diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-04-18 18:09:12 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-04-18 18:09:12 -0700 |
commit | 6835039d7ed618bbac0c8c18d62d3e030b162d37 (patch) | |
tree | 840f453cebdb1a908d3b40dfbcb9e42699636055 /kernel | |
parent | a86d52667d8eda5de39393ce737794403bdce1eb (diff) | |
parent | 41c21e351e79004dbb4efa4bc14a53a7e0af38c5 (diff) | |
download | talos-op-linux-6835039d7ed618bbac0c8c18d62d3e030b162d37.tar.gz talos-op-linux-6835039d7ed618bbac0c8c18d62d3e030b162d37.zip |
Merge branch 'userns-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux
Pull user-namespace fixes from Andy Lutomirski.
* 'userns-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux:
userns: Changing any namespace id mappings should require privileges
userns: Check uid_map's opener's fsuid, not the current fsuid
userns: Don't let unprivileged users trick privileged users into setting the id_map
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/user_namespace.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index a54f26f82eb2..e134d8f365dd 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; -static bool new_idmap_permitted(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, +static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, struct uid_gid_map *map); static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) @@ -612,10 +613,10 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (map->nr_extents != 0) goto out; - /* Require the appropriate privilege CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID - * over the user namespace in order to set the id mapping. + /* + * Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target. */ - if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !ns_capable(ns, cap_setid)) + if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) goto out; /* Get a buffer */ @@ -700,7 +701,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ret = -EPERM; /* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */ - if (!new_idmap_permitted(ns, cap_setid, &new_map)) + if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map)) goto out; /* Map the lower ids from the parent user namespace to the @@ -787,7 +788,8 @@ ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t &ns->projid_map, &ns->parent->projid_map); } -static bool new_idmap_permitted(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, +static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, struct uid_gid_map *new_map) { /* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */ @@ -795,12 +797,12 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first; if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) { kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id); - if (uid_eq(uid, current_fsuid())) + if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid)) return true; } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) { kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id); - if (gid_eq(gid, current_fsgid())) + if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid)) return true; } } @@ -811,8 +813,10 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, /* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability * (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace. + * And the opener of the id file also had the approprpiate capability. */ - if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid)) + if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid) && + file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, cap_setid)) return true; return false; |