From ef97837db916075af54554552628bcb0840df62f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Hellwig Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2018 14:44:42 +0200 Subject: x86: Remove pci-nommu.c The commit that switched x86 to dma_direct_ops stopped using and building this file, but accidentally left it in the tree. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: iommu@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416124442.13831-1-hch@lst.de --- arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c | 90 --------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 90 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c deleted file mode 100644 index ac7ea3a8242f..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* Fallback functions when the main IOMMU code is not compiled in. This - code is roughly equivalent to i386. */ -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include - -#define NOMMU_MAPPING_ERROR 0 - -static int -check_addr(char *name, struct device *hwdev, dma_addr_t bus, size_t size) -{ - if (hwdev && !dma_capable(hwdev, bus, size)) { - if (*hwdev->dma_mask >= DMA_BIT_MASK(32)) - printk(KERN_ERR - "nommu_%s: overflow %Lx+%zu of device mask %Lx\n", - name, (long long)bus, size, - (long long)*hwdev->dma_mask); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static dma_addr_t nommu_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page, - unsigned long offset, size_t size, - enum dma_data_direction dir, - unsigned long attrs) -{ - dma_addr_t bus = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page)) + offset; - WARN_ON(size == 0); - if (!check_addr("map_single", dev, bus, size)) - return NOMMU_MAPPING_ERROR; - return bus; -} - -/* Map a set of buffers described by scatterlist in streaming - * mode for DMA. This is the scatter-gather version of the - * above pci_map_single interface. Here the scatter gather list - * elements are each tagged with the appropriate dma address - * and length. They are obtained via sg_dma_{address,length}(SG). - * - * NOTE: An implementation may be able to use a smaller number of - * DMA address/length pairs than there are SG table elements. - * (for example via virtual mapping capabilities) - * The routine returns the number of addr/length pairs actually - * used, at most nents. - * - * Device ownership issues as mentioned above for pci_map_single are - * the same here. - */ -static int nommu_map_sg(struct device *hwdev, struct scatterlist *sg, - int nents, enum dma_data_direction dir, - unsigned long attrs) -{ - struct scatterlist *s; - int i; - - WARN_ON(nents == 0 || sg[0].length == 0); - - for_each_sg(sg, s, nents, i) { - BUG_ON(!sg_page(s)); - s->dma_address = sg_phys(s); - if (!check_addr("map_sg", hwdev, s->dma_address, s->length)) - return 0; - s->dma_length = s->length; - } - return nents; -} - -static int nommu_mapping_error(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t dma_addr) -{ - return dma_addr == NOMMU_MAPPING_ERROR; -} - -const struct dma_map_ops nommu_dma_ops = { - .alloc = dma_generic_alloc_coherent, - .free = dma_generic_free_coherent, - .map_sg = nommu_map_sg, - .map_page = nommu_map_page, - .is_phys = 1, - .mapping_error = nommu_mapping_error, - .dma_supported = x86_dma_supported, -}; -- cgit v1.2.1 From d3878e164dcd3925a237a20e879432400e369172 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaoming Gao Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 17:48:08 +0800 Subject: x86/tsc: Prevent 32bit truncation in calc_hpet_ref() The TSC calibration code uses HPET as reference. The conversion normalizes the delta of two HPET timestamps: hpetref = ((tshpet1 - tshpet2) * HPET_PERIOD) / 1e6 and then divides the normalized delta of the corresponding TSC timestamps by the result to calulate the TSC frequency. tscfreq = ((tstsc1 - tstsc2 ) * 1e6) / hpetref This uses do_div() which takes an u32 as the divisor, which worked so far because the HPET frequency was low enough that 'hpetref' never exceeded 32bit. On Skylake machines the HPET frequency increased so 'hpetref' can exceed 32bit. do_div() truncates the divisor, which causes the calibration to fail. Use div64_u64() to avoid the problem. [ tglx: Fixes whitespace mangled patch and rewrote changelog ] Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Gao Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/38894564-4fc9-b8ec-353f-de702839e44e@gmail.com --- arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c index ef32297ff17e..91e6da48cbb6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ static unsigned long calc_hpet_ref(u64 