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* CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFilesDavid Howells2009-04-031-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | Export a number of functions for CacheFiles's use. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
* lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hookPaul Moore2009-03-281-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | The socket_post_accept() hook is not currently used by any in-tree modules and its existence continues to cause problems by confusing people about what can be safely accomplished using this hook. If a legitimate need for this hook arises in the future it can always be reintroduced. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris2009-01-071-4/+22
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| * CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #3]David Howells2009-01-071-4/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to: commit 3b11a1decef07c19443d24ae926982bc8ec9f4c0 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100 CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when accessing current's creds. There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current task. Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test, without affecting the creds as seen from other processes. One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores. The affected capability check is in generic_permission(): if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode)) if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; This change passes the set of credentials to be tested down into the commoncap and SELinux code. The security functions called by capable() and has_capability() select the appropriate set of credentials from the process being checked. This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite: /* * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug. * * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued. * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html */ #include <limits.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #define UID 500 #define GID 100 #define PERM 0 #define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access" static void errExit(char *msg) { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* errExit */ static void accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr) { printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask)); } /* accessTest */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd, perm, uid, gid; char *testpath; char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20]; testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH; perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM; uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID; gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID; unlink(testpath); fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); if (fd == -1) errExit("open"); if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown"); if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod"); close(fd); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath); system(cmd); if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid"); accessTest(testpath, 0, "0"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK"); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } /* main */ This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS filesystem. If successful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 If unsuccessful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Revert "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() ↵James Morris2009-01-071-21/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ver #2]" This reverts commit 14eaddc967b16017d4a1a24d2be6c28ecbe06ed8. David has a better version to come.
| * CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]David Howells2009-01-051-4/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to: commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000 CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when accessing current's creds. There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current task. Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test, without affecting the creds as seen from other processes. One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores. The affected capability check is in generic_permission(): if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode)) if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and SELinux code. The capable() security op now only deals with the current process, and uses the current process's subjective creds. A new security op - task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds. strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers. This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite: /* * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug. * * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued. * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html */ #include <limits.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #define UID 500 #define GID 100 #define PERM 0 #define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access" static void errExit(char *msg) { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* errExit */ static void accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr) { printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask)); } /* accessTest */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd, perm, uid, gid; char *testpath; char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20]; testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH; perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM; uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID; gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID; unlink(testpath); fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); if (fd == -1) errExit("open"); if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown"); if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod"); close(fd); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath); system(cmd); if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid"); accessTest(testpath, 0, "0"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK"); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } /* main */ This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS filesystem. If successful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 If unsuccessful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.Kentaro Takeda2008-12-311-0/+66
|/ | | | | | | | | | Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()James Morris2008-12-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount(), so security modules can determine if a mount operation is being performed by the kernel. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* CRED: fix sparse warningsHannes Eder2008-11-251-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Impact: fix sparse warnings Fix the following sparse warnings: security/security.c:228:2: warning: returning void-valued expression security/security.c:233:2: warning: returning void-valued expression security/security.c:616:2: warning: returning void-valued expression Signed-off-by: Hannes Eder <hannes@hanneseder.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actionsDavid Howells2008-11-141-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of a task. This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of credentials. This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record: (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files). (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task creates. The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the LSM functions: (1) prepare_kernel_cred() Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared. (2) set_security_override() Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security context, assuming permission from the LSM policy. (3) set_security_override_from_ctx() As (2), but takes the security context as a string. (4) set_create_files_as() Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the same as that on a particular inode. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-141-18/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Inaugurate COW credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-141-31/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()David Howells2008-11-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself when it opens its null chardev. The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the dentry_open hook in struct security_operations. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Detach the credentials from task_structDavid Howells2008-11-141-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Detach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process() and releasing them in __put_task_struct(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooksDavid Howells2008-11-141-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Neuter sys_capset()David Howells2008-11-141-10/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current. This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading them against interference by other processes. This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since: (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed. (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit toEric Paris2008-11-111-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex indirection. This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* nfsd: fix vm overcommit crashAlan Cox2008-10-301-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Junjiro R. Okajima reported a problem where knfsd crashes if you are using it to export shmemfs objects and run strict overcommit. In this situation the current->mm based modifier to the overcommit goes through a NULL pointer. We could simply check for NULL and skip the modifier but we've caught other real bugs in the past from mm being NULL here - cases where we did need a valid mm set up (eg the exec bug about a year ago). To preserve the checks and get the logic we want shuffle the checking around and add a new helper to the vm_ security wrappers Also fix a current->mm reference in nommu that should use the passed mm [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Reported-by: Junjiro R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2008-08-281-3/+7
|\
