTIONS -/* These strip const, as traditionally they weren't const. */ -#define cpu_possible_map (*(cpumask_t *)cpu_possible_mask) -#define cpu_online_map (*(cpumask_t *)cpu_online_mask) -#define cpu_present_map (*(cpumask_t *)cpu_present_mask) -#define cpu_active_map (*(cpumask_t *)cpu_active_mask) - #define cpumask_of_cpu(cpu) (*get_cpu_mask(cpu)) #define CPU_MASK_LAST_WORD BITMAP_LAST_WORD_MASK(NR_CPUS) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 15c08f664d8ca4f4d0e202cbd4034422a706ef80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Axel Lin Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 12:21:17 +0800 Subject: regulator: Fix comments in include/linux/regulator/machine.h Signed-off-by: Axel Lin Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- include/linux/regulator/machine.h | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/regulator/machine.h b/include/linux/regulator/machine.h index 7abb16093312..b02108446be7 100644 --- a/include/linux/regulator/machine.h +++ b/include/linux/regulator/machine.h @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct regulator_state { * @uV_offset: Offset applied to voltages from consumer to compensate for * voltage drops. * - * @min_uA: Smallest consumers consumers may set. + * @min_uA: Smallest current consumers may set. * @max_uA: Largest current consumers may set. * * @valid_modes_mask: Mask of modes which may be configured by consumers. @@ -134,10 +134,8 @@ struct regulation_constraints { /** * struct regulator_consumer_supply - supply -> device mapping * - * This maps a supply name to a device. Only one of dev or dev_name - * can be specified. Use of dev_name allows support for buses which - * make struct device available late such as I2C and is the preferred - * form. + * This maps a supply name to a device. Use of dev_name allows support for + * buses which make struct device available late such as I2C. * * @dev_name: Result of dev_name() for the consumer. * @supply: Name for the supply. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5219a5342ab13650ae0f0c62319407268c48d0ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steffen Klassert Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 09:04:46 +0200 Subject: crypto: user - Fix size of netlink dump message The default netlink message size limit might be exceeded when dumping a lot of algorithms to userspace. As a result, not all of the instantiated algorithms dumped to userspace. So calculate an upper bound on the message size and call netlink_dump_start() with that value. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- crypto/crypto_user.c | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/cryptouser.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c index e91c16111ed3..f1ea0a064135 100644 --- a/crypto/crypto_user.c +++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c @@ -457,12 +457,20 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) && (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP))) { + struct crypto_alg *alg; + u16 dump_alloc = 0; + if (link->dump == NULL) return -EINVAL; + + list_for_each_entry(alg, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) + dump_alloc += CRYPTO_REPORT_MAXSIZE; + { struct netlink_dump_control c = { .dump = link->dump, .done = link->done, + .min_dump_alloc = dump_alloc, }; return netlink_dump_start(crypto_nlsk, skb, nlh, &c); } diff --git a/include/linux/cryptouser.h b/include/linux/cryptouser.h index 532fb58f16bf..4abf2ea6a887 100644 --- a/include/linux/cryptouser.h +++ b/include/linux/cryptouser.h @@ -100,3 +100,6 @@ struct crypto_report_rng { char type[CRYPTO_MAX_NAME]; unsigned int seedsize; }; + +#define CRYPTO_REPORT_MAXSIZE (sizeof(struct crypto_user_alg) + \ + sizeof(struct crypto_report_blkcipher)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 98b54aa1a2241b59372468bd1e9c2d207bdba54b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Wessel Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 10:17:03 -0500 Subject: kgdb,debug_core: pass the breakpoint struct instead of address and memory There is extra state information that needs to be exposed in the kgdb_bpt structure for tracking how a breakpoint was installed. The debug_core only uses the the probe_kernel_write() to install breakpoints, but this is not enough for all the archs. Some arch such as x86 need to use text_poke() in order to install a breakpoint into a read only page. Passing the kgdb_bpt structure to kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint() and kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint() allows other archs to set the type variable which indicates how the breakpoint was installed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 2.6.36 Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel --- include/linux/kgdb.h | 4 ++-- kernel/debug/debug_core.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/kgdb.h b/include/linux/kgdb.h index fa391835508d..e5d689c1d774 100644 --- a/include/linux/kgdb.h +++ b/include/linux/kgdb.h @@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ extern void kgdb_arch_set_pc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc); /* Optional functions. */ extern int kgdb_validate_break_address(unsigned long addr); -extern int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(unsigned long addr, char *saved_instr); -extern int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(unsigned long addr, char *bundle); +extern int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt); +extern int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt); /** * kgdb_arch_late - Perform any architecture specific initalization. diff --git a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c index 3f88a45e6f0a..a7e52ca94563 100644 --- a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c +++ b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c @@ -161,37 +161,39 @@ early_param("nokgdbroundup", opt_nokgdbroundup); * Weak aliases for breakpoint management, * can be overriden by architectures when needed: */ -int __weak kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(unsigned long addr, char *saved_instr) +int __weak kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt) { int err; - err = probe_kernel_read(saved_instr, (char *)addr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); + err = probe_kernel_read(bpt->saved_instr, (char *)bpt->bpt_addr, + BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); if (err) return err; - - return probe_kernel_write((char *)addr, arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, - BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); + err = probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr, + arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); + return err; } -int __weak kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(unsigned long addr, char *bundle) +int __weak kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt) { - return probe_kernel_write((char *)addr, - (char *)bundle, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); + return probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr, + (char *)bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); } int __weak kgdb_validate_break_address(unsigned long addr) { - char tmp_variable[BREAK_INSTR_SIZE]; + struct kgdb_bkpt tmp; int err; - /* Validate setting the breakpoint and then removing it. In the + /* Validate setting the breakpoint and then removing it. If the * remove fails, the kernel needs to emit a bad message because we * are deep trouble not being able to put things back the way we * found them. */ - err = kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(addr, tmp_variable); + tmp.bpt_addr = addr; + err = kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(&tmp); if (err) return err; - err = kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(addr, tmp_variable); + err = kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(&tmp); if (err) printk(KERN_ERR "KGDB: Critical breakpoint error, kernel " "memory destroyed at: %lx", addr); @@ -235,7 +237,6 @@ static void kgdb_flush_swbreak_addr(unsigned long addr) */ int dbg_activate_sw_breakpoints(void) { - unsigned long addr; int error; int ret = 0; int i; @@ -244,16 +245,15 @@ int dbg_activate_sw_breakpoints(void) if (kgdb_break[i].state != BP_SET) continue; - addr = kgdb_break[i].bpt_addr; - error = kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(addr, - kgdb_break[i].saved_instr); + error = kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(&kgdb_break[i]); if (error) { ret = error; - printk(KERN_INFO "KGDB: BP install failed: %lx", addr); + printk(KERN_INFO "KGDB: BP install failed: %lx", + kgdb_break[i].bpt_addr); continue; } - kgdb_flush_swbreak_addr(addr); + kgdb_flush_swbreak_addr(kgdb_break[i].bpt_addr); kgdb_break[i].state = BP_ACTIVE; } return ret; @@ -302,7 +302,6 @@ int dbg_set_sw_break(unsigned long addr) int dbg_deactivate_sw_breakpoints(void) { - unsigned long addr; int error; int ret = 0; int i; @@ -310,15 +309,14 @@ int dbg_deactivate_sw_breakpoints(void) for (i = 0; i < KGDB_MAX_BREAKPOINTS; i++) { if (kgdb_break[i].state != BP_ACTIVE) continue; - addr = kgdb_break[i].bpt_addr; - error = kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(addr, - kgdb_break[i].saved_instr); + error = kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(&kgdb_break[i]); if (error) { - printk(KERN_INFO "KGDB: BP remove failed: %lx\n", addr); + printk(KERN_INFO "KGDB: BP remove failed: %lx\n", + kgdb_break[i].bpt_addr); ret = error; } - kgdb_flush_swbreak_addr(addr); + kgdb_flush_swbreak_addr(kgdb_break[i].bpt_addr); kgdb_break[i].state = BP_SET; } return ret; @@ -352,7 +350,6 @@ int kgdb_isremovedbreak(unsigned long addr) int dbg_remove_all_break(void) { - unsigned long addr; int error; int i; @@ -360,12 +357,10 @@ int dbg_remove_all_break(void) for (i = 0; i < KGDB_MAX_BREAKPOINTS; i++) { if (kgdb_break[i].state != BP_ACTIVE) goto setundefined; - addr = kgdb_break[i].bpt_addr; - error = kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(addr, - kgdb_break[i].saved_instr); + error = kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(&kgdb_break[i]); if (error) printk(KERN_ERR "KGDB: breakpoint remove failed: %lx\n", - addr); + kgdb_break[i].bpt_addr); setundefined: kgdb_break[i].state = BP_UNDEFINED; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3751d3e85cf693e10e2c47c03c8caa65e171099b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Wessel Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 09:35:05 -0500 Subject: x86,kgdb: Fix DEBUG_RODATA limitation using text_poke() There has long been a limitation using software breakpoints with a kernel compiled with CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA going back to 2.6.26. For this particular patch, it will apply cleanly and has been tested all the way back to 2.6.36. The kprobes code uses the text_poke() function which accommodates writing a breakpoint into a read-only page. The x86 kgdb code can solve the problem similarly by overriding the default breakpoint set/remove routines and using text_poke() directly. The x86 kgdb code will first attempt to use the traditional probe_kernel_write(), and next try using a the text_poke() function. The break point install method is tracked such that the correct break point removal routine will get called later on. Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 2.6.36 Inspried-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel --- arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/misc/kgdbts.c | 17 -------------- include/linux/kgdb.h | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c index fdc37b3d0ce3..b9bd9d8de665 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -742,6 +744,64 @@ void kgdb_arch_set_pc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long ip) regs->ip = ip; } +int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt) +{ + int err; + char opc[BREAK_INSTR_SIZE]; + + bpt->type = BP_BREAKPOINT; + err = probe_kernel_read(bpt->saved_instr, (char *)bpt->bpt_addr, + BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); + if (err) + return err; + err = probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr, + arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA + if (!err) + return err; + /* + * It is safe to call text_poke() because normal kernel execution + * is stopped on all cores, so long as the text_mutex is not locked. + */ + if (mutex_is_locked(&text_mutex)) + return -EBUSY; + text_poke((void *)bpt->bpt_addr, arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, + BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); + err = probe_kernel_read(opc, (char *)bpt->bpt_addr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); + if (err) + return err; + if (memcmp(opc, arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + bpt->type = BP_POKE_BREAKPOINT; +#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */ + return err; +} + +int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA + int err; + char opc[BREAK_INSTR_SIZE]; + + if (bpt->type != BP_POKE_BREAKPOINT) + goto knl_write; + /* + * It is safe to call text_poke() because normal kernel execution + * is stopped on all cores, so long as the text_mutex is not locked. + */ + if (mutex_is_locked(&text_mutex)) + goto knl_write; + text_poke((void *)bpt->bpt_addr, bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); + err = probe_kernel_read(opc, (char *)bpt->bpt_addr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); + if (err || memcmp(opc, bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE)) + goto knl_write; + return err; +knl_write: +#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */ + return probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr, + (char *)bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE); +} + struct kgdb_arch arch_kgdb_ops = { /* Breakpoint instruction: */ .gdb_bpt_instr = { 0xcc }, diff --git a/drivers/misc/kgdbts.c b/drivers/misc/kgdbts.c index d087456ba089..3aa9a969b373 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/kgdbts.c +++ b/drivers/misc/kgdbts.c @@ -968,22 +968,6 @@ static void run_singlestep_break_test(void) kgdbts_break_test(); } -static void test_debug_rodata(void) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA - /* Until there is an api to write to read-only text segments, use - * HW breakpoints for the remainder of any tests, else print a - * failure message if hw breakpoints do not work. - */ - if (!(arch_kgdb_ops.flags & KGDB_HW_BREAKPOINT && hwbreaks_ok)) { - eprintk("kgdbts: HW breakpoints BROKEN, ending tests\n"); - return; - } - force_hwbrks = 1; - v1printk("kgdbts:Using HW breakpoints for SW breakpoint tests\n"); -#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */ -} - static void kgdbts_run_tests(void) { char *ptr; @@ -1016,7 +1000,6 @@ static void kgdbts_run_tests(void) v1printk("kgdbts:RUN access write breakpoint test\n"); run_hw_break_test(0); } - test_debug_rodata(); /* required internal KGDB tests */ v1printk("kgdbts:RUN plant and detach test\n"); diff --git a/include/linux/kgdb.h b/include/linux/kgdb.h index e5d689c1d774..c4d2fc194ede 100644 --- a/include/linux/kgdb.h +++ b/include/linux/kgdb.h @@ -63,7 +63,8 @@ enum kgdb_bptype { BP_HARDWARE_BREAKPOINT, BP_WRITE_WATCHPOINT, BP_READ_WATCHPOINT, - BP_ACCESS_WATCHPOINT + BP_ACCESS_WATCHPOINT, + BP_POKE_BREAKPOINT, }; enum kgdb_bpstate { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 66189be74ff5f9f3fd6444315b85be210d07cef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Shilovsky Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 21:56:19 +0400 Subject: CIFS: Fix VFS lock usage for oplocked files We can deadlock if we have a write oplock and two processes use the same file handle. In this case the first process can't unlock its lock if the second process blocked on the lock in the same time. Fix it by using posix_lock_file rather than posix_lock_file_wait under cinode->lock_mutex. If we request a blocking lock and posix_lock_file indicates that there is another lock that prevents us, wait untill that lock is released and restart our call. Cc: stable@kernel.org Acked-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky Signed-off-by: Steve French --- fs/cifs/file.c | 10 +++++++++- fs/locks.c | 3 ++- include/linux/fs.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/fs/cifs/file.c b/fs/cifs/file.c index 460d87b7cda0..fae765dac934 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/file.c +++ b/fs/cifs/file.c @@ -835,13 +835,21 @@ cifs_posix_lock_set(struct file *file, struct file_lock *flock) if ((flock->fl_flags & FL_POSIX) == 0) return rc; +try_again: mutex_lock(&cinode->lock_mutex); if (!cinode->can_cache_brlcks) { mutex_unlock(&cinode->lock_mutex); return rc; } - rc = posix_lock_file_wait(file, flock); + + rc = posix_lock_file(file, flock, NULL); mutex_unlock(&cinode->lock_mutex); + if (rc == FILE_LOCK_DEFERRED) { + rc = wait_event_interruptible(flock->fl_wait, !flock->fl_next); + if (!rc) + goto try_again; + locks_delete_block(flock); + } return rc; } diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c index 637694bf3a03..0d68f1f81799 100644 --- a/fs/locks.c +++ b/fs/locks.c @@ -510,12 +510,13 @@ static void __locks_delete_block(struct file_lock *waiter) /* */ -static void locks_delete_block(struct file_lock *waiter) +void locks_delete_block(struct file_lock *waiter) { lock_flocks(); __locks_delete_block(waiter); unlock_flocks(); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(locks_delete_block); /* Insert waiter into blocker's block list. * We use a circular list so that processes can be easily woken up in diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 135693e79f2b..528611843ba0 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -1215,6 +1215,7 @@ extern int vfs_setlease(struct file *, long, struct file_lock **); extern int lease_modify(struct file_lock **, int); extern int lock_may_read(struct inode *, loff_t start, unsigned long count); extern int lock_may_write(struct inode *, loff_t start, unsigned long count); +extern void locks_delete_block(struct file_lock *waiter); extern void lock_flocks(void); extern void unlock_flocks(void); #else /* !CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING */ @@ -1359,6 +1360,10 @@ static inline int lock_may_write(struct inode *inode, loff_t start, return 1; } +static inline void locks_delete_block(struct file_lock *waiter) +{ +} + static inline void lock_flocks(void) { } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3d92e05118262379f76a220772b666dfddb77a9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Gortmaker Date: Sun, 1 Apr 2012 16:38:40 -0400 Subject: avr32: fix build failures from mis-naming of atmel_nand.h Commit bf4289cba02b ("ATMEL: fix nand ecc support") indicated that it wanted to "Move platform data to a common header include/linux/platform_data/atmel_nand.h" and the new header even had re-include protectors with: #ifndef __ATMEL_NAND_H__ However, the file that was added was simply called atmel.h and this caused avr32 defconfig to fail with: In file included from arch/avr32/boards/atstk1000/setup.c:22: arch/avr32/mach-at32ap/include/mach/board.h:10:44: error: linux/platform_data/atmel_nand.h: No such file or directory In file included from arch/avr32/boards/atstk1000/setup.c:22: arch/avr32/mach-at32ap/include/mach/board.h:121: warning: 'struct atmel_nand_data' declared inside parameter list arch/avr32/mach-at32ap/include/mach/board.h:121: warning: its scope is only this definition or declaration, which is probably not what you want make[2]: *** [arch/avr32/boards/atstk1000/setup.o] Error 1 It seems the scope of the file contents will expand beyond just nand, so ignore the original intention, and fix up the users who reference the bad name with the _nand suffix. CC: Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD CC: David Woodhouse Acked-by: Hans-Christian Egtvedt Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/avr32/mach-at32ap/include/mach/board.h | 2 +- include/linux/platform_data/atmel.h | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/arch/avr32/mach-at32ap/include/mach/board.h b/arch/avr32/mach-at32ap/include/mach/board.h index 71733866cb4f..70742ec997f8 100644 --- a/arch/avr32/mach-at32ap/include/mach/board.h +++ b/arch/avr32/mach-at32ap/include/mach/board.h @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #define GPIO_PIN_NONE (-1) diff --git a/include/linux/platform_data/atmel.h b/include/linux/platform_data/atmel.h index d056263545b1..b0f2c56a8ea2 100644 --- a/include/linux/platform_data/atmel.h +++ b/include/linux/platform_data/atmel.h @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ * GPL v2 Only */ -#ifndef __ATMEL_NAND_H__ -#define __ATMEL_NAND_H__ +#ifndef __ATMEL_H__ +#define __ATMEL_H__ #include @@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ struct atmel_nand_data { unsigned int num_parts; }; -#endif /* __ATMEL_NAND_H__ */ +#endif /* __ATMEL_H__ */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From f68c56b7d2351036d1ec58c7a0ac4f258cbc1fa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Gortmaker Date: Sun, 1 Apr 2012 16:38:45 -0400 Subject: firewire: restore the device.h include in linux/firewire.h Commit 313162d0b838 ("device.h: audit and cleanup users in main include dir") exchanged an include for a struct *device but in actuality I misread this file when creating 313162d and it should have remained an include. There were no build regressions since all consumers were already getting device.h anyway, but make it right regardless. Reported-by: Stefan Richter Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/firewire.