deltatsc, u64 hpet1, u64 hpet2) hpet2 -= hpet1; tmp = ((u64)hpet2 * hpet_readl(HPET_PERIOD)); do_div(tmp, 1000000); - do_div(deltatsc, tmp); + deltatsc = div64_u64(deltatsc, tmp); return (unsigned long) deltatsc; } -- cgit v1.2.1 From 10daf10ab154e31237a8c07242be3063fb6a9bf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dou Liyang Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 09:40:52 +0800 Subject: x86/acpi: Prevent X2APIC id 0xffffffff from being accounted MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit RongQing reported that there are some X2APIC id 0xffffffff in his machine's ACPI MADT table, which makes the number of possible CPU inaccurate. The reason is that the ACPI X2APIC parser has no sanity check for APIC ID 0xffffffff, which is an invalid id in all APIC types. See "IntelĀ® 64 Architecture x2APIC Specification", Chapter 2.4.1. Add a sanity check to acpi_parse_x2apic() which ignores the invalid id. Reported-by: Li RongQing Signed-off-by: Dou Liyang Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: len.brown@intel.com Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180412014052.25186-1-douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com --- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c index dde444f932c1..3b20607d581b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c @@ -215,6 +215,10 @@ acpi_parse_x2apic(struct acpi_subtable_header *header, const unsigned long end) apic_id = processor->local_apic_id; enabled = processor->lapic_flags & ACPI_MADT_ENABLED; + /* Ignore invalid ID */ + if (apic_id == 0xffffffff) + return 0; + /* * We need to register disabled CPU as well to permit * counting disabled CPUs. This allows us to size -- cgit v1.2.1 From 1340ccfa9a9afefdbab90d7935d4ed19817e37c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alison Schofield Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 17:21:30 -0700 Subject: x86,sched: Allow topologies where NUMA nodes share an LLC Intel's Skylake Server CPUs have a different LLC topology than previous generations. When in Sub-NUMA-Clustering (SNC) mode, the package is divided into two "slices", each containing half the cores, half the LLC, and one memory controller and each slice is enumerated to Linux as a NUMA node. This is similar to how the cores and LLC were arranged for the Cluster-On-Die (CoD) feature. CoD allowed the same cache line to be present in each half of the LLC. But, with SNC, each line is only ever present in *one* slice. This means that the portion of the LLC *available* to a CPU depends on the data being accessed: Remote socket: entire package LLC is shared Local socket->local slice: data goes into local slice LLC Local socket->remote slice: data goes into remote-slice LLC. Slightly higher latency than local slice LLC. The biggest implication from this is that a process accessing all NUMA-local memory only sees half the LLC capacity. The CPU describes its cache hierarchy with the CPUID instruction. One of the CPUID leaves enumerates the "logical processors sharing this cache". This information is used for scheduling decisions so that tasks move more freely between CPUs sharing the cache. But, the CPUID for the SNC configuration discussed above enumerates the LLC as being shared by the entire package. This is not 100% precise because the entire cache is not usable by all accesses. But, it *is* the way the hardware enumerates itself, and this is not likely to change. The userspace visible impact of all the above is that the sysfs info reports the entire LLC as being available to the entire package. As noted above, this is not true for local socket accesses. This patch does not correct the sysfs info. It is the same, pre and post patch. The current code emits the following warning: sched: CPU #3's llc-sibling CPU #0 is not on the same node! [node: 1 != 0]. Ignoring dependency. The warning is coming from the topology_sane() check in smpboot.c because the topology is not matching the expectations of the model for obvious reasons. To fix this, add a vendor and model specific check to never call topology_sane() for these systems. Also, just like "Cluster-on-Die" disable the "coregroup" sched_domain_topology_level and use NUMA information from the SRAT alone. This is OK at least on the hardware we are immediately concerned about because the LLC sharing happens at both the slice and at the package level, which are also NUMA boundaries. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Prarit Bhargava Cc: Tony Luck Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: brice.goglin@gmail.com Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Igor Mammedov Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Tim Chen Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180407002130.GA18984@alison-desk.jf.intel.com --- arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c index ff99e2b6fc54..45175b81dd5b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include /* Number of siblings per CPU package */ int smp_num_siblings = 1; @@ -390,15 +392,47 @@ static bool match_smt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, struct cpuinfo_x86 *o) return false; } +/* + * Define snc_cpu[] for SNC (Sub-NUMA Cluster) CPUs. + * + * These are Intel CPUs that enumerate an LLC that is shared by + * multiple NUMA nodes. The LLC on these systems is shared for + * off-package data access but private to the NUMA node (half + * of the package) for on-package access. + * + * CPUID (the source of the information about the LLC) can only + * enumerate the cache as being shared *or* unshared, but not + * this particular configuration. The CPU in this case enumerates + * the cache to be shared across the entire package (spanning both + * NUMA nodes). + */ + +static const struct x86_cpu_id snc_cpu[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X }, + {} +}; + static bool match_llc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, struct cpuinfo_x86 *o) { int cpu1 = c->cpu_index, cpu2 = o->cpu_index; - if (per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu1) != BAD_APICID && - per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu1) == per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu2)) - return topology_sane(c, o, "llc"); + /* Do not match if we do not have a valid APICID for cpu: */ + if (per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu1) == BAD_APICID) + return false; - return false; + /* Do not match if LLC id does not match: */ + if (per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu1) != per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu2)) + return false; + + /* + * Allow the SNC topology without warning. Return of false + * means 'c' does not share the LLC of 'o'. This will be + * reflected to userspace. + */ + if (!topology_same_node(c, o) && x86_match_cpu(snc_cpu)) + return false; + + return topology_sane(c, o, "llc"); } /* @@ -456,7 +490,8 @@ static struct sched_domain_topology_level x86_topology[] = { /* * Set if a package/die has multiple NUMA nodes inside. - * AMD Magny-Cours and Intel Cluster-on-Die have this. + * AMD Magny-Cours, Intel Cluster-on-Die, and Intel + * Sub-NUMA Clustering have this. */ static bool x86_has_numa_in_package; -- cgit v1.2.1 From a841aa83dff0af75c88aa846ba610a8af4c5ee21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Young Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 14:56:10 -0700 Subject: kexec_file: do not add extra alignment to efi memmap Chun-Yi reported a kernel warning message below: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at ../mm/early_ioremap.c:182 early_iounmap+0x4f/0x12c() early_iounmap(ffffffffff200180, 00000118) [0] size not consistent 00000120 The problem is x86 kexec_file_load adds extra alignment to the efi memmap: in bzImage64_load(): efi_map_sz = efi_get_runtime_map_size(); efi_map_sz = ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16); And __efi_memmap_init maps with the size including the alignment bytes but efi_memmap_unmap use nr_maps * desc_size which does not include the extra bytes. The alignment in kexec code is only needed for the kexec buffer internal use Actually kexec should pass exact size of the efi memmap to 2nd kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417083600.GA1972@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dave Young Reported-by: joeyli Tested-by: Randy Wright Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 3182908b7e6c..7326078eaa7a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -398,11 +398,10 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel, * little bit simple */ efi_map_sz = efi_get_runtime_map_size(); - efi_map_sz = ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16); params_cmdline_sz = sizeof(struct boot_params) + cmdline_len + MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN; params_cmdline_sz = ALIGN(params_cmdline_sz, 16); - kbuf.bufsz = params_cmdline_sz + efi_map_sz + + kbuf.bufsz = params_cmdline_sz + ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16) + sizeof(struct setup_data) + sizeof(struct efi_setup_data); @@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel, if (!params) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); efi_map_offset = params_cmdline_sz; - efi_setup_data_offset = efi_map_offset + efi_map_sz; + efi_setup_data_offset = efi_map_offset + ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16); /* Copy setup header onto bootparams. Documentation/x86/boot.txt */ setup_header_size = 0x0202 + kernel[0x0201] - setup_hdr_offset; -- cgit v1.2.1 From 7010adcdd23527f7efef1e7bc0d8c458f6ec0dd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 00:02:09 +0200 Subject: x86/jailhouse: Fix incorrect SPDX identifier GPL2.0 is not a valid SPDX identiier. Replace it with GPL-2.0. Fixes: 4a362601baa6 ("x86/jailhouse: Add infrastructure for running in non-root cell") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Jan Kiszka Cc: Kate Stewart Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Philippe Ombredanne Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180422220832.815346488@linutronix.de --- arch/x86/kernel/jailhouse.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/jailhouse.c b/arch/x86/kernel/jailhouse.c index fa183a131edc..a15fe0e92cf9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/jailhouse.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/jailhouse.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL2.0 +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Jailhouse paravirt_ops implementation * -- cgit v1.2.1 From 84749d83758af6576552046b215b9b7f37f9556b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov Date: Sat, 21 Apr 2018 10:19:29 +0200 Subject: x86/microcode/intel: Save microcode patch unconditionally save_mc_for_early() was a no-op on !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU but the generic_load_microcode() path saves the microcode patches it has found into the cache of patches which is used for late loading too. Regardless of whether CPU hotplug is used or not. Make the saving unconditional so that late loading can find the proper patch. Reported-by: Vitezslav Samel Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Vitezslav Samel Tested-by: Ashok Raj Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180418081140.GA2439@pc11.op.pod.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180421081930.15741-1-bp@alien8.de --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c index 32b8e5724f96..1c2cfa0644aa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c @@ -485,7 +485,6 @@ static void show_saved_mc(void) */ static void save_mc_for_early(u8 *mc, unsigned int size) { -#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU /* Synchronization during CPU hotplug. */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(x86_cpu_microcode_mutex); @@ -495,7 +494,6 @@ static void save_mc_for_early(u8 *mc, unsigned int size) show_saved_mc(); mutex_unlock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex); -#endif } static bool load_builtin_intel_microcode(struct cpio_data *cp) -- cgit v1.2.1 From 09e182d17e8891dd73baba961a0f5a82e9274c97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov Date: Sat, 21 Apr 2018 10:19:30 +0200 Subject: x86/microcode: Do not exit early from __reload_late() Vitezslav reported a case where the "Timeout during microcode update!" panic would hit. After a deeper look, it turned out that his .config had CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU disabled which practically made save_mc_for_early() a no-op. When that happened, the discovered microcode patch wasn't saved into the cache and the late loading path wouldn't find any. This, then, lead to early exit from __reload_late() and thus CPUs waiting until the timeout is reached, leading to the panic. In hindsight, that function should have been written so it does not return before the post-synchronization. Oh well, I know better now... Fixes: bb8c13d61a62 ("x86/microcode: Fix CPU synchronization routine") Reported-by: Vitezslav Samel Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Vitezslav Samel Tested-by: Ashok Raj Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180418081140.GA2439@pc11.op.pod.