diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 11 |
4 files changed, 22 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index df28f2b6f3e1..118f4549404e 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY config HARDENED_USERCOPY bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY + depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR select BUG help This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when @@ -146,6 +147,17 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. +config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN + bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages" + depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY + depends on EXPERT + help + When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP, + hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are, + however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all + been removed. This config is intended to be used only while + trying to find such users. + source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 4b9b4a4e1b89..ef1e4e701780 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; char *cause = "unknown"; - struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0; @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ out: */ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) { - struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); int rc = 0; /* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 596ef616ac21..423d111b3b94 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) || strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) /* read 'security.ima' */ - xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file->f_path.dentry, &xattr_value); + xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 5adbfc32242f..17a06105ccb6 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <crypto/aes.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/sha.h> #include <crypto/skcipher.h> @@ -478,6 +479,7 @@ static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; struct skcipher_request *req; unsigned int encrypted_datalen; + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned int padlen; char pad[16]; int ret; @@ -500,8 +502,8 @@ static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, sg_init_table(sg_out, 1); sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, encrypted_datalen, - epayload->iv); + memcpy(iv, epayload->iv, sizeof(iv)); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, encrypted_datalen, iv); ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); skcipher_request_free(req); @@ -581,6 +583,7 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; struct skcipher_request *req; unsigned int encrypted_datalen; + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; char pad[16]; int ret; @@ -599,8 +602,8 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, epayload->decrypted_datalen); sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, sizeof pad); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, encrypted_datalen, - epayload->iv); + memcpy(iv, epayload->iv, sizeof(iv)); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, encrypted_datalen, iv); ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); skcipher_request_free(req); |