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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-07-23 12:27:27 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-07-23 12:27:27 -0700 |
commit | a66d2c8f7ec1284206ca7c14569e2a607583f1e3 (patch) | |
tree | 08cf68bcef3559b370843cab8191e5cc0f740bde /security/selinux | |
parent | a6be1fcbc57f95bb47ef3c8e4ee3d83731b8f21e (diff) | |
parent | 8cae6f7158ec1fa44c8a04a43db7d8020ec60437 (diff) | |
download | talos-op-linux-a66d2c8f7ec1284206ca7c14569e2a607583f1e3.tar.gz talos-op-linux-a66d2c8f7ec1284206ca7c14569e2a607583f1e3.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull the big VFS changes from Al Viro:
"This one is *big* and changes quite a few things around VFS. What's in there:
- the first of two really major architecture changes - death to open
intents.
The former is finally there; it was very long in making, but with
Miklos getting through really hard and messy final push in
fs/namei.c, we finally have it. Unlike his variant, this one
doesn't introduce struct opendata; what we have instead is
->atomic_open() taking preallocated struct file * and passing
everything via its fields.
Instead of returning struct file *, it returns -E... on error, 0
on success and 1 in "deal with it yourself" case (e.g. symlink
found on server, etc.).
See comments before fs/namei.c:atomic_open(). That made a lot of
goodies finally possible and quite a few are in that pile:
->lookup(), ->d_revalidate() and ->create() do not get struct
nameidata * anymore; ->lookup() and ->d_revalidate() get lookup
flags instead, ->create() gets "do we want it exclusive" flag.
With the introduction of new helper (kern_path_locked()) we are rid
of all struct nameidata instances outside of fs/namei.c; it's still
visible in namei.h, but not for long. Come the next cycle,
declaration will move either to fs/internal.h or to fs/namei.c
itself. [me, miklos, hch]
- The second major change: behaviour of final fput(). Now we have
__fput() done without any locks held by caller *and* not from deep
in call stack.
That obviously lifts a lot of constraints on the locking in there.
Moreover, it's legal now to call fput() from atomic contexts (which
has immediately simplified life for aio.c). We also don't need
anti-recursion logics in __scm_destroy() anymore.
There is a price, though - the damn thing has become partially
asynchronous. For fput() from normal process we are guaranteed
that pending __fput() will be done before the caller returns to
userland, exits or gets stopped for ptrace.
For kernel threads and atomic contexts it's done via
schedule_work(), so theoretically we might need a way to make sure
it's finished; so far only one such place had been found, but there
might be more.
There's flush_delayed_fput() (do all pending __fput()) and there's
__fput_sync() (fput() analog doing __fput() immediately). I hope
we won't need them often; see warnings in fs/file_table.c for
details. [me, based on task_work series from Oleg merged last
cycle]
- sync series from Jan
- large part of "death to sync_supers()" work from Artem; the only
bits missing here are exofs and ext4 ones. As far as I understand,
those are going via the exofs and ext4 trees resp.; once they are
in, we can put ->write_super() to the rest, along with the thread
calling it.
- preparatory bits from unionmount series (from dhowells).
- assorted cleanups and fixes all over the place, as usual.
This is not the last pile for this cycle; there's at least jlayton's
ESTALE work and fsfreeze series (the latter - in dire need of fixes,
so I'm not sure it'll make the cut this cycle). I'll probably throw
symlink/hardlink restrictions stuff from Kees into the next pile, too.
Plus there's a lot of misc patches I hadn't thrown into that one -
it's large enough as it is..."
* 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (127 commits)
ext4: switch EXT4_IOC_RESIZE_FS to mnt_want_write_file()
btrfs: switch btrfs_ioctl_balance() to mnt_want_write_file()
switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itself
spufs: shift dget/mntget towards dentry_open()
zoran: don't bother with struct file * in zoran_map
ecryptfs: don't reinvent the wheels, please - use struct completion
don't expose I_NEW inodes via dentry->d_inode
tidy up namei.c a bit
unobfuscate follow_up() a bit
ext3: pass custom EOF to generic_file_llseek_size()
ext4: use core vfs llseek code for dir seeks
vfs: allow custom EOF in generic_file_llseek code
vfs: Avoid unnecessary WB_SYNC_NONE writeback during sys_sync and reorder sync passes
vfs: Remove unnecessary flushing of block devices
vfs: Make sys_sync writeout also block device inodes
vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices
vfs: Reorder operations during sys_sync
quota: Move quota syncing to ->sync_fs method
quota: Split dquot_quota_sync() to writeback and cache flushing part
vfs: Move noop_backing_dev_info check from sync into writeback
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 6 |
3 files changed, 5 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index ffd8900a38e8..9292a8971e66 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2157,8 +2157,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, get_file(devnull); } else { devnull = dentry_open( - dget(selinux_null), - mntget(selinuxfs_mount), + &selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred); if (IS_ERR(devnull)) { devnull = NULL; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index dde2005407aa..6d3885165d14 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno); extern void selinux_complete_init(void); extern int selinux_disable(void); extern void exit_sel_fs(void); -extern struct dentry *selinux_null; +extern struct path selinux_null; extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val); extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 3ad290251288..298e695d6822 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ out: #define NULL_FILE_NAME "null" -struct dentry *selinux_null; +struct path selinux_null; static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) @@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); d_add(dentry, inode); - selinux_null = dentry; + selinux_null.dentry = dentry; dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &sel_last_ino); if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { @@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void) return err; } - selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type); + selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type); if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) { printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n"); err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount); |