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/firewire.h b/include/linux/firewire.h index 4db7b68f0582..cdc9b719e9c7 100644 --- a/include/linux/firewire.h +++ b/include/linux/firewire.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #define _LINUX_FIREWIRE_H #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -64,8 +65,6 @@ #define CSR_MODEL 0x17 #define CSR_DIRECTORY_ID 0x20 -struct device; - struct fw_csr_iterator { const u32 *p; const u32 *end; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3b3b0e4fc15efa507b902d90cea39e496a523c3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2012 09:37:02 -0700 Subject: LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a bigger space requirement. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 54 +++-------------------------- security/apparmor/audit.c | 38 ++++++++++----------- security/apparmor/capability.c | 6 ++-- security/apparmor/file.c | 54 +++++++++++++++-------------- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 28 ++++++++++++++- security/apparmor/ipc.c | 10 +++--- security/apparmor/lib.c | 4 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 +++-- security/apparmor/policy.c | 10 +++--- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 20 ++++++----- security/apparmor/resource.c | 12 ++++--- security/selinux/avc.c | 34 ++++++++++--------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 16 +++++++++ security/smack/smack.h | 13 ++++++- security/smack/smack_access.c | 11 +++--- 16 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index eab507f2b1cb..6f4fb37aac88 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -72,61 +72,15 @@ struct common_audit_data { /* this union contains LSM specific data */ union { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK - /* SMACK data */ - struct smack_audit_data { - const char *function; - char *subject; - char *object; - char *request; - int result; - } smack_audit_data; + struct smack_audit_data *smack_audit_data; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX - /* SELinux data */ - struct { - u32 ssid; - u32 tsid; - u16 tclass; - u32 requested; - u32 audited; - u32 denied; - /* - * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the - * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage. - */ - u32 auditdeny; - struct av_decision *avd; - int result; - } selinux_audit_data; + struct selinux_audit_data *selinux_audit_data; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR - struct { - int error; - int op; - int type; - void *profile; - const char *name; - const char *info; - union { - void *target; - struct { - long pos; - void *target; - } iface; - struct { - int rlim; - unsigned long max; - } rlim; - struct { - const char *target; - u32 request; - u32 denied; - uid_t ouid; - } fs; - }; - } apparmor_audit_data; + struct apparmor_audit_data *apparmor_audit_data; #endif - }; + }; /* per LSM data pointer union */ /* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */ void (*lsm_pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *); void (*lsm_post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *); diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 5ff67776a5ad..23f7eb658d9c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -115,23 +115,23 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) if (aa_g_audit_header) { audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor="); - audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad.type]); + audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad->type]); } - if (sa->aad.op) { + if (sa->aad->op) { audit_log_format(ab, " operation="); - audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad.op]); + audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad->op]); } - if (sa->aad.info) { + if (sa->aad->info) { audit_log_format(ab, " info="); - audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad.info); - if (sa->aad.error) - audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad.error); + audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad->info); + if (sa->aad->error) + audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad->error); } - if (sa->aad.profile) { - struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad.profile; + if (sa->aad->profile) { + struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile; pid_t pid; rcu_read_lock(); pid = rcu_dereference(tsk->real_parent)->pid; @@ -145,9 +145,9 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname); } - if (sa->aad.name) { + if (sa->aad->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name); } } @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { - sa->aad.type = type; + sa->aad->type = type; sa->lsm_pre_audit = audit_pre; sa->lsm_post_audit = cb; common_lsm_audit(sa); @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, BUG_ON(!profile); if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) { - if (likely(!sa->aad.error)) { + if (likely(!sa->aad->error)) { if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; @@ -196,21 +196,21 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET)) - return sa->aad.error; + return sa->aad->error; if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; if (!unconfined(profile)) - sa->aad.profile = profile; + sa->aad->profile = profile; aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); - if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) + if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current); - if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) - return complain_error(sa->aad.error); + if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) + return complain_error(sa->aad->error); - return sa->aad.error; + return sa->aad->error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 9982c48def4e..088dba3bf7dc 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -64,11 +64,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task, struct audit_cache *ent; int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, CAP); + sa.aad = &aad; sa.tsk = task; sa.u.cap = cap; - sa.aad.op = OP_CAPABLE; - sa.aad.error = error; + sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE; + sa.aad->error = error; if (likely(!error)) { /* test if auditing is being forced */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 5d176f2530c9..2f8fcba9ce4b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -67,22 +67,22 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) struct common_audit_data *sa = va; uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); - if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.request); + audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.request); } - if (sa->aad.fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (sa->aad->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); - audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.denied); + audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied); } - if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid); - audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad.fs.ouid); + audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad->fs.ouid); } - if (sa->aad.fs.target) { + if (sa->aad->fs.target) { audit_log_format(ab, " target="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.fs.target); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target); } } @@ -107,45 +107,47 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, { int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = op, - sa.aad.fs.request = request; - sa.aad.name = name; - sa.aad.fs.target = target; - sa.aad.fs.ouid = ouid; - sa.aad.info = info; - sa.aad.error = error; - - if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) { + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = op, + aad.fs.request = request; + aad.name = name; + aad.fs.target = target; + aad.fs.ouid = ouid; + aad.info = info; + aad.error = error; + + if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) { u32 mask = perms->audit; if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL)) mask = 0xffff; /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ - sa.aad.fs.request &= mask; + sa.aad->fs.request &= mask; - if (likely(!sa.aad.fs.request)) + if (likely(!sa.aad->fs.request)) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; } else { /* only report permissions that were denied */ - sa.aad.fs.request = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow; + sa.aad->fs.request = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow; - if (sa.aad.fs.request & perms->kill) + if (sa.aad->fs.request & perms->kill) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */ - if ((sa.aad.fs.request & perms->quiet) && + if ((sa.aad->fs.request & perms->quiet) && AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) - sa.aad.fs.request &= ~perms->quiet; + sa.aad->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet; - if (!sa.aad.fs.request) - return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error; + if (!sa.aad->fs.request) + return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error; } - sa.aad.fs.denied = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow; + sa.aad->fs.denied = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow; return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index 4ba78c203af1..3868b1e5d5ba 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -103,7 +103,33 @@ enum aa_ops { }; -/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data portion of common_audit_data */ +struct apparmor_audit_data { + int error; + int op; + int type; + void *profile; + const char *name; + const char *info; + union { + void *target; + struct { + long pos; + void *target; + } iface; + struct { + int rlim; + unsigned long max; + } rlim; + struct { + const char *target; + u32 request; + u32 denied; + uid_t ouid; + } fs; + }; +}; + +/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data structure */ #define aad apparmor_audit_data void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 