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180421081930.15741-2-bp@alien8.de --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c index 10c4fc2c91f8..77e201301528 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c @@ -564,14 +564,12 @@ static int __reload_late(void *info) apply_microcode_local(&err); spin_unlock(&update_lock); + /* siblings return UCODE_OK because their engine got updated already */ if (err > UCODE_NFOUND) { pr_warn("Error reloading microcode on CPU %d\n", cpu); - return -1; - /* siblings return UCODE_OK because their engine got updated already */ + ret = -1; } else if (err == UCODE_UPDATED || err == UCODE_OK) { ret = 1; - } else { - return ret; } /* -- cgit v1.2.1 From da6fa7ef67f07108a1b0cb9fd9e7fcaabd39c051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yazen Ghannam Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 09:02:28 -0500 Subject: x86/smpboot: Don't use mwait_play_dead() on AMD systems Recent AMD systems support using MWAIT for C1 state. However, MWAIT will not allow deeper cstates than C1 on current systems. play_dead() expects to use the deepest state available. The deepest state available on AMD systems is reached through SystemIO or HALT. If MWAIT is available, it is preferred over the other methods, so the CPU never reaches the deepest possible state. Don't try to use MWAIT to play_dead() on AMD systems. Instead, use CPUIDLE to enter the deepest state advertised by firmware. If CPUIDLE is not available then fallback to HALT. Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yazen Ghannam Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180403140228.58540-1-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com --- arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c index 45175b81dd5b..0f1cbb042f49 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c @@ -1571,6 +1571,8 @@ static inline void mwait_play_dead(void) void *mwait_ptr; int i; + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) + return; if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MWAIT)) return; if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH)) -- cgit v1.2.1 From b837913fc2d9061bf9b8c0dd6bf2d24e2f98b84a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "jacek.tomaka@poczta.fm" Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 00:14:25 +0800 Subject: x86/cpu/intel: Add missing TLB cpuid values Make kernel print the correct number of TLB entries on Intel Xeon Phi 7210 (and others) Before: [ 0.320005] Last level dTLB entries: 4KB 0, 2MB 0, 4MB 0, 1GB 0 After: [ 0.320005] Last level dTLB entries: 4KB 256, 2MB 128, 4MB 128, 1GB 16 The entries do exist in the official Intel SMD but the type column there is incorrect (states "Cache" where it should read "TLB"), but the entries for the values 0x6B, 0x6C and 0x6D are correctly described as 'Data TLB'. Signed-off-by: Jacek Tomaka Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180423161425.24366-1-jacekt@dugeo.com --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index b9693b80fc21..60d1897041da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -835,6 +835,9 @@ static const struct _tlb_table intel_tlb_table[] = { { 0x5d, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages" }, { 0x61, TLB_INST_4K, 48, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, full associative" }, { 0x63, TLB_DATA_1G, 4, " TLB_DATA 1 GByte pages, 4-way set associative" }, + { 0x6b, TLB_DATA_4K, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 8-way associative" }, + { 0x6c, TLB_DATA_2M_4M, 128, " TLB_DATA 2 MByte or 4 MByte pages, 8-way associative" }, + { 0x6d, TLB_DATA_1G, 16, " TLB_DATA 1 GByte pages, fully associative" }, { 0x76, TLB_INST_2M_4M, 8, " TLB_INST 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages, fully associative" }, { 0xb0, TLB_INST_4K, 128, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" }, { 0xb1, TLB_INST_2M_4M, 4, " TLB_INST 2M pages, 4-way, 8 entries or 4M pages, 4-way entries" }, -- cgit v1.2.1 From 3db3eb285259ac129f7aec6b814b3e9f6c1b372b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petr Tesarik Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 12:08:35 +0200 Subject: x86/setup: Do not reserve a crash kernel region if booted on Xen PV Xen PV domains cannot shut down and start a crash kernel. Instead, the crashing kernel makes a SCHEDOP_shutdown hypercall with the reason code SHUTDOWN_crash, cf. xen_crash_shutdown() machine op in arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c. A crash kernel reservation is merely a waste of RAM in this case. It may also confuse users of kexec_load(2) and/or kexec_file_load(2). When flags include KEXEC_ON_CRASH or KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH, respectively, these syscalls return success, which is technically correct, but the crash kexec image will never be actually used. Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Dou Liyang Cc: Mikulas Patocka Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Jean Delvare Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180425120835.23cef60c@ezekiel.suse.cz --- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 6285697b6e56..5c623dfe39d1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -534,6 +535,11 @@ static void __init reserve_crashkernel(void) high = true; } + if (xen_pv_domain()) { + pr_info("Ignoring crashkernel for a Xen PV domain\n"); + return; + } + /* 0 means: find the address automatically */ if (crash_base <= 0) { /* -- cgit v1.2.1 From e9088adda13cd23249d4b0abb97ff8a81bf5573a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2018 12:00:09 +0200 Subject: x86/tsc: Always unregister clocksource_tsc_early Don't leave the tsc-early clocksource registered if it errors out early. This was reported by Diego, who on his Core2 era machine got TSC invalidated while it was running with tsc-early (due to C-states). This results in keeping tsc-early with very bad effects. Reported-and-Tested-by: Diego Viola Fixes: aa83c45762a2 ("x86/tsc: Introduce early tsc clocksource") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Cc: len.brown@intel.com Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: diego.viola@gmail.com Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430100344.350507853@infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c index 91e6da48cbb6..23f36bc236ba 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c @@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@ static void tsc_refine_calibration_work(struct work_struct *work) /* Don't bother refining TSC on unstable systems */ if (tsc_unstable) - return; + goto unreg; /* * Since the work is started early in boot, we may be @@ -1297,11 +1297,12 @@ static void tsc_refine_calibration_work(struct work_struct *work) out: if (tsc_unstable) - return; + goto unreg; if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ART)) art_related_clocksource = &clocksource_tsc; clocksource_register_khz(&clocksource_tsc, tsc_khz); +unreg: clocksource_unregister(&clocksource_tsc_early); } @@ -1311,8 +1312,8 @@ static int __init init_tsc_clocksource(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC) || tsc_disabled > 0 || !tsc_khz) return 0; - if (check_tsc_unstable()) - return 0; + if (tsc_unstable) + goto unreg; if (tsc_clocksource_reliable) clocksource_tsc.flags &= ~CLOCK_SOURCE_MUST_VERIFY; @@ -1328,6 +1329,7 @@ static int __init init_tsc_clocksource(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ART)) art_related_clocksource = &clocksource_tsc; clocksource_register_khz(&clocksource_tsc, tsc_khz); +unreg: clocksource_unregister(&clocksource_tsc_early); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.1 From e3b4f79025e0a4eb7e2a2c7d24dadfa1e38893b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2018 12:00:12 +0200 Subject: x86/tsc: Fix mark_tsc_unstable() mark_tsc_unstable() also needs to affect tsc_early, Now that clocksource_mark_unstable() can be used on a clocksource irrespective of its registration state, use it on both tsc_early and tsc. This does however require cs->list to be initialized empty, otherwise it cannot tell the registation state before registation. Fixes: aa83c45762a2 ("x86/tsc: Introduce early tsc clocksource") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Diego Viola Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Cc: len.brown@intel.com Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430100344.533326547@infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c index 23f36bc236ba..74392d9d51e0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c @@ -1067,6 +1067,7 @@ static struct clocksource clocksource_tsc_early = { .resume = tsc_resume, .mark_unstable = tsc_cs_mark_unstable, .tick_stable = tsc_cs_tick_stable, + .list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(clocksource_tsc_early.list), }; /* @@ -1086,6 +1087,7 @@ static struct clocksource clocksource_tsc = { .resume = tsc_resume, .mark_unstable = tsc_cs_mark_unstable, .tick_stable = tsc_cs_tick_stable, + .list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(clocksource_tsc.list), }; void mark_tsc_unstable(char *reason) @@ -1098,13 +1100,9 @@ void mark_tsc_unstable(char *reason) clear_sched_clock_stable(); disable_sched_clock_irqtime(); pr_info("Marking TSC unstable due to %s\n", reason); - /* Change only the rating, when not registered */ - if (clocksource_tsc.mult) { - clocksource_mark_unstable(&clocksource_tsc); - } else { - clocksource_tsc.flags |= CLOCK_SOURCE_UNSTABLE; - clocksource_tsc.rating = 0; - } + + clocksource_mark_unstable(&clocksource_tsc_early); + clocksource_mark_unstable(&clocksource_tsc); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mark_tsc_unstable); -- cgit v1.2.1