| * security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()David Howells2008-08-141-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to change its own flags in a different way at the same time. __capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried. This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two: (1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process. current is the parent. (2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only, and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child. In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail. This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV. Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have been changed to calls to capable(). Of the places that were using __capable(): (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a process. All of these now use has_capability(). (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above, these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used. (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable(). (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been switched and capable() is used instead. (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating. (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process, whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged. I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: add/fix security kernel-docRandy Dunlap2008-08-201-4/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | Add security/inode.c functions to the kernel-api docbook. Use '%' on constants in kernel-doc notation. Fix several typos/spellos in security function descriptions. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_changeMiklos Szeredi2008-07-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl() calls notify_change() to change the file mode before changing the inode attributes. Replace with explicit calls to security_inode_setattr(), fat_setattr() and fsnotify_change(). This is equivalent to the original. The reason it is needed, is that later in the series we move the immutable check into notify_change(). That would break the FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, as it needs to perform the mode change regardless of the immutability of the file. [Fix error if fat is built as a module. Thanks to OGAWA Hirofumi for noticing.] Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] pass MAY_OPEN to vfs_permission() explicitlyAl Viro2008-07-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | ... and get rid of the last "let's deduce mask from nameidata->flags" bit. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* security: remove register_security hookJames Morris2008-07-141-29/+0
| | | | | | | | | | The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as a secondary module should do so explicitly. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
* security: remove dummy moduleMiklos Szeredi2008-07-141-10/+5
| | | | | | | | | | Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default. Compile and boot tested. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove unused sb_get_mnt_opts hookMiklos Szeredi2008-07-141-6/+0
| | | | | | | | The sb_get_mnt_opts() hook is unused, and is superseded by the sb_show_options() hook. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM/SELinux: show LSM mount options in /proc/mountsEric Paris2008-07-141-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own security_sb_show_options() function. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: fix return of void-valued expressionsJames Morris2008-07-141-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | Fix several warnings generated by sparse of the form "returning void-valued expression". Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
* Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attachStephen Smalley2008-07-141-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security modules to permit access to reading process state without granting full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged. Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the read mode instead of attach. In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps, lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired) or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks). This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler (change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking). Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0 or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdataDavid Howells2008-04-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* keys: add keyctl function to get a security labelDavid Howells2008-04-291-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key. The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt: (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context attached to a key in the buffer provided. Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy will take place. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is in force then an empty string will be returned. A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be successful. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* xattr: add missing consts to function argumentsDavid Howells2008-04-291-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | Add missing consts to xattr function arguments. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* capabilities: implement per-process securebitsAndrew G. Morgan2008-04-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0 based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually) possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain privilege via (set)uid-0. Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs. Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser from the process' tree of children. The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel. With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently fork()'d/exec()'d children with: prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f); This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is enabled at configure time. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning] [serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to pathAl Viro2008-04-211-10/+10
| | | | | | Namely, ones from namespace.c Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-04-181-1/+72
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable Security: Introduce security= boot parameter Audit: Final renamings and cleanup SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks SELinux: remove redundant exports Netlink: Use generic LSM hook Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
| * security: fix up documentation for security_module_enableJames Morris2008-04-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | security_module_enable() can only be called during kernel init. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Security: Introduce security= boot parameterAhmed S. Darwish2008-04-191-1/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module. User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen. LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux and SMACK to do so. Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done. Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooksAhmed S. Darwish2008-04-191-0/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
| * LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooksAhmed S. Darwish2008-04-191-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid) LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported SELinux interfaces. Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid secid exists. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26Linus Torvalds2008-04-181-10/+11
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26: (1090 commits) [NET]: Fix and allocate less memory for ->priv'less netdevices [IPV6]: Fix dangling references on error in fib6_add(). [NETLABEL]: Fix NULL deref in netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen() if ifindex not found [PKT_SCHED]: Fix datalen check in tcf_simp_init(). [INET]: Uninline the __inet_inherit_port call. [INET]: Drop the inet_inherit_port() call. SCTP: Initialize partial_bytes_acked to 0, when all of the data is acked. [netdrvr] forcedeth: internal simplifications; changelog removal phylib: factor out get_phy_id from within get_phy_device PHY: add BCM5464 support to broadcom PHY driver cxgb3: Fix __must_check warning with dev_dbg. tc35815: Statistics cleanup natsemi: fix MMIO for PPC 44x platforms [TIPC]: Cleanup of TIPC reference table code [TIPC]: Optimized initialization of TIPC reference table [TIPC]: Remove inlining of reference table locking routines e1000: convert uint16_t style integers to u16 ixgb: convert uint16_t style integers to u16 sb1000.c: make const arrays static sb1000.c: stop inlining largish static functions ...
| * LSM: Make the Labeled IPsec hooks more stack friendlyPaul Moore2008-04-121-10/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs on the stack to work around the LSM API. This patch attempts to fix that problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security" pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | security: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrencesHarvey Harrison2008-04-181-4/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | __FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__ Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount optionsEric Paris2008-03-061-8/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount options. This includes a new string parsing function exported from the LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security data blob. This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be handled by the loaded LSM. Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK when dealing with binary mount data. If the binary mount data is less than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an illegal page fault and boom. Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code since they were broken by past NFS changes. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protectionEric Paris2008-02-061-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Since it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn't be turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to set a default at compile time. This value is still tunable after boot in /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr Discussion: http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.html Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting bufferDavid P. Quigley2008-02-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized buffer. Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be used elsewhere for Labeled NFS. The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* security: add a secctx_to_secid() hookDavid Howells2008-01-251-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux implementation for this hook. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove security_sb_post_mountroot hookH. Peter Anvin2008-01-251-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security_sb_post_mountroot() hook is long-since obsolete, and is fundamentally broken: it is never invoked if someone uses initramfs. This is particularly damaging, because the existence of this hook has been used as motivation for not using initramfs. Stephen Smalley confirmed on 2007-07-19 that this hook was originally used by SELinux but can now be safely removed: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118485683612916&w=2 Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security informationEric Paris2008-01-251-0/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security/ cleanupsAdrian Bunk2007-10-171-57/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible: - remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix - remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security - remove some no longer required exit code - remove a bunch of no longer used exports Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Implement file posix capabilitiesSerge E. Hallyn2007-10-171-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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