7ee05c6f3c64..c3da93a5150d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; audit_log_format(ab, " target="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.target); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->target); } /** @@ -41,10 +41,12 @@ static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, int error) { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = OP_PTRACE; - sa.aad.target = target; - sa.aad.error = error; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = OP_PTRACE; + aad.target = target; + aad.error = error; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, audit_cb); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 9516948041ad..e75829ba0ff9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str) { if (audit_enabled) { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.info = str; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.info = str; aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL); } printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 97ce8fae49b3..ad05d391974d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -588,10 +588,12 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args); } else { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; - sa.aad.info = name; - sa.aad.error = -EINVAL; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; + aad.info = name; + aad.error = -EINVAL; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, __aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL, &sa, NULL); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 906414383022..f1f7506a464d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -964,11 +964,13 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info, int error) { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = op; - sa.aad.name = name; - sa.aad.info = info; - sa.aad.error = error; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = op; + aad.name = name; + aad.info = info; + aad.error = error; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, __aa_current_profile(), gfp, &sa, NULL); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 25fd51edc8da..deab7c7e8dc0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -70,13 +70,13 @@ struct aa_ext { static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; - if (sa->aad.iface.target) { - struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad.iface.target; + if (sa->aad->iface.target) { + struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad->iface.target; audit_log_format(ab, " name="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name->base.hname); } - if (sa->aad.iface.pos) - audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad.iface.pos); + if (sa->aad->iface.pos) + audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad->iface.pos); } /** @@ -94,13 +94,15 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name, { struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.aad = &aad; if (e) - sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; - sa.aad.iface.target = new; - sa.aad.name = name; - sa.aad.info = info; - sa.aad.error = error; + aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; + aad.iface.target = new; + aad.name = name; + aad.info = info; + aad.error = error; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb); diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index 72c25a4f2cfd..2fe8613efe33 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) struct common_audit_data *sa = va; audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu", - rlim_names[sa->aad.rlim.rlim], sa->aad.rlim.max); + rlim_names[sa->aad->rlim.rlim], sa->aad->rlim.max); } /** @@ -50,12 +50,14 @@ static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, unsigned long value, int error) { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT, - sa.aad.rlim.rlim = resource; - sa.aad.rlim.max = value; - sa.aad.error = error; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT, + aad.rlim.rlim = resource; + aad.rlim.max = value; + aad.error = error; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb); } diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 1a70fa26da72..00f3860c2370 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", - ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted"); - avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass, - ad->selinux_audit_data.audited); + ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted"); + avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass, + ad->selinux_audit_data->audited); audit_log_format(ab, " for "); } @@ -452,9 +452,9 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; audit_log_format(ab, " "); - avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid, - ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid, - ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass); + avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass); } /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */ @@ -464,10 +464,12 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, unsigned flags) { struct common_audit_data stack_data; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; if (!a) { a = &stack_data; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE); + a->selinux_audit_data = &sad; } /* @@ -481,12 +483,12 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)) return -ECHILD; - a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass; - a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested; - a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid; - a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid; - a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited; - a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied; + a->selinux_audit_data->tclass = tclass; + a->selinux_audit_data->requested = requested; + a->selinux_audit_data->ssid = ssid; + a->selinux_audit_data->tsid = tsid; + a->selinux_audit_data->audited = audited; + a->selinux_audit_data->denied = denied; a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback; a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback; common_lsm_audit(a); @@ -523,7 +525,7 @@ inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, if (unlikely(denied)) { audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; /* - * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in + * a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the @@ -532,15 +534,15 @@ inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, * * denied == READ * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule) - * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 + * selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 * * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for * ACCESS */ if (a && - a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny && - !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) + a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny && + !(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) audited = 0; } else if (result) audited = denied = requested; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 28482f9e15b8..3861ce4b1007 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1420,6 +1420,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int cap, int audit) { struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct av_decision avd; u16 sclass; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); @@ -1427,6 +1428,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int rc; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.tsk = current; ad.u.cap = cap; @@ -1492,9 +1494,11 @@ static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred, unsigned flags) { struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); ad.u.inode = inode; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags); } @@ -1507,9 +1511,11 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); ad.u.dentry = dentry; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); } @@ -1522,9 +1528,11 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, { struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); ad.u.path = *path; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); } @@ -1543,11 +1551,13 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); ad.u.path = file->f_path; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, @@ -1577,6 +1587,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; int rc; dsec = dir->i_security; @@ -1587,6 +1598,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); ad.u.dentry = dentry; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, @@ -1631,6 +1643,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, { struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int rc; @@ -1640,6 +1653,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); ad.u.dentry = dentry; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; av = DIR__SEARCH; av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); @@ -1674,6 +1688,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, { struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; @@ -1685,6 +1700,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, @@ -1970,6 +1986,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; int rc; @@ -2009,6 +2026,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path; if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) @@ -2098,6 +2116,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; struct tty_struct *tty; struct fdtable *fdt; @@ -2135,6 +2154,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; spin_lock(&files->file_lock); for (;;) { @@ -2472,6 +2492,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; int rc; rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); @@ -2483,6 +2504,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) return 0; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); } @@ -2491,8 +2513,10 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); } @@ -2656,6 +2680,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 perms; bool from_access; unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; @@ -2668,10 +2693,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return 0; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.inode = inode; if (from_access) - ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS; + ad.selinux_audit_data->auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS; perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); @@ -2737,6 +2763,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; @@ -2751,6 +2778,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return -EPERM; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.dentry = dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, @@ -3345,10 +3373,12 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { u32 sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; sid = task_sid(current); COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, @@ -3721,12 +3751,14 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 tsid = task_sid(task); if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sk = sk; return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); @@ -3805,6 +3837,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in char *addrp; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; @@ -3831,6 +3864,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in if (err) goto out; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net.family = family; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, @@ -3864,6 +3898,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in goto out; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net.family = family; @@ -3897,6 +3932,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; @@ -3922,6 +3958,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); @@ -4012,9 +4049,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; int err; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sk = other; err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, @@ -4042,8 +4081,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, @@ -4080,9 +4121,11 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; char *addrp; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net.family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); @@ -4111,6 +4154,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4135,6 +4179,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net.family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); @@ -4471,6 +4516,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u8 secmark_active; u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4488,6 +4534,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, return NF_DROP; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; ad.u.net.family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) @@ -4576,6 +4623,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk = skb->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 proto; @@ -4584,6 +4632,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, sksec = sk->sk_security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; ad.u.net.family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) @@ -4607,6 +4656,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u32 peer_sid; struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4653,6 +4703,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, } COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; ad.u.net.family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) @@ -4769,11 +4820,13 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = ipc_perms->security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); @@ -4794,6 +4847,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -4804,6 +4858,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) isec = msq->q_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, @@ -4824,11 +4879,13 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = msq->q_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, @@ -4868,6 +4925,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -4889,6 +4947,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, } COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; /* Can this process write to the queue? */ @@ -4913,6 +4972,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = task_sid(target); int rc; @@ -4920,6 +4980,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, msec = msg->security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, @@ -4935,6 +4996,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -4945,6 +5007,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) isec = shp->shm_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, @@ -4965,11 +5028,13 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = shp->shm_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, @@ -5027,6 +5092,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -5037,6 +5103,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) isec = sma->sem_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, @@ -5057,11 +5124,13 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = sma->sem_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 005a91bcb200..fa13f17ce0ff 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -46,6 +46,22 @@ struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned int frees; }; +struct selinux_audit_data { + u32 ssid; + u32 tsid; + u16 tclass; + u32 requested; + u32 audited; + u32 denied; + /* + * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the + * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage. + */ + u32 auditdeny; + struct av_decision *avd; + int result; +}; + /* * AVC operations */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 2ad00657b801..ccba3823d9ef 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -185,6 +185,15 @@ struct smack_known { */ #define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 5 +/* SMACK data */ +struct smack_audit_data { + const char *function; + char *subject; + char *object; + char *request; + int result; +}; + /* * Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set * to save some stack @@ -192,6 +201,7 @@ struct smack_known { struct smk_audit_info { #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT struct common_audit_data a; + struct smack_audit_data sad; #endif }; /* @@ -311,7 +321,8 @@ static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func, { memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a)); a->a.type = type; - a->a.smack_audit_data.function = func; + a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad; + a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func; } static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a, diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index cc7cb6edba08..2af7fcc98a71 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -275,9 +275,9 @@ static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access) static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; - struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->smack_audit_data; + struct smack_audit_data *sad = ad->smack_audit_data; audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s", - ad->smack_audit_data.function, + ad->smack_audit_data->function, sad->result ? "denied" : "granted"); audit_log_format(ab, " subject="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject); @@ -310,11 +310,12 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0) return; - if (a->smack_audit_data.function == NULL) - a->smack_audit_data.function = "unknown"; + sad = a->smack_audit_data; + + if (sad->function == NULL) + sad->function = "unknown"; /* end preparing the audit data */ - sad = &a->smack_audit_data; smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request); sad->subject = subject_label; sad->object = object_label; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 48c62af68a403ef1655546bd3e021070c8508573 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2012 13:15:44 -0400 Subject: LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of networking. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 35 +++++++-------- security/lsm_audit.c | 66 ++++++++++++++-------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ security/smack/smack.h | 10 ++++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 29 +++++++------ 5 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index 6f4fb37aac88..d1b073ffec24 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -22,6 +22,23 @@ #include #include +struct lsm_network_audit { + int netif; + struct sock *sk; + u16 family; + __be16 dport; + __be16 sport; + union { + struct { + __be32 daddr; + __be32 saddr; + } v4; + struct { + struct in6_addr daddr; + struct in6_addr saddr; + } v6; + } fam; +}; /* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */ struct common_audit_data { @@ -41,23 +58,7 @@ struct common_audit_data { struct path path; struct dentry *dentry; struct inode *inode; - struct { - int netif; - struct sock *sk; - u16 family; - __be16 dport; - __be16 sport; - union { - struct { - __be32 daddr; - __be32 saddr; - } v4; - struct { - struct in6_addr daddr; - struct in6_addr saddr; - } v6; - } fam; - } net; + struct lsm_network_audit *net; int cap; int ipc_id; struct task_struct *tsk; diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c index 8b8f0902f6e5..e96c6aa17bb0 100644 --- a/security/lsm_audit.c +++ b/security/lsm_audit.c @@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, if (ih == NULL) return -EINVAL; - ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; - ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; + ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; + ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; if (proto) *proto = ih->protocol; @@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, if (th == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = th->source; - ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = th->source; + ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { @@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, if (uh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; - ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; + ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { @@ -82,16 +82,16 @@ int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, if (dh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; - ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; + ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; + ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr *sh = sctp_hdr(skb); if (sh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = sh->source; - ad->u.net.dport = sh->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; + ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } default: @@ -119,8 +119,8 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb); if (ip6 == NULL) return -EINVAL; - ad->u.net.v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; - ad->u.net.v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; + ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; + ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; ret = 0; /* IPv6 can have several extension header before the Transport header * skip them */ @@ -140,8 +140,8 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, if (th == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = th->source; - ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = th->source; + ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { @@ -151,8 +151,8 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, if (uh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; - ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; + ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { @@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, if (dh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; - ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; + ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; + ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } case IPPROTO_SCTP: { @@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); if (sh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = sh->source; - ad->u.net.dport = sh->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; + ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } default: @@ -281,8 +281,8 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, } break; case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET: - if (a->u.net.sk) { - struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk; + if (a->u.net->sk) { + struct sock *sk = a->u.net->sk; struct unix_sock *u; int len = 0; char *p = NULL; @@ -330,29 +330,29 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, } } - switch (a->u.net.family) { + switch (a->u.net->family) { case AF_INET: - print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr, - a->u.net.sport, + print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net->v4info.saddr, + a->u.net->sport, "saddr", "src"); - print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr, - a->u.net.dport, + print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net->v4info.daddr, + a->u.net->dport, "daddr", "dest"); break; case AF_INET6: - print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr, - a->u.net.sport, + print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net->v6info.saddr, + a->u.net->sport, "saddr", "src"); - print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr, - a->u.net.dport, + print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net->v6info.daddr, + a->u.net->dport, "daddr", "dest"); break; } - if (a->u.net.netif > 0) { + if (a->u.net->netif > 0) { struct net_device *dev; /* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */ - dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, a->u.net.netif); + dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, a->u.net->netif); if (dev) { audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s", dev->name); dev_put(dev); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 3861ce4b1007..d85b793c9321 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3517,8 +3517,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) goto out; - ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; - ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; + ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; + ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; ret = 0; if (proto) @@ -3536,8 +3536,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, if (th == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = th->source; - ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = th->source; + ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } @@ -3552,8 +3552,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, if (uh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; - ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; + ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } @@ -3568,8 +3568,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, if (dh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; - ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; + ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; + ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } @@ -3596,8 +3596,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, if (ip6 == NULL) goto out; - ad->u.net.v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; - ad->u.net.v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; + ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; + ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; ret = 0; nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; @@ -3617,8 +3617,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, if (th == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = th->source; - ad->u.net.dport = th->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = th->source; + ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } @@ -3629,8 +3629,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, if (uh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = uh->source; - ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest; + ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; + ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } @@ -3641,8 +3641,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, if (dh == NULL) break; - ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport; - ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport; + ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; + ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } @@ -3662,13 +3662,13 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, char *addrp; int ret; - switch (ad->u.net.family) { + switch (ad->u.net->family) { case PF_INET: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; - addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr : - &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr); + addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr : + &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr); goto okay; #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) @@ -3676,8 +3676,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; - addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr : - &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr); + addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr : + &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr); goto okay; #endif /* IPV6 */ default: @@ -3752,6 +3752,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u32 tsid = task_sid(task); if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) @@ -3759,7 +3760,8 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.sk = sk; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sk = sk; return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); } @@ -3838,6 +3840,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; @@ -3865,8 +3868,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in goto out; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); + ad.u.net->family = family; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); @@ -3899,13 +3903,14 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); + ad.u.net->family = family; if (family == PF_INET) - ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; + ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; else - ad.u.net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; + ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); @@ -3933,6 +3938,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; @@ -3959,8 +3965,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); - ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); + ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; @@ -4050,11 +4057,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; int err; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.sk = other; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sk = other; err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, sksec_other->sclass, @@ -4082,10 +4091,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); @@ -4122,12 +4133,14 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; + ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; @@ -4155,6 +4168,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4180,8 +4194,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; + ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; @@ -4517,6 +4532,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 secmark_active; u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4535,8 +4551,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) return NF_DROP; @@ -4624,6 +4641,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 proto; @@ -4633,8 +4651,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) return NF_DROP; @@ -4657,6 +4676,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; + struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4704,8 +4724,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; - ad.u.net.family = family; + ad.u.net = &net; + ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) return NF_DROP; diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index ccba3823d9ef..4ede719922ed 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -325,6 +325,14 @@ static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func, a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func; } +static inline void smk_ad_init_net(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func, + char type, struct lsm_network_audit *net) +{ + smk_ad_init(a, func, type); + memset(net, 0, sizeof(*net)); + a->a.u.net = net; +} + static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a, struct task_struct *t) { @@ -348,7 +356,7 @@ static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a, static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a, struct sock *sk) { - a->a.u.net.sk = sk; + a->a.u.net->sk = sk; } #else /* no AUDIT */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index cd667b4089a5..81c03a597112 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1939,16 +1939,17 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) char *hostsp; struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net; rcu_read_lock(); hostsp = smack_host_label(sap); if (hostsp != NULL) { sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET); - ad.a.u.net.family = sap->sin_family; - ad.a.u.net.dport = sap->sin_port; - ad.a.u.net.v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr; + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family; + ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port; + ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr; #endif rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); } else { @@ -2808,9 +2809,10 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security; struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security; struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net; int rc = 0; - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET); + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other); if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) @@ -2840,9 +2842,10 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security; struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net; int rc = 0; - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET); + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk); if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) @@ -2990,6 +2993,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) char *csp; int rc; struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net; if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6) return 0; @@ -3007,9 +3011,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET); - ad.a.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; - ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; + ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); #endif /* @@ -3152,6 +3156,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, char *sp; int rc; struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct lsm_network_audit net; /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) @@ -3166,9 +3171,9 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET); - ad.a.u.net.family = family; - ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = family; + ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); #endif /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From b61c37f57988567c84359645f8202a7c84bc798a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2012 15:48:12 -0700 Subject: lsm_audit: don't specify the audit pre/post callbacks in 'struct common_audit_data' It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the only time those fields are filled are just before calling the common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those fields. So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is initialized in hot paths. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 7 +++---- security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +--- security/lsm_audit.c | 14 +++++++++----- security/selinux/avc.c | 4 +--- security/smack/smack_access.c | 3 +-- 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index d1b073ffec24..fad48aab893b 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -82,9 +82,6 @@ struct common_audit_data { struct apparmor_audit_data *apparmor_audit_data; #endif }; /* per LSM data pointer union */ - /* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */ - void (*lsm_pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *); - void (*lsm_post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *); }; #define v4info fam.v4 @@ -101,6 +98,8 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb, { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct common_audit_data)); \ (_d)->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; } -void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a); +void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a, + void (*pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *), + void (*post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)); #endif diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 23f7eb658d9c..cc3520d39a78 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -160,9 +160,7 @@ void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { sa->aad->type = type; - sa->lsm_pre_audit = audit_pre; - sa->lsm_post_audit = cb; - common_lsm_audit(sa); + common_lsm_audit(sa, audit_pre, cb); } /** diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c index e96c6aa17bb0..90c129b0102f 100644 --- a/security/lsm_audit.c +++ b/security/lsm_audit.c @@ -378,11 +378,15 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, /** * common_lsm_audit - generic LSM auditing function * @a: auxiliary audit data + * @pre_audit: lsm-specific pre-audit callback + * @post_audit: lsm-specific post-audit callback * * setup the audit buffer for common security information * uses callback to print LSM specific information */ -void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a) +void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a, + void (*pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *), + void (*post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -394,13 +398,13 @@ void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a) if (ab == NULL) return; - if (a->lsm_pre_audit) - a->lsm_pre_audit(ab, a); + if (pre_audit) + pre_audit(ab, a); dump_common_audit_data(ab, a); - if (a->lsm_post_audit) - a->lsm_post_audit(ab, a); + if (post_audit) + post_audit(ab, a); audit_log_end(ab); } diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 36c42bb52d81..8ee42b2a5f19 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -492,9 +492,7 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, slad.denied = denied; a->selinux_audit_data->slad = &slad; - a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback; - a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback; - common_lsm_audit(a); + common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback); return 0; } diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 2af7fcc98a71..c8115f7308f8 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -321,9 +321,8 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, sad->object = object_label; sad->request = request_buffer; sad->result = result; - a->lsm_pre_audit = smack_log_callback; - common_lsm_audit(a); + common_lsm_audit(a, smack_log_callback, NULL); } #else /* #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT */ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2def16ae6b0c77571200f18ba4be049b03d75579 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2012 22:33:02 +0000 Subject: net: fix /proc/net/dev regression Commit f04565ddf52 (dev: use name hash for dev_seq_ops) added a second regression, as some devices are missing from /proc/net/dev if many devices are defined. When seq_file buffer is filled, the last ->next/show() method is canceled (pos value is reverted to value prior ->next() call) Problem is after above commit, we dont restart the lookup at right position in ->start() method. Fix this by removing the internal 'pos' pointer added in commit, since we need to use the 'loff_t *pos' provided by seq_file layer. This also reverts commit 5cac98dd0 (net: Fix corruption in /proc/*/net/dev_mcast), since its not needed anymore. Reported-by: Ben Greear Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Mihai Maruseac Tested-by: Ben Greear Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/netdevice.h | 2 -- net/core/dev.c | 58 +++++++++++------------------------------------ net/core/dev_addr_lists.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h index 1f77540bdc95..5cbaa20f1659 100644 --- a/include/linux/netdevice.h +++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h @@ -2604,8 +2604,6 @@ extern void net_disable_timestamp(void); extern void *dev_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos); extern void *dev_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos); extern void dev_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v); -extern int dev_seq_open_ops(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, - const struct seq_operations *ops); #endif extern int netdev_class_create_file(struct class_attribute *class_attr); diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 6c7dc9d78e10..c25d453b2803 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -4028,54 +4028,41 @@ static int dev_ifconf(struct net *net, char __user *arg) #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS -#define BUCKET_SPACE (32 - NETDEV_HASHBITS) - -struct dev_iter_state { - struct seq_net_private p; - unsigned int pos; /* bucket << BUCKET_SPACE + offset */ -}; +#define BUCKET_SPACE (32 - NETDEV_HASHBITS - 1) #define get_bucket(x) ((x) >> BUCKET_SPACE) #define get_offset(x) ((x) & ((1 << BUCKET_SPACE) - 1)) #define set_bucket_offset(b, o) ((b) << BUCKET_SPACE | (o)) -static inline struct net_device *dev_from_same_bucket(struct seq_file *seq) +static inline struct net_device *dev_from_same_bucket(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) { - struct dev_iter_state *state = seq->private; struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq); struct net_device *dev; struct hlist_node *p; struct hlist_head *h; - unsigned int count, bucket, offset; + unsigned int count = 0, offset = get_offset(*pos); - bucket = get_bucket(state->pos); - offset = get_offset(state->pos); - h = &net->dev_name_head[bucket]; - count = 0; + h = &net->dev_name_head[get_bucket(*pos)]; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(dev, p, h, name_hlist) { - if (count++ == offset) { - state->pos = set_bucket_offset(bucket, count); + if (++count == offset) return dev; - } } return NULL; } -static inline struct net_device *dev_from_new_bucket(struct seq_file *seq) +static inline struct net_device *dev_from_bucket(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) { - struct dev_iter_state *state = seq->private; struct net_device *dev; unsigned int bucket; - bucket = get_bucket(state->pos); do { - dev = dev_from_same_bucket(seq); + dev = dev_from_same_bucket(seq, pos); if (dev) return dev; - bucket++; - state->pos = set_bucket_offset(bucket, 0); + bucket = get_bucket(*pos) + 1; + *pos = set_bucket_offset(bucket, 1); } while (bucket < NETDEV_HASHENTRIES); return NULL; @@ -4088,33 +4075,20 @@ static inline struct net_device *dev_from_new_bucket(struct seq_file *seq) void *dev_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) __acquires(RCU) { - struct dev_iter_state *state = seq->private; - rcu_read_lock(); if (!*pos) return SEQ_START_TOKEN; - /* check for end of the hash */ - if (state->pos == 0 && *pos > 1) + if (get_bucket(*pos) >= NETDEV_HASHENTRIES) return NULL; - return dev_from_new_bucket(seq); + return dev_from_bucket(seq, pos); } void *dev_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) { - struct net_device *dev; - ++*pos; - - if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) - return dev_from_new_bucket(seq); - - dev = dev_from_same_bucket(seq); - if (dev) - return dev; - - return dev_from_new_bucket(seq); + return dev_from_bucket(seq, pos); } void dev_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) @@ -4213,13 +4187,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations dev_seq_ops = { static int dev_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { return seq_open_net(inode, file, &dev_seq_ops, - sizeof(struct dev_iter_state)); -} - -int dev_seq_open_ops(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, - const struct seq_operations *ops) -{ - return seq_open_net(inode, file, ops, sizeof(struct dev_iter_state)); + sizeof(struct seq_net_private)); } static const struct file_operations dev_seq_fops = { diff --git a/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c b/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c index 29c07fef9228..626698f0db8b 100644 --- a/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c +++ b/net/core/dev_addr_lists.c @@ -696,7 +696,8 @@ static const struct seq_operations dev_mc_seq_ops = { static int dev_mc_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - return dev_seq_open_ops(inode, file, &dev_mc_seq_ops); + return seq_open_net(inode, file, &dev_mc_seq_ops, + sizeof(struct seq_net_private)); } static const struct file_operations dev_mc_seq_fops = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 20955e891d828b2027281fe3295dae6af8e0423b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Boyd Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2012 14:25:09 -0700 Subject: libfs: add simple_open() debugfs and a few other drivers use an open-coded version of simple_open() to pass a pointer from the file to the read/write file ops. Add support for this simple case to libfs so that we can remove the many duplicate copies of this simple function. Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd Cc: Al Viro Cc: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- fs/libfs.c | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/fs/libfs.c b/fs/libfs.c index 4a0d1f06da57..358094f0433d 100644 --- a/fs/libfs.c +++ b/fs/libfs.c @@ -264,6 +264,13 @@ Enomem: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } +int simple_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + if (inode->i_private) + file->private_data = inode->i_private; + return 0; +} + int simple_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = old_dentry->d_inode; @@ -984,6 +991,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_dir_operations); EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_empty); EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_fill_super); EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_getattr); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_open); EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_link); EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_lookup); EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_pin_fs); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index c437f914d537..c64c31d3ab2c 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2502,6 +2502,7 @@ extern int dcache_readdir(struct file *, void *, filldir_t); extern int simple_setattr(struct dentry *, struct iattr *); extern int simple_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *); extern int simple_statfs(struct dentry *, struct kstatfs *); +extern int simple_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); extern int simple_link(struct dentry *, struct inode *, struct dentry *); extern int simple_unlink(struct inode *, struct dentry *); extern int simple_rmdir(struct inode *, struct dentry *); -- cgit v1.2.3 From dac23b0d0513916498d40412818bd2c581b365f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Hocko Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2012 14:25:16 -0700 Subject: memcg swap: use mem_cgroup_uncharge_swap fix Although mem_cgroup_uncharge_swap has an empty placeholder for !CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR_SWAP the definition is placed in the CONFIG_SWAP ifdef block so we are missing the same definition for !CONFIG_SWAP which implies !CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR_SWAP. This has not been an issue before, because mem_cgroup_uncharge_swap was not called from !CONFIG_SWAP context. But Hugh Dickins has a cleanup patch to call __mem_cgroup_commit_charge_swapin which is defined also for !CONFIG_SWAP. Let's move both the empty definition and declaration outside of the CONFIG_SWAP block to avoid the following compilation error: mm/memcontrol.c: In function '__mem_cgroup_commit_charge_swapin': mm/memcontrol.c:2837: error: implicit declaration of function 'mem_cgroup_uncharge_swap' if CONFIG_SWAP is disabled. Reported-by: David Rientjes Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki Cc: Daisuke Nishimura Cc: Johannes Weiner Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/swap.h | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/swap.h b/include/linux/swap.h index 8dc0ea7caf02..b1fd5c7925fe 100644 --- a/include/linux/swap.h +++ b/include/linux/swap.h @@ -305,6 +305,13 @@ static inline int mem_cgroup_swappiness(struct mem_cgroup *mem) return vm_swappiness; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR_SWAP +extern void mem_cgroup_uncharge_swap(swp_entry_t ent); +#else +static inline void mem_cgroup_uncharge_swap(swp_entry_t ent) +{ +} +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SWAP /* linux/mm/page_io.c */ extern int swap_readpage(struct page *); @@ -375,13 +382,6 @@ mem_cgroup_uncharge_swapcache(struct page *page, swp_entry_t ent, bool swapout) { } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR_SWAP -extern void mem_cgroup_uncharge_swap(swp_entry_t ent); -#else -static inline void mem_cgroup_uncharge_swap(swp_entry_t ent) -{ -} -#endif #else /* CONFIG_SWAP */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 35f9c09fe9c72eb8ca2b8e89a593e1c151f28fc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2012 03:05:35 +0000 Subject: tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 2f533844242 (tcp: allow splice() to build full TSO packets) added a regression for splice() calls using SPLICE_F_MORE. We need to call tcp_flush() at the end of the last page processed in tcp_sendpages(), or else transmits can be deferred and future sends stall. Add a new internal flag, MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, acting like MSG_MORE, but with different semantic. For all sendpage() providers, its a transparent change. Only sock_sendpage() and tcp_sendpages() can differentiate the two different flags provided by pipe_to_sendpage() Reported-by: Tom Herbert Cc: Nandita Dukkipati Cc: Neal Cardwell Cc: Tom Herbert Cc: Yuchung Cheng Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski Cc: Mahesh Bandewar Cc: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- fs/splice.c | 5 ++++- include/linux/socket.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- net/socket.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c index 5f883de7ef3a..f8476841eb04 100644 --- a/fs/splice.c +++ b/fs/splice.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * Attempt to steal a page from a pipe buffer. This should perhaps go into @@ -690,7 +691,9 @@ static int pipe_to_sendpage(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, if (!likely(file->f_op && file->f_op->sendpage)) return -EINVAL; - more = (sd->flags & SPLICE_F_MORE) || sd->len < sd->total_len; + more = (sd->flags & SPLICE_F_MORE) ? MSG_MORE : 0; + if (sd->len < sd->total_len) + more |= MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST; return file->f_op->sendpage(file, buf->page, buf->offset, sd->len, &pos, more); } diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h index da2d3e2543f3..b84bbd48b874 100644 --- a/include/linux/socket.h +++ b/include/linux/socket.h @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ struct ucred { #define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0x4000 /* Do not generate SIGPIPE */ #define MSG_MORE 0x8000 /* Sender will send more */ #define MSG_WAITFORONE 0x10000 /* recvmmsg(): block until 1+ packets avail */ - +#define MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST 0x20000 /* sendpage() internal : not the last page */ #define MSG_EOF MSG_FIN #define MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC 0x40000000 /* Set close_on_exit for file diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 2ff6f45a76f4..5d54ed30e821 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ wait_for_memory: } out: - if (copied && !(flags & MSG_MORE)) + if (copied && !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST)) tcp_push(sk, flags, mss_now, tp->nonagle); return copied; diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index 484cc6953fc6..851edcd6b098 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -811,9 +811,9 @@ static ssize_t sock_sendpage(struct file *file, struct page *page, sock = file->private_data; - flags = !(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) ? 0 : MSG_DONTWAIT; - if (more) - flags |= MSG_MORE; + flags = (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0; + /* more is a combination of MSG_MORE and MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST */ + flags |= more; return kernel_sendpage(sock, page, offset, size, flags); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b4f79e5cb2182f27d151da6e223186f287a615d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Hutchings Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2012 14:38:49 +0000 Subject: ethtool: Remove exception to the requirement of holding RTNL lock Commit e52ac3398c3d772d372b9b62ab408fd5eec96840 ('net: Use device model to get driver name in skb_gso_segment()') removed the only in-tree caller of ethtool ops that doesn't hold the RTNL lock. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/ethtool.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/ethtool.h b/include/linux/ethtool.h index e1d9e0ede309..f5647b59a90e 100644 --- a/include/linux/ethtool.h +++ b/include/linux/ethtool.h @@ -896,8 +896,7 @@ static inline u32 ethtool_rxfh_indir_default(u32 index, u32 n_rx_rings) * * All operations are optional (i.e. the function pointer may be set * to %NULL) and callers must take this into account. Callers must - * hold the RTNL, except that for @get_drvinfo the caller may or may - * not hold the RTNL. + * hold the RTNL lock. * * See the structures used by these operations for further documentation. * -- cgit v1.2.3